Abstracts
Résumé
La violence est souvent regardée comme le moyen de prédilection des trafiquants dans la résolution de conflits dans le trafic de drogue. On ne remet que rarement en question cette évidence. La présente recherche analyse les récits des événements conflictuels vécus par douze hommes incarcérés pour trafic de cocaïne. Des 53 conflits discutés par ces trafiquants, 48 ont abouti à une résolution non violente qui n’exclut pas pour autant les menaces. Ces résolutions non violentes comportent des étapes et des stratégies des plus variées, allant de la négociation aux mesures préventives, de la participation d’un tiers dans la résolution de conflits aux conflits demeurés irrésolus. Les cinq derniers conflits ont été résolus de façon violente par les stratégies que sont les voies de fait ou les représailles. Une observation des méthodes violentes utilisées par les individus interrogés aidera à l’analyse du rôle de la violence, qu’elle soit la seule méthode envisagée ou qu’elle serve à des fins de dissuasion ou de rétribution.
Mots-clés :
- Trafiquants de cocaïne,
- conflit,
- résolution de conflits non violents,
- résolution de conflits violents,
- conséquences positives et négatives
Abstract
Drug dealers are commonly considered to have a predilection toward the use of violence to resolve disputes during dealing activities. Such an assumption is rarely questioned. This study analyses accounts of conflict from twelve individuals incarcerated for cocaine trafficking. Of 53 conflicts recounted by the interviewees, 48 were resolved in a non-violent fashion, notwithstanding possible use of violent threats. A variety of resolution strategies were employed, from negotiation, to preventative measures, to third party involvement, or conflicts simply remaining unresolved. The remaining five disputes were resolved in violent fashion. Examination of the violent methods used by the interviewees illustrates that violence serves primarily as a deterrent or cases of retribution.
Keywords:
- Cocaine dealers,
- conflict,
- dispute,
- non-violent settlement,
- violent settlement,
- consequences
Resumen
La violencia es percibida a menudo como el recurso privilegiado por los traficantes para resolver conflictos ligados al tráfico de drogas. Raramente se cuestiona tal evidencia. En la presente investigación se analizan los relatos de conflictos vividos por doce individuos encarcelados por tráfico de cocaína. De los 53 conflictos descritos, 48 fueron resueltos de manera no violenta, lo que no excluye que se haya recurrido a la amenaza de utilizarla. Dichas resoluciones de conflicto no violentas incluyen varias etapas así como diversas estrategias que van de la negociación a las medidas preventivas, del involucramiento de un tercero a la opción de dejar el conflicto sin resolver. Los últimos cinco conflictos fueron resueltos de manera violenta mediante golpes y otras represalias. La observación de los métodos violentos empleados por los individuos interrogados permite un análisis detallado del papel que juega la violencia, ya sea como único recurso o como medio de disuasión o retribución.
Palabras clave:
- Traficantes de cocaína,
- conflicto,
- resolución de conflictos no violenta,
- resolución de conflictos violenta,
- consecuencias positivas y negativas
Appendices
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