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# NOTES ON THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRANSLATION THEORY

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## **Résumé**

*La théorie de la traduction, qui commence par poser la question de savoir pourquoi ce texte-ci est la traduction de ce texte-là, doit se situer dans le champ conceptuel véhiculé par l'histoire millénaire du «sens». Mais dans le paradigme philosophique actuel, il faut ajouter un autre principe épistémologique que l'auteur appelle le principe du deuxième objet, lequel établit une coupure cartésienne entre les objets des sciences naturelles et ceux des sciences sociales dans un dualisme seulement méthodologique car l'auteur pense que l'épistémologie du «deuxième objet» — et sa première pierre, qui est la théorie de la traduction — constituent la prima philosophia ou fondement de tout savoir.*

## **WHO IS AFRAID OF THE THÉORIE DU SENS?**

The first and only question a translation theory has to answer is why this text Tt written in Spanish should be considered the “translation” of this other text here To, written in English. The only difference between To and Tt is the language, but the question is: what do they have in common? In the language game we call “translating” something is repeated and something is left behind. What is left behind is obviously the sign system (*la langue*<sup>1</sup>). Guess what is repeated... Call it what you wish. In French it has always been called *le sens* (latin “sensus”, verb “sentire”), in English “meaning, that what is meant, what people mean when they speak or write.” The same thing can be hinted at in a different way with the following thought: we must make a distinction between two different questions: “What is the meaning of that word or of that sentence?” and “What has the *speaker* meant with that word or that sentence?” As long as you do not distinguish clearly between what belongs to the *langue* (sign system) and what belongs to *le sens* (meaning meant), you are missing the essence of all language games, including the language game we call “translating.” What all language games have in common, *placet Wittgenstein*, is that someone speaks with the intention of saying something and someone else has to get that something, the message, and the message is *le sens*, and getting the message is called understanding, and whoever understands has to interpret because all perceiving is or at least involves interpretation. Pierce speaks of binary concepts. There are also trinary ones: the concept of “interpretation” is inseparable from the conceptual difference between *la langue* (sign system), and *le sens* (meaning meant). This Bermuda triangle, in which the sign system *langue* disappears to give birth to the message *sens*, is not anything new, invented by some people in Paris, it is common knowledge of mankind as old as the world of language. It has been discovered by all who had to listen and read carefully: translators (since Nehemias 8: 8<sup>2</sup> to Valery Larbaud<sup>3</sup>), lawyers, priests as exegetes of sacred texts, literary critics... Philosophers like Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Gadamer, Ricoeur *et aliter* have not only accepted as a matter of course that difference between ‘word’ (that is, *la langue*) and ‘meaning meant’ in what is called generally “hermeneutics” (and has become today a *prima philosophia*<sup>4</sup>) but also referred to the depths of truth revealed by it. That “difference,” which allows us to ask the only question that matters in translation theory, namely, why is Tt the translation of To, is the contrast between the famous structured systems so dear to Saussure and the structuralists, and the existential

actualization of the same in the actions of real agents in social gravitational fields in Bourdieu's sense of *champs sociaux*.<sup>5</sup>

#### THE HISTORY OF *LE SENS*

It is absolutely necessary and urgent that we learn to inherit the very long history of *le sens* or "meaning meant" which is to be found in the texts written by translators about that difference, but also in the no less long history of rhetoric and legal interpretation theories since Roman times to the present,<sup>6</sup> going through extremely fertile periods, like the Renaissance legal interpretation theories,<sup>7</sup> or the legal interpretation of Savigny.<sup>8</sup> And then there is the above mentioned European hermeneutics school, born in the Renaissance with the Lutheran interpretation revolution,<sup>9</sup> which pretended that not only the Church in Rome but every Christian had the right to read and interpret the Bible in his own way (freedom of interpretation or hermeneutic freedom). This movement gave rise to an abundant series of interpretation theories<sup>10</sup>... up to the hermeneutic theory of the romantic Schleiermacher<sup>11</sup> and the modern and varied hermeneutic schools.<sup>12</sup>

Let us consider for a moment the ever recurring elementary concepts of the general theory of hermeneutics as they appear in the literary theory of interpretation which tries to answer this question: what is the meaning of a literary work? E.D. Hirsch in *Validity in Interpretation* (1967) says that the meaning of a literary work is the "mental object" the author had in mind or intended at the time of writing<sup>13</sup>... Why Hirsch is able to maintain this position is essentially because his theory of meaning, like Husserl's, is prelinguistic. Meaning is something which the author wills: it is a ghostly, wordless mental act which is then 'fixed' for all time in a particular set of material signs.<sup>14</sup> This theory has been universally rejected nowadays, of course. Gadamer, in his book *Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode)* contends that *the meaning of a literary work is never exhausted by the intentions of its author*,<sup>15</sup> the interpretation of future readers living in future moments, in different historical and cultural circumstances, will change the meaning of the work. This idea has also been developed by the legal hermeneutics: the meaning of a law is not only the *mens legislatoris* or the *mens legis* but also, (some say "above all") its application to a concrete case many years later. We see here the concept of "applicatio" which plays such an important role in Gadamer's hermeneutics and which is nothing else than the famous "scopus" theory developed by Emilio Betti in 1962 (Betti 1962). This suggests that all interpretation is situational, it is made by the other from her/his otherness (centuries or seconds later). And it also means that all interpretation is productive, the interpreter, the reader, is not passive, he creates, co-produces the meaning in a given situation, in a given moment of time. Authors like Ingarden, Iser and Jauss will insist in the role of the reader, like Umberto Eco. The reader is a co-author. The reader has to awaken the meaning lying dead in the page. This so-called "reception theory" finds an extreme position in Stanley Fish attitude: "the true writer is the reader"... which has provoked the famous debate about the limits of interpretation: the reader is constrained by... what is called the "institutional" limits, imposed by Academia, by editors, critics, who all together determine the stock of socially legitimate ways of reading works.<sup>16</sup>

It seems evident to me that all those schools of thought, translators, and legal, religious, and literary hermeneutics share a common conceptual structure, namely, that to listen to and trying to understand speeches or to read texts is not an easy or obvious or mechanical or automatic task. On the contrary it requires interpretation, and all interpretation consists in making a difference between the semantic value of words and sentences and what the people speaking or writing want to say. After all, speaking, in its two modalities of orality and writing, is a series of social activities, and, therefore, the inten-

tions of the social agents is the most important fact. And then there is this: all interpretation is made by an interpreter rooted or located in a personal, social and historical situation or context, and, therefore, all interpretation involves an element of application of the supposed intended meaning to the personal, social and historical circumstances in which the interpretation takes place. We have here delineated a conceptual field in which all translation theory has necessarily to take roots.

#### **LE SENS, MEANING AND CONSCIOUSNESS, SAME FIGHT**

There are still too many people interested in translation studies that somehow manage to ignore that conceptual field. A comparable situation prevails in the province of American philosophy, where the general tendency of physical materialism prevents many writers in the field from using the word "conscience." That is why the fight of a philosopher like John Searle is so interesting for translation theory, "conscience" being obviously the same concept as "meaning meant by speakers".<sup>17</sup> Those materialists must be the people who believe that to speak about *le sens* as different from "the semantic value of words and sentences in a purely lexical setting" (*la langue* in Saussurian parlance) is just a ridiculous vice from the seleskovitchiens or some other unfortunate people contaminated by that simplistic belief. It has even become fashionable to attack the so-called *théorie du sens* and I feel a bit guilty about that because I coined that expression and now I realized it was not a good idea after all.<sup>18</sup> But the really funny thing is that those critics seem to ignore that *la théorie du sens* does not exist and has never existed, although some take the trouble of describing it.<sup>19</sup> It is not a "theory," that is, an *explicatio*, but exactly the opposite, an *explicandum*. It is not a theory, it is a fact, the monumental fact of translation... and of language, the essential phenomenon, what the theory has to explain. For it to be a theory, it would have to explain or make understandable what the *sens* (meaning meant) is, whether it is a mental representation or a perception or what. Is it a hypothesis people make when they try to understand what somebody is saying? Is it a psychological or a cognitive or a social object or the three? And to do that, the theory would have to construct a conceptual pattern like, for example, saying the *sens* is a second degree perception (concept 1) which is produced in a social act of language communication (concept 2) in which several agents (concept 3) do certain things called 'social activities' which consist of manipulating "sign systems" (concept 4) with the intention of transmitting a perception from a human brain to another human brain.<sup>20</sup> This would be a first and minimum set of concepts, which I mentioned here as an example (see later the *Pöckhacker Hypothesis*). But then, of course, there is something about theories which we have to take into account. Against the common belief that theories have to reflect reality and that, somehow, as we penetrate reality, the mirroring theory will constitute itself,<sup>21</sup> the more refined view asserts that there is no mirror at work and that theories are always *a priori* hypothesis which might or might not be confirmed by research. This act of confirmation is just a decision about whether hypothesis are more or less suitable to explain the known and new "facts" established by local research. Among the criteria to decide whether a hypothesis is more or less suitable to "facts," there is above all the explanatory breadth, *id est*, a better theory is one which explains more facts than others.

#### **THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IS THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF THE XXTH CENTURY**

It was in 1976 while working with Seleskovitch on my Ph.D. in the Sorbonne<sup>22</sup> that I suddenly realized that a translation theory capable of making a radical distinction between the systemic aspects of language and the social reality of people using that system to produce a social construct called 'meaning,' might be the solution to the one

and only real problem of philosophy in our time. Since the 50's, when I was a student of Philosophy of Language in Germany, I have been following the evolution of the problem on both sides of the Atlantic: the several schools populating the Anglo-Saxon camp culminating in Wittgenstein and Searle, and the German idealistic tradition flowing out to the hermeneutics of the late Heidegger and Gadamer.<sup>23</sup> For the German hermeneutic stance, the project was to show that the general philosophical foundation (the Greek *arkhé*, *der Grund*, or *prima philosophia*) was to postulate that human life was constructed with... language, and that, therefore, to live was to understand... what? obviously, the text of life. (Which would mean that everybody is an interpreter.) Life was obviously<sup>24</sup> a text for a professor, not a speech, an idea which, like always, found its way to Paris some years later and from there to America where ideas are promulgated *urbi et orbe*. But in all this rhetoric nobody cares to buckle down to such a menial task as to define the elementary concepts they all freely use, like 'language' or 'communication.' In his 1175 pages book on *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*,<sup>25</sup> Habermas never defines the main concept of the whole book: *kommunikatives Handelns*!<sup>26</sup>

In the Anglo-Saxon camp, all philosophy of language is reduced to one single question: what is meaning? (Or recently "what is consciousness?," which is the same in a different way and this sameness reveals that the comprehension of meaning is just another kind of perception!) Some progress has been made through Wittgenstein's idea that i), "in the great majority of cases," *the meaning of a word is its use in the language*, (which is our "meanings meant by speakers versus a priori semantics"), and that ii), meanings are produced in language games regulated by rules particular to each game (which is our concept of the "language communication act"). Searle has added three main elements to the solution of the problem by seeing meaning comprehension as a cognitive operation where beliefs and knowledge count as much as the semantic value of words, and also by presenting the meaning meant by speakers as an intentional act (Benveniste 1974's *le vouloir dire des sujets parlants*), and by the really great innovation of suggesting that intentionality is an *act of perception*.<sup>27</sup> And lately, Searle (1992) adds a fourth element, namely, the mind as consciousness and, therefore, as meaning.

That is why, when I reflected on the difference between *signification* and *sens intenté par les sujets parlants* (Benveniste 1974), I realized that a translation theory based on that distinction might offer a real solution to the philosophical problem of meaning by allowing us to construct a set of well-defined basic concepts out of scientific research of the simultaneous oral translation situation.<sup>28</sup> This research possibility seemed to me to be the *experimentum crucis* for the epistemological foundation of philosophy and the social sciences in the same way as Galileo's fall of bodies experiment proved to be the foundation experiment of the natural sciences. The meaning should be seen, on the one hand, as some kind of mental representation intended by the intentionality of speakers, and not as the meaning of isolated words or sentences. On the other hand, meaning could be conceptualised as the result of an act of understanding or, as we would now say, a cognitive act, which resulted necessarily in a perception, what else?<sup>29</sup> Nowadays, we know that the distinction between linguistic and pragmatic or cognitive aspects is also essential to logic, as Recanati (1993) has shown solving some of Frege's pending problems.<sup>30</sup> And, of course, that cognitive act should be seen as the result of the actions of social agents acting in a social field.

But to discover a thing is not the same as to explain it. What Seleskovitch "discovered" — and thousands of people before her in the last two thousands years — is not an *explicatio* but an *explicandum*. Remembering Freud's Vienna seminar, I thought of organizing the production of the cartography of the continent of meaning by trying to convince Seleskovitch to convene a monthly seminar in her house south of Paris inviting a

selected group of doctors of translation, psycholinguists and neurologists. — because obviously it was a cognitive problem, not a linguistic one — to construct the first foundations of a real *théorie du sens*.<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately, Seleskovitch was not interested in theories but in practical matters, like, for example, writing manuals for interpretation and translation schools and their teachers but, one would tend to ask, what is the point of writing manuals of that kind, with or without basic concepts and models, when there is no translation theory at all to back them up and justify their assertions?<sup>32</sup>

#### THE THERMODYNAMICS PHASE OF TRANSLATION THEORY

After Seleskovitch rediscovered *le sens* in the 70s for the first generation of AIIC interpreters, a new generation of thinking interpreters rediscovered Galileo and the natural sciences. The “scientific” theory of interpretation took off, rejecting as speculation the seleskovitchian “personal” theorizing (?) and proclaiming as the only task the researching of concrete cases without preconceived models (*Zurück zur Empirie*). We know that this is not possible, strictly speaking, because every research program, even when it pretends not to have preconceived notions, has always, and necessarily, its own tacit assumptions, presumptions or presuppositions (hidden premises). Quite a number of those research projects refer back to an unspoken model which reminds one of thermodynamics: interpretation is being tacitly conceived as an anonymous, not human or social but natural energy which is used, wasted, compressed, divided in a series of phases and obstacles with currents flowing through channels, all of it, presumably, at a cognitive subconscious level (to avoid any hint or shadow of “personal” theorizing). This second wave was a reaction to the lack of scientific vocabulary, rhetoric and attitude in the Seleskovitch camp. It probably originated at the end of the seventies in Gile’s disappointment with Seleskovitch’s seminar, some of whose sessions he attended. He told me at the time he was dissatisfied with the lack of scientific panache of that bunch of people. He had been nurtured in natural science (not in mathematics, though, which require a lot of theorizing) and saw the world through those lenses. This naturalistic credo, which found an echo in a number of places like Trieste, insists on empirical research at all price, if possible of “natural” objects, like the brain and its irrigation patterns.<sup>33</sup> Sometimes, this obsession with the natural sciences phraseology leads to the creation of mythical entities, like the “mental energy” in Gile (1995: 161), where the comprehension effort of a human being called interpreter is treated as a thermodynamic machine, or to metaphorical use of scientific looking words like in the “gravitational” model of linguistic availability in Giles (1995: 217).

I would only say to that what Searle (1992) says of the Indian intellectuals who still believe in soul transmigration: they haven’t read the news. Galileo, the first of the founding fathers of classical mechanics, lived and worked in the XVIth century, and since then many things have happened which we ought to take into account, living as we are at the end of the XXth century. Certainly, we all know that Galileo and Descartes had to fight against the speculative habits of the Middle Ages paradigm, and they, together with their generation, fought, on the one side, by imposing the principle of empiricism against speculation, which says that whatever appears in the scientific mind must be found previously in a repeatable experiment to avoid talking without reference like the monks were doing in their very interesting treaties on motion and velocity, *id est*, the nature of continuous magnitude. But those Founding Fathers of modern science fought also against speculation — which some people conveniently forget — by applying the mathematical way of writing (notation), which avoids lengthy and fuzzy discussions and involves postulation of an

initial slate of definitions in an operation which is, strictly speaking, speculative and cannot be otherwise. (You may call it philosophical, if you wish.)<sup>34</sup>

#### THE REINVENTION OF THE WHEEL

It is most probable that future historians of the evolution of scientific ideas will speak of the law of the reinvention of the wheel in the following manner: the ontology of scientific generations reproduces the phylogeny of philosophic battles. That is to say that any wave of newcomers go through the same motions of empiricism against speculation and the rediscovery that without speculative asking there are no empirical answers. After Galileo's attack on medieval speculation, followed by the empiricist warning of Locke and Hume, we had Kant's re-establishment, on a new basis, admittedly, of the *a priori* categories of Pure Theoretical Reason. This Kantian revolution remained unassailed until the Vienna Circle's positivist stance at the beginning of this century, a trend which leads to Russell's disavowal of Hegel and to Ayer's logical empiricism. This revival of the empiricist positivism is conveniently summed up in Gardner 1985, which obligingly forgets to mention the reaction of the speculative party in, for example, Poper's admonition that any scientific experiment is the answer to a question, and, as we just said, there is no possibility of asking questions without previous definition and demarcation of a field, which is pure speculation. Let us then reinvent the wheel and start all over again. What should be the field of translation theory? Let us proceed to the definition and demarcation of that field. This operation is called epistemology. But before that, allow me to repeat the essential propositions of epistemology as it came out of European classical philosophy from Descartes to Kant and beyond. It consists of asking whether sure knowledge (*scientia*) is possible and under what conditions. There was some sort of agreement, at the beginning of this classical period at least (XVIth century), on saying that sure knowledge was only possible under two conditions: all knowledge must originate in experience (*Erfahrung*) and must be organized by "reason" or "ratio", consisting of *a priori* categories or axioms. If we apply these two principles to answer the question about the object of translation theory, the answer seems to be double: firstly, the law of empiricism, as a scientific research (*Erfahrung*), and, secondly, the axioms defining the field.<sup>35</sup>

#### THE NEW EMPIRICISM AND THE FORMULATING OF HYPOTHESES

I will start by saying that the first part of the answer to the epistemological question, namely, that all our hypotheses must originate in the real experience of the object, have to be clarified in the following manner: we should start by modeling the experience of oral translation in the form of simultaneous interpretation (SI) for the simple reason that here we find the simplest form of translation. It is the simplest form because it is an oral form. This implies, of course, that we have to agree on the meaning of orality.

First of all, this empirical principle eliminates all literary and "peripatetic" speculation on "translation." Secondly, by concentrating on oral translation (SI), we would comply with the Cartesian principle which nobody has denied or refuted or rejected and which says that to solve difficulties it is better to start with the simplest problems and ascend stage by stage on the scale of complication.<sup>36</sup>

#### MODELING IS ANOTHER WAY OF SPECULATING, THAT IS, OF CONSTRUCTING THEORIES

This second epistemological principle entails that we must arrive at a model, not just examine the facts in experimental research without having decided before hand what to look for, as Gile (1994) seems to imply. We must define, *a priori* of all research,

exactly the terms of that research. This can only happen through the advancing of hypotheses. Let us suppose for example, to follow the complaints of Gile (1994), that we do not know what happens in the mental processes, that we want to devise a research program to try to learn something about those mental processes. We would have to start making hypotheses like these: when a French interpreter sits in her/his booth listening to a speaker speaking in English what probably happens is that s/he understands the speech in question because of her/his knowledge of the speaker's language and of the subject under discussion and of the situation (including all what has been said and has happened before). This kind of thinking is, I am afraid, unavoidably a speculative operation: one has to speculate about what is probably happening. This speculation is a hint about what to look for in the experimental series, and, therefore, about how to construct that research program to confirm or infirm those hypotheses. We might think of testing the knowledge of the subject, or of the situation, organizing experimental series where some interpreters are forced to interpret a speech without previous knowledge of the subject, or of the situation, whereas other interpreters are allowed to interpret normally, that is to say, from the beginning, knowing before hand what the subject is and learning step by step what the different and consecutive situations are by participating in them. We might find out in the course of this kind of research program that our hypotheses were the wrong ones because it so happens that interpreters are able to speak their own speeches without actually understanding the subject or even without knowing anything of the situation but this negative finding would be a positive research result inasmuch as it would direct our attention towards other hypotheses. You can, of course, do as if you did not have any aprioristic hypotheses or assumptions and go into the research program pretending you are innocent of preconceived speculations or personal theories, and then, if your findings confirm your hidden premises, you can pretend that you have "discovered scientific facts in a scientific way."

#### **THERE IS METHOD IN OUR MADNESS**

All this is modeling and, therefore, theorizing, without which it is perfectly useless to think of experimental research. These are things which are common knowledge to scientific communities, it only happens that the newly born scientific community of interpreters writing about interpretation is so new that their members had not the time to read the news about scientific methodology. What normally happens in scientific communities is that they are composed of at least two sorts of members, some are of the theorizing, speculative kind, and others are of the experimental, research kind. Both of them are equally serious, equally "scientific" and equally necessary, and, therefore, the young research community we are talking about would do well to stop squabbling about who is doing the right thing and agree on a minimum of rules to start thinking and research the object of translation theory. The good news is that, in spite of all those combative polemic attitudes, there is a lot of agreement on the essentials of a model of oral translation (SI) as we can see in Pöchhacker (1994) (see later the Pöchhacker Hypothesis) and, above all in Gile (1995).

#### **A PROPOSAL FOR THE OPERATIVE DEFINITION OF THE OBJECT OF TRANSLATION THEORY**

I think indeed that there is now some sort of agreement on certain essential features of the object of oral translation theory. Let me go straight to the point by formulating two propositions:

**First proposition:** I suggest we ought to start circumscribing the object of oral translation theory with the following consideration: the language game we call “translating” consists evidently — nobody can deny that — of repeating something and of dropping something. It seems to me also evident that what we drop in that language game is *la langue*. The question is what is it that we repeat or reproduce in translating. That should be the first definition of the external frontiers of the object of oral translation theory. There is absolutely no need to give a name to that mysterious object, let us call it  $\Sigma$ ... *Soit dit en passant*, the tremendous advantage of formal symbolic notation is that it eliminates all those unnecessary debates about the names of things. We could say that  $\Sigma$  is what some people call this or the other, and some other people prefer to call this or that.<sup>37</sup> This would be a way to manage conflicts between different schools of thought or different inclinations or perversions. We could agree that all translation theory worthy of its epistemological salt should contribute to answer that first and ultimate question... in whatever way and with whatever method it chooses.

**Second proposition:** once we have reached a gentle researchers’ agreement on the external frontiers of the object of oral translation theory, we would say that the concrete outline of the research object could be what I would like to call the *Pöchhacker Hypothesis*, namely the effort in Pöchhacker (1994) to sum up all theoretical positions which impinge upon translation theory. The main ingredients of such an effort are:

- i), all oral translation studies (SI) should be seen as a part of a general translation theory.
- ii), SI is an activity (*translatorisches Handeln*) and a social activity at that, but let us not forget that all action (*Handeln*) includes necessarily the intention (*Zweck*), and someone is going to ask what is the object intended, let us call it  $\Sigma$ ...
- iii), SI should be seen as a “system” in the meaning of von Bertalanffy (we speak of a bertalanffyian system,<sup>38</sup> which is totally different from the Saussurian concept of “structured system” applied to *la langue*<sup>39</sup> which was the base for the development of the structuralist school. A bertalanffyian system is an *actual event*, whereas a saussurian system is a *virtual structure*). *But how would you describe what is happening in the system?*
- iv), SI is a process, but let us not forget that there is no process without a product and a result, *and what is the name of the product... and of the result, if different?*
- v), in this processual system of social interactions there are social agents playing social roles (somebody writes an original text, (we might call it To), somebody translates it (let’s call it a Tt), somebody reads the Tt and this somebody is the “person” for whom the translator wrote her/his Tt.
- vi) therefore, we can see the language game called “translating” as a social communicative linguistic interaction between several social agents (shall we speak of two or three poles of communication?), where something is produced and re-produced in several phases or acts.

But let us not forget that we are playing games as long as we are afraid to ask the real question: how can we tell that Tt is a translation of To?

#### THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND THE UNNATURAL ONES

There is something else I would like to add and it is this: Translation Theory is not an object of the natural sciences. Let me explain what I mean.

I pretend there is a special predicament with the object of translation theory, namely, that it is essentially different from the kind of objects contemplated by the natural sciences. This means that the epistemological model constructed by European classical

philosophy since Descartes to Kant, and still in force today, is useless for our purposes and this is the cause of quite a number of misunderstandings among the members of our scientific community and might explain the division of that community into two different and mostly uncommunicated groupings that Moses-Mercer (1994) calls the "liberal arts group" and "the natural sciences oriented group."<sup>40</sup> Let me try to elucidate what I mean. The epistemological model for the natural sciences, as constructed by the above mentioned European classical philosophy, consists of a perception subject, (a scientist), in front of a perception object, which is a natural process (planets, electrons, photons orbits, blood cells, genets chains, etc.).<sup>41</sup> This model presents a human being in front of an inanimated thing. This is a silent encounter where there is no past, no history, no words.

On the other hand, the epistemological model for all the social sciences (I am afraid translation theory is a social science because it deals with social agents doing things in social fields) has to be different: it has to contemplate a human being in front of another human being and not in front of a "natural process." That model, as I see it, presents a subject of perception, (who is also a scientist), contemplating, not a "natural process" but a "social process," that is to say, a process in which there are human beings doing things in the presence of other human beings, doing things to each other, or at least doing things which can be seen and interpreted by other human beings. Let us call this model the general epistemological model for the social sciences.<sup>42</sup>

In the case of a scientist (as perception subject) contemplating people doing translations to each other he sees people talking, either orally or in writing,<sup>43</sup> in a first communication act, where several human beings, at least two, using sign systems to produce and interchange sign chains with the intention of transmitting messages ( $\Sigma$ ) according to social rules, in a social situation defined by certain structures, — it being understood that one of them is trying to create and transmit that message ( $\Sigma$ ) and the other one is trying to receive and understand it. And the scientist sees that once this second human being has understood that message ( $\Sigma$ ), he proceeds, in a second communication act, to produce sign chains of a second sign system with the intention of transmitting that  $\Sigma$  to a third "person" (to make this third person produce a perception of that  $\Sigma$ ). In this model, one immediately feels that we are confronting a repetition: something produced in the first communication act is re-produced in the second communication act, but, in fact, both acts have the same structure, the same "system," the same "process," and, therefore, the real model underlying this description is in fact simpler: it consists of a scientist contemplating a human being saying something to another human being and whether this second human being re-produces or not what s/he might have understood is immaterial because, as a repetition of the first communication act, it is redundant. Of course, you must go on and define with a little more precision what "saying" means for the purposes of the model. You could say, for example, as we have just done, that it means using a sign system (*la langue*) to produce and transmit or communicate a something, which we have called provisionally  $\Sigma$ , (a "message" or some "information quantum"), but it would be useful, or at least interesting, to see what happens if you call it a "perception." According to Searle (1983), this should be called a "perception" from the point of view of the speaker, and this proposal I consider to be a great step forward but why not call a perception what the hearer "perceives" when s/he "understands"? I think we can accept this at least as a heuristically relevant hypothesis. And so you can go on refining the "speculative" presentation of this model to prepare your research but let it be understood that it is only a first model to guide research and this means that one should not try to be too meticulous about details because everything can be modified later, the main thing being the general structure of the model, which obviously is a model of interaction between two poles of communication.

### THE SECOND OBJECT HYPOTHESIS

This thesis which I have just postulated, namely, that the object of translation theory (because translating is a social transaction involving social actors in social situations) needs a new epistemological model, different from the one elaborated for the natural objects of the natural sciences, is what I call the "Second Object Hypothesis".<sup>44</sup>

This hypothesis should be understood in this way: the epistemological model for the natural sciences contemplates objects which have several characteristics in common, like, for example, they are all processes which happen without any influence of man, they have not been created or produced by man, they happen in the cosmos without any influence from intelligent social beings, and would have happened anyhow in our planet even if the species *h.linguisticus* would have never existed. Another characteristic is they are "causal" but no "teleological," that is, the natural processes are causal chains of events and there is nothing about them which one would allow anybody to speak of intention. This means that the question "what is the cosmos for?" is the wrong question to ask for all natural processes as objects of the natural sciences. Granted, this lack of *telos* does not apply to complex animated organic objects, like higher animal species, where we see the beginnings of teleology or intentionality. Let us call all this collection of natural objects and processes "The First Object"... in relation, of course, to the postulated Second Object, which would be the label for all the social processes contemplated by social sciences.

If you consider the history of sciences since Galileo to the present day you will remember that around the end of the XVIII and beginning of the XIXth centuries — about the time that some historians, like R. Palmer, call "the age of revolution" — there is a deliberate attempt to use the episteme and methodology recently created for natural processes with "historical objects," as they were first called, or "social objects," as they are nowadays called.

### THE PRINCIPALS DEFINING THE SECOND OBJECT

It might be useful to consider my Second Object Hypothesis as a set of principles which try to describe, together and with unavoidable overlapping, a concept:

#### **First Principle: There is a difference of categories or "categorical difference"<sup>45</sup> between the First and the Second Object**

The Second Object is the totality of all social objects and each one of them.<sup>46</sup> For example, the activity of language usage, which happens between social actors in a social situation conceived of as a social "gravitational" field, is such an object. This "second object" is *eingebettet*<sup>47</sup> (immersed) in the physical and biological reality but it is something different. You can, therefore, study the physics and the biology of such an activity, measuring for example blood irrigation curves of both brain hemispheres in the presence of some excitation like listening to a speaker but then you are transforming your "second" object into a "first object," that is, you are "naturalizing" it.

#### **Second Principle: The Second Object exists only in the wavelength of language**

What we call social reality is not a natural object (it does not belong to the First Object), its reality is constituted not by physical or chemical matter but by "language matter," and more specifically, by meanings meant and perceived in social speech interactions ("linguistic perceptions" in my terminology). This is, again, an ontological observation, that is to say, an observation about the manner of being of the Second Object, which is not a "thing," or a "natural process" but a social process of linguistic interaction and its products. All animal species live in surroundings constituted by their perceptual systems. The species *h.linguisticus* lives in a "world" produced by its perceptual system which is

in turn structured by language.<sup>48</sup> Children abandoned at birth (*enfants loups*) cannot live in our social worlds because their brains, although endowed with a chomskyan universal grammar device, did not develop the necessary pragmatic language circuitry and, therefore, they cannot use their chomskyan device. The end result is that they are not human, they do not belong to the species *h.linguisticus*.

**Third Principle: Whatever is in the Second Object has been created or produced by social actors acting in social situations (it is not “natural” like the rain)**

In the primobjectal nature we have natural processes of which it cannot be said that they have been or are being produced by social actors acting in social situations, they have not been produced by man. There is a difference between manmade things, like chairs, cars, theories, and, on the other hand, cosmic “things,” like atoms, molecules, blood cells, etc. This has epistemological consequences: in the realm of the First Object it is possible to ask whether there is an “objective” reality confronting the perception subject which corresponds to the reference capacity of the propositions of the logical language of natural sciences. This question has to be qualified when speaking of “social realities,” because these, as produced by men acting in social transactions, are always related to the perspectivistic social subjectivity of those actors, and, therefore, social scientists cannot get rid of their own value systems, prejudices or preconceived semiconscious opinions, ideological stances, when researching social phenomena.<sup>49</sup> There is also the fact that social scientists confront phenomena that (i) present themselves as already interpreted by social prejudices inherited by and transmitted by everyday language (we all know what “translation” is, don’t we?), and (ii) they come immersed in history, and, therefore, they “speak” to the scientist, they are not silent like the natural objects (“translating” is a very old social activity which has been described and analyzed and commented upon by hundreds of people, some of them translators, hence we cannot act as if we just discovered it).

**Fourth principle: the principle of totalities**

In the Second Object there are no “things,” only relations between actions in process. There is only one Object, namely, the totality of the Second Object... which is constituted by a great number of subtotalities, each one of them being integrated by other subtotalities and so on... until we reach the appearances we see in everyday life and which we take for “reality.” Bertalanffy and Hegel. Only the totalities are the truth (Hegel: *das Wahre ist das Ganze*). The isolated “aspects” are lies inasmuch as they hide the totality to which they belong. Thus, for example, the social act of communication through sign systems is a processual totality in which we can artificially isolate some “moments” or “aspects,” which have been called “existential” because they are perceived in everyday perception as actions actuated by social actors (which we can see physically) — and we would “naturally” tend to consider those aspects or moments as “things.” Sign systems, although reified by grammars and linguistics and everyday perceptions and prejudices, are not things that exist by themselves as primobjectal objects do but only aspects or moments of the totality of social activity (which is mainly communication activity). And, by the same token, “persons,” although reified by the same everyday presentation of our life world, are not “things” but aspects or moments of the constant state of social communication in which that strange reality we call “society” manifests itself, that is to say, the Second Object.<sup>50</sup> The principle of totality means also something else, namely, that the pattern of whatever happens at a certain level of social reality is the same pattern at all levels. In each drop of social life we find the whole ocean.

**Fifth principle: the principle of quotidianity**

The Second Object — also called “human life” or *Dasein* — presents itself to us in the disguise of quotidianity and then we speak of *le monde vécu*. All the contents of the Second Object are present in quotidianity under the mask of familiarity. Quotidian familiarity (which breeds contempt) can be seen as actions in a world which is the sum total of prejudices, *idées reçues*, that is, the weight of the past, of history. The activity of thinking in the social sciences should consist, first of all, in taking off those masks to see through what is behind, namely, the reality of social processual relations between aspects and moments lacking primobjectal objectivity.<sup>51</sup> To succeed in this Nietzschean *demaskierung* we have to go beyond the familiar quotidianity as someone who suddenly goes to live in a foreign country and finds that everything is the same in a different (and strange) way (*dépaysement*) before learning the local vernacular which will convey to him the familiar quotidianity and verisimilitude of those strange things that happen. This interruption of the quotidian *karma* leads to the Kafkian estrangement (*Verfremdung*). But the “truth” that becomes visible after the estrangement or distancing has to be translated back into quotidianity, first of all to explain the masks, and, secondly, because the masks are the truth of everyday life, which are only a lie inasmuch as they hide from us the totalities in which our reified icons<sup>52</sup> lose their ontological hardness.

**Sixth principle: the ontological difference between virtual structures (like *la langue*) and actual actions**

We have already mentioned this difference before when we said that there are other aspects or moments also present and gravitating upon social communication acts which are not “existential” but rather “virtual systems or structures,” for example, the sign system (*langue*), which is present, and so to speak “gravitating” on the social situation and on the process itself. These virtual structured systems are the possibility for individual actions by agents, determining beforehand what agents can do. A sign system (*la langue*) determines the class of sentences which can be produced and interchanged, social agents are not free to produce any kind of sign chain, they have to observe systemic rules which are mostly subconscious. But there are other “virtual more or less structured systems” apart from *la langue*, and translation mistakes reveal their presence: systems of knowledge (encyclopedic or thematic), systems of social norms which regulate social and linguistic behavior, systems of beliefs.<sup>53</sup> These phenomena have been the “object” of the structuralist school of Saussurian origin, as a reaction to the existential trend of Heidegger and Sartre, which contemplated only, as the content of the Second Object, actions by individuals acting in a void, instead of in a social field. The contribution of Saussure and all the other structuralists is this fact of the structured systems creating orbits of social actions for the social actors. Their ontological status is exactly that: they are not individual actions but social gravitational fields which should be understood as the possibility of action. Individual actions by social agents do exist positively, the positivist scientist does accept them as things happening in space and time. Whereas the virtual structures, like *la langue* and the others, do not exist in a positivistic manner, do not happen in space and time, but nevertheless “gravitate” upon actions.

**WHAT ARE THE USES OF THE SECOND OBJECT HYPOTHESIS<sup>54</sup>**

The net result of the Second Object hypothesis, apart from offering a new vision of the translating process as deeply grounded in culture, is that we can solve several problems which seemed difficult as for example:

### The concept of equivalence revisited

i) Quine's theory of the indeterminacy of translation presupposes that meanings are "natural objects," and, therefore, does not apply to a translation conceived as Second Object.<sup>55</sup> The difficulties explaining the notion of equivalence in translation are due to the fact that the concept of equivalence is thought to refer to the equivalence between two natural objects or two mathematical or two propositions of "natural" logic. If we consider "translation equivalence" as a Second Object, we can see that we are speaking about interpretations of intentions, *id est*, equivalent from the point of view of that reader's interpretation in that particular context. This is what I call the hermeneutic concept of equivalence, and in this context "hermeneutic" is synonymous with "secondobjectal." We could also say, following these terminology rules, that "translation equivalence" is not an "object" but an "inject."<sup>56</sup> And, of course, all this applies also to the equivalence which is supposed to occur between what I am trying to say and what the reader will decide to understand.<sup>57</sup>

This distinction between primobjectal and secondobjectal epistemologies and methodologies will allow us to understand better the apparently confused message of Derrida's deconstruction: what it all means is that meanings created in language acts, like texts, are not natural objects nor logical propositions.

ii) Another consequence of the secondobjectal nature of translating is that the product of the interpreter (a speech = Di) or of the translator (a text) are both original language products; precisely because the equivalence is not a mechanical or a mathematical one (it is not a primobjectal one), the trajectory of the meaning goes through an understanding which is personal and then through a way of expressing it which is also "personal." (Over the fallacy of the translated text, see Sanguinetti 1992.) Another consequence: no two translations are equal.

### Mantissas and exponents

Another fallout of my Second Object Hypothesis is that we would have to add another proposition to the Pöchhacker Hypothesis list, namely,

*there are saussurian (virtual) structured systems that gravitate upon the social processual system of language communication that we have to take into account because they define the social gravitational field of possible actions, and the best known is the "langue" but there are others like the system of knowledge (encyclopaedic or thematical), the beliefs (Searle 1983), social rules or norms, psychological determinations (Freudian or otherwise)... and we should symbolise these "virtual entities"<sup>58</sup> as exponents affecting mantissas which symbolise actualities.*

Translating is a Second Objectal activity, a social activity, a process of communication, not the confrontation of two texts but the encounter of persons, of agents, in a social transaction acting in a social field constituted by virtual structures... that is what we cannot see easily in the translation of texts because the printed page hides from us the reality of language as speech, the fact that language only exists as people speaking, as we can see in orality...

Another thing: the principle of totality forces us to see that the social act of language communication is not an isolated phenomenon nor a "unit" which would happen alone but it is in fact a continuum of millions and millions of oral speech acts (and thousands of written acts) taking place every day and night in this planet... as a manifestation of human life. And, of course, if we accept the Second Object hypothesis, we would have to think at all times that in analysing translation activities we are dealing not with "things" but only with interpretations of intentions as aspects or moments of a totality of relations. Also we must bear in mind that this secondobjectal reality comes immersed in

past history, teeming with prejudices, pre-knowledges and pre-interpretations. This means that we have to take into account all the conceptual schemata of the several hermeneutic traditions: legal, exegetic, literary traditions... This rule reads: please refrain from "naturalizing" the secondobjectal phenomena... unless, of course, you are interested in contributing to the medical sciences or to the psychology of efforts.

#### MY LAST SENTENCE

The conclusion of my epistemological excursion is that the translation model I propose<sup>59</sup> is to be considered (the principle of totality at work) as the model of models for the social sciences (and for the hermeneutic philosophy) because it offers a model of the construction of social reality through the social production of "mental linguistic spaces."<sup>60</sup> What the translation model offers for the first time is the possibility of building a set of elementary concepts which can be later refined to apply to more complex social phenomena. The difficulty is always to find something easy to model. Who would have thought that Galileo's time and space measuring of a ball falling down an inclined plane would deliver the conceptual foundations of physics, and, therefore, of all natural sciences? Who would have thought that the modelling of oral translation could provide the epistemological first stone for the social sciences and, therefore, for the new foundation of philosophy? That is why this last sentence should now become the first one of the general epistemology worthy of its name: the study of oral translation could make it possible to start the construction of the foundations of social sciences and philosophy... provided that we consider the object of study (people speaking to re-produce meanings), not as an object of natural sciences to be handled with the methodology of those sciences, but rather as a Second Object to be handled with the secondobjectal methodology: not a thing but an ensemble of social relations in social gravitational field centrifuging perceptions caused by the manipulation of sign systems with no reference — or, if at all, only critical one — to anything outside that ensemble or to an outside view of that ensemble.

#### Notes

1. The English word "language" is useless because it is irretrievably ambiguous, whereas *la langue*, after Saussure, is perfectly defined as system of signs.
2. King James version: "So they read {*aloud in Aramean*} in the book in the law of God {*written in Hebrew*} distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading." (When they came back from the exile in Babylon, the people spoke Aramean, did not understand Hebrew, so Ezra and Nehemiah and all the other priests used to make at sight translations into Aramean of the Hebrew Torah text.)
3. Steiner, in *After Babel*, gets hold of the real theoretical problem, namely, the distinction between the systemic value of isolated sign chains and the value of the message, but then in an incomprehensible move coming from someone who is writing such a book on translation, goes on to demand that this distinction should be proved when it is in fact, as his book amply and brilliantly shows, the monumental and millenarian experience of all translators. Referring to St. Jerome's famous sentence, Steiner writes: "In whatever form it is put, *non verbum e verbo sed sensum exprimere de sensu* assumes precisely that which requires demonstration. It predicates a literal meaning attached to verbal units, normally envisaged as single words in a purely lexical setting, which differs from, and whose straightforward transfer will falsify, the 'true sense' of the message." (1975: 276). And, speaking of Valery Larbaud, I refer, of course, to his book *Sous l'invocation de Saint Jérôme*.
4. See Jean Grondin (1993).
5. I refer to the notion of *champ* in Pierre Bourdieu's *Œuvre*.
6. The principle of "sensus" or force of intention is already set forth in classical rhetoric and in Jutinian's Digest: *scire leges non hoc verba earum tenere sed vim et potestatem*, (to know the laws — we would say today "understand" — is not to "hold the words" but its strength and power, *vis et potestatem*). The word *vis* (force) is used quite often to mean what I call "sense or meaning meant" (which has the "force" of people speaking). But even before the legal hermeneutics of Imperial Rome there was the distinction made by the Greek philosophers of the Stoa (stoics) between *logos endiathetos* or "inner speech" and *logos proforikos* or outer speech (linguistic sign chains), taken over by Augustine in the IVth century of our era as

*actus exercitus* or meaning intended by the speakers intention of saying, and *actus signatus*, or sign chains. (Grondin 1993: 247 and 262)

7. See Ian Maclean (1992), a book all interpreters should read, where you find, for example, the distinction between *interpretatio expositiva, correctiva, taxativa, amphativa, inductiva, fictiva, translativa, intensiva, extensiva, restrictiva*.... which are of immediate application to the particular case of conference interpretation, and where interpretation problems are discussed (like sticking to the sense) which might involve the "preference of intended subjective meaning, perceived intuitively, over literal sense"...
8. García-Landa (1978).
9. The Lutheran revolution was condemned by the Catholic Church in the Council of Trent, in particular during the session of the 8th of April 1546. The catholic position was that the Holy Scriptures, qua text, were not entirely understandable without the help of Tradition, this tradition being the opinion of the Fathers of the Church as kept and administered by the authorities in Rome. Against that position, the revolutionaries had to demonstrate that it was enough to read the texts ....with reading methods and rules, to understand the meaning. These rules and "hermeneutic" methods were set out by Matthias Flacius Illyricus in his book *De ratione cognoscendi sacras literas*, also named *Clavis Scripturae Sacrae* (1567), whence the name of *golden key of hermeneutics* given to this doctrine. Flacius includes in his system the tradition of classical rhetorics — the art of public speech — but as modified by Descartes's disciple Melanchton, who turned it into art of restoring the classical texts to their original purity and the art of understanding them. Thus, the shift of meaning of the word "rhetorics" which now goes on to signify the art and later the theory of comprehension, which will become the grand theme of hermeneutics.
10. Among the successors of Flacius, mention must be made of Johann Jacob Rambach, whose *Institutiones hermeneuticae sacrae*, of 1723, introduce the notion of the psychological state in hermeneutics. The interpreter, according to Rambach, should plunge and immerse himself in the intended meaning of the speaker or the author in a burst of psychological identification (this is the beginning of Schleiermacher's *Einführung*).
11. Hermeneutic psychology was developed by the great representative of romantic hermeneutics, Schleiermacher, with his concept of *Einführung*. This concept has been criticized in our day, especially by Gadamer. Conference interpreters also speak of psychological interpretation. Can one speak of a "psychological" penetration of the intentions of saying of the speaker? Or of an identification phenomenon according to which the interpreter becomes the persona of the speaker? Gadamer criticizes Schleiermacher for the sin of "psychologism" but Gadamer forgets that romantic psychology is not "psychic" in the modern exchange value of the word but rather in the romantic sense where it is... the spirit (or, as we would say today, the information level of the mind). Penetrating the intended meaning of the speaker is not to feel his psychological state of mind or his soul but rather to feel what he feels when he feels the meaning, *id est* reconstruct and reproduce the context of his act of production of meaning (the latin word "sensus" comes from the verb "sentire" which we should transpose as "perceive," and this allows us to suggest that to comprehend what somebody is trying to say is to perceive a meaning, and that, therefore, meaning is perception). Think of the second hermeneutic rule of Betti (1962). Or, if you prefer, understand his logic, place oneself within the point of view of his reasoning, understand why he is saying what he is saying, from what set of circumstances his intended meaning pours forth. And in that sense, identify oneself with his intentions and re-live it.
12. Spinoza devotes the seventh chapter of his *Tractatus theologico-politicus* to hermeneutics using for the first time in the history of hermeneutics the concept of the "situation" (context). This refers to the historic situation of the text and its author. More important yet: Spinoza wants to create a sound scientific base for hermeneutics so that the sciences which use interpretation as a method like history, for example, may enjoy the same dignity as the natural sciences, which anticipates on Wilhelm Dilthey, who, two centuries later, elaborating Schleiermacher's positions, wanted to build a foundation for the social sciences. Thus hermeneutics enters its present phase where it becomes, with Heidegger, Gadamer and Habermas the prime task of philosophy, not as a methodology of social sciences but as the first principle of philosophy and therefore of all sciences. Because everything men think and do is thought and done in the social interactions of their daily life, what Ong 82 calls their "life world," which is born in the placenta of every day orality of oral language, which happens to be the working environment of the interpreter.
13. Eagleton 1983, p. 67.
14. Eagleton 1983, p. 67.
15. Eagleton 1983, p. 71.
16. Eagleton 1983, p. 88.
17. Searle 1992.
18. See García-Landa (1981) in whose title the expression *théorie du sens* is used for the first time in the history of translation theory. Seleskovitch wanted to call "biolinguistics" her vision of translation studies and it was to prevent her from going ahead with that slightly ridiculous idea that I suggested *la théorie du sens*... as the name for a future theory that we were going to build but never did.

19. You find an attempt to describe what could have been a possible *théorie du sens* in Pöchhacker (1994: 19-24).
20. Which are the main contentions of my theory of translation in García-Landa (1990).
21. Lenin was one of the propounders of the "mirror theory of knowledge," considered today to be one of the most primitive epistemological views.
22. It was an empirical study of "the deliberate deviations of literality" in conference interpretation": I went around with my Sony machine, recording "professional interpreters working in genuine settings," (Shlesinger 1989a: 81) that is to say, recording what I call the *Do* (*Discours de l'orateur*) and *Di* (*Discours de l'interprète*) and comparing them to find real cases, as opposed to imagined examples, in which the interpreter decides to use sign chains with no resemblance at all to the *Do*'s sign chains.
23. Gadamer's seminal book *Wahrheit und Methode* appeared in 1960.
24. In spite of all their protestations, it never occurs to a professor to remember that much before writing was invented, and for many thousands of years, people lived in strictly oral cultures. Even today, from the more than 4000 languages spoken in this planet less than 100 have an alphabet and can be written, all the others remaining in the oral phase. People in Western culture are so intellectualized (textified) that they cannot even start imagining what it is to live in an oral culture, to be an oral personality.
25. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1981.
26. Grondin 1993: 117.
27. This is what has allowed me to speak of a perceptual theory of language as the most favourable terrain to construct a translation theory. By the way, Searle uses in that book a formal notation to present his idea, which is the inspiration of the special notation I developed to construct my perceptual theoremes of language comprehension (García-Landa 1990).
28. See the set of 10 definitions in García-Landa 1990.
29. Formidable help for the proposition that semantic meanings are different from meanings meant and comprehended by speakers in social fields can be found not only in Sach's and Javella's experimental research on the disappearance from short term memory of sign chains but also in Heidegger's idea of a logos-free vision produced by language (Grondin 1993: 258).
30. Recanati (1993) offers a solution to some of the difficulties of the direct reference theory and takes into account recent advances in pragmatics to distinguish between semantic and pragmatic meaning.
31. A theory, by the way, is, inter alia, a set of rules on how to use certain words, and that is why it should start with a set of definitions, as in Euclid's Principles of Geometry and Newton's "Mathematical Principles of the Philosophy of Nature."
32. See from a Seleskovitch disciple, Amparo Hurtado Albir (1990), where the idea of language communication act is expressed in a series of graphic models.
33. Pöchhacker (1993) points diplomatically to the limits of this approach.
34. "Les épistémologues, comme Karl Popper, et les historiens des sciences, pensons à Thomas S. Kuhn, nous ont appris jusqu'à quel point la théorie scientifique est toujours interprétation, découpage, lecture du réel en fonction des exigences, peu ou prou explicites, de la recherche et de son contexte historicoculturel. La science ne se borne pas, comme le pensent le positivisme et le sens commun, à décrire des faits; elle doit les mettre en ordre, les conceptualiser, en un mot, les interpréter. Grondin (1993 : 194).
35. As in García-Landa (1990).
36. Rules V and VI, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*.
37. Giles (1995) calls it "the Message" or "the Aim" or "the meaning".
38. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Austrian philosopher, one of the leading members of the "general systems" philosophical school which explored the concept of organized ensembles in natural and social sciences. His work has more echo in the USA than in Europe. See his book *General System Theory*, 1968. See also from John W. Sutherland *A General Systems Philosophy for the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 1973.
39. See below the Sixth Principle of the Second Object.
40. I do not entirely agree with the description that Moser-Mercer (1994) gives of those two groups because I do not think that one can say that the "liberal arts group" "involves the intellect in a less logically rigorous manner." Here again we have a case of confusion of what "science" is. There is not only one kind of science, the one where quantification and mathematical logic counts. There is also another kind of science, social science, and another kind of logic, namely, hermeneutical logic. (See Grondin 1993, chapters XI and XIII) And, above all, even in natural sciences we tend to forget that it involves, as I have already said, a lot of speculative theorizing to define a field. I was hoping translation theory could do something about it.
41. I have developed this difference between the classical perceptual model and the linguistic perception one in García-Landa (1985).
42. Later we shall see that it is more than that.
43. I know there might be some resistance on the part of the reader to admit that writing is another way of talking, or to say it in French, *qu'il y ait deux paroles, la parole orale et la parole écrite*, but this has been previously admitted (*i. e.* Montaigne).

44. The idea I am about to present has been haunting translation studies in several disguises: first, some people used to say that interpretation has nothing to do with *langues*, only with ideas, and then, recently, some other people insist that translation studies transcend linguistics, are an independent interdiscipline deeply grounded in culture. See M. Snell-Hornby, F. Pöchhacker and Klaus Kaindl (Eds.) (1994).
45. This is a concept due to the German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann. In his project for an ontology of the real world, Hartmann distinguishes between several levels of reality: there is first a physical level on top of which appears a biological level on top of which appears the socio-cultural level. Every higher level is *eingebettet* in the previous ones but there is a radical change in the categories defining each of the levels so that we can say that the biological level is *eingebettet* in the physical level but there is a radical categorial difference because in living organisms, whether vegetal or animal, you find new categories. And the same applies to the socio-cultural level, it is also "nature" and "physics" and "biology" but there is some more, something new which constitutes the categorial difference.
46. At a certain moment of contemporary European philosophy, the totality of all social objects was called *das menschliche Leben oder das Dasein* (M. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der Phänomenologie*, 1927, and *Sein und Zeit*, also 1927).
47. Famous past participle used by Nicolai Hartmann.
48. This is the pavlovian concept of language as a social perceptual system built upon the natural sensorial one.
49. It can, for example, happen that the social scientist has a personal ideological stance, according to which nothing can exist which is not "material" and this perspectivistic subjectivity will blind him to all aspects of reality which are not strictly "material."
50. This constant state of communication is sometimes alluded by the everyday use of the word "language" but it also receives the referential impact of the word "mind" (I mean, we could safely call it "mind," which would save us from a lot of trouble).
51. This is what Sartre calls, following an old scholastic terminology, *ens per se*, or *le néant*, because this lack of primobjectal objectivity was perceived by Sartre as a lack of being, whereas it is only a different kind of being.
52. I found this use of the word "icon" in Bacon.
53. Searle (1983) considers that background beliefs play a necessary role in language understanding but he thinks they lack systemic character, that is, they are not systems and it will be impossible to try to show that they are.
54. To see in a practical exemple what happens when the problem of meaning is treated with "primobjectal" epistemology, see Atmanspacher (1994: 174ss).
55. It would appear that this was a deliberate attempt by Quine to undermine the belief that meanings are "natural objects": "*This unsettling claim is part of Quine's wider campaign against our tendency to think of meaning and synonymy as matters of objective fact.*" (Kirk 1986: XIX).
56. Not an "ob-ject" (indoeuropean *obhi-jactio*), not a "sub-ject" but an "in-ject."
57. Translation is a particular case of the general structure of all language games. I know that Wittgenstein says there cannot be a general rule applying to all language games but I believe that the model of language game (Do) delivered by a general theory of translation can show that this is not the case.
58. If you pass me this *contradictio in adjecto* because if they are "virtual," they have no entity, they are what Plato called "me-on" or "non-being" but they nevertheless have a great potency inasmuch as they constitute the social field.
59. In García-Landa (1990) I have formulated in formal notation a complete model to be considered as a first heuristic attempt.
60. For a good hint of how this concept of "mental spaces" could be constructed see Nystrand (1982).

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