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The purpose of the present article is to examine the strategy developed by unions to obtain improved working conditions for labour. The analysis is based on the relationship between the pressure tactics of a local union and the characteristics of work organization in a company. It pursues a double objective: first, to show that a union increases its demands at this level to gain advantages in areas traditionally excluded from the field of negotiations through the elaboration of demands legitimized by general consensus in industrial relations; and secondly to show that union action in a company is closely linked to the particularities of work organization in its various departments.DemandsInstead of putting the accent on demands according to their relations with a certain member of explanatory factors, analysis here consists of examining the significance of a particular type of demand in relation to other themes evoked, plus one explanatory factor: works organization.Union Action and Works OrganizationMore and more unions digress from their established policy of protecting employees against the negative effects of work organization. They will attempt, in future, to obtain direct control over work organization. In today's industrial relations system, this sort of control is not considered negotiable. As a result, certain unions will adopt the strategy of acting indirectly on work organization by formulating demands in terms generally admitted in industrial relations practice. Demands elaborated may, thus, correspond to a double objective and pursue interest both institutional and non-institutional in negotiation.Analysis of Local Union StrategyInitially union demands are classified in three categories: individual, semi-collective and collective. With this classification, the author reveals how basic principes of work organization helps explain that the union seeks to improve work content of employees' jobs in certain departments by formulating a traditional demand: increasing the value of the coefficients of classification. By means of this demand, the union seeks to improve the position of employees in relation to the salary scale, but also seeks to obtain modification of works content for some. This strategy is possible because of the fundamental principle establishing a link between coefficients of classification and content of specific tasks. Take, for example, the maintenance department. Repair tasks are classified according to both time and difficulty and are affected by various coefficients.Thus, the most complex tasks are affected by coefficients situated at the top of the scale, intermediate tasks by intermediate coefficients, and the easiest tasks by lesser coefficients. Employees are given the coefficient of the classification corresponding to the degree of difficulty of the tasks completed. Therefore, the employee who is continually assigned by his foreman to tasks of intermediate difficulty will be given an intermediate coefficient. The union, then, advances a number of individual demands in the department in question relative to increasing the value of coefficients. In the face of pressure tactics by employees in support of union demands, management often has a tendency to accept the union position. Such concessions, nevertheless, have consequences for the employee concerned through both salary in-crease and improvement in works content of his job. In fact, in order to respect the basic principle of works organization, management required the foreman to reestablish the correspondance between the level of difficulty of tasks and the coefficient by assigning him tasks equivalent to his new coefficient. The union, consequently, obtains satisfaction of its demands in a non-institutionalized area of what is negotiable by making demands which are considered admissible.

AbstractAs it is most often conceived, the theme of “sustainable development” refers to a wide range of changes to be carried out in all spheres of society. For this reason, it is logically in line with a tone of general mobilization. It frequently leads to a call for renewed procedures in the organization of community life, in order to encourage all the cooperations that could be useful. A common problem on the procedures to be put in place to reconcile – or at least make them think and discuss – actors with potentially divergent interests has thus formed around the issues of sustainable development and governance. In a sense, “sustainable development” is, more or less explicitly, to be taken as an incentive to rethink the issues of the practical experience of democracy and of the institutions from which it is supposed to operate. It is even a form of equation that almost tends to be raised between “sustainable development” and “democracy”, with a relationship of dependency between the two terms. Such an assumption is an invitation to question the nature and the logics of this discursive assemblage, in particular to understand the institutional arrangements which tend to be redeployed. What kind of progress towards democracy is drawn ? What assumptions are articulated ? What proposals arrive in the discussions ? To what devices might these proposals lead ? What kinds of practices are taking shape and to what extent do they come as a continuation of what seems to be a renewed programme of government ? This contribution attempts to find answers to these questions.

Most of the firms have a less developed informational system. Banks have so, in theory, a repugnant attitude regarding to their financing. The purpose of this work is to establish if the bank strategies in fixing the credit conditions is the pooling one. In order to do this, we use a sample of 523 credit files of small and medium Tunisian businesses.The empirical test realized seems to indicate that the considered bank uses pooling contracts, and it is showned that the charged rates do not represent correctly the future risk of the borrowers. In addition, the test reveals that the interest rate is dependent on some modalities of guarantees and the financial leverage.

Keywords: Asymétrie informationnelle, Décision de crédit, Stratégie de regroupement, Petites et moyennes entreprises tunisiennes

AbstractA model is developed where the possibility to speculate on a financial market incites a rational individual to take a socially bad action. For this purpose, we shall model the microstructure of the trading process. Our model determines the movement of prices, their informational content and the liquidity of the market. The example considered here is to be contrasted with the one studied by Hirshleifer (1971) where speculative opportunities favor the internalization of positive externalities.

Integration of strategic and marketing decisions in SMBs : propositions for a conceptual frame and empirical verification processes. This article presents remarks about the coherence between strategic and marketing decisions in SMBs. First, the authors review the contributions of strategic and marketing literature and emphasize the inadequate knowledge of integration mechanisms. Therefore, they propose a methodological approach in order to observe such behaviours among decisions processes in SMBs.

Keywords: Marketing, Stratégie, Cohérence, Intégration fonctions, Recherche, Méthodologie, Projet

The paper shows that a norm of governance is a convention in the game of governance; that the convention is Pareto - efficient; and, finally, that it is a norm of legitimacy in the sense of utilitarian ethics. Thereby, it proves in principle that the requirements of legitimacy in a firm or organization can be justified, not only for readers who accept ethical principles on a priori grounds, but also for those who claim profit maximization is the only objective a firm should have.

Keywords: Régulation des émotions, orientations client, performance de service, personnalité, émotions

When two-sided platforms start their business, they face a “circularity problem”. To overcome this problem, the academic literature often advises entrepreneurs to adopt a two-stage strategy. First they are supposed to acquire clients on one side of the market. Then, they have to recruit the counterparts of these clients on the other side of the market. The aim of this article is to show that this sequential launch strategy can be sub-optimal. We propose a more efficient method which can sometimes significantly reduce the early customer acquisition costs of platform owners. Our demonstration is based on a heuristic model and the application of the “birthday paradox” to the concerns of two-sided platforms.

Keywords: Plateformes bifaces, Amorçage, Paradoxe des anniversaires, Two-sided platforms, Launch strategy, Birthday paradox, Start-up