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L'Actualité économique

Volumen 75, número 1-2-3, Marzo-Junio-Septiembre 1999, p. 123-147

L’économie publique

Dirigido por Nicolas Marceau, Pierre Pestieau y François Vaillancourt

Dirección : Claude-Denys Fluet (directeur)

Editor : HEC Montréal

ISSN : 0001-771X (impreso)  1710-3991 (digital)

DOI : 10.7202/602287ar

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Artículo

Dissuader le crime : un survol

Nicolas Marceau

Département des sciences économiques, Université du Québec à Montréal

CREFÉ, Université du Québec à Montréal

Steeve Mongrain

Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

RÉSUMÉ

Depuis une trentaine d'années, les économistes ont appliqué leurs outils et leurs méthodes au problème de la dissuasion du crime. Dans ce texte, nous présentons une revue de leurs principales contributions.

ABSTRACT

Crime Deterrence: A Survey

In the last thirty years, economists have been applying their tools and methods to the study of crime deterrence. In this paper, we review their most important contributions.

 

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Autores : Nicolas Marceau y Steeve Mongrain
Título : Dissuader le crime : un survol
Revista : L'Actualité économique, Volumen 75, número 1-2-3, Marzo-Junio-Septiembre 1999, p. 123-147
URI : http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/602287ar
DOI : 10.7202/602287ar

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