EN :

Because of the Cuban presence in Africa (Angola), President Carter put a stop, in November 1978, to the normalization procedures started with Cuba at the commencement of his mandate. The Reagan administration, far from redressing the situation, has worsened it by incessantly accusing and threatening the Cuban government. At the rime of General Haig's resignation as State Secretary on June 26, 1982, his policy of intimidation towards Cuba had failed to keep the Castro's regime in step. Moreover, the American policy has been thwarted by external obstacles — the attitudes of the Cuban and Soviet leaders, the change in the political climate in Latin America (the conflict in the Malvinas) - and by internal causes - blunders, conflicting announcements, incoherent strategies, fluctuating and equivocal appraisals of the situation by the Reagan administration. This administration has alternately advocated a military solution to the Cuban problem and an essentially economic approach to neutralise the castrist influence in the region. Cuba has been at rimes referred to as a sovereign State to be dealt with on a bilateral basis, and at other rimes as a soviet satellite to be handled with the framework of East-West relations. Under the Reagan administration, Cuba has remained more than ever the ideal scapegoat of American leaders faced with a reassessment of the "pax americana" in Central America and in the North-South relations.

EN :

This article explores changes in the international political significance of "strategic minerals" over the past half-century. The method of analysis is comparative historical, or "diachronic", and the major issues examined are: 1) minerals as a cause of international conflict; 2) minerals as a factor contributing to the military potential of states; and 3) the question of mineral scarcity. In addition to the above issues, the author analyzes two central concepts, "geopolitics" and "strategic minerals" . He concludes that while it does make sense to speak of a "new geopolitics of Minerals" in the post-1973 era, there are nevertheless important ways in which recent strategic-minerals issues resemble those of the earlier period under examination, the interwar years (and, in particular, the 1930s). What does not seem to have changed in respect of strategic minerals since the 1930 s is that access to them continues ultimately to be a function of political processes, and therefore the access question remains what it was, a matter of geopolitical concern. Where there have been differences in the relevance of strategic minerals, these have mainly consisted in: 1) the declining importance of minerals as a major contributory factor in the breakdown of world order; 2) the lessening of what had formerly been a deterministic equation between mineral possession and military potential; and 3) the increased salience in the post-1973 era of the perception that access will be affected by the growing scarcity of minerals, whether due to the actual depletion of reserves or politically induced supply disruptions.

EN :

The atlantic crisis is as old as the Alliance itself, but is has now acquired a critical nature in that in affects deeply the relations of the two major countries : The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

This crisis lies at the crossroads of an evolution in the international context which has stirred up doubts regarding American protection, and of a change in generation which expresses itself in different ways on either side of the Atlantic.

The concepts of "comparative vulnerability" and of "mutual fear of decoupling" are used in an attempt to apprise the situation. A study of the search for a German and a European identity and of the Western responses to events in Poland has led the author to make a few recommendations regarding a new policy of the Atlantic Alliance towards Eastern Europe.

EN :

Ever since Monroe's doctrine and up to President Carter, the American foreign policy in Latin America has been remarkably continuous both from the point of view of objectives - the maintenance and extension of American influence and domination - and that of the pressures required to attain them - from direct military intervention to economic sanctions, including clandestine activities of destabilization. Carter came to power and from then on that policy rested on different principles which became expressed, particularly in the case of El Salvador, in pressures for the respect of human rights, a temporary suspension of aid from the Interamerican Development Bank and in the immediate recognition of the regime which followed the coup d'État of october 1979 and which made possible a third option between a reactionary dictatorship and a takeover by the Marxists. The principles were once again altered under President Reagan for whom the fight against communism and international terrorism is a priority.

Latin America acquired a new strategic importance and El Salvador became the scene of the East-West conflict, the symbol of American determination to contain Soviet expansionism. But Reagan's policy in El Salvador had to be restrained confronted as it was by opposition both internal, from the public, and external through the stand taken by the Allies. In spite of starting doctrinal differences, Carter's and Reagan's policies in El Salvador are very similar, both showing incoherence and inefficiency. They are heirs to a situation and an intellectual tradition which they perpetuate, one clumsily, the other cheerfully. But the failure of the Reagan administration is even more patent than that of its predecessor. The United States have only one alternative left, military intervention or negotiations with the guerilla, and furthermore they risk "losing" El Salvador the Vietnam or the Nicaragua way.