La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature

Le présent article fournit un exposé synthétique de la riche littérature sur l’économie de l’information. L’introduction situe la théorie économique de l’information dans la théorie économique générale et la définit par rapport au modèle des marchés contingents de Arrow-Debreu. Trois sections intitulées : Asymétrie d’information et structure des marchés, Transmission d’information par les prix et Information asymétrique et échange, analysent les principaux articles et leurs résultats. En conclusion, on aborde le thème de la valeur de l’information, on présente les caractéristiques de l’information en tant que bien et on souligne le défi que représente son intégration dans un modèle d’équilibre général.

Abstract

The economic theory of information: a synthesis of the literature

This paper attempts to give an integrated view of the numerous contributions to economic theory of information. After an introduction where the economics of information is placed within the context of general economic theory and defined relative to the Arrow-Debreu contingent market model, the paper reviews in three sections, entitled Asymetric information and Market Structure, Information revealed by prices, and Asymetric information and exchange, the core articles and their main results. The paper concludes with the value of information, its characteristics as a good, and the challenge of integrating it into a general equilibrium model.

Bibliographie

AKERLOF, G. (1970), "The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500. DOI:10.2307/1879431

AKERLOF, G. (1976), "The Economics of Caste and the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 599-618. DOI:10.2307/1885324

ARROW, K. (1970), Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, North-Holland, Amsterdam.

AUMANN, R. (1976), "Agreeing to Disagree", The Annals of Statistics, 4, 1236-1239. DOI:10.1214/aos/1176343654

BLACKWELL, D. (1951), "Comparison of experiments" in Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, ed. by J. Newmann, University of California Press.

BRADFORD, D.F. et KELEJIAN, H.H. (1977), "The Value of Information for Crop Forecasting in a Market System: Some Theoretical Issues", Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 519-531. DOI:10.2307/2296905

BUTTERS, G.R. (1977), "Equilibrium Distribution of Sales and Advertising Prices", Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 465-491. DOI:10.2307/2296902

CHAN, Y.C. et LELAND, H. (1982), "Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly Information", Review of Economic Studies, 49, 499-516. DOI:10.2307/2297283

COOPER, R. et Ross, T.W. (1984), "Prices, Product Qualities and Asymetric Information: The Competitive Case", Review of Economic Studies, 51, 197-207. DOI:10.2307/2297687

DIAMOND, P.A. (1971), "A Model of Price Adjustment", Journal of Economic Theory, 3, 156-168. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90013-5

DIAMOND, P.A. et MASKIN, E. (1979), "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contracts, I Steady States", Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 282-316. DOI:10.2307/3003332

DIONNE, G. (1983), "Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts", Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 8, 316-333.

DIONNE, G. et LASSERRE, P. (1985), "Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy", Review of Economic Studies, 52, 719-723. DOI:10.2307/2297743

FAMA, E. (1970), "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work", Journal of Finance, 25, 383-417. DOI:10.2307/2325486

FEIGER, G. (1976), "What is Speculation?", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 677-687. DOI:10.2307/1885329

FISHER, F.M. (1970), "Quasi-competitive Price Adjustment by Individual Firms: A Preliminary Paper", Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 195-206. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(70)90005-0

GASTWIRTH, J.L. (1971), "On Probabilitistic Models of Consumer Search for Information", Unpublished paper, John Hopkins Univ. and the Nat. Sci. Found.

GEANOPOKLOS, J. et POLEMARCHAKIS, H. (1982), "We Can't Disagree Forever", Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 192-200.

GREEN, J.R. (1973), "Information, Efficiency and Equilibrium", Discussion Paper No 284, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University.

GREEN, J. (1977), "The Non-existence of Informational Equilibria", Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 451-463. DOI:10.2307/2296901

GREEN, J.R. et MAJUMDAR, M. (1972), "The Nature and Existence of Stochastic Equilibria", Unpublished paper.

GROSSMAN, S. (1976), "On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders have Diverse Information", Journal of Finance, 31, 573-585.

GROSSMAN, S.J. (1977), "The Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational Externalities", Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 431-449. DOI:10.2307/2296900

GROSSMAN, S.J. (1981), "An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations under Asymetric Information", Review of Economic Studies, 48, 541-559. DOI:10.2307/2297195

GROSSMAN, S.J. et HART, O.D. (1983), "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem", Econometrica, 51(1), 7-45. DOI:10.2307/1912246

GROSSMAN, S.J., KIHLSTROM, R.E. et MIRMAM, L.J. (1977), "A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning by Doing", Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 533-547. DOI:10.2307/2296906

GROSSMAN, S.J. et STIGLITZ, J.E. (1976), "Information and Competitive Price Systems", American Economic Review, 66, 246-253.

GROSSMAN, S.J. et STIGLITZ, J.E. (1980), "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets", American Economic Review, 70, 393-407.

HARSANYI, J.C. (1967-68), "Game with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players", Parts 1, 2, 3, Management Science, 14, (3), (5), (7), 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.

HART, O. (1975), "On the Optimality of Equilibrium when Markets are Incomplete", Journal of Economic Theory, 11, 418-443. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90028-9

HAYEK, F.A. VON (1945), "The Use of Knowledge in Society", American Economic Review, 35, 519-530.

HELLWIG, M.F. (1980), "On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets", Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 477-480. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(80)90056-3

HELLWIG, M.F. (1982), "Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Conditioning on Past Prices: A Mean-Variance Example", Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 279-312. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90005-9

HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1971), "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity", American Economic Review, 61, 561-574.

HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1975), "Foundations of the Theory of Speculation: Information, Risk and Markets", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, 519-542. DOI:10.2307/1884690

HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1976), "Reply to Comments on "Speculation and Equilibrium, Information, Risk, and Markets", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 689-696. DOI:10.2307/1885330

HOLMSTROM, B. (1979), "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91. DOI:10.2307/3003320

HOLMSTROM, B. et MYERSON, R.B. (1983), "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information", Econometrica, 51(6), 1799-1819. DOI:10.2307/1912117

JAFFEE, D.M. et RUSSELL, T. (1976), "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 651-666. DOI:10.2307/1885327

JORDAN, T.S. et RADNER, R. (1982), "Rational Expectations in Microeconomic Models: An Overview", Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 201-223. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90001-1

KIHLSTROM, R.E. (1974a), "A Bayesian Model of Demand for Information about Product Quality", International Economic Review, 15.

KIHLSTROM, R.E. (1974b), "A General Theory of Demand for Information about Product Quality", Journal of Economic Theory, 413-439. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90019-2

KIHLSTROM, R. et MIRMAN, L. (1975), "Information and Market Equilibrium", Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 357-376. DOI:10.2307/3003230

LAFFONT, J.J. (1979), Fondements du rôle de l'information dans la vie économique, vol. 1, Rapport de recherche, Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique.

LAFFONT, J.J. (1985), Cours de théorie microéconomique, vol. 2, Économie de l'incertain et de l'information, Éditions Economica.

LELAND, H. (1979), "Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standard", Journal of Political Economy. DOI:10.1086/260838

LIPPMAN, S.A. et J.J. MCCALL (1976), "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey", Parts I and II, Economic Inquiry, 14, 155-189, 347-368. DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x

LUCAS, R.E. JR. (1972), "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money", Journal of Economic Theory, 4, 103-124. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90142-1

LUCAS, R.E. et E.C. PRESCOTT (1974), "Equilibrium Search and Unemployment", Journal of Economic Theory, 7, 188-209. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90106-9

MALINVAUD, E., Leçons de théorie microéconomique, 4e édition, Dunod.

MARSCHAK, J. (1971), "Economics of Information Systems", in Economic Information, Decision and Prediction, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 270-334.

MARSCHAK, J. et RADNER, R. (1972), Economic Theory of Teams, Yale University Press, New Haven.

MCCALL, J.J. (1965), "The Economics of Information and Optimal Stopping Rules", Journal of Business, 300-317. DOI:10.1086/294789

MCCALL, J.J. (1970), "Economics of Information and Job Search", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 113-126. DOI:10.2307/1879403

MCDONALD, G.M. (1984), "New Directions in the Economic Theory of Agency", Canadian Journal of Economics, 17, 415-440. DOI:10.2307/135183

MILGROM, P. (1981a), "An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge", Econometrica, 49, 219-222. DOI:10.2307/1911137

MILGROM, P. (1981b), "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding", Econometrica, 49, 921-943. DOI:10.2307/1912511

MILGROM, P. et N. STOKEY (1982), "Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge", Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 17-27. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1

MIRLESS, J. (1975), "On Moral Hazard and the Theory of Unobservable Behavior", Oxford, miméo.

MYERSON, R.B. (1979), "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem", Econometrica, 47, 61-74. DOI:10.2307/1912346

MYERSON, R.B. (1983), "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal", Econometrica, 51(6), 1767-1797. DOI:10.2307/1912116

MYERSON, R.B. (1984), "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information", Econometrica, 52, 461-488. DOI:10.2307/1911499

NELSON, P. (1970), "Information and Consumer Behavior", Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311-329. DOI:10.1086/259630

OZGA, S.A. (1960), "Imperfect Markets through Lack of Knowledge", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 74, 29-52. DOI:10.2307/1884132

Quarterly Journal of Economics, Symposium on Economics of Information, 1976.

RADNER, R. (1967), "Équilibre des marchés à terme et au comptant en cas d'incertitude", Cahiers du séminaire d'économétrie, CNRS 35-52.

RADNER, R. (1968), "Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty", Econometrica, 36, 31-58. DOI:10.2307/1909602

RADNER, R. (1979), "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices", Econometrica, 47, 655-678. DOI:10.2307/1910413

RADNER, R. (1981), "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship", Econometrica, 49, 1127-1148. DOI:10.2307/1912747

RADNER, R. (1985), "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting", Econometrica, 53, 1173-1198. DOI:10.2307/1911017

Review of Economic Studies, Symposium on Economics of Information, 1977.

Review of Economic Studies, Symposium on Incentive Compatibility, avril 1979.

RILEY, J. (1975), "Competitive Signalling", Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 174-186. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90049-6

RILEY, J. (1976), "Information, Screening and Human Capital", American Economic Review, 66, 254-260.

ROGERSON, W.P. (1985), "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems", Econometrica, 53, 1357-1367. DOI:10.2307/1913212

ROTHSCHILD, M. (1970), "Prices, Information and Market Structure", Unpublished paper. (Cité dans Rothschild (1973)).

ROTHSCHILD, M. (1973), "Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey", Journal of Political Economy, 81, 1283-1308. DOI:10.1086/260128

ROTHSCHILD, M. (1974), "A Two-Armed Bandit Theory of Market Pricing", Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 185-202. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90066-0

ROTHSCHILD, M. et STIGLITZ, J.E. (1976), "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629-650. DOI:10.2307/1885326

RUBINSTEIN, A. (1985), "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences", Econometrica, 53, 1151-1171. DOI:10.2307/1911016

RUBINSTEIN, A. et YAARI, M.E. (1983), "Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard", Journal of Economic Theory, 30, 74-97. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7

RUBINSTEIN, A. et WOLINSKY, A. (1985), "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining", Econometrica, 53, 1133-1150. DOI:10.2307/1911015

SALANT, S.W. (1976), "Hirshleifer on Speculation", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 667-675. DOI:10.2307/1885328

SALOP, S. (1973), "Systematic Job Search and Unemployment", Review of Economic Studies, 40, 191-201. DOI:10.2307/2296647

SALOP, S. (1976), "Information and Monopolistic Competition", American Economic Review, 66, 240-245.

SALOP, S. (1977), "The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion and Price Discrimination", Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 393-406. DOI:10.2307/2296898

SALOP, J. et SALOP, S. (1976), "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 619-628. DOI:10.2307/1885325

SALOP, S. et STIGLITZ, J. (1977), "Bargains and Ripoffs?: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion", Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 493-510. DOI:10.2307/2296903

SCHWARTZ, A. et L. WILDE (1982), "Competitive Equilibria in Markets for Heterogeneous Goods under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysis with Policy Implications", Bell Journal of Economics, 13(1), 181-193. DOI:10.2307/3003439

SCHWARTZ, A. et L. WILDE (1985), "Product Quality and Imperfect Information", Review of Economic Studies, 52, 251-262. DOI:10.2307/2297620

SHAVELL, S. (1979a), "On Moral Hazard and Insurance", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, 541-562. DOI:10.2307/1884469

SHAVELL, S. (1979b), "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship", Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 55-73. DOI:10.2307/3003319

SPENCE, M. (1974a), Market Signalling, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

SPENCE, M. (1974b), "Competitive and Optimal Responses to Signals: An Analysis of Efficiency and Distribution", Journal of Economic Theory, 7, 296-332. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90098-2

SPENCE, M. (1976), "Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 591-597. DOI:10.2307/1885323

STIGLER, G. (1961), "The Economics of Information", Journal of Political Economy, 69, 213-225. DOI:10.1086/258464

STIGLER, G. (1962), "Information in the Labour Market", Journal of Political Economy, 70, 94-104. DOI:10.1086/258727

STIGLITZ, J.E. (1977), "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market", Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 407-430. DOI:10.2307/2296899

TIROLE, J. (1982), "On the Possibility of Speculation Under Rational Expectations", Econometrica, 50, 1163-1181. DOI:10.2307/1911868

TIROLE, J. (1985), "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations", Econometrica, 53, 1071-1100. DOI:10.2307/1911012

VARIAN, H.R., Microeconomic Analysis, 2e édition, W.W. Norton's Company.

WILSON, C.A. (1977), "A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information", Journal of Economic Theory, 16, 167-207. DOI:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7

WILSON, R. (1978), "Information, Efficiency and the Core of an Economy", Econometrica, 46, 807-816. DOI:10.2307/1909750

WINTER, S. (1971), "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85, 237-261. DOI:10.2307/1880703

Auteur :	René Garcia
Titre :	La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature
Revue :	L'Actualité économique, Volume 62, numéro 1, mars 1986, p. 88-109
URI :	http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/601361ar
DOI :	10.7202/601361ar