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Lawrence Dewan

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ST. ALBERT, CREATION, AND THE PHILOSOPHERS

Lawrence DEWAN

RÉSUMÉ. — Alors que Thomas d'Aquin était convaincu qu'Aristote (et peut-être Platon) était conscient de la création de la matière première, Albert le Grand soutenait que tous les philosophes avaient été incapables de voir la matière comme créée. Je passe d'abord les écrits d'Albert en revue afin de montrer que telle est bien son opinion. J'offre ensuite un élément d'explication du fait que Thomas et Albert aient lu les philosophes d'une manière si différente. Cependant que selon Thomas la substance de la matière et la puissance de la matière pour la forme sont identiques, Albert distinguait l'une de l'autre de sorte que la substance de la matière est en dehors de toute unification causale du réel.

SUMMARY. — While Thomas Aquinas was convinced that Aristotle (and perhaps Plato) knew of the creation of primary matter, Albert the Great held that all the philosophers had failed to see matter as created. I first review Albert's writings to show that this is indeed his opinion. I then offer one element of explanation as to why Thomas and Albert read the philosophers in such a different way. While Thomas held that the substance of matter and the potency of matter for form are identical, Albert distinguished between the two, so that the substance of matter stands outside any causal unification of the real.

IN THIS PAPER, I will be speaking of "creation" as including the production from nothing even of, and especially of, primary matter. Pierre Courcelle has noted a trend among the later neo-Platonists towards such a doctrine.¹ However that

1. Cf. COURCELLE, Pierre, *La Consolation de la philosophie dans la tradition littéraire*, Paris, 1967: Études augustinienes, pp. 223-224. He presents this point, moving from Proclus through Ammonius, son of Hermias, to Hierocles. Concerning the latter, we read: "Enfin Hiéroclès, dès le Ve siècle, soutenait dans son traité *De Providentia* exactement la thèse de la création 'ex nihilo', qu'il attribue d'ailleurs à Platon; il blâme 'certains Platoniciens qui ne croient pas que Dieu avait assez, pour produire le monde, de sa propre sagesse et de sa propre puissance, mais disent qu'il n'a pu créer qu'avec le secours de la matière inengendrée et de la nature non créée par lui'; car, dit-il, dans leur hypothèse, 'ce ne serait pas un bien pour la matière de recevoir l'ordre, si du moins elle était inengendrée non seulement quant au temps, mais encore quant à la cause.'"

may be, there is no doubt that the question: "what did Plato and Aristotle think about the creation of matter?" was of great importance for 13th-century Latin thinkers. Already we find Peter Lombard (mid-12th century), at the very beginning of the second book of his *Sentences* (in which second book he treats of creation), noting the error of Plato who in the *Timaeus* taught that there were three uncreated principles: God, the Ideas, and matter. Aristotle is also mentioned as positing such principles: matter and form, and an agent, along with the doctrine that the world always is and was.² Since Peter Lombard's *Sentences* became a basic tool, an "institution" one might say, for theological instruction, starting in Paris about 1235–40, lecturers on the *Sentences* were strongly invited to consider the problem. Thus we see St. Bonaventure, who lectured on the *Sentences* in the years 1251–53, while noting the error of Plato, raise the question: did Aristotle posit the creation of matter? Bonaventure says he is not sure, but he thinks *not*.³ On the other hand St. Thomas Aquinas, who lectured on the *Sentences* in the years 1252–1256, while he too notes the error of Plato, nevertheless expresses his disagreement with Peter Lombard concerning Aristotle. Aristotle, says Thomas, reduced *everything* to one first principle: even matter is produced by the first principle.⁴ Moreover St. Thomas considers it normal enough that Aristotle should so teach, since St. Thomas believes the creation of matter is demonstrable by reason.⁵ This is a position which he never relinquishes.⁶

What about St. Albert? In his *Commentary on the Sentences* Albert says that all the philosophers taught that matter is eternal and not produced by the first efficient

2. Cf. Peter LOMBARD, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae* (ed. tertia), t. I, pars II, Grottaferrata, 1971: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas: Lib. II, dist. I, cap. 1 (p. 330. 4–6) and cap. 3 (p. 331.21–23). Concerning the date of composition, cf. *ibid.*, t. I, pars I, "prolegomena", p. 129*: "1155–1157". Peter Lombard himself, in the passages in question, is merely citing the reference to the errors of Plato and Aristotle contained in the *Glossa ordinaria* (of the Bible) on *Genesis* 1,1, which in turn is quoting the 9th-century writer, Walafrid Strabo: cf. J. de BLIC, "L'œuvre exégétique de Walafrid Strabon et la Glossa ordinaria", *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.* 16 (1949), esp. pp. 20–21.
3. Cf. ST. BONAVENTURE, *Sent.* 2, dist. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1; in *Opera omnia*, Quaracchi, 1885, t. II, P. 17A. Cf. John F. QUINN, C.S.B., "Chronology of St. Bonaventure (1217–1257)", *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972) 168–186, who gives 1251–1253 as dates for Bonaventure's lecturing on the *Sentences*; this would of course not necessarily coincide exactly with the date of writing of the commentary. — Concerning the official introduction of the *Sentences* into the Paris university program for formation of a *magister*, cf. James WEISHEIPL, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, Garden City, N.Y., 1974: Doubleday, pp. 67–69.
4. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Sent.* 2, dist. 1, expositio textus (ed. P. Mandonnet, Paris, 1929; LETHIELLEUX, p. 43): "... Aristoteles non erravit in ponendo plura principia: quia posuit esse omnium tantum a primo principio dependere; et ita relinquitur unum esse primum principium. Erravit autem in positione aeternitatis mundi." And: "... secundum ipsum [Aristotle]... forma et materia... ab illo primo principio producuntur." — For the dates of Thomas' lecturing on the *Sentences*, cf. WEISHEIPL, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, pp. 49–51 and 358–359.
5. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Sent.* 2, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Mand., pp. 17–18): "... sic creatio potest demonstrari, et sic philosophi creationem posuerunt..." One of the notes of creation, as he is here speaking of it, is that, as distinction from generation, which "praesupponit materiam", creation causes "omne id quod est in re".
6. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Summa theologiae* 1.44.1 and 2; also *In Phys.* 8.2 (ed. Maggiolo, Rome/Turin, 1954: Marietti, para. no. 975 (5)), where even Plato might be thought to know the creation of matter. Notice also *Summa theologiae* 1.15.3, *ad* 3 (with its important note in the Ottawa edition) and *ad* 4, where St. Thomas holds himself aloof from the assertion that Plato posited matter as uncreated.

cause.⁷ He is writing in 1246.⁸ This is a comparatively early text of Albert. He has not yet begun his paraphrases on Aristotle. Since our question bears directly on Albert's view of the meaning of the teachings of the philosophers, it is to the paraphrases that we must turn.

The question is raised very explicitly in Albert's *Physics*. In the first book he asks how matter comes into being. He answers that the first cause causes it by a command. In answer to the difficulty that only that which has its formal idea in the first cause can be produced by it, and that this cannot be true of matter, which lacks all form, he replies that the first, which causes by command, has an idea of matter, taking matter according to its proportion to form, i.e. according to its role as subject. He compares this to the wood being considered by the artist, not in itself as wood, but insofar as it is apt to receive the form of art. To the difficulty that only what is most perfect can come immediately from the first, he says this is true of what is brought to be according to maximal likeness to the first, but need not be true of what is brought to be as foundation and subject for all products.⁹ Though he says it is not "the

7. Cf. ST. ALBERT, *Sent.* 2, dist. 1, A, a. 5 (ed. S.C.A. Borgnet, Paris, 1890: Vivès, t. 27, p. 18B): "... Plato bene vidit... quod materia et efficiens numquam coincidunt in idem secundum rem; et cum ipse videret, quod *primum efficiens* nihil habeat de potentia, nec sit compositum: ipse putabat, quod licet in se non impediri posset ab actu, tamen impediri posset ex defectu recipientis operationes ejus. Cum igitur forma aliquo modo sit in efficiente, vidit bene quod ipse illam ex se aliquo modo dare potuit. Quia autem nihil sibi est in potentia, potentia non fuit in ipso: et ideo illam, ut sibi videbatur, ex se *producere non potuit*, et ideo dedit eam sibi ab aeterno. Et haec ratio *omnes* Philosophos coegit ad ponendum materiam esse aeternam. Sed deceptio est in hoc, quia procedunt ac si Deus agat per necessitatem naturae: quia tunc absque dubio impediretur si non haberet in quid actiones imprimeret suas. Sed nos ponimus quod agit per imperium, et ita de nihilo educit eam. Et hac positione facta, nihil sequitur impossibile quæ timuerunt *omnes* Philosophi." — Later, in the same place, at a. 11 (p. 30B), Albert says that in speakings of Aristotle, Peter Lombard goes beyond the letter of the text, but with reason for doing so: "... Aristoteles in veritate non dicit hoc, quod tria vel duo sint principia mundi. Sed ipsi probat duo non incepisse per motum, scilicet materiam primam, et motorem primum: et ideo *imponitur ei* quod duo dixerit esse ab aeterno..." (my italics throughout).

8. Cf. WEISHEIPL, James, "Life and Works of St. Albert", in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences*, Toronto, 1980: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, p. 22. We should mention Albert's *De quatuor coaequævis*, tr. I, q. 2, a. 3 (ed. Paris, t. 34, p. 326A ff.): "Utrum materia creata sit, vel non?" The work antedates *Sent.* bk. II (1246), according to WEISHEIPL, *ibid.* The arguments for the affirmative reply are simply two authoritative statements from St. Augustine (326B). To be noted also is the *ad 3* (327B) on how matter has a divine idea. This is explained in terms of the "ratio potentiae" which is in matter. It is called a "forma secundum quid" and a "forma rationis". It is said not to diminish the simplicity of matter "secundum rem". All this, however, must be read in conjunction with the immediately following article, a. 4, "Utrum materia sit simplex vel composita?" There we are told it is "simplex... non habens compositionem penitus... nisi tantum ordinis ad formam cum substantia materiae: et hic ordo differt ab ipsa, sicut potentia... ita scilicet quod non habet compositionem in aliquo quod est res simpliciter; ... ordo ad formam... medium est inter ens et non ens." (329B–330A). Clearly the composition is not simply the work of the mind. Concerning the simplicity of matter, cf. below, n. 28.

9. Cf. ALBERT, *Phys.* 1, tr. 3, c. 13 (ed. Paris, t. 3, p. 77B): "... quamvis Philosophi non sit determinare de exitu materiae in esse, sed potius relinquere materiam esse: eo quod ipsa sit principium physicum, sicut quælibet scientia relinquit esse sua principia, et non quærit qualiter in esse exiverunt: tamen propter bonitatem doctrinae dicimus, quod a prima causa exivit in esse: et sicut ipsa scibilis est per analogiam ad formam, hoc modo secundum rationem proportionis habuit ideam: primum enim causat per imperium: et ideo subjectum cadit in intellectu esse, hoc modo quo lignum in mente artificis: non enim cadit in mente artificis in eo quod est lignum, sed in eo quod susceptibile est artis: et hoc est primum subjectum formae naturalis quod cadit in mente divina. — Ad hoc autem quod objicitur quod, id quod est a prima causa immediate, perfectissimum est, dicendum quod hoc est verum, quod ad esse conducit maxima sui similitudine, sicut est intelligentia. Quod autem sic ad esse

philosopher's" task to ask this question, he means clearly enough the physicist; he shows no pessimism whatever as to the metaphysician's ability to handle the question.

However, it is in *Physics* bk. 8 that we have the most detailed discussion of problems touching the doctrine of creation. Arguing against Averroes as to whether any philosophers admit that something can come from nothing, Albert says:

The most important Peripatetics *do not deny* that by a simple act, especially of the first cause, the essence of primary matter together with the substantial form is brought from nothing into being by God: and even Aristotle says in his book *De natura deorum* that the world is created by God the maker.¹⁰

While this statement is not very strong ("do not deny" is not "affirm", and one might well wonder if the "essence" of primary matter means primary matter in its entirety),¹¹ Albert's position against Averroes is quite simply that some philosophers have held (and it is a necessary truth) that something can come from nothing, even if only the *forms* of things.¹² Subsequently Albert very solemnly affirms his own opinion, and his faith, and the reasons which he can marshal in its avour. This includes very explicitly the creation of primary matter by God.¹³ The argument presented focusses especially on the heavens and their diversity of parts and matter/form composition. This points to their being caused. They are not generable. They must be produced from nothing. The same will be true of the lower composites of matter and form, and, says Albert, "especially of primary matter".¹⁴ A little later,

conducit, ut sit fundamentum et subjectum omnium quæ produci habent, non oportet quod sit perfectissimum." — Albert also answers here a difficulty that to have both matter and form issue from the first cause implies there is a prior common nature which matter and form share. He rejects this through an appeal to community, not as a genus, but by analogy (pp. 77B–79A).

10. Cf. ALBERT, *Phys.* 8, tr. 1, c. 4 (ed. Paris, t. 3, p. 530B): "Non autem negant præcipui Peripateticorum quin actu simplici præcipue causæ primæ, essentia materiæ primæ cum forma substantiali educta sit de nihilo in esse a Deo: quod etiam Aristoteles in libro suo de *Natura Deorum*, mundum a Deo opifice dicit esse creatum." — To judge from Albert, *CPU* bk. 2, tr. 2, c. 1 (ed. Paris, t. 10, p. 477B), he is getting his information about what he calls Aristotle's *De natura deorum* through the remarks about Aristotle in Cicero's *De natura deorum*. Thus, they are really references to Aristotle's lost dialogue *On Philosophy*. Cf. CICERO, *De natura deorum*, bk. 1, c. xiii (ed. H. Rackham, Cambridge, Mass./London, 1933: Harvard/Heinemann [Loeb Classics]), p. 35; also, and especially bk. 2, c. xxxvii (ed. cit., p. 215–217), where Aristotle speaks of the eternal regular movements of the heavenly bodies as the works of the gods.
11. For the grounds for such scruples, cf. below nn. 33 and 37.
12. Cf. ALBERT, *Phys.* 8, tr. 1, c. 4 (ed. Paris, t. 3, p. 531B): "Prima autem forma non potest educi de materia: quoniam si de materia educeretur, tunc oporteret inchoationem ejus esse in materia: sed inchoatio ejus est aliquid formæ: ergo ante primam formam est aliquid formæ, quod est impossibile: ergo oportet quod prima forma sit ab efficiente primo. Constat autem quod nihil præcedit formam primam ex quo fiat: ergo ipsa per actum causæ educitur de nihilo..."
13. Cf. ALBERT, *Phys.* 8, tr. 1, c. 13 (ed. Paris, t. 3, pp. 549B–550B).
14. Speaking of the heavens, ALBERT says: (*ibid.*, p. 552A–B) "Non igitur restat aliquid dicendum, nisi quod compositum totum corpus in forma et materia, ab aliquo quod est causa sui, productum sit in tota illa diversitate quam videmus in ipso: et sit ideo non generabile et non corruptibile, quia elongatum est a contrariis... Cum autem producat in forma et materia... producit ex nihilo: hoc autem nos vocamus creationem: ergo ex nihilo creatus est orbis, et per eandem rationem alia sunt educta de nihilo, et præcipue materia prima." (my italics)

speaking of why, if his argument is more reasonable than what Aristotle presents, Aristotle himself did not present it, he says :

It was Aristotle's practice in the *Physics* to present physical objects which can be proved by physical arguments. The beginning of the world by creation in neither a physical object nor can it be physically proved. And that is why Aristotle was silent about this line of thinking in the *Physics*, and he touched upon it expressly only in the book *De natura deorum* which he wrote.¹⁵

Albert says he will inquire diligently into the issues connected with creation in "*prima philosophia*". He does not regard his own argument in *Physics* 8 as any more than probable.¹⁶

Albert's *Physics* is only the first of the Aristotelian paraphrases, written about 1250.¹⁷ Let us then turn to the works of "first philosophy" the *Metaphysics* and the *De causis et processu universitatis* (henceforth "*CPU*"), dated no earlier than 1263.¹⁸ To speak generally, considering the immense interest in the question at the time, what is astonishing is that one finds *no ex professo* treatment of the question in the "first philosophy" paraphrases. Albert is remarkable for his silence on the issue.

Take first the *Metaphysics*. These books simply bulge with marvellously detailed "digressions" on all sorts of questions. Discussions of matter are among the most frequent. Yet nowhere do we find a digression on the creation of matter by the first cause. Albert's presentation of metaphysics is from the start a doctrine of *creation*. The *esse* which is the focal-point of all metaphysical consideration is the *primum creatum*.¹⁹ However, we look in vain for the doctrine that primary matter is created. At one point Albert cites an argument for the creation of the universe by the choice of the first cause, requiring no matter because of his infinite power. He rejects this, characterizing it as a confusion of philosophy with theology.²⁰

Take now *CPU*. This work is not simply a paraphrase, even an Albert-style paraphrase, of the *Liber de causis*. It is that, indeed, in the second of its two books. But it has a first book which treats of the first cause, its primacy, its knowledge, will, and mode of influence on all else. Thus, it affords ample occasion for treatment of our question. Once again, there is much discussion of creation — how the first cause creates the first effect, and so on. However, *nowhere* is our question discussed. One finds a presentation of how the being of all things is derived from the first cause

15. Cf. ALBERT, *Phys.* 8, tr. 1, c. 14 (ed. Paris, t. 3, p. 555A-B).

16. Cf. *ibid.*, c. 4 (p. 531B).

17. Cf. WEISHEIPL, "Life and Works of St. Albert", p. 30.

18. Fr. WEISHEIPL, *ibid.*, pp. 40-41, has Albert beginning his *Metaphysics* around 1264, and engaged in writing *CPU* around 1269; D. Siedler and Paul Simon, in their introduction to Albert's *Summa theologiae* (ed. Cologne, t. 34 (1), p. XVI, lines 84-87), are inclined to place both works towards 1263.

19. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica* 1, tr. 1, c. 1 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 2.16-21): "Hæc autem speculatio est rerum altissimarum divinarum, quæ sunt esse simplicis differentie et passiones præter conceptionem cum continuo et tempore, nihil accipientes principiorum essendi ab eis, eo quod priora illis sunt et causæ eorum, et ideo ista stabiliunt in esse omnia continua et omnia temporalia." Also, *ibid.* (p. 3.1-4): "Esse enim, quod hæc scientia considerat non accipitur contractum ad hoc vel illud, sed potius prout est prima effluxio dei et creatum primum, ante quod non est creatum aliud."

20. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica* 11, tr. 3, c. 7 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 542.7-29).

(“*necesse esse*”), and one might think that should suffice.²¹ Yet on the very next page we are told that matter has *no* cause as regards its “*id quod est*”. One may be forgiven for wishing for an *ex professo* treatment. Thomas Aquinas, writing at about the same time in his *Summa theologiae*, after presenting a demonstration that all beings whatsoever have their being from God, felt the need to add immediately a complementary discussion: “even primary matter is created by God”.²³

At one point in *CPU*, bk. 1, in criticizing Gebirol, Albert says Gebirol has not explained the origin of matter. However, the passage is a short *aporia*, noting difficulties on both sides of the question: it contains no positive doctrine.²⁴

CPU, bk. 2 discusses causes which remain aloof from matter in a remarkable way. The progressive “contraction” or limitation as we descend the hierarchy “does not go all the way to matter”. The book is about forms “having nothing material” about them. The forms “stay out” of matter, and yet are the efficient and formal principles of (material) things. The forms of material things are a “resplendence” of the forms discussed in this book.²⁵

21. Cf. ALBERT, *CPU*, bk. 1, tr. 1, c. 10 (ed. Paris, t. 10, p. 383B): “Ex omnibus his relinquitur, quod omnia quæ sunt in universitate mundi, sunt ab eo quod est necesse esse, et quod ipsum nullo modo sit vel possit esse ab alio, et quod omnia alia, eo quod in unoquoque eorum aliud sit esse et illud quod est, necesse est esse ab alio: et quod ipsum est fons et origo omnium quæ sunt... ita quod primum quod est necesse esse, fundamentale erit ad omnia: et si ipsum contineat emanationem esse, nihil erit ens vel esse in tota existentium universitate.”

22. Cf. ALBERT, *CPU*, bk. 1, tr. 1, c. 11 (ed. Paris, t. 10, p. 384B): “Cum autem causa dicatur secundum quatuor genera causarum, constat quod causa illa præ omnibus habet poni principium, quæ nullo modo causam habet, neque secundum esse, neque secundum id quod est. Talis autem causa forma non est: licet enim forma secundum id quod est, causam non habet: tamen secundum esse in effectu, causam habet efficientem: et secundum quod fundatur in esse, causam habet materialem. Talis etiam causa non est materia vel hyle: licet enim materia secundum id quod est, non habeat causam: tamen secundum esse in effectu, causam habet formam: et ut efficiatur in effectu, causam habet efficientem: et ut moveatur ad effectum, causam habet finalem.” This passage is repeated almost word for word by Albert’s disciple, Ulrich of Strasbourg, but with explicit reference to “the philosophers”: “Inter genera quoque causarum, illa causa proprie est principium quod nullo modo causam habet, scilicet nec secundum esse nec secundum id quod est. Et hoc non convenit formæ nec materiæ, licet enim philosophi dicunt formam secundum id quod est non habere causam, tamen concedunt ipsam secundum esse in effectu habere causam efficientem, et quod secundum quod fundatur in esse, causam habet in esse, scilicet materiam. Similiter quamvis dicant materiam sive secundum id quod est nullam habere causam, tamen secundum esse in effectu causam habet formam et ut fiat in effectu causam habet efficientem, et ut moveatur ad hoc esse, causam habet finem...” Ulrich of Strasbourg, *Summa de bono* 4.1.1. (ed. Francis J. Iescoe [*God as First Principle in Ulrich of Strasbourg*], New York, 1979: Alba House, p. 149, ll. 12–23.

23. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Summa theologiae* 1.44.1 and 2. The work is dated 1266–1268: cf. Leonard E. BOYLE, *The Setting of the Summa theologiae of St. Thomas*, Toronto, 1982: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, p. 14.

24. Cf. ALBERT, *CPU*, bk. 1, tr. 1, c. 6 (ed. Paris, t. 10, p. 372A): “Hæc autem opinio... imperfecta est. Non enim dicit bene unde ortum habeat materia, quæ quamvis per generationem et corruptionem non producat in esse, tamen aliquo modo habet esse: et sic vel erit principium, vel ex principio. Principium esse non ponit, quia ab esse deficit: et quod ab esse deficit, nullius, secundum esse potest esse principium. Si autem ex principio, non potest esse nisi ex primo universi esse principio: actus autem principii completus est et completivus: oporteret ergo quod materia completiva quoddam esset, quod iterum falsum est. Neutrum autem istorum Avicbron determinavit.”

25. Cf. ALBERT, *CPU*, bk. 2, tr. 1, c. 1 (ed. Paris, t. 10, p. 434B): “... formæ rerum omnium in fonte causæ primæ, et in lumine intelligentiarum et in fluxu super animas nobiles acceptæ, nihil habent materiale, contrarium, vel privativum admixtum, sed sunt splendide et puræ: et de talibus per totum librum

It is true that we are told the providence of the first cause extends to every "*quod est*", even to matter. This is shown by matter's obedience.²⁶

There is even a passage in which it is made perfectly clear that in the hierarchy, the first cause produces not only the *act* of the product, but even the *receptive potency* for this act.²⁷ However, it is a fact that Albert regularly distinguishes between the *potency* which is in the matter vis-à-vis the form and the *substance* of the matter.²⁸ Such passages, then, leave us unsatisfied.

My suggestion, then, is that Albert's silence is significant. The doctrine of creation of matter is simply not part of the philosophical enterprise, as he conceives of it. If this is so, it suggests a further question. Why is it that Thomas Aquinas is so positive as to the presence of a doctrine of creation of primary matter among the philosophers, as well as the philosophical demonstrability of such a doctrine, whereas Albert neither finds it in their writings nor thinks it pertains to philosophical thinking at all?²⁹ I propose that consideration of what each teaches about the nature of matter will help us understand their difference as to what Aristotle, particularly, meant.

persequemur." Also, *ibid.* (p. 435A-B): "... hic agitur de his principiis quæ rebus communicabilia non sunt, et ideo rebus non umbrantur, nec in diffinitionibus rerum accipiuntur: cum tamen sunt principia rerum et efficienter et formaliter. Sunt ergo lumina sincera, quorum resplendentia sunt formæ rerum..."

26. Cf. ALBERT, *CPU*, bk. 2, tr. 2, c. 10 (ed. Paris, t. 10, p. 493B).

27. Cf. ALBERT, *CPU*, bk. 2, tr. 4, c. 12 (ed. Paris, t. 10, p. 585A-B): "Causa enim prima non tantum est producens res, sed gradus et ordinem rerum prædeterminat, ut dicit Moyses Aegyptius: nisi enim omnium capacitates impleret, non esset dives majus omnibus, nec esset causa universalis: et ideo sub actu producti producit potentiam susceptivam: quæ quia sub umbra actus producit, necesse est quod imperfecta sit: propter quod potentia non in esse alicujus est. Aliter enim potentia et actus essent simul in eodem et secundum idem: quod esse non potest." Also, *ibid.* (p. 586B): "... diversitas autem recipientium... determinatur a sapientia primi, quod superdives non esset, si uno modo tantum communicaretur: sed superdives est quando secundum omnem possibilitatem recipientium communicatur."

28. Cf. e.g. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 3, tr. 3, c. 8 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 147.19-35): "... materia nullo modo potest esse generationis subiectum aut *entis principium* nisi per analogiam ad formam. Ad formam autem non habet analogiam nisi per formæ esse imperfectum et indeterminatum et confusum existentis in ipsa. Propter quod ipsa non est substantia simplex, et si ut substantia simplex acciperetur, non potest esse mutationis subiectum, cum mutation sit forma facta post formam continue, nec simplex accepta esset *entis principium*, cum omne ens perfectum principietur ab imperfecto secundum idem esse, imperfectum autem secundum idem esse perfecti sumptum est eiusdem formæ cum perfecto, secundum modum et esse differens. Et sic materia est principium et esse et cognitionis et subiectum. Sic autem accepta habet potentiam ad actum formæ et operationes." (italics added) — Cf. also ALBERT, *Phys.*, bk. 1, tr. 3, c. 13 (ed. Paris, t. 3, p. 76A); Bruno NARDI, in "La Dottrina d'Alberto Magno sull' 'inchoatio formæ'", *Studi di Filosofia Medievale*, Rome, 1960: Editioni di Storia e Letteratura, p. 88, expresses the view that in this latter text the matter and its potency are identical. However, I think that even as regards the potency by which matter is subject of form, for Albert, the potency is diverse from the matter.

29. If this statement seems rather strongly put, consider the position of Albert in his *Summa theologiae*, part 2, tr. 1, q. 3 (ed. Paris, t. 32, p. 21A-B): "... Philosophi ductu rationis non adjunctæ per aliquid intus vel extra non potuerunt cognoscere principium creationis vel etiam creationem, secundum quod proprie dicta est creatio productio alicujus ex nihilo... omnes... dixerunt... materiam factam non esse. Sed ratio adjuncta interius per inspirationem et fidem, et exterius per sacræ Scripturæ inspectionem... exterius etiam adjuncta per opus quod opificem ostendit... poterant cognoscere omnipotentiam primi principii: et quia omnipotentia in summo est, et quia majoris potentia est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex aliquo, hoc modo poterant cognoscere primum principium esse creans: sed hoc modo non cognoscitur nisi quia primum principium est omnipotens. Quid autem sit omnipotentia ejus, non

Let us look, if only briefly, at St. Thomas. In his presentation of matter as created, in the *Summa theologiae*, he presents the conception of creation as a consideration of the cause of beings as beings. His point is to stress how all-penetrating such causality is. Nevertheless, there is the other premise, namely that matter pertains to the being of the thing. In this way, it comes within the field proper to the cause of beings as beings.³⁰ What I wish to stress is that for Thomas, there are no grounds for doubt that matter falls *entirely* within the field of influence of the cause of beings as beings. The reason is his thoroughgoing identification of the substance or "*quod est*" of matter and the very potency to be. Thus, I take as highly significant such a statement as: "... matter, as regards the very subject which it is, is potency to the being which is through form..." ("Cum materia hoc ipsum quod est sit potentia ad esse quod est per formam...").³¹ This complete identification of the very stuff of matter, if one may so put it, with potency for being, comes out frequently. Thus, in the *De substantiis separatis*, we read:

Because matter, as regards its "that which is" ("secundum id quod est"), is a being in potency ("in potentia ens"), it is necessary that in function of diversity of potency there be diverse matters. Nor by "the substance of matter" do we mean anything else but the very potency which is in the genus of substance.

And the same point is made in St. Thomas' *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*.³²

scitur nisi infinite, ut dictum est." Albert, in this place, should be compared with the parallel passage in the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, i.e. bk. 2, Inq. II, tr. I, sect. 1, q. II, tit. II-26 (in Alexandri de HALES, *Summa Theologica*, Quaracchi, 1928: ex typographia collegii s. Bonaventurae, t. 2, p. 37B). This latter work is very positive that the philosophers have known creation "ex rationibus", explicitly including creation of matter: "omnia, et ita materiam". Albert's *Summa theologiae* is dated, as to its second part, "not finished before 1274": cf. D. SIEDLER and Paul SIMON, Albert, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Cologne, t. 34/1, p. XVII, lines 34-39.

30. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Summa theologiae* 1.44.2, especially *ad* 3: "... oportet quod etiam illud quod se habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse ipsius pertinet, creatum est." Cf. also *Summa contra gentiles*, 2.16, para. 12 ("Item. Materia prima..."); notice that in the *SCG*, 2.15 and 16, St. Thomas first asks the question about God as cause of all beings, and then secondly explicitly raises the issue of primary matter (just as in the *Summa theologiae*).

31. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Compendium theologiae* I, c. 74, lines 26-27 (*Opera omnia*, t. 42, p. 105).

32. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *De substantiis separatis*, c. 8, lines 12-21 (*Opera omnia*, t. 40, p. D 53): "... quia materia secundum id quod est est in potentia ens, necesse est ut secundum potentiae diversitatem sint diversae materiae; nec aliud dicimus materiae substantiam quam ipsam potentiam quae est in genere substantiae, nam genus substantiae sicut et alia genera dividitur per potentia et actum. Et secundum hoc nihil prohibet aliquas substantias quae sunt in potentia tantum esse diversas secundum quod ad diversa genera actuum ordinantur..." Cf. *ibid.*, c. 6, lines 194-202 (p. D 51): "Materiae autem proprium est in potentia esse; hanc igitur materiae distinctionem accipere oportet non secundum quod est vestita diversis formis aut dispositionibus, hoc enim est praeter essentiam materiae, sed secundum distinctionem potentiae respectu diversitatis formarum: cum enim potentia *id quod est* ad actum dicatur, necesse est ut potentia distinguatur secundum id ad quod primo potentia dicitur." (my italics) — Cf. also, ST. THOMAS, *In Phys.*, bk. 1, lect. 15 (ed. Maggìolo, para. 131 [3]). Notice that in *Sent.* 1.3.4.2. *ad* 4 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 117), St. Thomas begins his reply by at least mentioning the possibility that someone might mean by "passive potency" the relation or order of matter to form, a relation not identifiable with the essence of the matter. However, in later treatments of the same point (*St* 1.77.1. *ad* 2; *Q. de anima* 12. *ad* 12; and *De spiritualibus creaturis* 11. *obj.* 15 and *ad* 15), no such "option" is even mentioned.

On the other hand, St. Albert constantly teaches the distinction between the substance of matter and the potency of matter.³³ However, Albert's treatment of matter is complex, and we must proceed very carefully to do him justice. He makes quite a sharp distinction between matter as treated by the physicist and matter as treated by the metaphysician. Matter as subject of change is matter as pertaining to physics, but matter as foundational being ("*fundans ens*") and as individuating and standing under entity pertains to the metaphysician.³⁴ Thus, I believe we should ask whether the composition in Albert's matter is only a composition between the *quod est* of matter, by which it is foundation, and the *potency* by which it is principle of change, or whether, as regards matter as proper to metaphysics, one must still posit the *quod est* of matter, on the one hand, and a relation of matter to form, on the other. If the latter, then I believe we would have a very good idea why Albert cannot accept to see a doctrine of creation of matter among the philosophers. The *quod est* of matter would always stand outside the unity of metaphysical synthesis.

Now, this latter actually seems to be the doctrine. Thus, immediately after presenting us with metaphysical matter, Albert, in order to explain how it can be a principle of knowledge and demonstration *in metaphysics*, speaks of its proportion to form, analogy to form. Only on the basis of such proportion to form can matter be a metaphysical principle.³⁵ But is this proportion to form not the very stuff of matter? Not at all. As Albert puts it, if matter is to be taken as a principle of being, it cannot be taken as a simple substance. Every perfected being has its principle in an imperfect being only inasmuch as the imperfect being is taken as already having the form, but in an imperfect mode. That is how matter is principle of being. So taken, it is not a simple substance because it has in it the *potency* to the act of the form.³⁶ Albert insists on the *relational* nature of being a "principle". Matter is not a principle by its very substance ("*per hoc quod est in se*"). Rather, it is the nature of form which gives to

33. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 11, tr. 1, c. 7 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 467.80–468.7): "... cum proximam materiam resolvimus in priorem et remotiorem, non facimus hoc nisi per formæ ablationem, et ideo forma nulla est, quando accipitur materia prima sed per privationem intelligitur formarum... Hoc autem modo materia non est in natura, sed solum in intellectu accepta per privationem formarum, et sic *non est in potentia* nec sensibillum materia." Cf. also *ibid.*, c. 2 (p. 461.69–76): "Secundum veritatem tamen ita se habet, quod si ipsa natura accipiat, ad quam refertur diffinitio, illa est unum illud quod est potentia definita et determinata ad actum. Tunc procul dubio illius sunt principia potentia et actus, et *materia quidem nihil est de esse neque de principiis eius, nisi sub potentia, quæ est formæ inchoatio*, designetur, et sic designatur per genus..." (my italics). Cf. also *ibid.*, c. 8 (p. 470.52–53): "... omne quod generatur, educitur de potentia ad actum, et *hæc potentia* de qua educitur, est *intra materiam*, et tamen *nihil est de substantia materiæ*." (my italics)

34. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 3, tr. 3, c. 1 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 139.77 and following): "Licet enim causa unde motus et materia et finis videantur mobilis in eo quod mobile est, esse principia, tamen... est materia non determinata per subiectum mutationis et motus, sed potius per hoc quod ipsa est fundans ens et individuans et substans entitati et huiusmodi, quæ sunt ante motus subiectum, eo quod non subicitur mutationi et motui nisi fundatum et individuum et substans, et non convertitur, quod omne fundatum et individuatum et substans in seipso mutationi subiciatur et motui... Et quoad huiusmodi considerationes... prima materia substans... determinare habet primus philosophus..."

35. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 3, tr. 3, c. 2 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 141.54–57): "Et si utitur materia in demonstrando, illam iterum inducit per analogiam relatum ad formam, quæ confusa est in ipsa, quia aliter non esset principium cognoscendi aliquid."

36. Cf. above, n. 28, first text quoted.

matter even the sort of determinateness (“*esse tale*”) it has when it is not yet in act through form.³⁷

One gets the idea that even matter’s being a foundation is not the proper contribution of its substance, but of its already having in it the form in an imperfect mode of being. This, however, does not seem to be true, or not the whole truth. Let us ask: what does Albert attribute to matter just in itself? Matter, of itself, is first in the line of “subject”. The reason is that otherwise there would be a process to infinity. This base, Albert sometimes calls “*esse materiae*” (confusingly enough).³⁸ Matter is the foundation of and receiver of all *esse*, being, but that does not mean it brings it about that things *are*, in any way. It is form which makes things be. Matter receives and *contracts* being to merely being the being of *this*, precisely as *this*. This pertains to the *poverty* of matter.³⁹ Matter thus has something of its own, quite apart from form, taking form in all its amplitude, as flowing from the first cause and finding its truest realization in the first cause. Matter of itself has the being of matter: “*esse materiae*

37. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 1, tr. 4, c. 2 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 49, 14–26): “Similiter consideremus id quod Peripatetici principium vocant, quod est materia. Huius enim consideratio [est], quod est subiectum et fundamentum et quod ipsa est in potentia; et per primum quidem sustinet formam et per secundum est infinita, sed finibilis. Quaeramus igitur, utrum materia per hoc quod est, est rerum principium aut per ista duo. Si est principium per hoc quod est in se, tunc in nulla habitudine ad formam et ad motum est principium, quia per hoc quod est id quod est, est in seipsa. Sed oportet principium ab actu principiandi dictum principium esse ab habitudine principiandi; ergo materia per hoc quod est duo ista, est existentium principium.” Clearly, here, even matter’s being the principle which sustains form derives from a relation over and above the very *quod est* of the matter. Later, in the same passage, we read: (lines 33–40): “Constat... materiam non esse subiectum nisi per aliquid formae, quod inchoative est in ipsa; hoc autem est esse formae in potentia; esse igitur formae et in potentia esse sunt unius iterati, quia esse formae, quaecumque sit, materiae dat unitatem et esse tale quale competit materiae, quando non est actu per formam...” — In the first passage above, at line 21, I use an alternate reading, i.e. “per hoc quod est in se, tunc”, rather than “per hoc quod est, est in se; tunc”.

38. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 1, tr. 4, c. 8 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 58, 54–61): “... materia... licet nullo indigeat ad esse materiae, tamen omnibus indiget ad esse perfectum; adhuc enim nihil omnium est, quod ita et tot et tantis indigeat sicut ipsa. Et quod ad esse materiae nullo indiget, hoc est ideo, quia hoc est primum in ratione subiecti, et si ad hoc alio indigeret, oporteret, quod hoc esset subiectum prius primo, et abiret hoc in infinitum, et infinitum abhorret intellectus omnis.”

39. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 7, tr. 1, c. 5 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 324 80–85): “Cum autem dicitur, quod ipsa [sc. materia] per hoc quod substat omnibus, substat et existere facit omnia, hoc plane est falsum, quia forma substantialis secundum esse et existere, prout ipsa essentia est, non dependet ab ipsa, sed potius ab intellectu agente, cuius ipsa est lumen.” Also, and especially, *ibid.*, bk. 1, tr. 4, c. 8 (p. 58, 33–38): “Et quod... eam [sc. materiam] in omnibus dare, quod sunt, omnino falsum est, quia hoc dat forma per hoc quod est aliquid de esse divino; fundamentum tamen est, in quo recipitur et fundatur esse et contrahitur ad hoc quod sit esse huius, secundum quod est hoc, et hoc est paupertatis et particularitatis ipsius.”

40. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 1, tr. 4, c. 9 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 60, 24–41): “Quod autem forma non sit actu nis fundata et substantificata in materia, penitus est falsum, quia sic materia conferret esse formae, quod falsum est, quia e converso forma dat esse materiae. Forma enim est quasi foris manens dicta, et quanto plus manet foras materiam substantia et esse et operatione, verius habet nomen formae. Et ideo intellectus verius est forma quam sensus, et intelligentia verius est forma quam anima, et deus maxime est forma omnia formans. Illae autem formae quae in materia sunt, imagines vocantur, eo quod sunt formarum verarum resultationes et imitationes, quantum permittunt materiae, ut dicit Plato. Ex hoc igitur apparet non esse verum dictum Melissi. Licet autem forma nihil conferat materiae de esse materiae, eo quod *esse materiae habet materia a seipsa*, tamen composito sola confert esse forma, et materia suscipit illud et distinguitur et numeratur ex ipso.” (italics added)

habet materia a seipsa". Even the highest cause does not give matter its very stuff: ... *materia secundum id quod est non habeat causam...*"⁴¹

Take this last statement, however. It comes from a discussion in *CPU* about the sense in which the first principle is called a "principle". It is pointed out that it is a principle in the sense of a cause. Then the four Aristotelian causes are considered on the basis that the first must itself have a cause in *no* way, i.e. neither as regards *esse* nor as regards *id quod est*. Form is seen to have no cause as regards *id quod est*, while it has an efficient cause as regards "*esse in effectu*" and requires a foundation "*in esse*", i.e. a material cause. So also, matter has no cause as regards *id quod est*, but as regards "*esse in effectu*" it has form as cause, and so as to be "effected effectively" ("*efficiatur in effectu*") it has an efficient cause; and so as to be moved towards perfection ("*ad effectum*"), it has a final cause. As for the final cause, the first principle is final cause of all, but such a conception supposes that all the things are ordered towards the first, and so taken they are viewed as already existing in themselves ("*omnia existere in seipsa*"). Thus, if one looked merely at the final causality, the first principle would not be principle of all according to the *esse*, the existence, of each one. It is as efficient cause, and as an efficient cause of the sort which stands aloof from all its effects, like an artist whence come all things, and upon which all depend "*secundum esse*", as to existence — it is in this sense that the first is first.⁴²

Does not such a text clearly mean that the very existence of matter itself depends on the first principle? Is not this a doctrine of creation of matter? It would be, if the expression: "the existence of matter" were not ambiguous. When it is said that the "*esse*" of matter depends entirely on the first efficient cause, "*esse*" refers to existence as it belongs to the *composite* of matter and form. Such *esse* is the property of form as form, and primarily of the first principle, the most formal of all beings. However, the expression: "*esse materiae*" can refer to matter just in itself — matter's *own* grade of existence. As to this, it does not come from any form, however supreme. Thus we read in Albert's *Metaphysics*:

But that form is not, actually, except as founded and substantified in matter, is altogether false, for if that were so, matter would confer existence ("*esse*") on form: which is false. Rather, form gives existence to matter ("*forma dat esse materiae*"). Form, indeed, is so called, as much as to say "*for-ma*", "*foris manens*", "remaining outside", and the more "outside" it remains vis-à-vis matter, according to substance and being and operation, the more truly it is called "form". Thus, intellect is more truly form than sense, intelligence is more truly form than soul, God is maximally form, giving form to all things ("*omnia formans*"). But the forms which are in matter are called "images", because they are such echoes ("*resultationes*") and imitations of true forms as the [various]

41. Cf. above, n. 22.

42. Cf., in addition to what is cited in n. 22, *ibid.*: "Primum ergo principium omnium dicitur ut finis, et hoc est in ordine quo omnia se habent ad ipsum: in hoc autem ordine supponitur omnia existere in seipsis: non enim se habet ad aliud nisi quod existit in seipso: et sic non sequeretur quod primum principium esset principium omnium secundum esse uniuscujusque eorum... [p. 385A] Cum vero omnia secundum esse dependeant ad ipsum, et emanent ex ipso, sicut jam ostensum est, oportet quod primum principium sit efficiens, sicut artifex, distinctus ab omnibus, et nullo modo commixtus ipsis."

matters permit, as Plato says. Therefore, from this it is evident that what Melissus says is not true. For though form confers *nothing* of *esse materiæ* on matter, because matter has *esse materiæ* just by itself (“*a seipsa*”), nevertheless *form alone* confers *esse* on the composite, and matter receives that [the “*esse*” of the composite] and is given distinctiveness (“*distinguitur*”) and number from it [i.e. from the *esse* of the composite].⁴³

Existence, in the important sense, and form (as primarily realized in the first principle) come to the same thing for Albert.⁴⁴ It is in the light of such texts that I understand how the first principle gives *esse* to matter, even though there is an *esse materiæ* which has no cause.

Albert tells us that while matter, as studied by the physicist, is not all of the same order (the matter of generables is not the same as the matter of the celestial bodies), nevertheless matter as foundation, the matter properly of interest to the metaphysician, is all of one order (“*genus*”).⁴⁵ As one has the coming forth of beings, causes, from the first cause, each cause “*metaphorically touches matter*”, and thus gives rise to the variety of celestial bodies. This sort of scenario seems to be the fundamental Peripatetic one for Albert.⁴⁶

43. Cf. above, n. 40.

44. In addition of the texts given in notes 39 and 40, cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 1, tr. 4, c. 2 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, pp. 48.80–49.13): “... Ex quo convincitur idem intellectus esse formæ et unitatis. Modum tamen alium habet unitas et alium forma, quoniam in se considerata est unitas, sed considerata, prout eius proprietas est esse, quod dat rei, est forma. Esse autem dico formæ proprietatem potius quam effectum, quoniam esse nihil aliud est nisi diffusio formæ in eo quod est actu existens. Ex hoc accipitur, quod licet idem sit intellectus unitatis et formæ, tamen modus unitatis est simplicior quam modus formæ. Quod sic clare videtur: esse quod est proprietas formæ, quæ propter hanc ipsam proprietatem ‘quid erat esse’ vocatur, diffusio est formæ in eo quod participat actum essendi; ergo tendit esse in potentias eius quod est, ut perficiat eas; et sic procedit se spargendo, sicut lumen procedit a lucente. Unitas autem, qua res una est, procedit, sparsa in potentiis eius quod est, colligendo et uniendo et finiendo ipsa et terminando ad unitatem. Et isti sunt actu principii, quod est naturans res. Igitur forma est principium per hoc quod est unitas; et si unitas est ratio principii, cum per seipsa sint prima principia, unitas erit per se principium entis omnis.” — Also of great importance for this point is *ibid.* bk. 2, tr. 2, c. 2 (p. 93.6–29).

45. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk.3, tr. 2, c. 10 (ed. Cologne, t. 16, p. 129.58–61): “Materia autem secundum Aristotelem secundum esse accepta, sicut proprie sumitur in physicis, non est unius generis, sed accepta sicut substantia fundans, una est.” Cf. also ALBERT, *Physica*, bk. 1, tr. 3, c. 11 (ed. Paris, t. 3, p. 71A-B).

46. Cf. ALBERT, *Metaphysica*, bk. 11, tr. 2, c. 20 (ed. Cologne, p. 508.16ss): “... omnes Peripatetici conveniunt in hoc cum Stoicis et maxime cum Platoniciis, quod materia prima non exiverit in esse per causam aliquam generantem vel moventem, sed quod sit perpetua. Peripatetici autem dicebant, quod movens primum dupliciter consideratur, in se videlicet, et sic est lux et intellectus activus, nihil supra lucem et intellectum existens. Consideratur etiam ut causans, et ex parte illa metaphorice attingit materiam, et quodammodo incorporatur, sicut intellectus artificis in se lux est et ex parte, qua movet, incorporatur forma et lux artis corporibus instrumentis. Quod igitur est a causa prima, prout ipsa est lux immensa in se existens et lucem emittens, est intelligentia primi ordinis post eam. Quod autem fit ab ipsa, secundum quod est tangens materiam, est cælum primum, quod ipsa per suam formam agentem movet. Primo modo enim considerata est ipsa actus et secundo modo considerata est potentia activa mixta materiæ.” To the objection that the heavens are not generable, notice that Albert replies with the example of the eternal foot making the eternal print in the eternal sand (lines 62–74). To those who object to the doctrine that the first cause “*touches matter*”, as this would suggest a twofold mode of being of the first, a kind of mixing of the light of the first with shadow, Albert says that this objection holds according to the Platonists and those who distinguish the intelligences from the souls of the heavens (thus, presumably for these, the first cause would not “*touch matter*”). However, here is how

To conclude: Albert presents the metaphysics of the Peripatetics as entirely creational, insofar as creation is the production of form, and even of the receptive potency for form, from nothing, by the first cause.⁴⁷ Moreover, he presents that metaphysics as focussed on existence. However, insofar as "creation" includes the note: production from nothing of the very substance of matter, Albert finds no doctrine of creation among the Peripatetics.⁴⁸

Albert describes the position of those who say that the intelligences and the souls of the heavens are substantially identical: "... secundum illos qui dicunt easdem esse substantias et animas cælorum et intelligentias, non est ita, quia lux primæ causæ simplex est et pura. Et ideo cum attingit materiam, non recipit obumbrationem, sed vincit eam et vincendo terminat ad esse instrumenti sui, quod est cælum primum. Cum autem irradiat ad constitutionem intelligentiæ primi ordinis, hoc fit per actum, qui est compositi, et est actus primæ causæ in orbe primo. Et ideo fit, quod id quod fit per huiusmodi irradiationem, est ordinis inferioris, quam ipsa sit." (*ibid.*, lines 83–93)

47. Cf. above, nn. 19, 21, and 27.

48. Cf. above, n. 29.