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“RESOURCEFUL IN EXPEDIENTS” — SOME EXAMPLES OF AMBASSADORIAL POLICY MAKING IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

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The ambassador should be ingenious and clever, but not so clever as to overreach himself. He should be shrewd in evaluating evidence, resourceful in expedients, firm in his grasp of realities, far-visioned in his imaginative foresight.¹

These, according to Thomas A. Bailey, are among the most desirable attributes of diplomats. In addition,

The foreign service officer should be willing to assume responsibility and exercise initiative — to stick his neck out if he finds he must make a crucial decision in the national interest.²

Many of the standard works on diplomacy contain some such compendium of necessary or desirable qualities.³ But what, it might be asked, does this paragon of all virtues find to do in the twentieth-century world of instant communications? What has been the role of the diplomatist in the relatively recent past?

Charles Thayer noted and dealt critically with the popular view that “nowadays diplomats are mere messengers delivering notes between governments. Modern communications have decapitated diplomacy.”⁴ But Thayer, and Ellis Briggs⁵ and Dean Rusk⁶, are in a distinct minority. The consensus is perhaps stated, somewhat scathingly to be sure, in a Staff Paper submitted in 1964 to a U.S. Senate Subcommittee: “The modern Ambassador plies his diplomatic trade with less autonomy than in earlier days.”⁷ The general idea is conveyed that the twentieth-century diplomat is much less influential than his eighteenth or nineteenth-century predecessor, and that the change in the ambassador’s role from part or even sole formulator of policy to that of, at best, adviser or executant came about either around the turn of the century or at the latest as a result of the first world war.⁸ Post-1945 technological advances have merely accentuated this process. And although the ambassador cannot yet be replaced by the telex machine, he is really little more than a part of the communications process, a sort of sophisticated and tactful messenger and occasional gatherer of news.⁹ Even Bailey’s wise and far-sighted diplomat, bursting with initiative, is constrained by the fact that Washington can communicate with him instantly: “technology has reduced independence of judgment.”¹⁰

There is, it need scarcely be said, a good deal of truth in all this, though some of the literature seems overly concerned to demonstrate the distinction between foreign policy and its "instrument",¹¹ diplomacy. A preoccupation with the formal role of the diplomat may obscure the fact that even in the twentieth century diplomats in practice may play a role in policy formulation and indeed have done so. They continued to operate within an international system that had not undergone any fundamental structural change as a result of World War I. It was a system that remained multi-polar in nature.¹² Of course, the volume of "external affairs," and their complexity, increased in the twentieth century, and there came to be more publicity attendant upon their transaction,¹³ but this was hardly a qualitative change. Within this slowly evolving rather than radically changed system, envoys "trained in the old school" continued to practice their art,¹⁴ and governments were prepared, or compelled by the speed, multiplicity or complexity of events, to give their diplomats considerable freedom of initiative at least on matters of detail.¹⁵

The twentieth century consequently saw no radical changes in the role of diplomats, at least before World War II.¹⁶ Envoys were what they always had been. Some were passive communicators: the messengers of contemporary literature. Others were shrewd observers whose advice and penetrating comments could provide a basis upon which policy could be formulated. And some, probably — as in earlier days — a small minority, either wished to make policy or in particular situations were compelled so to do. In any case, we should recognize that "Diplomats . . . have personalities of their own, and their reactions to problems are influenced by individual attitudes and idiosyncracies."¹⁷

It is not possible within the context of this paper to set up a typology of ambassadorial involvement in policy formulation. But some parameters must be established, and some examples cited even if only to exclude them from further discussion.

At one end of the scale is what may be termed the orthodox pattern. An envoy, either of his own initiative or upon request, suggests in substantial detail a line of action which is then adopted as policy by his own government. An instance is provided by the despatch which the Austrian Minister in London sent to Vienna in June 1922. The problem to which he addressed himself was how Austria might secure the foreign loans of which she was then in such dire need.¹⁸ Of Baron Franckenstein's unsolicited proposal it has been said that "the guidelines for Austria's future conduct contained in his report of June 7 were carried out to the letter."¹⁹ Clearly in this case the goal was not at issue, and we are thus concerned with policy as "a course of action"²⁰

and not with policy as an objective — though in practical terms this distinction cannot at all times be upheld. More commonly, the advice tendered by an ambassador is merely one (albeit often a very important one) of a number of inputs into the decision-making process.

At the other end of the spectrum is the envoy who finds it necessary without prior authorization to take some action or make some statement which commits his government or might be taken as an expression of his government's policy. Possibly this contingency was not so rare: "When one is without instructions," so George Kennan decided upon presenting his credentials in Moscow in 1952, "one has to say something."²¹ In one sense, such a statement remains nothing but the envoy's personal opinion unless it is later expressly endorsed by his government. In that eventuality the diplomat has in effect made policy.²² But unless explicitly repudiated by his own government (and unless this repudiation is made known to those to whom it was initially made),²³ the diplomat's statement — or action — may be taken by the decision-makers to whom it was addressed to represent his government's policy.²⁴ For the purposes of a perception-reaction model, it would thus have become government policy because it would be so regarded by others who would frame their actions accordingly.

In between these two types of cases lie a whole host of others, of which it is here possible to mention only a few. A government may have left its agent on the spot sufficient discretionary power (or he might so interpret his instructions) to make policy decisions.²⁵ Or an ambassador might refuse to carry out particular instructions, or at least challenge them and ask that they be reconsidered.²⁶ Between the latter practice and deliberate delaying tactics there may be only a very thin line. In view of the significance of timing in diplomacy, an envoy may thereby influence in an important manner the way in which events develop.²⁷ Another tactic available to the diplomatist comes from his ability to "water down" his instructions, a tactic of which Sir Nevile Henderson was a prime exponent.²⁸

In general, all the examples of ambassadorial behaviour given above, even the refusal for presumably good reason to carry out instructions, fall within the ambit of acceptable conduct. Only occasionally was an envoy sacrificed as a scapegoat. However, the repertoire of ploys at the disposal of the diplomat is not yet complete. Three cases of positive though unauthorized action will now be discussed. They all involve activity which was sufficiently unusual within the context of diplomacy to be termed unorthodox. All of them show resourcefulness of a type of which the author of the opening quotation would certainly have disapproved.

II

In December 1922 the German government of Chancellor Cuno was engaged in a desperate effort to avert the threatened French invasion of the Ruhr. A comprehensive German "offer" on reparations was being prepared. In addition, attention was being devoted to finding means of assuaging France's fears for her own security. On December 15, 1922, the German ambassador in Washington announced to Secretary of State Hughes that Germany was now prepared to make a definite suggestion, to the effect that

the Powers especially interested in the Rhine, such as Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, should enter into an agreement that neither one of them would engage in a war with any of the others for a generation without putting the matter to a popular vote.²⁹

A reformulated version, delivered in writing to the State Department a few days later, made it appear as if the United States was making the proposal. This version included a passage according to which the four Powers would

promise to the Government of the United States that they will not go to war against each other for a period of one generation without being authorized to do so by a plebiscite of their own people.³⁰

Along these lines the proposal, now once again a German one, formed part of a programmatic speech which Cuno made in Hamburg on New Year's Eve.³¹ By then the French had already rejected it.³² If anything, the proposal was counter-productive. Those in Paris and elsewhere who thought in terms of a militaristic Germany regarded it as a piece of typically Teutonic chicanery: in the words of the French ambassador in Washington, "if they wanted to make war they could easily get a vote to that effect."³³

It has been suggested that this "peace plan" in some way originated with the German industrialist Hugo Stinnes.³⁴ Its real progenitor, however, was the first post-war American ambassador in Berlin, Alanson B. Houghton.

Houghton, the man who had built up the Corning Glass Works, had taken up his appointment in April 1922. His qualifications for the post were better than those of the average political appointee, for he served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and he knew the language and customs of the country to which he was accredited. He was in fact very pro-German.³⁵ The detailed instructions given him before his departure by the State Department left him dissatisfied. There was nothing in them "about what I felt was much more important than mere instructions — the temper and attitude of mind in which I

was to approach the German Government and people." On his farewell visit to Harding, Houghton therefore told the President that unless he objected,

I proposed to enter into my new duties having more in mind the hundred years of friendship and good will that existed between Germany and the United States than the few years of war and bitterness which had separated them. The President listened attentively, swung around in his chair, and looked out the window for a moment, and then said "That's a good thought. Say it as often as you can".³⁶

Once in Germany Houghton was caught up in the problems of the country. The state of the German economy, reparations, inflation, and the spectre of bolshevism are topics which occur frequently in his communications to the State Department and its officials, and in his diary.³⁷ Known to be well-disposed to Germany, and as the representative of a country from which Germany hoped much, Houghton moved easily among its powerful men. He was not altogether uncritical,³⁸ but he was perhaps too easily impressed, particularly by Ludendorff's personality³⁹ and by Stinnes' forceful advocacy of a German-dominated cartel covering Western Europe, regarding which the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, William Castle, had to warn him:

I think I realize as clearly as you do the horror of war, but I still claim that there are many things that are worse — and a world dominated by such men as Stinnes would be quite as unendurable as a world trying to recover from war⁴⁰

The horror of war was, for Houghton, a guiding and indeed an overriding principle. Already before leaving New York he had seen himself in the role of a reconciler, who would strive to overcome the hatreds engendered by the recent war just as others had reconciled North and South after the American Civil War.⁴¹ In Berlin he wanted his embassy to "bring together and to work with men of good will."⁴² And, so it seemed, practically all men (and women) were men of good will.

Why, then, had there been such a devastating war? And how had men been induced to undergo such terrible experiences? An answer to these puzzling problems had been supplied to Houghton during a visit to the American forces in the Rhineland before his arrival in Berlin: only prolonged propaganda could give the troops the necessary conviction that they were morally right and that the enemy was morally wrong and violating the peace. From this Houghton drew his conclusion, that "apparently the great masses of men on both sides can only be made ready for war by a similar process of education — in

other words, they do not want war at all."⁴³ It followed, therefore, that wars were made by small cliques. In 1914 only a few hundred or a few thousand men in high position had desired war.⁴⁴ The people, on the other hand — the men, women and children who actually bore the burdens and made the sacrifices — wanted peace,⁴⁵ and had only responded because they believed they were being attacked.⁴⁶

The idea that there was a power that might control recurrent war crises but which had never been fully utilized — "the power which plain men and women may exert if their wills and desires can be given definite form and expression" — was adopted by Houghton at first with some hesitation, but it speedily became for him a burning conviction.⁴⁷ The goal was already clear by August 1922. The first great step to peace was to be made by taking the war-making power from the hands of the governments and placing it in the hands of the peoples. How was this to be done? By persuading every civilized country to include in its constitution or fundamental law "a provision that war cannot be made except after a plebiscite and with the consent of the people themselves."⁴⁸

Houghton tried assiduously to spread his idea among the Germans and Americans alike.⁴⁹ Ludendorff was unimpressed,⁵⁰ and one German acquaintance, while mildly encouraging, noted that "most of the financiers I talk to sing the old song, that there always has been and always will be war, and 'wait till we get a hack at France',"⁵¹ — but Houghton himself was undeterred. He did, however, recognize that some external impetus might facilitate the realization of his hopes. After considerable soul-searching, and after consulting with the U.S. envoys in Europe who were assembled in Berlin, he suggested to Secretary of State Hughes that it lay with the power of the United States vastly to alleviate the European situation. The harsh conditions, the German inflation, the threat of bolshevism, the breakdown of morale, the "sullen distrust" — all these could be overcome. The United States should

say to the plain people of England and France and Italy and Germany, that if, first, they will, by a plebiscite, agree not to make war on one another for fifty years; if, second they will make it part of their fundamental law that such a war cannot thereafter be declared except by their affirmative vote; and if, third, there shall be a substantial disarmament, — the American people, believing that peace, humanly speaking, would then be assured, will remit and cancel the debt.

He wanted the administration to present the matter to the American people, or, if this were deemed inexpedient, to permit him to put it forward as a personal suggestion in a Thanksgiving Day

address.⁵² William Castle, then visiting Europe, supported Houghton's idea, but Roland Boyden, unofficial American representative on the Reparation Commission, correctly foresaw that the administration would not dare to open up the war debts question or even allow Houghton to speak informally on his proposal.⁵³

And so it turned out. After consulting Harding, Hughes replied that the reparations problem must be settled on a business basis, and that the President could not authorize the ambassador to make the suggested statement.⁵⁴ Perhaps Houghton had expected no different outcome. He tended to blame himself for presenting his idea in an inadequate fashion. He would abide by the decision. "The matter, however, cannot end here."⁵⁵

Nor did it. Houghton unsuccessfully tried to use his Washington contacts to create a different attitude there. Intermittently during his ambassadorial career, and consistently for several years thereafter, he returned to his plan, shorn by that time of any link with the remission of debts.⁵⁶ In the short run too there were after-effects. For the time being circumstantial evidence must suffice. Nevertheless two factors establish sufficiently clearly Houghton's role as "stepfather" of the German "peace plan".

In the first place, the similarity between ideas propounded by Houghton as early as August 1922 and the German proposals of December is too striking to be a mere coincidence. Houghton talked to a sufficiently large number of people for his views to be well enough known in official circles in Berlin. Given the special status which the American ambassador at the time enjoyed, it is scarcely conceivable that his opinions would not be heeded even if he did not express them in an official capacity.

Second, there was a special relationship between Houghton, the businessman from Corning, and Cuno, the businessman from Hamburg. Precisely how close this was is not easily establishable from the documents. But Cuno at an early date created a highly favourable impression on the ambassador — "one of the really constructive forces in Germany", so he called him in the summer of 1922.⁵⁷ How often they met cannot be readily established. Houghton's papers contain several notes from Cuno arranging meetings.⁵⁸ The two men certainly met in late July, towards the end of August in Hamburg, on October 23, when Cuno told Houghton he had been offered the foreign ministry, over lunch on November 18, when Cuno asked Houghton what he should do, and again on the evening of November 29.⁵⁹ To Hughes, Houghton wrote that he had had "several" talks with Cuno before leaving Berlin

on December.⁶⁰ It would be very surprising if Houghton did not discuss his "peace plan" with his "friend",⁶¹ especially in view of the open-ended request for advice on November 18.

The conclusion is inescapable. Houghton, an enthusiastic and determined advocate of a worthy though impractical ideal, failed in his attempt to persuade his own government to adopt it as its policy. Instead, he had the satisfaction of seeing it adopted as policy by the government to which he was accredited.

III

If Houghton was, on the issue of peace, the innocent from the land of illusions, his British counterpart in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon, was surely the rogue elephant. "A typical Englishman, hard as nails . . . under a rather bluff and pleasant exterior," so the American noted after their first meeting.⁶² This is but an inadequate characterization of the man of whom Lord Vansittart, no uncritical admirer, has left the following sketch:

D'Abernon was handsome, brilliantly intelligent, financier, scholar, as good judge of a horse as of a picture; white-bearded as an acute father Christmas with something more than an eye for a pretty girl, excellent company, one of those Britons who contrive to be cosmopolitan in culture and insular in outlook.⁶³

As Edgar Vincent, this almost larger than life figure had made his money in Ottoman and Egyptian finances, including some transactions for which the French never forgave him. He married 'the most beautiful woman in England' — though there had been some doubt whether she would join him in Berlin. He had been involved in British politics, and there was some dismay in the Foreign Office when, in 1920, Prime Minister Lloyd George appointed him, because of his knowledge of finance, to the Berlin post.⁶⁴

Perhaps there was something about D'Abernon's conduct of affairs which reflected those early years spent in the shadows of the British embassy in Constantinople. Certainly he played the role of the grand ambassador, and it was his "modest wish" that when the time came for him to leave Berlin it should be "with maximum éclat and with some distinction."⁶⁵

In late 1924, however, the situation looked ominous to D'Abernon, and not merely from the perspective of his personal prestige. I have dealt with this matter in detail elsewhere,⁶⁶ and only the bare bones need therefore be given here. D'Abernon was dedicated to the rehabilitation of Germany within the European system. This would eliminate

the lure of Russia and of bolshevism and at the same time restore Germany as a genuine counterweight to France in the European balance of power. This policy was now threatened. The wartime Allies were about to refuse to evacuate the Cologne zone of the occupied Rhineland, thereby causing great offence in Germany. Worse still, the British government had promised France during the reparation negotiations in the summer of 1924 to take positive steps regarding French security. The Labour government's support of the Geneva Protocol had been no threat to D'Abernon's long-range goal. However, it soon became obvious that the Conservative administration which took office in early November would reject the Protocol. With the francophile Austen Chamberlain in charge of the Foreign Office, and in view of the necessity of satisfying France on the security question, it seemed to D'Abernon very probable that Britain would enter into some special guarantee arrangement with France, whose effect could not help but be to create at least the impression of an anti-German front and consequently drive Germany into the embrace of Soviet Russia.

In fact, the possibility of the government agreeing to a bilateral arrangement with France was never as great as D'Abernon feared.⁶⁷ However, he acted upon his own perception of the situation. Having failed during the previous eighteen months to persuade the British to take the initiative in the security question,⁶⁸ and being convinced that it was Germany rather than France that was in need of guarantees against aggression,⁶⁹ he deliberately fired a broadside across his Foreign Secretary's policy. In circumstances of great secrecy he indicated to State Secretary Schubert on December 29, 1924, that Germany should revive the Cuno proposal of 1922, though stripped of its objectionable provision about plebiscites to sanction war. When the Germans showed interest in some such initiative, he urged them on. In particular, being concerned about the development of British policy, he pressed them to act speedily. This, with some misgivings, the Germans did. On January 20, 1925, they communicated their security pact proposal in London, and on February 9 in Paris. The first steps which were to lead in October to Locarno had been taken.⁷⁰

Clearly this is the case of a man who felt very strongly that his own government was about to embark on a disastrous policy. In such a situation D'Abernon felt fully justified in making his intervention. His independence of mind, his rather quick judgments of men and somewhat *simpliste* views on national character, his intimacy with the mysteries of high finance, and his own self-confidence and success, all contrived to give him a sense of his own importance. He was

very scornful of the methods of German diplomacy. The "virile and rather clumsy Teuton" was in fact "obstinate and slow in negotiations", and the Germans were "particularly slow in seeing how best to put their own case or to take advantage of a given opportunity." Rather than "abstain and let things go wrong," as would normally happen if they were left to express their own views, he deemed it preferable "to translate what the German Government desires into acceptable words," even if this involved "the risk of presenting, not what the German Government thinks, but what one believes they ought to think."⁷¹

These are unorthodox notions regarding the proper function of an ambassador. In D'Abernon's case their effect was compounded by the fact that he had long and strongly disapproved of attitudes which he felt underlay policy formulation in London. He detected there a marked tendency — which he termed "Rip van Wilkleism" — to identify the Europe of 1924 with that of 1914, and a refusal to recognize that, while it was still Britain's aim to curb the strength of the dominant power in Europe, that power was now France.⁷² In any case, he held no very high opinion of the Foreign Office's senior personnel: they "rather go off" around the age of forty, so he once wrote to his wife, "like Jewish and Oriental youths do at 18", adding for good measure that "neither marriage nor non-marriage and illicit connections seem to help."⁷³

In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that D'Abernon at this moment of apparent crisis should have taken action entirely of his own initiative. It is noteworthy, however, that the Germans, who thought they knew their D'Abernon pretty well, believed that he would not have acted in this matter without instructions from London⁷⁴ This belief persisted for some little time even after Crowe's denial and the unenthusiastic initial Foreign Office reception of the German proposal should have put it to rest.⁷⁵ It is noteworthy too that D'Abernon deliberately helped to create this misunderstanding, and that he was prepared to use other forms of deceit also in order to further his objective.⁷⁶

IV

D'Abernon practiced deceit on a grand scale. Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath, German Ambassador in Rome, told a simple lie. He reported to Berlin on July 21, 1926, that the Secretary-General of the Italian Foreign Ministry had suggested that Germany and Italy should conclude an arbitration treaty, which might become the prelude to friendly collaboration between them.⁷⁷

Relations between Germany and Italy had at this time barely recovered from the nadir to which they had descended as a result of German agitation on behalf of the German-speaking population of South Tyrol and of the Italian reaction to this.⁷⁸ Though still frigid, they were now a little better than in February, when Mussolini, in a bombastic speech, had referred to Italy's German-speaking minority as an ethnographic relic, the residue of barbarian invasions, and had threatened to carry the Italian flag beyond the Brenner. From many points of view an improvement in relations was very desirable.

The "Italian" proposal, however, did not evoke any great enthusiasm in Berlin. Germany had in fact avoided making such a proposal herself from fear that during the negotiations, and particularly during the drafting of the preamble to such a treaty, the Italians might raise questions that Germany would find inconvenient. Nevertheless, now that a proposal had been made, Germany had little option but to proceed, cautiously, with it.⁷⁹ Negotiations were not begun in earnest until October.⁸⁰ Thereafter there were difficulties not of a juridical nature but arising from the German concern to avoid any reference, even in a disguised form, to the Anschluss or the Brenner frontier, and from the Italian fear that Germany might try to broach the treatment of the South Tyrolese and consequent insistence that any matter falling within the internal jurisdiction of either state be excluded from arbitration. As finally signed on December 29, 1926, the text of the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation was devoid of any political significance.⁸¹

Despite Neurath's original report and its subsequent reaffirmation,⁸² it is clear that he himself had made the proposal which he attributed to Secretary-General Bordonaro. That the Italian published documents refer to a "German" proposal is itself no sufficient indication of its origin, especially as the impression is given that the first move was made by Foreign Minister Stresemann in Geneva in September.⁸³ The initial response of the German foreign ministry to Neurath's report shows that the idea of the arbitration treaty did not come from Berlin. By the time of its signature, when its origin had become a matter of some international concern, doubts seem to have arisen there about who had taken the first step. Although a staunch front about the "Italian" initiative was maintained *vis-à-vis* third parties, the Germans were by no means so adamant about this point towards the Italians themselves.⁸⁴ The thrust of the circumstantial evidence is amply confirmed in the memoirs of Friedrich von Prittwitz, an able and experienced diplomat at this time serving as Counsellor in the German embassy in Rome, who named Neurath as the man who made the proposal.⁸⁵

In view of the attitude of his foreign ministry, Neurath had every cause for concealing his own part in the matter. Yet he wanted to bring about an improvement in German-Italian relations, and he therefore seized on a convenient means for achieving this end. This is not merely a case of that well-known disease of diplomats, "localitis", though that may have played its part too. Over the years, however, Neurath's reports show that he had in fact a shrewd and realistic appreciation of the secondary though not unimportant role which Italy played in Germany's overall policy in the 1920s.

Precisely because he had this appreciation it appeared dangerous to Neurath to alienate Italy unduly at a time when many issues of major significance to Germany remained to be settled. Italy made a dangerous enemy, but in view of her interest in seeing Germany be an effective counter-weight to France, she might also be helpful if treated with care.⁸⁶ The ambassador thought that relations between Germany and Italy had been allowed to deteriorate beyond any necessary point. He was not indifferent to Italian oppression of the South Tyrolese, but he rightly regarded many of the reports which so inflamed German opinion as exaggerated and therefore counterproductive, and he blamed Stresemann and the foreign ministry for augmenting rather than dousing the flames. Moreover, he felt himself to have a better understanding than the people in Berlin of what Germany could in fact do for the German-speaking minority: in many cases oppression consisted of being treated in the same manner as other citizens of Fascist Italy. Germany had no legal right to intervene; public protests would only do harm. The correct method of bringing about an alleviation of conditions was by discreet pressure on Mussolini, combined with some improvement in the general relations between the two countries.⁸⁷

Neurath suspected that Stresemann had been using the furore over South Tyrol for his own domestic political purposes. There was some antipathy between the two men, and angry words were exchanged between them at the beginning of 1926.⁸⁸ This was not a momentary flare-up. Weeks later the ambassador was still critical of the foreign minister's faulty tactics,⁸⁹ and in May he was still alarmed at the strength of Germanophobia in Italy.⁹⁰ Nothing that occurred in the first half of the year could have led Neurath to assume that Stresemann would take the initiative to bring about an improvement in German-Italian relations, with — hopefully — some attendant benefits to the South Tyrolese. So he himself had to take action. A little lie, the easily effected attribution of his own suggestion to his Italian conversation partner, must have seemed well worthwhile.

V

"One would like to think," so Barbara Tuchman has recently written,

that historical factors are more rooted in natural law, more Toynbeeian in scope, than the chance character of a minor individual who was neither heroic nor demonic. But history is not law-abiding or orderly and will often respond to a breeze as carelessly as a leaf upon a lake.

Of course, as she demonstrates, it is not the quirk of personality alone which determines the course of events.⁹¹ It is the interaction of the individual and his environment which is of significance to the historian. None of the three ambassadors could have achieved what they did had not other factors been at work too.

Only some highlights can here be mentioned. In 1922 the German government, facing a default in reparation deliveries and the threat of a French occupation of the Ruhr, and being fully aware that this was not only a financial problem but also a highly political one, was ready to clutch at straws. Even if Houghton's proposal merely created some favourable publicity for Germany in the United States, it would have been of value.

D'Abernon's suggestion in late 1924 showed the Germans a way out of an impasse. There were many reasons why they should have availed themselves of it, though in fact they did so only with considerable trepidation. Despite what might be called "the logic of the situation", there is no indication that a German security pact proposal would have eventuated at this time without D'Abernon's prompting.⁹² Moreover, the timing was crucial in another respect also, for it is difficult to envision a British Conservative government agreeing to participate in a continental guarantee scheme at any date much later than March 1925. As it was, the majority of the members of the Cabinet wanted simply to reject the Geneva Protocol and revert to an Empire and Isolation policy, and were only with difficulty persuaded to allow negotiations to begin.⁹³

As for Neurath, his task was in some ways the simplest of the three. The German government could not very well decline the "Italian" offer, especially in view of the numerous arbitration treaties which had been concluded or were being negotiated. The Italians for their part wanted to effect some improvement in their relationship with Germany, which had been too tense to allow Italy to essay its customary balancing role in European affairs. They hoped to derive definite political advantages from the existence of a treaty, even if not from its contents.

Apart from the very fact that they initiated action, what else did the ambassadors achieve? Neurath's treaty "normalized" relations between the two countries, and did something towards slightly alleviating conditions in the South Tyrol, though fundamental Italian policy there was unchanged.⁹⁴ Its conclusion also caused flurries in Paris, London and Moscow, and French Foreign Minister Briand at one time even suggested that its signature be postponed.⁹⁵ Neurath's initiative thus occasioned some problems for German foreign policy, and secured but slight benefits.

Houghton's intervention proved detrimental to Germany in the short run. The provision of a plebiscite in the "Cuno" plan to determine the issue of war and peace was believed to be a hypocritical ploy by means of which the warlike Germans would escape a control that would fetter more pacific peoples. In governmental circles especially it increased the suspicion with which Germany was already regarded. Yet in a different sense, by suggesting a multilateral agreement pledging peace along the Rhine, Houghton deserves to be called "the grandfather" of the Locarno Pact. Lord D'Abernon regarded that treaty very much as his own child. Certainly he was primarily responsible for the first steps, and he then lavished much loving care on the further negotiations. Whether its fruition was, in the long run, beneficial to Europe may be doubted.⁹⁶

Only one of the three ambassadors was a career diplomat. But if, of the trio, only Neurath was a professional, Houghton as a representative of the American patronage system is certainly not out of place. In any case the non-professional diplomat in the service of a European great power was not truly exceptional in the inter-war period: a host of Russian ex-revolutionaries; several mediocre German politicians, able journalists and amiable former *bürgermeister* of Hansa towns; François-Poncet for France and Crewe, Derby and Geddes for Britain afford ample illustration of this point.

However much new functions impinged, the envoys still operated in what Donald Watt has termed

the familiar world of nineteenth-century diplomacy; the world of contractual and implied obligations, of conflicts and compromises, of interests, of alliances, pacts, staff-talks, arms, armaments and *matériel de guerre*.⁹⁷

Within this system the envoys, career and non-career alike, conformed more or less to the traditions and practices of their respective services. Perhaps the career men made fewer *gaffes*. All, including the American political appointees, were expected to obey instructions from their foreign ministries (subject to the right to ask for a review)

and not to engage in independent action unless they had specifically been given discretionary powers.⁹⁸ We shall probably never know how many or what proportion of them departed significantly from this orthodox role. This paper has sought to show some of the possibilities beyond the traditional duty to report and advise that were open to the diplomat "resourceful in expedients". The constitutional responsibility for exercising whatever freedom of choice the course of events allowed of course rested with governments and particularly with foreign ministers. In a formal sense "foreign policy is the sum of the decisions taken by the ministers of foreign affairs and the heads of governments."⁹⁹ In practice, the cogs of the machine sometimes took matters into their own hands.

NOTES

¹ Thomas A. Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience* (New York, 1968), p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

³ Harold Nicolson's ideal diplomatist, for example, is truthful, accurate, calm, patient, good-tempered, modest and loyal; Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London, 2nd ed., 1950), pp. 110-126.

⁴ Charles W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 1-37; the quotation is from p. 13.

⁵ Ellis Briggs, *Farewell to Foggy Bottom* (New York, 1964), pp. 5-6. There is little in Briggs' autobiographical account to substantiate his contention that diplomats play significant roles.

⁶ In testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee in December 1963, see Henry M. Jackson (ed.), *The Secretary of State and the Ambassador: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on the Conduct of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1964), p. 119.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 68. How George Kennan, for whom diplomacy was "an art rather than a skill," *Memoirs 1950-1963* (Boston, 1972), p. 275, must have hated the idea that he 'plied his diplomatic trade'!

⁸ See Bernadotte Schmitt's chapter in S.C. Kertesz and M.A. Fitzsimons (eds.), *Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Notre Dame, 1959); Pietro Quaroni, *Diplomatic Bags: An Ambassador's Memoirs* (London, 1966), p. xi; Marcel Cadieux, *The Canadian Diplomat, An Essay in Definition* (Toronto, 1963), p. 96; *Diplomatic Service: Formation and Operation, Report on the Commonwealth Conference held in Singapore 1970* (London, 1971), p. 35. See also Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's qualified statement in his *Inner Circle* (London, 1959), p. 268.

⁹ Arthur Andrew, "His Ex or Telex?", *International Journal*, XXV (1970), pp. 676-684.

¹⁰ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 58. Writing two decades ago about the inter-war period, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert noted (*The Diplomats*, New York, 1963, first published 1953, vol. I, p. 4) that with improvements in communications "the age of the 'great ambassadors', who were *perforce* policy-makers in their own right, was over" (emphasis added). They rightly emphasized that other factors besides improved communications have to be taken into account in any analysis of the changing role of diplomats (*Ibid.*,

pp. 3-6). To their categories might be added the increased staffing and increasing bureaucratization of the various foreign offices. As for the 'great ambassadors', these were in fact the exceptions rather than the rule; see Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 75, and Sir Charles Webster, *The Art and Practice of Diplomacy* (London, 1961), p. 40.

¹¹ Sir William Hayter, *The Diplomacy of the Great Powers* (London, 1960), p. 43.

¹² See L.W. Martin (ed.), *Diplomacy in Modern European History* (New York, 1966), p. 2.

¹³ *Diplomatic Service: Formation and Operation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁴ Not yet was negotiation studied "as a form of game conflict rather than of rational accommodation" — see John F. Campbell, *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* (New York, 1971), p. 34. But see also Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 48, who states that British ambassadors "did not fit in easily with the new world produced by the war."

¹⁵ Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-219. It is well here also to quote the words of Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy-Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1971), p. 5: "Rather than through grand decisions on grand alternatives, policy changes seem to come through a series of slight modifications of existing policy, with the new policy emerging slowly and haltingly by small and usually tentative steps, a process of trial and error, in which policy zigs and zags, reverses itself, and then moves forward in a series of incremental steps."

¹⁶ An exception may have to be made in the case of Russian diplomats after 1917.

¹⁷ Craig & Gilbert (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸ Franckenstein to Vienna, Report 262 P of June 7, 1922, Austrian State Archives, Vienna, Neues Politisches Archiv, Karton 40.

¹⁹ Gottlieb Ladner, *Seipel als Überwinder der Statiskrise vom Sommer 1922* (Wien-Graz: 1964), p. 60. footnote 265.

²⁰ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

²¹ Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 121. See also the experience of Neurath as treated below. Sometimes a government deliberately kept an envoy without instructions — at times so as "not to shatter his faith in his own good cause"; see the cynically frank explanation made by Richard Schüller, Austria's foreign trade expert, to Carl von Schubert, German Ambassador in Rome, and recorded by the latter in a memorandum of March 23, 1931 (German Foreign Ministry Archives, Bonn (hereinafter *GFMA*), 5269/E324410-13). This, of course, denotes the concealment of policy, not its absence.

²² Kennan in 1943 gave the Portuguese Prime Minister an unauthorized assurance — in fact one which he had been expressly forbidden to make. For his refusal to follow instructions, his resultant explanations in Washington and the resolution of the incident, see George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston 1967), pp. 147-163, also *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, hereinafter *FRUS*), 1943, *Europe*, vol. II, pp. 554-562. I am not here concerned with apparent contradictions, such as the engaging practice of the Italian Minister in Tirana who is said to have persuaded King Zog to do x by telling him that the Italian government wanted him to do y; see Queroni, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

²³ For example, the *démenti* of reports about statements made by the German Consul in Geneva issued by the DNB agency on Nov. 7, 1935; *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945* (London, and Washington, hereinafter *DGFP*), Series C, col. IV, No. 397, footnote 4. Consul Krauel had exceeded his instructions; Hitler wanted to have him recalled immediately. For the whole episode see *ibid.*, Nos. 394-400. The German Minister in Vienna was recalled following his actions after the Nazi attack on the Austrian Federal Chancellery on July 25, 1934; *DGFP*, C, II, Nos. 115 and 123.

²⁴ See p. 310 for the belief in Berlin that Lord D'Abernon was speaking for the British government, not for himself.

²⁵ For example, General Harrington at the height of the 1922 Chanak crisis; see David Walder, *The Chanak Affair* (London, 1969).

²⁶ The right of a diplomat to challenge his instructions is generally recognized: see *Diplomatic Service: Formation and Operation*, *op. cit.*, p. 35, Sir Douglas Busk, *The Craft of Diplomacy* (New York, 1967), p. 35, and Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 66. Among those who refused to carry out certain instructions were Josephus Daniels in Mexico (*Ibid.*, p. 67) and Ulrich von Hassell in Rome in 1933 (*DGFP*, C, I, Nos. 14 and 35).

²⁷ See Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 9. *Diplomatic Service: Formation and Operation*, *op. cit.*, p. 82; and Livingstone Merchant in E.A.J. Johnson (ed.), *The Dimensions of Diplomacy* (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 122-123.

²⁸ Even at the end of August 1939 Henderson sought to make what he had to communicate more palatable to Hitler by saying that even an Anglo-German alliance was not beyond the bounds of possibility, *Documents on British Foreign Policy* (London, hereinafter *DBFP*). Third Series vol. VII, No. 455; see also *Ibid.*, No. 545.

²⁹ Memorandum by Hughes, Dec. 15, 1922, *FRUS*, 1922, II, pp. 203-204.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

³¹ Text in Karl-Heinz Harbeck, *Das Kabinett Cuno* (Boppard am Rhein, 1968), pp. 103-110. See also Ludwig Zimmermann, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Ara der Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen, 1958), pp. 138-142.

³² Memorandum by Hughes, Dec. 21, 1922, *FRUS*, 1922, II, pp. 206-207.

³³ *Ibid.*; see also State Secretary Schubert's memorandum of Jan. 14, 1925 on a conversation with Lord D'Abernon, *GFMA*, 4509/E124805-09; D'Abernon to Sir E. Crowe, Mar. 11, 1923, D'Abernon Papers, British Museum, London, (hereinafter *BM*), Add. Mss. 48926; and Houghton to Hughes, Jan. 3, 1923, Houghton Papers, Corning (hereinafter *HP*), Berlin Correspondence, 'Hughes 1923'. I am grateful to the Hon. Amory Houghton for permitting me to see his father's papers, and to the University of Manitoba Research Fund for a grant that enabled me to conduct research at Corning.

³⁴ Dieter B. Gescher, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und die Reparationen 1920-1924* (Bonn, 1956), p. 131. But Gescher also allows for the possibility that it was inspired by Houghton, *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-88, Robert Gottwald, *Die deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen in der Ara Stresemann* (Berlin-Dahlem, 1965), pp. 12-13. At Harvard Houghton had developed a great admiration for German scholarship, and he had studied in Germany in the 1880s, see *HP*, Professor A. Mitchell's notes on his interview with Houghton on June 4, 1941. In his very old age Houghton became an apologist for Hitler's Germany; see especially his address to the Literary Society, April 1, 1939, *HP*, "Speeches".

³⁶ Address to the U.S. Consuls in Germany, August 7, 1922, *HP*, A.B.H. Speeches (Berlin).

³⁷ Houghton's telegrams to the State Department, his correspondence with Hughes and with various officials, and his Berlin Diary, are among the Houghton Papers at Corning.

³⁸ *HP*, Berlin Diary, I, May 12 and 17, 1922, and III, Oct. 16 and Nov. 28, 1922.

³⁹ *HP*, Berlin Diary, III, Oct. 16.

⁴⁰ Castle to Houghton, Nov. 14, 1922, *HP*, Berlin Correspondence, 'Castle 1922'. Houghton had considerable contact with Stinnes and was informed also by other sources of the plans of German industrialists. See, *inter alia*, *HP*, Berlin Diary, II, Sept. 13, 15 and 18, and III, Nov. 28; Houghton's telegrams 185 of Sept. 15 and 191 of Sept.

23, 'Berlin: 1922, Department of State, Telegrams to'; Arnold Rechberg to Houghton, Sept. 2, Berlin Corresp. 'R-1'; and a holograph memorandum of Oct. 14, marked "written by Stinnes", Berlin Corresp. 'Misc. -1922'.

⁴¹ Speech at the Metropolitan Club, New York, Mar. 31, 1922, see *New York Times*, Apr. 1, and *Literary Digest*, Apr. 15, 1922. Houghton acknowledged that the parallel was not exact, but used the theme again in his address of Aug. 7, 1922 (see footnote 36 above).

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Houghton to Hermann Hagedorn, Aug. 4, 1922, *HP*, Berlin Corresp., 'H-1'.

⁴⁵ Houghton to Congressman Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts, Jan. 3, 1923, *HP*, Berlin Corresp. 'R-2'.

⁴⁶ Houghton to Hughes, Dec. 27, 1922, *HP*, Berlin Corresp., 'Hughes 1922'.

⁴⁷ See his Armistice Day Speech, New York, Nov. 10, 1929, *HP*, 'Speeches'. The idea was given its most sophisticated expression in Houghton's 1927 Harvard Commencement Address, see *Address of Hon. Alanson B. Houghton before Harvard Alumni Association, June 23, 1927* (n.p., n.d.).

⁴⁸ Houghton to Hagedorn, Aug. 4, 1922 (see footnote 44 above); see also Houghton to Congressman John Dwight, May 24, 1923, *HP*, Berlin Corresp., 'Dwight 1923'.

⁴⁹ The evidence is doubtless fragmentary, but see Houghton to Hagedorn, Aug. 4 (footnote 44), and letters to Houghton from James R. Joy, Sept. 22, S.D. Weyer, of the International News Service, Oct. 7, John L. Nuelson, Resident Bishop in Central Europe, Methodist Episcopal Church, Oct. 27, 1922, and from James T. Shotwell, Jan. 2, 1923, all in the appropriate letter files in the Berlin Correspondence. See also Berlin Diary, III, Dec. 6, 1922, and *The Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (Indianapolis, 1961) pp. 173-74. There was an unauthorized article in the *Milwaukee Herald* of Sept. 20, 1922, which appears not to have attracted wide attention.

⁵⁰ *HP*, Berlin Diary, III, Oct. 16, 1922; also Rechberg to Houghton, Jan. 3, 1923, Berlin Corresp. 'R-1'.

⁵¹ Hagedorn to Houghton, Aug. 10, 1922, *HP*, Berlin Corresp. 'H-1'.

⁵² Houghton to Hughes, Oct. 23, 1922, *FRUS*, 1922, II, pp. 171-175. see also Berlin Diary, III, Oct. 20 and 24, 1922. In his letter to Hughes, Houghton also made it clear that the U.S. remission of war-time debts was to be used to effect the cancellation of other debts (i.e. reparations) too.

⁵³ Castle to Hughes, Oct. 24, Houghton (Boyden) to Hughes, Nov. 9, 1922, *FRUS*, 1922, II, pp. 176-177 and 180-181.

⁵⁴ Hughes to Houghton, Nov. 14, 1922, *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

⁵⁵ Houghton to Castle, Nov. 25 and Dec. 2, 1922, *HP*, Berlin Corresp. 'Castle 1922'.

⁵⁶ Houghton was ambassador to Germany until 1925 and thereafter ambassador to Britain until 1929. In his retirement he became Chairman of the Commission for International Justice and Goodwill. For his views see particularly Victor Poliakov to Houghton, Nov. 11, 1925, *HP*, London Corresp., 'P-1925', the Harvard Commencement Address and the Armistice Day speech (footnote 47), and his speech of Mar. 10, 1930, to the Canadian Club in Toronto, *HP*, 'Speeches'.

⁵⁷ Houghton to Castle, July 29, 1922, *HP*, Berlin Corresp., 'Castle 1922', see also Houghton to Hughes, Dec. 20, 1922, *loc. cit.*, 'Hughes 1922'.

⁵⁸ *HP*, Berlin Corresp., 'H-2'; unfortunately most of these are waterdamaged.

⁵⁹ See Houghton to Castle, July 29 and Aug. 26, 1922, *HP*, Berlin Corresp., 'Castle 1922', Houghton's telegrams Nos. 199 of Oct. 23, 223 of Nov. 18, and 228 of Nov. 30, *HP*, 'Berlin: 1922, Department of State, telegrams to', and *HP*, Berlin Diary, III, Nov. 18 and Dec. 2.

⁶⁰ Houghton to Hughes, Dec. 20, 1922, *HP*, Berlin Corresp., 'Hughes 1922'.

⁶¹ Houghton used the word in his interview with Professor Mitchell on June 3, 1941, and added that he went to lunch with Cuno at the office of the Hamburg-Amerika Line as Cuno did not want to be seen coming to the U.S. embassy, *HP*, Notes by Professor Mitchell on his interview with Houghton, June 3, 1941. Evidently this is the lunch on November 18, 1922.

⁶² *HP*, Berlin Diary, I, Apr. 25, 1922.

⁶³ Lord Vansittart, *The Mist Procession*, (London, 1958), p. 253.

⁶⁴ *Dictionary of National Biography, 1941-50* (London, 1959), pp. 908-910; *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik* (Göttingen, hereinafter *ADAP*), Serie B, vol. I, part 2, No. 13. See also *Ibid.*, No. 190, and Harding to Rumbold, July 13 and Sept. 4, 1920, Cambridge University Library, Harding Mss, vol. 43.

⁶⁵ D'Abernon to Curzon, Dec. 25, 1923, *BM*, Add.Mss. 48927.

⁶⁶ F.G. Stambrook, "Das Kind — Lord D'Abernon and the Origins of the Locarno Pact", *Central European History*, I (1968), pp. 233-263, on which much of what follows is based.

⁶⁷ See Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Feb. 13 and 19, 1925, (Public Record Office, hereinafter *PRO*), Cab. 2/4; Records of the Cabinet Meetings of Mar. 2 and 4, *PRO*, Cab. 23/49; and Crowe to Chamberlain, Mar. 12, 1925, Birmingham University Library, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 52/240.

⁶⁸ Stambrook, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-243.

⁶⁹ D'Abernon to Macdonald, tel. No. 49 of Feb. 5, 1924, *PRO*, F.O. 371/1818.

⁷⁰ Stambrook, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-248 and 254-258.

⁷¹ See D'Abernon's Diary, Aug. 8, 1922, *BM*, Add.Mss. 48957, and Jan. 4, May 2 and 15, and Dec. 25, 1923, *BM*, Add.Mss. 48959, and D'Abernon to Curzon, Dec. 25, 1923, *BM*, Add.Mss. 48957, also Lord D'Abernon, *An Ambassador of Peace* (London, 1929), vol. II, pp. 77-78, 205-206, 211-212 and 287-289, and Stambrook, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-238.

⁷² D'Abernon to J.W. Headlam Morley, Nov. 13, 1924, *BM*, Add.Mss. 48927; see also General Wauchope to D'Abernon, undated but evidently November 1924, *Ibid.*, For Rip van Winkleism see also D'Abernon's draft despatch of Dec. 6, 1923, *Ibid.*

⁷³ *BM*, Add.Mss. 48936.

⁷⁴ "We would therefore scarcely be able to ignore his urgings," Stresemann to Hoesch, tel. No. 48 of Jan. 15, 1925, *GFMA*, 3123/642046-51; see also Stambrook, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-254.

⁷⁵ Sthamer (London) to A.A., tel. No. 45 of Jan. 26, 1925, *GFMA* 3123/642097. Sthamer thought that it might now be inconvenient for the British government to acknowledge responsibility and that the initiative was therefore being ascribed to D'Abernon.

⁷⁶ On Jan. 14, 1925, D'Abernon told Schubert (a) that the German proposal would be welcome to Chamberlain, and (b) that the United States would now probably accept the role of holder of the pledges in which the Cuno proposal had cast her. For neither statement could D'Abernon have had any foundation; all the indications were in fact to the contrary. See Stambrook, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-255, and footnotes 75 and 81 thereto. See also Houghton to Hughes, Jan. 12, 1925, *HP*, Berlin Corresp., 'Hughes 1925'.

⁷⁷ Neurath to A.A., tel. No. 229 of July 21, 1926, *ADAP*, B, III, No. 169. There is no equivalent document in *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, hereinafter *DDI*), Settima Serie, vol. IV.

⁷⁸ See *Ibid.*, Nos. 218, 229, 239, 243, 244, and 246, *ADAP*, B, III, Nos. 3, 6-9, 11, 13, 15-20, 22-24, 28, 30-32, etc., and F.G. Stambrook, "German-Italian Relations 1920-1932" (University of London, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1960), pp. 272-296.

⁷⁹ *ADAP*, B, III, No. 171.

⁸⁰ Prittwitz (Rome) to A.A., report I 3880 of Sept. 11, 1926, *GFMA*, 6001/E442461-62.

⁸¹ See *ADAP*, B, III, Nos. 205, 210, 220, 229, 233, 234, 249, 250 and 253, *DDI*, 7, IV, Nos. 422, 431, 436, 444 and 560, and Stambrook, *German-Italian Relations*, pp. 319-321.

⁸² Neurath to A.A., tel. No. 322 of Oct. 26, 1926, *GFMA*, K445/K129950.

⁸³ See especially *DDI*, 7, IV, No. 422, 431 and 560. It should be added too that the Italians were initially ill-prepared to begin negotiations.

⁸⁴ Aldrovandi to Stresemann and Stresemann to Aldrovandi, Jan. 2 and 7, 1927, *GFMA*, K445/K130156-63, see also *DDI*, 7, IV, No. 560, and *ADAP*, B, III, Nos. 207 and 253, and IV, No. 73, footnotes 1 and 2.

⁸⁵ Friedrich W. von Prittwitz und Gaffron, *Zwischen Petersburg und Washington: Ein Diplomatleben* (München, 1952), p. 156.

⁸⁶ *ADAP*, B, III, Nos. 7 and 157, IV, No. 73; see also I, Nos. 93 and 129, and Neurath to A.A., tel. No. 77 of Feb. 22, 1926, *GFMA*, M246/M008667.

⁸⁷ *ADAP*, B, III, Nos. 3, 11, 15 and 20; see also IV, No. 2.

⁸⁸ *ADAP*, B, III, Nos. 11, 13, 15, 19, 20 and 24. There had also been an angry exchange of telegrams between Neurath, Stresemann and Schubert at the turn of 1923-24, *GFMA*, serials 4688 and 5271.

⁸⁹ See the excerpt from report No. 1089 of Mar. 4, 1926, by the Bavarian Minister in Berlin, in Bavarian State Archives, Munich, *M.Inn.* 73566.

⁹⁰ *ADAP*, B, III, No. 127.

⁹¹ Barbara W. Tuchman, "If Mao had come to Washington: An essay in Alternatives," *Foreign Affairs*, 51 (1972), pp. 44-64; the quotation is from p. 52.

⁹² Stambrook, "Das Kind", *op. cit.*, 248-253. For the general context see also Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy* (Princeton, 1972), pp. 4-12.

⁹³ See the documents cited in footnote 67 above; also Jacobsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-26.

⁹⁴ *ADAP*, B, III, Nos. 3 and 73 (with footnote 5 thereto). On conditions in South Tyrol see also Dennison I. Rusinow, *Italy's Austrian Heritage 1919-1946* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 174-184.

⁹⁵ *DDI*, 7, IV, Nos. 553, 565 and 569; *ADAP*, B, I/2, No. 188; and III, Nos. 211, 219, and 221, also Sthamer to A.A., tel. No. 927 of Dec. 30, and Moscow Embassy tel. No. 1284 of Dec. 31, 1926, reporting an unfavourable comment in *Pravda*, *GFMA*, K445/K130136 and K130154-55. For French views in general see *DBFP*, IA, II, Nos. 358 and 359.

⁹⁶ See George Grün, "Locarno, Idea and Reality," *International Affairs*, XXXI (1955), pp. 477-485, and William J. Newman, *The Balance of Power in the Interwar Years, 1919-1939* (New York, 1968), *passim*.

⁹⁷ D.C. Watt, "The Rome-Berlin Axis, 1936-1940. Myth and Reality," *Review of Politics*, XXII (1960), p. 519.

⁹⁸ Changes set in in the 1930s, especially in Germany, but also in the United States. Secretary of State Hughes, when asked in the 1920s how much discretion a diplomat could exercise without consulting him, replied "Not much. He'd better cable." Betty Glad, *Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence* (Urbana, 1966), p. 136, footnote 13.

⁹⁹ Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, in Kertesz and Fitzsimons (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 79.