Documents found

  1. 51.

    Thesis submitted to Université de Montréal

    2003

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    Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

  2. 52.

    Thesis submitted to Université de Montréal

    1997

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    Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

  3. 53.

    Thesis submitted to Université de Montréal

    1987

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    Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

  4. 54.

    Thesis submitted to Université de Montréal

    1993

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    Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

  5. 57.

    Article published in Psychiatrie et violence (scholarly, collection Érudit)

    Volume 9, Issue 1, 2009

    Digital publication year: 2010

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    AbstractThe professionals in the fields of health and justice are increasingly asked to assess the risk of recidivism and the dangerousness of the people entrusted to them. However, for some of them, the concept of “acceptable risk” may vary depending on the individual. Our assessment depends on our specific social perceptions and representations of dangerousness. Each one of these various representations of danger has a certain social usefulness the simultaneous consideration of which – possible by means of a pluralistic approach – can become a source of enrichment for each professional as well as a means of improving the assessment of dangerousness.

    Keywords: risque, dangerosité, perceptions sociales, représentations sociales, evaluation, risk, dangerousness, social perceptions, social representations, assessment

  6. 60.

    Article published in Philosophiques (scholarly, collection Érudit)

    Volume 20, Issue 1, 1993

    Digital publication year: 2007

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    ABSTRACTFodor's views about scientific psychology raise three puzzles : Is the Formality Condition compatible with there being intentional psychological laws (referring to the contents of mental states)? Is Content Atomism consistent with Fonctionalism? Can Content Atomism be reconciled with the claim that human thoughts are systematic? In the first three sections of this paper, I try and show how to solve the three puzzles. Finally, in the fourth section, I examine Fodor's recent view of belief-ascriptions in "Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs" according to which the belief relation is a four place relation between a believer, a symbol token (or vehicle), a functional role and a propositional content. I argue that Fodor faces a dilemma : either the functional role is a determinant of content, in which case Fodor must reject Content Atomism; or it is a determinant of the causal efficacy of the vehicle, in which case he must amend his Formality Condition.