Documents found
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211.More information
Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
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212.More information
Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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213.More information
Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
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214.More information
Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
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215.More information
Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
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216.More information
Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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217.More information
Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
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218.More information
AbstractBrentano's thesis of “intentional inexistence” has been traditionally interpreted as a theory of “intentional relationships”, i.e., of the relation between a mental act and its “immanent” or “intentional object”, within consciousness. Starting from the famous passage on intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), the present paper shows that the dominant ontological interpretation of Brentano's former theory of intentionality is untenable. Proceeding from the sources of Brentano's thought, in particular from Aristotle's theory of perception and of relatives, the conception of the immanent or intentional object as an immanent entity to consciousness is rejected. Instead, the continuity between Brentano's former conception of intentionality and the subsequent one, following the so-called reistic turning-point in his thought, is highlighted.
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219.More information
Johann Georg Sulzer's name is associated with the birth of philosophical aesthetics in Germany, above all through his major work, General Theory of the Fine Arts (1771-1774). The paper will show how this influential member of the division of speculative philosophy at the Berlin Academy, who was deeply influenced by the thought of Leibniz and Wolff but who was also attentive to psychopathological particularities of the human mind and to the corporeal components of psychic activity, claims to present a metaphysical foundation for the theory of beauty, by basing it on what, since Wolff, was called psychology. Starting from a study of a series of ‘Mémoires' composed between 1751 and 1763, we will focus our attention on the project of the deduction of pleasant and unpleasant feelings, something that Sulzer understands to proceed from the principle of activity of the soul, in order better to grasp the nature of the pleasures that beauty affords us. On this basis, we will return at the end to the question of the function of the fine arts in Sulzer's thought, in order to defend the idea that the energy of art cannot be reduced to the question of beauty.