Search Results

Since the U.S. Catholic bishops gave their "strictly conditioned" moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence in 1983, much has changed on the strategic landscape, most notably with the emergence of numerous space-based and defensive schemes, and it is not clear how a committee struck by the hierarchy to review recent developments will respond. There are reasons to suggest the outcome will not be a complete condemnation of deterrence, whatever judgment is mode of current U.S. policies. It is equally likely that the review will fail, as did the 1983 letter, to provide sufficient justification for what it conditionally accepts. The 1983 letter cannot be construed as "soft" on the Soviet Union. But Us scant account of an expansionist adversary appears only after its moral judgments and prudential alternatives are stated. The letter, argued in a just war framework, cannot find the language to refer to a particular adversary by name or indicate why deterrence is justified on an interim basis. This f allure is ascribed to two factors. First, Catholic teaching increasingly has restricted the scope of jus ad bellum and shifted its emphasis to jus in bello criteria of discrimination and proportionality in judging modem war. Second, within a generation, the U.S. hierarchy has redefined its relationship to its society and become less willing to alter Church teaching to accomodate national purposes, even while affirming in general terms the traditional right and duty of self-defence. Y et insofar as this right remains operative, the bishops' inability to describe what is to be defended, and from what, leaves the reader unclear as to why the U.S. and its allies should possess nuclear weapons even, or only, conditionally.

The territorial sovereignty over Alaska, the Arctic islands of the Soviet Union, Svalbard, Greenland and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago poses no problem, but the continental shelf off those territories and islands has yet to be delimited between the five Arctic States: Alaska, the Soviet Union, Norway, Denmark and Canada. Beyond the continental shelf, the mineral resources of the deep sea-bed should normally form part of the common heritage of mankind, but their presence has not yet been determined. The Arctic Ocean, in spite of the permanent presence of ice, is subject to the freedoms of the seas. The straits of the Northeast Passage are internal waters of the Soviet Union, at least since the establishment of straight baselines in 1985 (presumably, under the Territorial Sea Convention to which the USSR is a Party) and, possibly before, by way of historic title. Under the Convention, a right of innocent passage would exist but not if they are historic waters. The waters of the Northwest Passage are internal waters of Canada since their enclosure by straight baselines in 1985, under customary international law, and no right of passage exists. The sovereignty of Arctic States extends to the air space above their territory, internal waters and territorial sea. There is no right of over flight above those areas, outside of the I.C.A.O. Conventions. The Arctic Ocean being a semi-enclosed sea, bordering States should cooperate under the new Law of the Sea Convention in the exploitation of the living resources, the protection of the marine environment and the conduct of scientific research. This cooperation could best be attained by the creation of an Arctic Basin Council composed of all Arctic States and, possibly, the Nordic countries.

The theory of the Cult of the Offensive clearly stands out among the most recent works being conducted in Strategic Studies. The aim of this article is to better understand this new theoretical contribution by looking at its strengths and weaknesses, and by applying it to the case of the evolving American naval strategy. The central elements of this approach will be analysed in order to explain the significant growth that the American Navy has experienced since the start of the 1980s. In this manner, it will be possible to perceive as much the applicability of this theory as the relevance of the case study, to show the value of strategic studies as a field which seeks a greater understanding of strategic choices.

From 1850 to 1914, many regional monographs were written in Québec, thus establishing a geographic genre characterized by an applied approach and bearing a nationalist perspective. Following this period, Québec geography evolved towards an academic form with Emile Miller and, then, with the works of Raoul Blanchard. This article discusses aspects of this genre : the typical plan, data and informations used, methods and concepts. Specifically, the concept of region is debated because it is in opposition with the Vidal regional paradigm. The colonization monograph was part of colonial geography, but the effort to establish the legitimacy of this claim is inconclusive. Those works preluded the attempt of a scientific legitimation of colonial geography. Can one nonetheless talk of a Québec school of geography?

Keywords: Monographie régionale, Québec, colonisation, genre, école nationale, Regional Monograph, Quebec, Colonization, Genre, National School

If it were to become a sovereign state, Québec would benefit from the addition of maritime areas — territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf — the width of which would be measured from straight or normal baselines. Overlapping areas would then exist and be subject to the delimitation of maritime boundaries in accordance with international law. In light of cases and state practice, and given relevant circumstances, various methods of delimitation are suggested.

Keywords: Golfe du Saint-Laurent, mer territoriale, zone contiguë, zone économique exclusive, plateau continental, frontière maritime, équidistance, enclave, effet partiel, exploitation en commun, Gulf of St. Lawrence, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive économie zone, continental shelf, maritime boundary, équidistance, enclave, partial effect