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The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War have forced Japan to question its defence policy. In the past this policy has been firmly based on a purely defensive posture which relied totally on Japan's alliance with the United States. Because the Cold War dragged on in East Asia for much longer than in Europe, Japan could carry on the same defence policy as before. Japanese defence planners found it convenient to emphasize the « Soviet threat » as a way to maintain annual increases in the military budget, and refusing to normalize their relations with the Soviets, until the question of the Northern Territories had been settled. They can no longer ignore the various signs of détente in East Asia. Yet they have had limited effects on Japan's defence policy. The Americans have called on Japan to play a role more commensurate with its economic power but want to avoid any hint of an autonomous Japanese defence policy. They pressured Japan into playing a more active part in the Gulf crisis and the ensuing war, but the government failed to muster sufficient support, at home and amongst the other countries of East Asia, for any role for its military outside Japan, even in a non combat capacity.So Japan has sought other regional and global security policies to compensate for this handicap and has met with mixed success. The recent failure to pass legislation allowing its Self-defence Forces to participate in UN peacekeeping operations has seriously jeopardized Japan 's search for a more active role in regional affairs. But will the Japanese continue for much longer to play a second role in the United States' System of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region which that country can afford less and less ? This is the real dilemma of Japanese defence policy : it can neither remain as it is nor can it easily change direction.

Japan's distant seafishing industry provides opportunities for supergains, y et it still remains dependent on the internal market. Its activities which are directed by the State, and implemented by the large industrial and commercial enterprises, are part of the whole evolution of the traditional corporations of the Kumiai. A study of the political, technical, and economical conjuncture and balance of power at the international level show three important periods. 1904-1941 : The imperialistic policy of the military-industrial complex supports the operations of the large enterprises. Between 1933 and 1940, Japan has several hundreds of fishing plants along the coasts of the Russian Far East; factory vessels are used for the canning of salmon and crabs in the Sea of Okhostk and the Behring Sea, and for whaling in the Antarctic and North Pacific ; industrial trawling is carried on along the coasts of the Asian continent while numerous enterprises are set up in Indo-Malaysia for coastal tuna fishing. 1948-1973 : Within the framework of the reconstruction of its economy, Japan at first resumes the same campaigns as those of the pre-War period; to these are added drifting long line fishing of tuna in the intertropical grounds and a powerful industrial trawling in North Pacific. By 1960, these activities are curtailed due to regulations imposed by USSR, USA, and the International Whaling Commission for stock protection. And then there are new competitors (Taiwan, South Korea). A general fail off after 1965 is partly compensated by the industrial trawling in the Behring Sea. 1974-1986: Significant geopolitical and economic changes force Japan to define and to redeploy its foreign fisheries. Pressured by waterside States, Japan gradually withdraws from traditional fishing grounds and endeavours to find new resources in waters which have remained international so as to maintain a balance with its internal market (tuna drifting long lines and seiners, squid fishery). New technology and profits from the internal market allow the industrial armaments to keep their competitive edge. The State strongly supports this sector through its diplomacy and the provision of funds for research and redeployment and by planning the integration of the distant fishing industry within the economical and social development of the traditional fishing cells of the Archipelago.

SummaryTraditionally lulled by the illusion that the artist is free from the influence of the society in which he/she lives, the art world has been influenced by a second ideology during the last fifteen years : the illusion of cultural equality in the art scene, and the abolition of borders associated with both globalization and métissage. However, if one takes into consideration different, objective indicators from the economic sphere (contemporary art auctions and fairs) and institutional sphere (museums, contemporary art centers and biennial events), a strong hierarchy becomes apparent that seldom varies regardless of the indicator considered. The United States is on top. Germany occupies a comfortable second place. Then four Occidental countries emerge : Great Britain, Italy, France and Switzerland. The rest of the world, particularly the whole non-occidental portion, is still largely excluded from the world of international contemporary art.

The interpretation of the WTO Agreements fulfills three objectives. As any interpretative process, the first goal of the interpretation is to define and/or determine the meaning and the scope of the various provisions of the WTO Agreements. Interpretation of these agreements is mainly given by the panels and the Appellate Body, in the framework of the dispute settlement mechanism. WTO Case law reveals that they almost systematically and skillfully refer to the customary rules of interpretation. Beside this first objective, the interpretation of the WTO Agreement aims at fulfilling a second objective. Considering the complexity of the entangled obligations arising out of the WTO Agreements, the interpret has inevitably to clarify their articulation. The interpretation of the WTO Agreements aims therefore at ensuring the coherence of the whole multilateral trading system. Finally, the use of the general customary rules of interpretation tends to enshrine WTO Law in general international law. However, this third objective of the interpretative process reveals the existing tensions between two antagonist aspirations: the preservation of the equilibrium of the negotiated rights and advantages on the one hand, and the absence of clinical isolation of WTO Law vis-à-vis international law on the other.

The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control appears to be a new legal tool against the spread of the tobacco epidemic. According to the provisions of this tobacco convention, states are required to adopt national measures in order to reduce the consumption and the offer of tobacco products. Even if this convention is the first global health treaty concluded under the auspices of the WHO, it has unfortunately not answered some important questions, like its interactions with WTO law. The main question addressed is thus to know whether WTO law could undermine the effectiveness of the tobacco convention. This contribution therefore assesses the compatibility between the WHO framework convention and WTO provisions on goods, services and intellectual property rights.

The authors ask themselves what might be the effects over the Water Resources Law of the practical developments of two relatively recent concepts: the environmental necessity test and the precautionary principle. Originated in two different fields of the International Law (International Trade Law and Environmental Law), the two are able to influence the Water Resources Law through different modalities, that the authors examine. The conclusion is that the complementarity of the two instruments can be helpful in order to increase the utility of their (independent or conjunct) contribution to solving some of the problems that Water Resources Law confronts with.