Volume 13, Number 2, 1982

EN:

In the introductory remarks of this article the authors examine the birth of the newly industrialized countries and the emergence of a new international division of labor. After stressing the two modes of the industrial strategy followed by these countries, the authors look at two newly industrialized countries (Brazil and South Korea). These specific countries due to the interplay of both, objective factors (natural resources, location, manpower...) and policy choices have followed divergent development strategies. The authors conclude that it is not so much the classical policy dilemma import substitution vs expert promotion that will determine the future of these semi-industrialized countries, than their ability to master the technological know-how that sustains their industrial development. The new technological trends in robotics and telematics constitute powerful factors of relocation which may threaten the long run growth prospects of the semi-industrialized countries.

EN:

Utilizing content analysis methodology, this paper studies Pakistani press perceptions of external sources of threat and support covering the Period 1958-1965.

From the literature on Pakistani foreign policy, seven specific hypotheses are extracted

for testing:

1 - during the period 1958-1965, India was perceived to be the major threat to

Pakistan ;

2 - the perception of India as the major threat increased sharply from 1962 onwards;

3 - in 1959 China was perceived to be a greater threat to Pakistan than India was;

4 - the Soviet Union was perceived to be the major threat in 1958, a significant but

secondary threat in 1959, the main threat again in 1960, and an insignificant

threat from 1961 onwards;

5 - at no time during the period 1958-1965 was the United States perceived to be a

threat to Pakistan;

6 - the respective policies of China, the US.S.R., and the U.S. towards South Asia in

general and on the Kashmir issue in particular, played a major part in determining

Pakistan's attitudes toward these states;

7 - U.S. arms aid to India in 1962 resulted in a major Pakistani disillusionment with

the United States and this was accompanied by more positive Pakistani views

toward the US.S.R. and China.

Our data drawn from front page news stores and editorials appearing in a sample of the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, confirm in general terms hypotheses 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7, but fall to confirm hypotheses 3 and 4.

Overall, the data point to the significance of the Sino-Indian border war in the fall of 1962 as a crucial turning point in Pakistan 's foreign policy alignments. Specifically, we see evidence of a turning away from the United States, combined with a movement toward China. Attitudes toward the Soviet Union were ambivalent.

EN:

We have divided the evolution of bilateral cooperation between Canada and the French-speaking countries of Africa into three major phases. During the first phase, which lasted from 1961 to 1968, Canadian aid was slight and discontinuous. The second phase, from 1969 to 1975, was characterized by a remarkable increase of the CIDA 's activities. That period was specially influenced, on the one had, by the rudeau and Chevrier missions and, on the other hand, by the reconsideration of Canada's foreign policy during the 1970's. The third phase, from 1975 to 1981, was arked, among other things, by what one could call industrial cooperation, that is cooperation between « project-countries » and « program-countries ». We have tried to analyse the main characteristics of each of those three phases, while striving to « link » them to the socio-economic and political context of Canada and the French-speaking countries of Africa.

EN:

The Soviet Union and its East European glacis are experiencing their second major wave of crisis since the death of Stalin. But unlike the "de-stalinization" crisis of the second half of the 1950s, which was largely political and was overcome through a combination of repression and reform that left the system basically intact, the present crisis cannot be weathered so easily and threatens to usher in a period of political upheaval, as it has already in Poland and, to some extent, in Romania.

On the most obvious level, the crisis manifests itself in the constant decline of the economic growth rate since the late 1950s, which has put an end to the slow but steady rise in living standards, the basis upon which the tacit post-Stalin accord between the bureaucracy and society was founded. The roots of this crisis are deeply structural, but structural reforms, in particular the introduction of the « regulated market mechanism », which appears to be the nly viable alternative open to the bureaucracy, will meet with strong opposition from important sectors of that elite, especially the provincial party bosses, and threaten to create a split in its ranks.

At the same time, such a reform is politically unfeasible without important concessions to the working class in the direction of democratization or, at the least, the right to organize into independent trade unions to protect itself against management, whose powers would be greatly enhanced by the reform. But such concessions to the working class, as Poland shows, are perceived by the bureaucracy as a threat to its very existence. At the same time, the working class today is potentially a much more formidable political force than at any time since the civil war.

The leadership is, therefore, in a dilemma. The 1980s are likely to see the explosive combination of a simultaneous crisis "as the top" and "at the bottom".