Fraude fiscale et offre de travail au noir

Un résultat bien connu de la littérature théorique sur la fraude fiscale montre que des taux d’imposition élevés sur le revenu constituent une désincitation à la fraude, contrairement à ce que laisserait croire le sens commun. En interprétant la fraude fiscale comme une décision de participation au marché du travail non déclaré, on montre ici que ce résultat ne tient plus lorsque, ce qui semble vraisemblable, le taux de salaire au noir est inférieur au taux de salaire avant impôt gagné sur le marché du travail déclaré.

Abstract

Tax evasion and the supply of unofficial labour

A well-known result in the theoretical literature on income tax evasion states that higher tax rates reduce tax evasion, in contrast to common sense beliefs on the matter. When tax evasion is interpreted in terms of the allocation of one's work effort between a "registered" and an "unregistered" labour market, this result is shown not to hold if, as seems reasonable, the wage rate for undeclared work is less than the before tax wage rate for declared work.

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Author:	Claude Fluet
Title:	Fraude fiscale et offre de travail au noir
Journal:	L'Actualité économique, Volume 63, Number 2-3, June-September 1987, p. 225-242
URI:	http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/601420ar
DOI:	10.7202/601420ar