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Résumé de l'article

Pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, le gouvernement canadien commence à recourir aux techniques des sciences sociales pour élaborer ses politiques d'information. Ceci n'est pas sans susciter de vives oppositions de la part des gens de la presse qui estiment que, dans un gouvernement élu démocratiquement, toute manipulation de l'information brime la liberté du citoyen puisqu'elle l'empêche de se faire une opinion personnelle de l'événement.

Au fait, les années de guerre voient alterner à la tête de l'organisme gouvernemental chargé de l'information publique des hommes représentant tantôt les gens de la presse, tantôt les adeptes des sciences sociales. C'est ainsi que se succèdent Gardiner, un partisan de la presse, qui est en poste de juillet 1940 à juin 1941, puis, Thorson, un supporteur des sciences sociales, qui est en fonction jusqu'à mai 1942; vient ensuite Vining, un tenant de la presse, de mai 1942 à février 1943, suivi de Grierson, un fervent des sciences sociales de février 1943 à janvier 1944. Après lui, on opte définitivement pour les instruments qu'offrent ces dernières.

En janvier 1944, la direction passe à Dunton, un journaliste qui a travaillé sous Vining et Grierson. Pendant son mandat, on développera des techniques qui se réclament nettement des sciences sociales; elles s'étendront d'ailleurs assez rapidement à d'autres agences du gouvernement, voire même, elles permettront au parti libéral de se faire réélire en 1945. En somme, la guerre a accéléré l'intégration des méthodes des sciences sociales dans le cadre de l'administration gouvernementale; cependant, elle n'a pas apporté de solution au problème que soulevèrent les journalistes tout au long de cette période: celui de la manipulation de l'information dans un état démocratique.

Academics and Social Scientists versus the Press: the Policies of the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board, 1939 to 1945

WILLIAM R. YOUNG*

During the Second World War, the Canadian government gradually accepted the social sciences as tools in its information policy. Not only in this area but throughout its operations, the government came to use theories and techniques associated with sociology, psychology and political science as instruments of public administration. This development represented a change from the pre-war period when academic recruits into the bureaucracy generally filled jobs which did not involve the practice of their disciplines. Dr. O.D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the "boys" that he hired from the universities, for example, held down many of the more sensitive administrative posts in the whole bureaucracy and not just in the Department of External Affairs. Only the economists in the Bank of Canada and in the Department of Finance remained connected with the academic aspects of their "dismal science". After 1939, however, practitioners of the newer social scientific disciplines no longer worked only in the academics' ivory towers, the universities. As qualified specialists, they began to apply their techniques in the service of the government. This situation particularly held true in new wartime government agencies like the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board. In this unprecedented context, old time bureaucrats, as inexperienced as the outsiders, had a more difficult time arguing from precedent and preventing the academics from gaining a greater measure of control. By the end of the war, academics in the bureaucracy, including a large contingent of social scientists, formed as "distinct a group as the businessmen."¹

If the war did not begin this trend, it certainly speeded it up. No one foresaw the extent of the physical and emotional commitment that Canada would eventually make in the years after 1939. Following 1940, in the years of total war, official decisions intruded more and more into the daily lives of Canadians. As this expansion took place, the government increasingly required the skills of specialists. These individuals, for example, began to do research into the requirements for, and the impact of, economic controls into alternative sources

* My thanks to Margaret Prang, Jack Granatstein and Jacques Naud without whose assistance this paper could not have been written.

1. John Porter, "Higher Public Servants and the Bureaucratic Elite in Canada", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXIV:4 (November 1958), p. 485.

of nutrition and into the effect of such proposed social policies as family allowances. This demand also accompanied a changed perception of the requirements for the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board. The government found that the patriotic enthusiasm, even of the English Canadians, began to dwindle as the war dragged on. Nor could the exhortations from speakers' platforms maintain public morale. As these difficulties appeared and in order to explain and to gain support for complicated wartime measures, many government officials came to believe that a government information agency had to adopt the academics' point of view and undertake studies of specific sources of wartime discontent. After completing these, information officers could prepare programmes to explain contentious policies in ways that would have a positive effect on public opinion. Once the government accepted this means of dealing with morale problems, it also saw the need for those with the necessary expertise, the social scientists, to have a large part in rectifying them.

This solution was not without its struggles nor its dangers. As far as information work was concerned, vested interests opposed the application of the social sciences. Politicians and bureaucrats had to overcome their belief that anyone who wanted to could design programmes to deal with the public. The most serious opposition, however, arose from Canadian newspapers who, in principle, opposed any government wartime information agency. The press believed that in a democratic state any government manipulation of the news undermined the freedom of the population to make up its mind freely on issues. Dismissing any thought of its own bias, the press jealously guarded its position as the sole purveyor of news and as the major agency to build morale. It opposed the establishment of any rivals, public or private. Apart from any self-interest involved in the newspapers' views, the use of social scientific techniques to mould opinion did raise difficulties for a democratic state. The scientific study of morale problems, for example, revealed areas of weak support for the government and provided the party in power with the means of mending its own public image. To the extent that it used this information for political benefit, the government proved the newspapers' objections to be justified.

In the month after Canada's declaration of war, both the press and the academics tried to influence the government's information policy. J.F.B. Livesay, general manager of the Canadian Press Association, argued that the government should merely assist news sources and newspapers in moulding public opinion. He pointed out that "the most efficient propaganda lies in the selection of news. As long as it is news, newspapers will use it and play it up. . . ." To accomplish its ends, the government had to employ newsmen rather than soldiers, civil servants or authors to man its public information facilities.² Contradicting this, a University of Toronto psychologist, J.D. Ketchum, argued that any policy which ignored social scientific techniques to maintain morale was bound to fail. The government could not rely on the unco-ordinated efforts of editors, speakers

2. Public Archives of Canada [PAC], Department of External Affairs Records, D1 series, vol. 711, file 342, part 1, memorandum: R.K. Carnegie to O.D. Skelton, 5 October 1939 with attached memorandum by J.F.B. Livesay.

and preachers. In order to gain Canadians' support for the war effort, the government had to utilize the services of academics trained to understand the social, economic and ideological nature of the country.³

Uncertain about the propriety of a democratic government establishing an information organization, Prime Minister Mackenzie King refused to choose between these two arguments. Although he did worry about information policy to the extent that it involved his personal appearance before a film crew or a radio microphone, he also retained doubts about the government's setting up an organization to argue the case for its policies.⁴ King hesitated because he saw no need to extend Canadian wartime activities further than necessary. The Prime Minister was backed up by many civil servants who hated to hand any government operation over to professional publicity men or to academics with no experience in public affairs.⁵ They all believed that the establishment of a cabinet sub-committee on public information on August 30, 1939, could provide the general supervision required.⁶ They would not, therefore, support Norman McLarty, the Minister of Labour and chairman of the committee, when he put the case for the political advantages to be gained from an active Ministry of Information that used slick American advertising techniques.⁷ Fearing charges of political partisanship and of establishing an equivalent to Dr. Goebbels, Mackenzie King continued to hope that information about government operations would "ooze out by osmosis untouched by human hands."⁸ A provincial election in Quebec scheduled for October 25 justified King's caution. A new information ministry would have provided Quebec's Premier, Maurice Duplessis, with another target for his charges that the federal government was using the war to expand federal power and to undermine provincial autonomy.

The threat of an attack on centralized information activities disappeared when Quebec's voters replaced Maurice Duplessis by the Liberal leader, Adélard Godbout, and Mackenzie King immediately began to work out an information

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3. PAC, W.L.M. King Papers, J4 series, vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155828ff., memorandum by J.D. Ketchum, 9 October 1939.
 4. *Ibid.*, J13 series, diary, 8 December 1939; *Ibid.*, 17 January 1940.
 5. *Ibid.*, J4 series, vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155856, memo: A.D.P. Heeney to King, 10 November 1939; *Ibid.*, p. C155853ff., memo: Walter Turnbull to A.D.P. Heeney, 8 November 1939.
 6. *Ibid.*, vol. 153, file 1306, p. C110342, copy of PC 2474, 30 August 1939. For a description of the Cabinet's wartime structure see C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of the Government of Canada, 1939-1945* (Ottawa, 1970), pp. 111-9.
 7. McLarty bombarded King with many suggestions. See King Papers, J1 series, p. 230876, letter: McLarty to King, 3 October 1939; *Ibid.*, p. 230891A, letter: McLarty to King, 23 October 1939. For the assessment of these see *Ibid.*, J4 Series, vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155852, memo: Turnbull to Heeney, n.d. [October - November 1939].
 8. Transcript of the author's interview with Hon. J.W. Pickersgill, Ottawa, 21 February 1974; King Papers, J1 series, diary, 25 September 1939; *Ibid.*, 26 September 1939; *Ibid.*, J4 series, vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155869, memorandum by King, 5 December 1939.

policy that inclined towards the journalists' approach. A group of civil servants suggested that the government should start to supply more reports to newspapers. For his part, Mackenzie King decided to ask L.W. Brockington, former chairman of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, to take a position as Recorder of Canada's War Effort and Counsellor to the War Committee of the Cabinet. Just before Brockington's appointment on December 21, King asked the former publicity director of Canadian National Railways and current Chief Censor, Walter Thompson, to establish a small Bureau of Public Information attached to the Prime Minister's Office.⁹ As information adviser and as Director of Information, Brockington and Thompson were only supposed to become part of a diffuse operation that included the Prime Minister, his civil servant advisers and the cabinet sub-committee on information. By avoiding the establishment of a particular centre of responsibility, King hoped that he could avoid charges of managing the news for his political advantage.¹⁰ The new men basically accepted King's system and agreed with his other advisers that the government had to act to "keep the lunatics in leash", but that this activity should remain limited. They all feared that, unless the government maintained amical relations with the press and provided the newspapers with some direction, extremists might stir up social and racial tensions that could hamper the war effort. Walter Thompson, therefore, wanted to assure journalists access to government figures and to provide the press with information about the course of government policies. Although they were willing to experiment, the civil servants believed that providing information to journalists remained the most important task.¹¹

The *blitzkrieg* in the spring of 1940 put an end to Canada's limited war effort and the government began scurrying to find new avenues, including an information policy, to meet the needs of total war. As the German armies moved through western Europe, Mackenzie King, who fortunately on March 26 had won his largest parliamentary majority to that time, consented to the dispatch overseas

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9. *Ibid.*, J13 series, diary, 16 November 1939; *Ibid.*, J4 series, vol. 230, file 2213, pp. C155860-61, memo: McLarty to Heeney and Turnbull, 16 November 1939; *Ibid.*, p. C155750, draft memo by King, n.d.; *Ibid.*, vol. 151, file 1280, pp. C109901ff., memo: Heeney to King, 21 December 1939 and copy PC 4284, 21 December 1939; *Ibid.*, J1 series, vol. 273, p. 230905, letter: McLarty to King, 20 November 1939; PAC, J.W. Dafoe Papers, vol. 11, 1939, letter: Grant Dexter to Dafoe, 30 November 1939; PAC, Privy Council Office Records, series 18, vol. 5, file D-27-1, copy: PC 4073, 8 December 1939.
 10. King Papers, J4 series, vol. 230, file 2213, pp. C155868-75, memorandum by King, 5 December 1939.
 11. Included in the civil service group were Arnold Heeney, the principal secretary in the Prime Minister's Office and later Secretary to the War Committee of the Cabinet; the other secretaries, Walter Turnbull and J.W. Pickersgill; as well as John Grierson. See King Papers, J4 series, vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155856, memo: Heeney to King, 10 November 1939; *Ibid.*, p. C155853, memo: Turnbull to Heeney, 8 November 1939; *Ibid.*, vol. 155, file 1345, p. C111174, memo: 15 November 1939. For the Brockington and Thompson approach see King Papers, J4 series, additional, vol. 413, file 3989, n.p., memorandum by Leonard Brockington, December 1939; *Ibid.*, J13 series, diary, 5 December 1939.

of a second Canadian division. King's strong position also made for an easy passage on June 18 of the National Resources Mobilization Act, which permitted the government to conscript Canadians for home defence. The Prime Minister also changed his mind about the requirements for the provision of information. Because he had not, however, overcome a long-standing suspicion of editorial writers, he preferred to drum up public support for Canada's new wartime role by sending out news releases to tell the government's story straight to the people.¹² This meant an expanded government press operation and news service. The civil servants strongly urged this course on the Prime Minister. They still felt that the best way to gather support was to improve the sources of accurate and first-hand information available to journalists. They advocated, for example, better arrangements for transmitting news from England, more imaginative treatment of news stories, a stronger Canadian slant for overseas news and fuller and more regular ministerial press conferences. Not completely convinced of a journalistic approach to wartime information, they did advocate supplementing it by hiring specialists to prepare appeals to ethnic and social groups.¹³

As a result of this pressure and of the new wartime situation, King authorized setting up a stronger Bureau of Public Information. He intended the Bureau to formulate information programmes and in early July transferred responsibility for its operations to J.G. Gardiner, the new Minister of National War Services who also served as Minister of Agriculture.¹⁴ This gave the journalists their chance. When the Prime Minister opposed Gardiner's proposal to expand the Bureau's operations by centralizing all the government's publicity sections, Gardiner accepted the journalists' philosophy of information. The minister asked D.B. Rogers, a reliable Liberal who edited the Regina *Leader Post*, to formulate a policy that, hoped Gardiner, would satisfy the Prime Minister.¹⁵

Canadian newspapers had always held that government information policy should suit their needs. Apart from this claim to supremacy by the fourth estate, the press had many specific complaints. Although some editors seemed satisfied with the government's haphazard policy of press releases, by mid 1940 others were accusing the government of drying up their sources and of creating, in addition to official censorship, a dangerous quasi-censorship over the nation's newspapers. The press demanded the facts about the deteriorating military situation without interpretation or embellishment by phalanxes of press officers. Nor, claimed the editors, would they stomach "selling the public on how wonderful the head of our Government is or what fine gentlemen the Cabinet ministers are."

12. *Ibid.*, 8 May 1940.

13. *Ibid.*, J4 series, additional, vol. 413, file 3989, memo: Brockington to King, 15 May 1940; PAC, Wartime Information Board Records, vol. 1, file 1-1-4, memo: O.D. Skelton to King, 27 June 1940.

14. Canada, *Statutes*, 4 George VI (1940), Chap. 22, section 5(d); King Papers, J4 series, additional, vol. 413, file 3989, copy: PC 3333, 19 July 1940.

15. *Ibid.*, J13 series, diary, 28 June 1940; WIB Records, vol. 24, file 37-188, letter: G.H. Lash to Walton, 25 July 1940; External Affairs Records, D1 series, vol. 771, file 342, letter: Walter Turnbull to O.D. Skelton, 26 July 1940.

This was no way to convince Canadians of the need for total effort. Through thick and thin, the newspapers argued that the government should get out the facts by giving journalists better access to official sources, not by setting up another elaborate bureaucracy.¹⁶

Presented to the Minister on August 4, Rogers' report echoed these repeated demands and gained for them the status of official policy. Because the Canadian public did not require more "spoon-feeding" in wartime than in peacetime and would not lose its ability to distinguish "hard" news from shallow boosterism, Rogers believed any attempt to change public opinion except by presenting the news would fail. Government information operations should only supplement normal channels with proven interest and appeal. Any co-ordination or consolidation, Rogers' argued, would cause unnecessary red tape and confusion. If newspapers were allowed to do their job as interpreters of opinion, wartime morale would take care of itself.¹⁷ Convinced by the report, J.G. Gardiner announced on August 7 that he would "let the news be released in its own way while it is news." The Minister hoped that Rogers' policy would satisfy press criticism and would not present the opposition with a political target. The Director of Public Information, Gardiner ordered, should stick to the job of making government officials and ministers more accessible to reporters.¹⁸

The growing complexity of the wartime situation quickly undermined support for Gardiner's "new" policy and for the Minister himself. The Bureau could not deal with the resentment of French Canada following the compulsory registration of manpower in August, 1940, nor explain the extension of economic controls by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board in December, or the federal-provincial fractiousness at the premiers' conference in 1941. Conservative newspapers heaped scorn on Gardiner's Bureau by pointing out that if the government believed that "news was news" in peace or war, then the Bureau should close up shop and allow the journalists to get on with their job.¹⁹ At this, the civil service advisers to the Prime Minister quickly took alarm. They had never meant to

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16. The newspapers' contentions received specific mention on several occasions throughout the war. One publisher told King that the press was the "heavy artillery of public information". (King Papers, J1 series, vol. 322, letter: W. Clark to King, 21 December 1942). Lionel Bertrand, M.P. and President of the Rural Press Association of Quebec, believed the press to be the "essential tool" for explaining wartime policies in a lasting form. (House of Commons, *Debates*, 1943, pp. 1461-2). See also *The Toronto Telegram*, 23 September 1940; *Ibid.*, 22 October 1940; *Ibid.*, 18 November 1940; 28 August 1942.
 17. King Papers, J4 series, additional, vol. 413, file 3989, memorandum on public information by D.B. Rogers, 4 August 1940.
 18. *The Toronto Telegram*, 7 August 1940; PCO Records, series 18, vol. 6, file PCO-D-27, letter: J.G. Gardiner to King, 13 September 1940.
 19. PAC, Department of Finance Records, series E1(d), vol. 2701, file 300-1, memo: broadcasting about the Rowell Sirois Report, n.d. [January 1941]; J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto, 1975), pp. 174-7; Toronto, *The Globe and Mail*, 2 January 1941; *Ibid.*, 20 February 1941.

exclude other efforts nor to restrict the Bureau's scope to merely assisting reporters.²⁰ By early 1941, Gardiner himself viewed the Bureau with a jaundiced eye. He finally authorized his Director of Public Information, G.H. Lash, to apply for a \$500,000 grant to expand the Bureau and to use the money for films, radio programmes and pamphlets to help the government explain its policies to Canadians.²¹ But the Minister could not save his own skin. Tired of the mounting attacks on his government, Mackenzie King blamed Gardiner for not organizing things properly.²² Catching wind of the Prime Minister's dissatisfaction, Gardiner resigned as Minister of National War Services just before he was to get the sack. On May 27, 1941, Gardiner announced that he would return to his first duty, Minister of Agriculture. He said that he did not have time for both jobs.²³ Mackenzie King, furious at this premature resignation, had to "dope things out" before choosing J.T. Thorson a couple of weeks later. King believed that Thorson, a "thorough" Liberal, had one eye fixed on a judicial appointment and could serve as an interim Minister before leaving to give a place for a brighter, more competent individual.²⁴

A number of academics and civil servants took the opportunity after the change of Ministers to urge Thorson to allow the Bureau to use the tools of the social scientist. These men, many of them not academics or social scientists themselves, believed that only by researching the political and social interaction in the country could the Bureau prepare material that would generate the required support for the war effort. Before the war, many had supported the Radio League's campaign for public broadcasting and had gained an appreciation of the potential of radio as a means of moulding public attitudes. As members of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, they were aware of the studies of the media undertaken by that organization, Carlton McNaught's *Canada Gets the News* and Florent LeFèbvre's *The French Canadian Press and the War*.²⁵ Those involved in these activities included E.A. Corbett, Executive Director of the Canadian Association for Adult Education; Brooke Claxton, M.P. for St. Lawrence-St. George; T.W.L. MacDermot, Principal of Upper Canada College; J.W. Pickersgill, Secretary to Mackenzie King; L.B. Pearson, Canadian Minister in Washington; Norman A.M. MacKenzie, President of the University of New

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20. King Papers, J4 series, file 3904, p. C257072, memorandum: Brockington to King, 8 August 1940.
 21. *Ibid.*, J1 series, vol. 304, p. 257570ff, letter: Gardiner to King, 28 February 1941; WIB Records, vol. 20, file 11-3-17, letter: T.C. Davis to Norman Robertson, 17 April 1941; King Papers, J4 series, additional, vol. 413, file 3981, memo: G.H. Lash to P.M., 6 May 1941; *Ibid.*, J1 series, vol. 304, pp. 257601ff, letter: J.G. Gardiner to King, 8 May 1941.
 22. J.W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, I, 1939-1944, (Toronto, 1960), p. 222; Dafoe Papers, series A, vol. 12, memo: Grant Dexter to Dafoe, 20 May 1941.
 23. St. Thomas, *Times Journal*, 27 May 1941.
 24. Dafoe Papers, series A, vol. 12, memo: Grant Dexter to Dafoe, 30 May 1941; King Papers, J13 series, diary, 4 June 1941; *Ibid.*, 11 June 1941.
 25. For the ideas of the Radio League see M.E. Prang, "The Origins of Public Broadcasting in Canada", *The Canadian Historical Review*, XLVI:1 (March 1965).

Brunswick; J.W. Dafoe and George V. Ferguson, the editors of the *Winnipeg Free Press*; and John Grierson, the Canadian Government Film Commissioner.

Among those urging reforms in 1941, the men, particularly the academics associated with the adult education movement, believed firmly that the war provided a great opportunity to adapt the principles of sociology and psychology to educate citizens. "Faith and hope," they argued, "cannot be implanted in men by either exhortation upon or reiteration of the eternal verities alone."²⁶ The state should not trust that Canadians who believed the war to involve only "licking the daylight out of Germany" would realistically understand complex wartime issues. The Great War's experience had shown that wartime expectations aroused by newspaper-style sloganeering would lead to post-war social unrest. Publicity regarding Woodrow Wilson's "war against war" had led citizens to expect post-war changes which had not materialized and had led to popular cynicism and mistrust of government. Looking at this earlier failure, they believed that Canada already was experiencing a polarization of opinion. Canadian leftists, by 1941, had begun to talk of using the wartime situation to promote an economy fully planned by the government and had begun waging verbal warfare against the "dessicated reactionaires", the *laissez-faire* liberals. For their part, the believers in free enterprise had begun a popular campaign to garner support for the elimination of wartime restrictions.²⁷

To deal with this situation, W.H. Brittain, the Dean of Macdonald College, proposed that the government call upon the services of experts. Citizens, he argued, must possess an intense interest in political processes in order to eliminate "potential elements of disunity. . . ." In this task, newspapers and lunch clubs could not help much because they had only a "haphazard, competitive and localized" effect on public opinion. Essentially, Brittain proposed that the government cooperate with an omnibus organization of educators, the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, whose members included provincial departments of education, teachers' federations, the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, the Workers' Educational Association, the Canadian Association for Adult Education and the federal government departments interested in education. The Council could provide assistance in the proper presentation of material. The heart of Brittain's proposal, however, lay in his suggestion that the government hire a "small but expert group of highly qualified specialists in economic, social and industrial questions." These academics would secure and summarize basic information, as well as "organize, plan and interpret" responses in order to integrate the official news of government agencies and give the public a clear sense of direction within the bounds of a definite long-term policy that recognized "economic as well as educational principles." In addition, an "action

26. McGill University Archives, Redpath Library, Wilfrid Bovey Papers, box 2, file 169, memo attached to letter: Robert England to Bovey, 21 November 1940.

27. WIB Records, vol. 14, file 8-20-2, memo by W.H. Brittain enclosed with a letter: Ian Eisenhardt to John Grierson, 9 June 1943; Archives of Ontario, Workers' Educational Association Papers, Drummond Wren's files, file 53-5-1, Drummond Wren to G.H. Lash, 21 November 1941.

section" would utilize modern techniques of popular education to co-ordinate radio broadcasts and films in an "imaginative and thoroughly expert fashion."²⁸

Following Thorson's appointment in 1941, the advocates of the social scientific approach gained their influence from the failure of the government to establish a coherent policy. Thorson had decided to give the Director of Public Information the opportunity to prove his mettle free from Gardiner's restriction. G.H. Lash, who had taken charge in January, 1940, had served with the first director, Walter Thompson, at the publicity department of the Canadian National Railway. Never happy with Gardiner's policy, Lash had worked steadily in true bureaucratic fashion to increase the scope of the Bureau. He had organized and prepared radio broadcasts, reference booklets, posters, pamphlets and films.²⁹ But his work remained eclectic. True to his corporate background, Lash wanted to copy the public relations policies of the banks, railways and insurance companies. His first big solo venture, in September, 1941, owed much to the ballyhoo of private advertising. Reconsecration Week, as it was called, took place amid mass rallies, gun salutes, church services, parades, proclamations, pledges and radio speeches.³⁰

Recognizing the special needs of French Canada, Lash did allow the development of a semi-autonomous French section. Headed by the Associate Director of Public Information, Claude Melançon, this section took a more authoritarian view of the role of government. Faced with Quebec's lower enlistments, anti-British attitude and defeatism reflected in the growth of separatist and nationalist political movements, Melançon tried to neutralize them. "Le plus tôt possible," he believed that he must counteract "ce travail de sape qui menace directement notre effort de guerre, tend à créer une situation très difficile après la guerre et compromet l'avenir de notre minorité de langue française."³¹ This would depend upon closer collaboration between censorship and information authorities who must strictly apply the censorship provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations. In addition to measures to restrict the uncooperative French-language press, Melançon wanted the government to apply gentle pressures to the Roman Catholic church and to the universities. This persuasion, he believed, would stop

28. McGill Archives, Macdonald College, Vice-Principal's Records, box 53, file 16, memorandum attached to letter: W.H. Brittain to F.S. Rivers, 7 July 1941.
29. *The Ottawa Journal*, 24 June 1941; PAC, Brooke Claxton Papers, vol. 20, Th-W file, letter: J.T. Thorson to Claxton, 12 August 1941; House of Commons, *Debates*, 1941, p. 1334; WIB Records, vol. 6, file 2-1-4, WIB History; *Ibid.*, vol. 24, file 37-202, letter: Lash to J. Preston, 12 December 1940.
30. WIB Records, vol. 11, file 6-36, Reconsecration Week Proclamation; *Ibid.*, letter: G.H. Lash to J.T. Thorson, 1941; Archives of Ontario, Prime Minister's Records, Mitchell Hepburn Papers, public, general correspondence, 1941, Department of National War Services file, letter: Thorson to Mitchell Hepburn, 25 August 1941; Provincial Museum and Archives of Alberta, Premier's Papers, file 1205, memo: E.H. Newland to William Aberhart, 8 September 1941; WIB Records, vol. 11, file 6-36, circular letter: G.H. Lash to editor, 23 August 1941.
31. PAC, Ernest Lapointe Papers, vol. 55, memo: anonymous, [Claude Melançon] to Lapointe, 28 April 1941.

anti-war sermons, root out "subversive" activities and prevent German propaganda arriving from collaborationist Vichy sources from gaining a Quebec audience. To complement these restrictions, Melançon urged the government to take action to convince French Canadians of their place in the war. An educational campaign accompanied by the appointment of French Canadians to important government positions, he believed, would serve the purpose.³²

Although the academics never found a place in the French section, they exercised a growing influence over English-language activities and used this knowledge of information operations to criticize the Bureau. In February, 1942, G.H. Lash called in academics, mainly psychologists, to form a committee on morale to advise him. Although it praised some of the Bureau's work, the committee suggested the adoption of social scientific methods, for example, to gauge the impact of leaflets, to pre-test reaction to posters and to conduct surveys. These techniques, they argued, would prove useful in advising the government about the state of public opinion and in making suggestions about the presentation of policies. The committee felt that men with practical experience in moulding public opinion in peacetime did not possess the proper training to deal with war-time problems and recommended that the government use psychologists, sociologists and political scientists with more useful technical and theoretical knowledge. The best information policy would result if the government could weld the two groups into one. Certainly the social scientists could evaluate the techniques of maintaining morale and suggest modifications on the basis of their theoretical training. They could also advise upon the research necessary to evaluate the media and could develop research facilities. The committee believed that use of the social sciences in this manner could shake Canadians' "inertia" and help co-ordinate appeals to emotional impulses in line with evolving social trends.

Specifically applying psychological theories to current problems, the committee on morale pointed out that the government should keep in mind that an unreachd goal provided a greater incentive than an attained one. Canadians, therefore, would not fight for a democracy that had suffered nine years of depression unless a better life could emerge at the war's end. If government publicity constantly presented only the bright side of the picture, it would mainly provide a rationalization for potential army recruits to go on working in war industry. In addition, psychological experiments showed that, since objective reasoning proved incompatible with strong emotion, the government must take care to guide opinion and to prevent aimless agitation and conflict. Weakening moral sanctions and the experience of the Great War had made natural patriotism difficult to arouse. The psychologists believed that, since propaganda based on an appeal to moral responsibility would not work, the government should begin factual information programmes to eliminate confusion about domestic and foreign events and to provide a long-range perspective.³³ The committee studied the in-depth interviews of the British Mass Observation surveys and recom-

32. King Papers, J4 Series, vol. 358, file 3831, pp. C247533ff., memo: Melançon to T.C. Davis, 15 March 1942; Lapointe Papers, vol. 55, memo: anonymous [Claude Melançon] to Lapointe, 28 April 1941.

mended use of this technique as a means of evaluating the attitudes of special groups, for example, industrial workers. In August, 1942, the committee also arranged for sociologist, John A. Irving, to visit the United States to discuss the American government's application of social scientific methods to the evaluation of public attitudes.³⁴

Events outside the Bureau, however, threatened to destroy any opportunity for the social scientists to institute their proposals. Mackenzie King had long been unhappy about the effect of information work. His advisers had told him that Quebec's overwhelming vote against conscription in the April, 1942, plebiscite indicated that the Bureau had failed to make an impact on French-Canadian opposition to various wartime measures. Behind his back, they had commented that American publication of magazine photographs of an elderly Mackenzie King and his "obese dog" would not help win appreciation in the United States for Canada's war contribution.³⁵ Knowing their sentiments, if not their sarcastic expression, King called in his old acquaintance, Charles Vining, in May, 1942. He asked the former director of the Canadian Newsprint Association and newsprint controller of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board to study the means of reforming the information operations.

Vining's report, presented to the Prime Minister on July 10, 1942, effectively eliminated the academics from the scene and restored the government's reliance on the press. Vining did not even consult the social scientists when he carried out his investigation. Forcefully, he reiterated the importance of information work and his opinion that the Canadian government should not change its techniques, but should assign a higher priority to the goal, the establishment of an efficient organization. This effectiveness, Vining believed, could grow out of informal meetings between qualified spokesmen and influential opinion leaders. Drinks at the Rideau Club would serve the purpose nicely. This approach could result in the achievement of his other priority, good relations between the government and the publishers. According to Vining, the press was best able to serve as the major

33. WIB Records, vol. 12, file 8-2-2, memo by J.S.A. Bois, 4 March 1942; *Ibid.*, memo by J.D. Ketchum, 31 March 1942; *Ibid.*, minutes: committee on morale, 1 April 1942; *Ibid.*, minutes: 4 June 1942; *Ibid.*, letter: J.D. Ketchum to J.T. Thorson, n.d.; J.D. Ketchum, "Morale in Canada", Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, *Civilian Morale*, (New York, 1942); J.S.A. Bois, "French Canada and the War", in *Ibid.*

34. WIB Records, vol. 12, file 8-2-2, minutes: committee on morale, 20 August 1942; *Ibid.*, vol. 12, file 8-2-1, "Report to the Committee on Morale on a visit to the United States by Professor John A. Irving", August 1942.

35. Claxton Papers, vol. 44, Kidd file, letter: H.E. Kidd to Claxton, 24 May 1941; King Papers, J4 series, additional, vol. 414, file 3990, n.p., clippings from the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 6 October 1941 and the *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 October 1941; Claxton Papers, vol. 52, MacDermot file, letter: Claxton to T.W.L. MacDermot, 30 May 1942; *Ibid.*, vol. 179, speeches, "Canada After Two Years of War", 7 January 1942; Dafoe Papers, series A, vol. 13, memo: Grant Dexter to J.W. Dafoe, 19 April, 1942.

channel of information to the public and he bent over backwards to avoid recommending measures that would antagonize Canadian newspapers. Believing that the successful presentation of news would maintain support for the war effort, Vining ignored the fripperies of popular education. In large part, this reliance on the press stemmed from his belief that the government should subordinate domestic activities to the creation of a new image in the United States. If the press looked after the task of informing Canadians, the government could concentrate its efforts abroad. To carry out his proposals, Vining suggested the transformation of the Bureau of Public Information into the Wartime Information Board, the primary aim of which would be to improve Canada's image in the United States.³⁶

His proposals notwithstanding, Charles Vining did, in fact, recognize the potential contribution of the social sciences to wartime information. Asked by Mackenzie King to serve as Chairman and chief executive officer of the Wartime Information Board established in August, 1942, Vining began to implement his own report.³⁷ He requested Davidson Dunton, the editor of the *Montreal Standard*, to set up a reports branch which would "collect, analyze and report on all information relating to Canada's war effort." This was a tall order for the branch's six officers. Among these, psychologist J.D. Ketchum took on the job as the chief of the research section. Earlier, Ketchum had urged the government to adopt social scientific techniques, had written articles on the psychological aspects of wartime morale and, as a member of the committee on morale, had advised the Bureau of Public Information. Ketchum's section appeared to be of minor significance in Vining's scheme of things, however, considering the large contingent of newsmen which the Chairman brought into the Board.³⁸

The priorities that Vining's domestic policy granted to the newspapers did not prevent press complaints that contributed to the Chairman's resignation. The press believed that news still arrived more quickly from the wire services than from the Board's newsrooms. Editors questioned this, as well as the Board's political neutrality. They accused its officers of trying to cover up stories that damaged the government. Vining's efforts to woo journalists to Ottawa by offering them higher salaries than publishers could afford to pay also resulted in private complaints to the government.³⁹ Combined with personnel problems and his "sans gêne extraordinaire", which offended his colleagues on the Board,

36. King Papers, J4 series, additional, vol. 414, file 3990, n.p., Charles Vining, "Canadian Publicity in the United States: A Report to the Prime Minister", 10 July 1942.

37. King Papers, J1 series, vol. 336, p. 288527, letter: King to Vining, 28 August 1942.

38. WIB Records, vol. 6, Organization chart of the Wartime Information Board, January 1943.

39. Department of Finance Records, E2C series, vol. 526, file 129-W, clipping: *The Ottawa Citizen*, n.d. [December 1942]; WIB Records, vol. 25, dead file A-E, letter: Ronald Everson to A.D. Dunton, 11 January 1943; King Papers, J1 series, vol. 322, pp. 273441ff., letter: W.L. Clark to King, 21 December 1942; *Ibid.*, pp. 273443ff., letter: King to W.L. Clark, 22 December 1942.

these difficulties led to a mysterious illness and the Chairman's resignation on January 27, 1943.⁴⁰

Following Vining's departure, a reorganized Board opened the door for a re-oriented information policy. Although the government quickly appointed an academic, Norman A.M. MacKenzie, President of the University of New Brunswick, as Vining's replacement, the Chairman's position grew less significant. This resulted both from the absentee location of the incumbent who did not move to Ottawa and from the separation of the duties of the chairman and of the chief executive officer.⁴¹ The government appointed a general manager to supervise the Board's operations and to suggest policies. To fill this new job, the cabinet appointed John Grierson, the Canadian Government Film Commissioner, in February, 1943. For the year following his appointment, Grierson exercised the predominant influence over the Board's development.

A self-proclaimed "expert at mindbending",⁴² Grierson evolved a philosophy of information based on social reform that invited participation by academics. Grierson believed that the average citizen had lost touch with contemporary developments because the educational system had failed to equip him with the means of coping with a complex society. The education system still had its feet grounded in the relatively simple society contemplated by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberal theorists and could not explain the speed of communications, wider horizons and specialized jobs of contemporary society. Hence, individuals could not understand their world and had come to rely not on their centres of formal education but on publishing, radio and films controlled by men interested in private profit.⁴³ As a remedy, Grierson pointed out that "judgement in knowledge may not be so important as judgement in purpose. . . ." Education could instil a sense of the patterns of social development by teaching about the everyday world and by trying, therefore, to provide a sense of what the wider world comprised. By taking as its subject matter such topics as industrial relations, economic stability and conservation, education could pattern the terms of a more active citizenship.⁴⁴ In teaching about the new system of social relations,

40. External Affairs Records, G2 series, vol. 2252, file 4310-40C, part 2, letter: O.M. Biggar to N. Robertson, 3 January 1943; WIB Records, vol. 5, file 2-1-1, letter: Philippe Brais to Emile Jean, 9 January 1943; PAC, L.B. Pearson Papers, vol. 2, Robertson file, telegram: N. Robertson to L.B. Pearson, 27 January 1943; WIB Records, vol. 1, file 2-1, minutes: WIB, 27 January 1943.

41. King Papers, J4 series, vol. 376, file 3944, p. C260363, memo: Heeney to Council, 5 February 1943.

42. Canadian Radio and Television Commission, "Transcript of an Interview with John Grierson by R. Chiasson and André Martin", Montreal, 27 February 1969.

43. John Grierson, "Films and the Community, Comprising the Use of Radio and Films in the Classroom: An Address to the National Union of Teachers, 1936", in Forsyth Hardy, comp. and ed., *Grierson on Documentary*, revised edition, (London, 1966), p. 191 [hereafter Hardy]; John Grierson, "Education and Total Effort: An Address at Winnipeg, Canada, 1941", in Hardy, pp. 272 ff.

44. John Grierson, "Searchlight on Democracy", *Documentary News Letter*, 1939, in F. Hardy, pp. 235-6; WIB Records, vol. 11, file 8-2-A, Speech by John Grierson, "Films and the ILO", 26 April 1944.

Grierson argued for a distinctly reformist approach. The values of individual competition and the liberal ethic, he felt, did not suit the educational requirements of the times, for "we are entering upon a new and interim society which is neither capitalist nor socialist, but in which we can achieve central planning without loss of individual initiative."⁴⁵ As the means of reaching the public with his ideas, Grierson naturally placed great emphasis on the role of imagery and art, namely the documentary film. Yet, his system implied the participation of the social sciences as the best way of doing the research necessary to isolate pertinent social developments and to prepare a response.

When he applied his ideas to a society at war, Grierson used the same arguments as the academics when he urged the government to take the lead in applying his concepts to information policy. "Under stress of war," he asserted, "we articulate the terms of our faith in progressive democracy. We learn to integrate the loyalties and forces of the community in the name of positive and highly constructive ideas." Aware of the expansion of government forced by the war, Grierson believed that governments:

cannot take upon themselves the responsibility of planning unless they exercise the power to inform and instruct the people on matters of state. Information services—propaganda if you like—follow inevitably in the wake of a government initiative. They are as inseparable as Siamese twins.⁴⁶

Although he did not dismiss the peril of political interference that this implied, Grierson thought that government information policy could "strike beyond party differences" and serve as "education in a world where the state is the instrument of the public enterprise."⁴⁷ Educators and government had to combine forces to rebuild the confidence of citizenry shattered by war following ten years of hard times. This meant recognizing basic needs and discontent arising from industrial transfers, inadequate health services and poor housing. No one could tell people to fight for the old way of life. Why sacrifice for a return to the Depression? To gain popular cooperation, governments had to demonstrate that they willed changes by combining exhortation with action. Again, this approach would mean the increased use of social scientific methods not only to study and to suggest areas for the expansion of the government into planning and social programmes, but also to design information policy to explain this change.⁴⁸

45. Claxton Papers, vol. 147, Speech by John Grierson to the Canadian Association for Adult Education Convention, Winnipeg, 30 May 1941; John Grierson, "The Documentary Idea: 1942", *Documentary News Letter*, 1942, in Hardy, pp. 249-50.

46. WIB Records, vol. 6, file 2-1-3, "The Necessity and Nature of Public Information", speech by John Grierson, Montreal, June 1943.

47. *Ibid.*, Grierson statement "It is Not Done with Mirrors"; John Grierson, "Propaganda and Education: An Address Before the Winnipeg Canadian Club", in Hardy, p. 285.

48. Claxton Papers, vol. 147, John Grierson's speech to the Canadian Association for Adult Education Convention, 30 May 1941; External Affairs Records, D1 series, vol. 1978, file 963, "The Nature of Propaganda"; *Ibid.*, "Notes on the Psychological Factor in Administration and the Relation of Public Information to Public Morale" attached to a memo: Grierson to Robertson, 27 October 1942.

WARTIME INFORMATION BOARD

As general manager of the Wartime Information Board, Grierson incorporated many academics with progressive political beliefs into the Board's structure. Despite this shift in the character of the Board's staff, the general manager did not reduce the number of newsmen. Since he believed as firmly as Rogers, Vining and Lash that the efficient dissemination of war news played an important role in informing the public, he continued the Board's news services and, in fact, operated them more efficiently than his predecessors committed to the priority of press services.⁴⁹ Grierson, however, did replace many of the corporate public relations specialists hired by Vining with academics drawn from the universities. He brought in political scientists like C.B. Macpherson and David Petegorsky, both recent graduates of the London School of Economics. Other academics appeared on the Board's roster. Gregory Vlastos, for example, joined the Board to look after information to the armed forces. Vlastos, a professor of philosophy at Queen's University, had carried out more than superficial research into politics during his involvement in the 1930's with the League for Social Reconstruction and his activities on behalf of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. Under the general manager's direction, the academics began evaluating proposals to co-ordinate the media for educational purposes and to stimulate social action.⁵⁰ The reports branch, the information gathering service of the Board, expanded quickly. Under branch director, Davidson Dunton, the Board acquired the research facilities to survey the labour, American, foreign-language and daily newspapers, as well as to monitor public opinion. As recommended earlier by the Bureau's committee on morale, Dunton set up a system of local correspondents across the country to report on public opinion regarding various wartime issues.⁵¹

In order to establish these information activities based on a philosophy that combined social science techniques with a belief in social reform, the Board had to overcome opposition. Much of this arose not out of disagreement in principle, but from the fear of adverse political consequences. Regarding public opinion surveys, R.B. Bryce, economist and board member representing the Department of Finance, had to convince his Minister, J.L. Ilesley, that tight restrictions on the distribution of government-commissioned poll results could avoid Conservative objections that the government possessed exclusive access to politically useful material.⁵² The later criticism of T.L. Church, a Tory Member of Parliament from Toronto, that the Canadian Gallup poll operated as a "Liberal" institution lent credibility to Ilesley's hesitation. Church did not even know that the Board was commissioning private surveys when he objected to the operations of the

49. WIB Records, vol. 13, file 8-10-1, report by C.F. Crandall, 25 March 1943.

50. *Ibid.*, vol. 15, file 8-3-5, memo: Walter Abell to John Grierson, 6 March 1943; *Ibid.*, vol. 12, file 8-2-1 memo: n.a., n.d., [David Petegorsky to Grierson, February-March 1943]; *Ibid.*, vol. 1, file 1-2-13, appendix "D" to minutes: Wartime Information Board, 12 April 1943; *Ibid.*, vol. 6, file 2-1-3, memo: Ian Eisenhardt to Grierson, 29 April 1943; *Ibid.*, vol. 9, file 3-16, memo: Maude Ferguson to Grierson, 14 June 1943.

51. PCO Records, 7C series, vol. 12, minutes: Cabinet War Committee, 21 January 1943.

52. Department of Finance Records, vol. 4030, file 129W-1B, memo: R.B. Bryce to J.L. Ilesley, 8 January 1943.

Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, the Canadian Gallup subsidiary.⁵³ Apart from this, the reports branch circulated a lengthy memorandum throughout the government to argue that "developments in the social sciences during the past fifteen years" had led to increasing respectability of current studies of public attitudes. The journal which published survey results, the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, had established its academic credentials and the large American foundations were funding studies by political scientists, sociologists and psychologists using survey techniques. Besides, concluded this memorandum, both Great Britain and the United States had tested the techniques and continued to use them to gain relevant, first-hand, up-to-date, topical and comparable knowledge about public attitudes.⁵⁴ After first giving permission in January, 1943, for the Board to undertake the public opinion surveys, the Cabinet revoked it and regranting it after Grierson put the Board's case again in March, 1943.⁵⁵

The alliance of the academics with social reform also caused ideological problems. The Department of Munitions and Supply, for example, objected to the whole idea of an industrial information section. These civil servants, for the most part dollar-a-year men on loan from Canadian corporations, could not accept the Board's contention that good morale among workers resulted from research into methods of improving social and working conditions in industry. To these men, building workers' support for the war effort should consist of emphasizing "moral responsibility".⁵⁶ Other Ottawa civil servants told each other to "beware of St. John and his disciples"⁵⁷ with their "high brow and high faluting ideas."⁵⁸

While Grierson convinced his Board to reiterate his philosophical arguments to overcome this opposition,⁵⁹ he also pointed out the political advantages which could accrue to the government of a democratic state if it adopted social scientific

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53. House of Commons, *Debates*, 20 May 1943, p. 2838; WIB Records, vol. 12, file 8-7A, letter: Arthur Porter to J.D. Ketchum, 27 May 1943; *Ibid.*, Ketchum to Porter, 28 May 1943.
 54. PAC, Department of Labour Records, vol. 886, file 8-9-19, WIB, Reports Branch, "Wartime Information and the Appraisal of Public Attitudes", memorandum #4, 8 February 1943.
 55. PCO Records, vol. 12, minutes: Cabinet War Committee, 21 January 1943; *Ibid.*, minutes: 27 January 1943; WIB Records, vol. 1, file 2-1, minutes: WIB, 8 March 1943, Appendix "E", letter: Heeney to Grierson, 5 March 1943.
 56. *Ibid.*, vol. 12, file 8-2-1, letter: Grierson to Claxton, 17 June 1943; *Ibid.*, minutes: committee on industrial morale, 11 June 1943; *Ibid.*, memo: by the co-ordinator of production, May 1943; PAC, Department of Munitions and Supply Records, vol. 141, file 3-1-A, memo: G.K. Sheils to Berry, 10 March 1944; *Ibid.*, file 14-1-188, letter: H.H. Webb to Sheils.
 57. L.B. Pearson Papers, vol. 2, Robertson file, letter: Pearson to Norman Robertson, 30 June 1943.
 58. Department of Finance Records, vol. 4030, file 129W-1B, letter: R.B. Bryce to A.D. Dunton, 7 September 1943.
 59. King Papers, J4 series, vol. 376, file 3944, p. C260387, WIB, Reports Branch, "Ballyhoo in Wartime", *Information Briefs*, 7, 3 May 1943.

methods of manipulating public opinion. For staff and money, Grierson shrewdly decided to play on Mackenzie King's current political fears and to demonstrate that information programmes based on the social sciences would help overcome the government's difficulties. He drew the Prime Minister's attention to the danger of the government's trusting the newspapers to explain its wartime policies and post-war plans when Canadians were increasingly alienated from the political system. General public sentiment, he reminded King, expressed a "distrust of effecting anything useful through democratic methods." This threatened state of social discontent, the Prime Minister knew full well, was accompanied by increasingly shaky support for his government. Grierson concluded that the way to give the government the "break" that the newspapers were refusing was by studying public attitudes and then by preparing programmes that would relate the war effort "to the larger matter of the reputation of Ottawa and the parliamentary institutions."⁶⁰ Although the general thrust of Grierson's argument revolved around re-awakening a sense of democracy, the implicit advantage for the Liberal party stood out clearly. For whatever reason, in October, 1943, Grierson managed to gain enough money to hire staff for his new programmes.⁶¹

Evidence exists that everyone interested in applying social scientific techniques was as concerned about the immediate political advantages as in the longer term implications for democracy. Grierson's view of social progress perhaps went farther than the government was prepared to accept and, consequently, the general manager could not gain support for some of his programmes. Among the academics, although he had hired many left-wing "liberals" to work for the Board, Grierson had also brought in many socialists.⁶² These individuals tried to promote their own views in carrying out their work. Critics noted this and Grierson had trouble gaining Cabinet approval for his projects.⁶³ Plans for an information programme to integrate Canadian ethnic groups into the war effort foundered. Grierson's officers favoured the more left-wing ethnic organizations while the Department of National War Services supported the most strongly anti-communist groups. As a result, the Board's involvement ended.⁶⁴ Grierson's efforts to build up a close relationship with the Canadian Association for Adult Education came under a cloud because many Liberals, particularly Brooke Claxton, the Prime Minister's Parliamentary Assistant, suspected that the socialists involved in the adult education movement were working to turn public

60. WIB Records, vol. 7, file 2-16, letter: Grierson to King, 9 October 1943.

61. PCO Records, 7C series, vol. 14, minutes: Cabinet War Committee, 21 October 1943.

62. The socialists included David Petegorsky, Gregory Vlastos, C.B. Macpherson, Martyn Estall, and Lorne T. Morgan.

63. Transcript of the author's interview with G.C. Andrew, Vancouver, 24 August 1974; Transcript of the author's interview with Lorne T. Morgan, Vancouver, August 1973; WIB Records, vol. 8, file 3-5, memo: A.D. Dunton to F.W. Park, 3 April 1945; *Ibid.*, vol. 8, file 3-5, letter: Rupert Davies to Dunton, 23 August 1944.

64. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, file 12-219, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 2 November 1943; *Ibid.*, vol. 13, file 8-9-2, letter: Grierson to Robertson, 28 December 1943; *Ibid.*, vol. 1, minutes: 10 January 1944; *Ibid.*, letter: G.C. Andrew to C.H. Payne, 12 January 1944.

attitudes to the disadvantage of the Liberals. Consequently, Grierson could not gain Cabinet approval for a programme to inform Canadians about the proposed alternative courses of action during the reconstruction period.⁶⁵

Under these circumstances, Grierson resigned in January, 1944, and Davidson Dunton, who shared many of Grierson's ideas, took over the general manager's position. A newspaperman, Dunton had joined the Board to set up the reports branch for Charles Vining. In this position, he had established an organization that used social scientific techniques to gather information about public attitudes. Because of his friendship with and support of Brooke Claxton during the 1940 election campaign, the government did not appear to worry that the new general manager would provide critics with a target for complaints about socialists working for the government. In addition to this, Dunton retained a belief in using the social sciences as well as the press in order to build support for the war effort. He needed all the means at his disposal because by 1944 Canadians' flagging enthusiasm threatened the operation of such essential wartime policies as rationing and price controls.⁶⁶

As one way of dealing with this potentially politically damaging situation, Dunton organized an even more efficient application of social scientific methods. The research branch developed sophisticated confidential public opinion polls and carried out surveys of up to 2,500 individuals. J.D. Ketchum, head of the branch, and Arthur Porter, the Gallup organization's Canadian director, helped each other to develop efficient gauges of Canadians' attitudes. Usually re-analyzing the Gallup results, Ketchum would tabulate the data by geographic region, economic rank, age, sex, education and occupation.⁶⁷ *Information Briefs*, a publication circulated throughout the government, made the civil service aware of Canadians' reactions to various issues. The "WIB Survey", a more confidential document, was distributed to those on a special list. These surveys complemented other reviews. The Board's system of correspondents reached its peak under Dunton's direction. Beginning with Vining, the Board asked individuals all over the country to write weekly or bi-monthly reports on local reaction to various issues. Correspondents included clergymen, housewives, projectionists on the National Film Board's movie circuits and the writers' war committee of the Canadian Authors' Association. Reports arrived from more than 140 communities. From these dispatches, the branch regularly prepared a confidential series of "Field Reports" that topically analyzed the letters as a means of piecing together

65. Claxton Papers, vol. 31, Mrs. G.V. Ferguson file, letter: Claxton to Mary Ferguson, 23 December 1943; King Papers, J4 series, vol. 326, file 3440, p. C226109, memo: Claxton to King, 5 November 1943; Archives of Ontario, Canadian Association for Adult Education Papers, series A-1, box 1, letter: George Edison to H.R.C. Avison, 18 August 1943.

66. Interview with G.C. Andrew; King Papers, J4 series, vol. 577, file 3945, pp. C260783ff., memo: Heeney to King, 7 January 1944; WIB Records, vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity co-ordinating committee, 25 January 1944.

67. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, J.D. Ketchum, "Press and Research Section", WIB, "Annual Report, 1943-1944"; *Ibid.*, vol. 3, Wartime Information Board, "Annual Report, 1945"; *Ibid.*, vol. 12, file 8-7A, letter: Ketchum to O.J. Morris, 17 August 1943.

a picture of general attitudes, including areas of discontent.⁶⁸ Complementing these two reviews, the Board received excerpts from censored letters and carried out an analysis of the Canadian press. Other government departments frequently used the Board's assessments of opinion on specific issues in order to design policies to overcome their own difficulties with the public.⁶⁹

The use of these social scientific techniques raised questions as to the place of the manipulation of public opinion in a democratic state, even a state at war. Because of the fear of charges of partisan manipulation of public opinion given the close ties between the government and the pollsters, the Board refused to allow the Gallup company to publicize the relationship.⁷⁰ Similarly, the Board did not make a practice of providing the Liberals with political information. Its reports to the Cabinet, however, did indicate the government's political strengths and weaknesses. Brooke Claxton, appointed Minister of National Health and Welfare in 1944, remained the most consistent student of the Board's political findings and privately asked for breakdowns of Canadians' political preferences.⁷¹ Generally, the Board used the opinion surveys to argue in favour of expanded domestic information facilities. Dunton would report to the Cabinet to demonstrate the existence of a specific morale problem and to seek authorization for remedial measures. These surveys were used as tools to analyze current levels of public information in order to prepare a plan of attack. It sometimes seemed, though, as if the Board used only the findings that bolstered its preconceived notions of the proper course of action. Ketchum, furthermore, would encourage the Gallup company to publish many of the commissioned results in order to influence public opinion without indicating the Board's hand. The Gallup people had to make it seem as though they had collected the data on their own initiative.⁷²

In 1944 and 1945, the Board reached the height of its activities in the application of social scientific techniques to specific problems and to the media. The first opinion surveys had indicated that interest in "patriotic" issues had waned and

68. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, monthly reports, J.D. Ketchum, "Research Section", October 1943; *Ibid.*, November 1943; PAC, Canadian Authors' Association Papers, vol. 5; WIB Records, vol. 27; *Ibid.*, vol. 2, Monthly Reports, J.D. Ketchum, "Reports Branch", June 1943.

69. Among the agencies using WIB research were the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (*Ibid.*, May 1944); the Department of Labour (*Ibid.*, October 1944); the Department of National Defence (*Ibid.*); and the Department of National Health and Welfare (*Ibid.*, December 1944).

70. *Ibid.*, vol. 12, file 8-7A, letter: J.D. Ketchum to O.J. Morris, 26 September 1944; *Ibid.*, letter: G.C. Andrew to Wilfrid Sanders, 5 November 1945.

71. *Ibid.*, vol. 27, "Field Reports", 28, 5 January 1944; *Ibid.*, vol. 12, file 8-7A, letter: Porter to Ketchum, 11 August 1943; *Ibid.*, letter: Ketchum to Porter, 30 March 1944; *Ibid.*, letter: Claxton to Dunton, 30 March 1944; Claxton Papers, vol. 140, Dominion Provincial Relations file, memo: Ketchum to Claxton, 31 March 1944.

72. WIB Records, vol. 12, file 8-7A, letter: Ketchum to Porter, 21 September 1943; *Ibid.*, vol. 3, WIB "Annual Report, 1945"; *Ibid.*, vol. 12, file 8-7A, "Questions for WIB Survey No. 3", n.d. [1944].

that the people wanted a stronger sense of participating in the process of government. Proportionally, most of those who did not understand the war effort were found in the social group with low income and educational levels.⁷³ The academics convinced the Board that it had to satisfy the demands of this large body of Canadians and that it must set out the pros and cons of national issues in terms these people could understand.⁷⁴ Accordingly, the Board's political scientists, C.B. Macpherson among them, began to prepare pamphlets to show ordinary citizens how to gain a greater voice in political decisions. This effort at promoting participatory democracy was not set out in civics course fashion, but rather explained how ordinary citizens could organize pressure groups and use their united strength to influence government decisions.⁷⁵

Apart from this general appeal, the academics prepared proposals that urged the government to consider the wide-ranging implications of every-day problems. Policies, as well as information programmes, they said, must take conditions such as industrial transfers, a heavier tax load, food and nutritional deficiencies, poor health services and substandard housing into account. The academics argued that, unless the government authorized studies of the problems of individual motivation resulting from these conditions, it could not design policies, let alone explain them. When public opinion surveys in 1943 demonstrated declining support for wage and price controls as well as for food conservation measures, the academics convinced the Board to support an educational campaign to explain the social, political and economic necessity for these policies.⁷⁶ The Board's social scientists then helped to design a message that took into account their research on the attitudes of the individual citizen as consumer. They emphasized the concept of "participant citizenship and social responsibilities of the individual."⁷⁷ The academics delivered speeches and wrote film strips to try to simplify their own knowledge enough to allow the "man in the street" some understanding of the complexities of economic inter-relationships.⁷⁸ By modify-

73. WIB, Reports Branch, "Information Wanted", *Information Briefs*, 8 (17 May 1943); *Ibid.*, "Information Wanted II", in *Ibid.*, 11 (27 December 1943); *Ibid.*, "Acceptance of Sacrifice", in *Ibid.*, (March 1943); *Ibid.*, "News Penetration" in *Ibid.*, 4 (20 March 1943).

74. WIB Records, vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity co-ordinating committee, 4 March 1944.

75. *Ibid.*, vol. 13, file 8-14B, mss: "Who's Our Boss: An Outline of Who Our Country Runs and Who Runs It", n.d. [1944].

76. *Ibid.*, vol. 9, file 3-16, memo: Adrian Head to K.W. Taylor, 31 May 1943; *Ibid.*, file 3-6-2, memo: summary and preliminary budget, [c. April 1943]; *Ibid.*, vol. 7, file 2-3, "A Nationwide Survey of Canadian Attitudes Towards Wartime Ceilings and Rationing", June 1944; *Ibid.*, vol. 4, "WIB Survey", 58 (March 1945); WIB, Reports Branch, "The Problems of Inflation Control", *Information Briefs*, 18 (4 October 1943).

77. WIB Records, vol. 10, file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 25 April 1944.

78. *Ibid.*, vol. 10, file 6-2-7, economic stabilization film project; *Ibid.*, mss: "Shoes, Ships, Ceiling Wax and Economic Stabilization", speech delivered by Lorne T. Morgan, 28 July 1944.

ing this new approach, the social scientists could apply it to alienated groups. The armed forces and industrial information programmes attempted to undertake a systematic evaluation of the causes of workers' and soldiers' discontent and then to explain government policies in a manner that would integrate these groups, as individuals, into the Canadian social and political scene. In the rehabilitation information programme, the academics expressed concern that the population might believe that many returning soldiers would arrive home with serious psychological problems. In order to counteract this impression, therefore, the social scientists took to the airwaves as one means of explaining the sociological and psychological implications of military life for the veteran and his family.⁷⁹

As the Board set up these programmes, it discovered that this work had wider implications than just conveying a message to the public. The academics' systematic studies of the social, economic and political impact of government activities began to show up ambiguities and deficiencies in government policies. Their research gave the social scientists working for the Board considerable influence over government policies in areas other than information activities. In publicizing rehabilitation measures, for example, the research carried out by political economist, Lorne T. Morgan, revealed problems in the interpretation of relevant legislation and departmental directives. The rehabilitation information committee, therefore, drew the attention of the Department of Veterans' Affairs to these problems. When the Department failed to act, the Board went directly to the Cabinet to suggest modifications.⁸⁰

Although by 1944 these programmes had begun to run smoothly, the approaching peace again raised the question of the implications for a democracy of the government's use of the social sciences in information work. For the Wartime Information Board, Dunton began the task of considering the issues in a November 1944 memorandum. He noted that a democracy, at peace or at war, needed to have the means of providing its citizens with enough facts to allow them to consider basic social issues. Canadians' "support for participation in national measures", he argued, "is determined by their convictions." As long as government accepted the "principle that in a democracy, it is both wrong and unnecessary to attempt to exhort, cajole or bamboozle people into acceptance of precepts laid down by a power above", there was no reason that the government should totally dismantle all its means of providing Canadians with the facts. With the peace, complex questions would not disappear and the government still had to provide the means for citizens to understand these issues. The success of complicated national measures, the proposed social security schemes for

79. For an explanation of the WIB's programmes see W.R. Young, "Making the Truth Graphic: The Canadian Government's Home Front Information Structure and Programmes During World War II", (Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1978), chapter IV; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Programme Archives (Toronto), disc 450502-1D, "The Soldiers Return", talk by J.D. Ketchum, 1945.

80. WIB Records, vol. 10, file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 14 March 1945; *Ibid.*, memorandum to Cabinet, 10 June 1945; *Ibid.*, memorandum to Cabinet, 6 February 1945.

example, would still depend on public understanding. In concluding, however, Dunton acknowledged that many citizens would fear that the government agency would serve mainly as an instrument of political manipulation and thus hamper the operation of the democratic process.⁸¹

This, in fact, was the chief argument of the newspapers which remained ever hostile to any threat to their place as the sole channel between the citizen and his government. They attacked any suggestion that the government retain peacetime information services in their wartime form. After the Japanese surrender in August, 1945, the weight of editorial opinion fell very strongly against any retention of the Board's domestic operations. A government press survey reported that, in a symposium on the post-war era, only eight out of twenty-one individuals favoured keeping up the Board's work at home.⁸² Believing that the press represented business interests which favoured the economic and the social *status quo*, some less influential elements of society, the Canadian Labour Congress and the adult educators, for example, did support the retention of some form of peacetime operation as a means of explaining to Canadians the expanded role of the government's social programmes.⁸³

Never totally at ease with the concentration of the academics and of the new social tools in the Wartime Information Board, the government came to accept the newspapers' point of view. To Mackenzie King and his Cabinet, the Board's domestic operations had continuously presented too obvious a target for charges of manipulating public opinion for the Liberals' political advantage. Not that they opposed the manipulation. The dangers of criticism, however, would prove even greater in peacetime. Consequently, caution prevailed and the Prime Minister, the civil service and the Cabinet agreed to abolish the Wartime Information Board. While the domestic operations ceased, the external branch became the Canadian Information Service on September 28, 1945, and later the information division of the Department of External Affairs.⁸⁴

In many ways, dismantling the Board did not erase the war's experiences. Authorities still believed that social scientific approaches and research had merit. In some areas, however, such as the Department of National Defence, the social scientists did not retain their wartime clout during the peacetime years. The

81. *Ibid.*, vol. 5, file 1-2-1, memo by A.D. Dunton, 22 November 1944; see also King Papers, J4 series, vol. 377, file 3945, p. C260866, memo: Heeney to King, 6 January 1945; *Ibid.*, p. C260860, memo: Heeney to King, 8 December 1944.

82. *The Toronto Telegram*, 23 June 1944; *Ibid.*, 6 January 1945; *The Ottawa Journal*, 4 December 1944; External Affairs Records, G2 series, vol. 2253, file 4310-40C, part 6, memo: opinions regarding the WIB, [August 1945].

83. Claxton Papers, vol. 52, MacDermot file, memo: T.W.L. MacDermot to Claxton, 7 September 1945; CAAE Papers, B2 series, box 2, draft article; WIB Records, vol. 8, file 3-5, letter: Eugene Forsey to G.C. Andrew, n.d. [Fall 1945].

84. *Ibid.*, vol. 4, file 1-4-9, letter: G.C. Andrew to N.A.M. MacKenzie, 24 August 1945; King Papers, J4 series, vol. 377, file 3945, p. C260885, memo: Heeney to P.M., 21 September 1945; Department of Finance Records, E2C Series, vol. 526, file 129W, copy PC 6300, 28 September 1945.

government also withdrew its support from many of the reform-oriented projects dear to the hearts of the adult educators. Nonetheless, the struggle of the social scientists to prove that their techniques remained applicable to government operations succeeded to some extent. The government, particularly the Department of National Health and Welfare, used the principles and practice of sociology and psychology to monitor the success of its social programmes. The various government agencies still retained academic advisers and information officers who used some of the Board's methods. Outside the government, various bodies used polling operations. Political parties also learned the advantages of public opinion survey results to design their election campaigns. In no small measure, the Liberals owed their re-election in 1945 to the speed with which they adopted this means of testing their party platform. In short, the war speeded up the shaping of the social sciences into "policy sciences within an administrative framework."⁸⁵

The war, however, did not provide a solution to the problem of the democratic state's place in manipulating public opinion. In fact, the social sciences provided a more accurate means of monitoring and, hence, modifying public attitudes. This made the question more acute. Throughout the war, everyone involved in public information remained aware of the dangers involved. Certainly, the newspapers argued that this use of the social sciences was illegitimate. The Wartime Information Board's officers, many of them committed to social reforms, sometimes used their access to survey results to promote their particular point of view. While the politicians expressed general concern about the implications of the government's arguing contentious issues before the public, once convinced, they took a different tack. After they had overcome their hesitations about establishing a strong information agency, they appeared less concerned about using it for their own political advantage than about getting caught at it. This was the reason for the Board's demise. The problem of state manipulation in a democratic society remained. The absence of an operation like the Wartime Information Board merely removed the major focus of debate.

85. John Porter, "Higher Public Servants and the Bureaucratic Elite in Canada", p. 486.

Résumé

Pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, le gouvernement canadien commence à recourir aux techniques des sciences sociales pour élaborer ses politiques d'information. Ceci n'est pas sans susciter de vives oppositions de la part des gens de la presse qui estiment que, dans un gouvernement élu démocratiquement, toute manipulation de l'information brime la liberté du citoyen puisqu'elle l'empêche de se faire une opinion personnelle de l'événement.

Au fait, les années de guerre voient alterner à la tête de l'organisme gouvernemental chargé de l'information publique des hommes représentant tantôt les gens de la presse, tantôt les adeptes des sciences sociales. C'est ainsi que se succèdent Gardiner, un partisan de la presse, qui est en poste de juillet 1940 à juin 1941, puis, Thorson, un supporteur des sciences sociales, qui est en fonction

jusqu'à mai 1942; vient ensuite Vining, un tenant de la presse, de mai 1942 à février 1943, suivi de Grierson, un fervent des sciences sociales de février 1943 à janvier 1944. Après lui, on opte définitivement pour les instruments qu'offrent ces dernières.

En janvier 1944, la direction passe à Dunton, un journaliste qui a travaillé sous Vining et Grierson. Pendant son mandat, on développera des techniques qui se réclament nettement des sciences sociales; elles s'étendront d'ailleurs assez rapidement à d'autres agences du gouvernement, voire même, elles permettront au parti libéral de se faire réélire en 1945. En somme, la guerre a accéléré l'intégration des méthodes des sciences sociales dans le cadre de l'administration gouvernementale; cependant, elle n'a pas apporté de solution au problème que soulèveront les journalistes tout au long de cette période: celui de la manipulation de l'information dans un état démocratique.