Ideology and Conquest: the Question of Proselytism and Expansion in the French Revolution, 1789–1793

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I

Within a year of embarking on war in the spring of 1792, the French revolutionaries annexed territory on a scale surpassing anything in the national experience, set France on the path of conquest and began to introduce their ideology abroad. A persistent view is that these developments sprang from the nature of the new principles and the passions of the revolutionaries. Proclaiming rights applicable to mankind, the revolution seemed to mock frontiers between states. Shriil pronouncements about its inevitable spread lent it a messianic character and gave the impression that it was directed by zealots bent on converting the globe. But the beginnings of expansion and ideological dissemination resulted from considerations of national interest rather than from principles or messianic fever. Moreover, the theory explaining both expansion and the spread of ideology was not fashioned in advance but developed in response to circumstances.

Renouncing conquest did not mean, as response to a revolution in Avignon made clear, that the state would never expand. In June 1790 the deputies were startled to receive an appeal for union from Avignon, a papal enclave in the Rhone Valley that had revolted against its sovereign and voted to join France. A large part of the population of the Comtat Venaissin, Avignon’s neighbour and also a papal possession, followed suit, but many of the pope’s subjects remained loyal and engaged in civil war with the pro-French party. France had strong legal claims to both places which the monarchy had occasionally enforced, and the fact that the natives were closely linked with Frenchmen of surrounding areas made union an attractive prospect. But the deputies were in no haste and waited fifteen months before acquiescing in the appeal. Having repudiated force, they
had to provide a new justification to acquire the enclaves. This they found in a
theory that recognized both changes in the nature of the French state and the
realities of international politics. In the process of meeting challenges to its
authority in the first year of the revolution, the assembly had reinterpreted the
basis of national unity in terms of popular sovereignty: each part of France was
joined to the rest not because of the treaties of princes but because each had
willed this by participating in the popular pact of 1789. Self-determination was
the foundation of unity within, and the assembly invoked the same principle to
justify the annexation of foreign territory. In its vocabulary annexation based
on popular will invalidated any charge of conquest. Concurring in the
Avignonese assertion that it was as ridiculous to claim that assent to a popular
request for union amounted to conquest “as it would be ridiculous to claim that
the acceptance of a present is a theft,” the assembly proceeded on the assump-
tion that there was nothing in common between the union of peoples by consent
and the constraint that characterized conquest. Since civil war had cast doubt on
the authenticity on the first expressions of popular will, the assembly in-
corporated the enclaves only after a formal plebiscite convinced it that the people
had freely chosen union. It was equally determined not to let annexation harm
national interests. To avoid providing a pretext for foreign intervention, it
carefully copied the practice of the monarchy in its quarrels with Rome over the
enclaves by adducing rights drawn from public law. While the deputies con-
sidered self-determination to be the basis of union, they knew that legal claims
were the sole ones that could legitimize their title before Europe and calm fears
over their intentions. Realism tempered the idealism of the Constituents.

Fears were not entirely allayed by the assembly’s adoption of arguments
understood by the chancelleries. Frenchmen as well as foreigners expressed con-
cern that if France would not conquer in the traditional sense she might expand
in more devious ways. The deputy Bouche, champion of the pope’s subjects,
proposed that France league herself with all peoples seeking freedom. An
anonymous zealot also argued that assistance to foreign patriots ought to
become part of the nation’s “diplomatic catechism.” Did expansionist
designs lie behind these proposals? If France preached the virtues of her prin-
ciples and urged their adoption abroad, would she not foment insurrections, or
encourage those underway, with a view to aggrandizing herself or extending her
influence? Some observers professed to see such tendencies in the Avignon af-
fair. The anti-annexationist deputy, Malouet, charged that efforts to exploit the
universality of revolutionary ideas in the enclaves amounted to a “real aggres-
sion.” A German publicist asked if telling neighbours “Rise up, and unite with
us!” was not a manifestation of the spirit of conquest. In reply, Menou, a
spokesman of those favouring annexation of the enclaves, stated categorically
that France sought neither to convert foreigners nor to disturb international
peace. He admitted that France would have imitators. However, imitation would
result not because of French missionary activity but because foreigners found
revolutionary principles inherently sound and locally applicable. “Liberty is like
an electric spark, which spreads to whoever is prepared for it.”
French reaction to disturbances abroad confirmed Menou's contention. The revolution in the enclaves was the work of natives who, with abundant grievances, needed no prompting from Paris. Individuals and groups in France lent verbal support but even the most zealous of them fanned rather than ignited the insurrectionary flame. Reaction at the official level was as correct as circumstances permitted. Reluctant to intervene, the assembly finally did so at the request of both factions only after it was evident that nothing else would end the intolerable disorder and reveal the wishes of the inhabitants. The French role was one of response to a fait accompli and did not warrant the accusation that the nation had instigated the dethronement of a sovereign in order to despoil him of his possessions. To revolutions elsewhere the French saw no reason even to respond, and from those in Liège and the Austrian Netherlands in 1789-90 they remained aloof. Their attitude towards ferment in the Bishopric of Basel, better known as Porrentruy, was no different. When a revolutionary movement there collapsed after the ruler summoned Austrian troops in 1791, its exiled leaders pleaded for French intervention. Though the location of Porrentruy between France and the Swiss cantons, and close to important imperial territory, made it a sensitive zone, and though France was authorized to occupy its strategic gorges under certain conditions, the assembly, frowning on proselytizing adventures and not yet viewing the Austrian presence as a threat, rejected the entreaties of its emulators.

Clearly the early revolutionaries did not seek to expand the state by any means. Having abjured conquest as an instrument of policy and a means for expansion, they did not replace it with propaganda. To have done so would have imperilled national interest by provoking the powers. Moreover, if they believed that the universality of revolutionary ideals meant their eventual adoption everywhere, they knew that not all peoples were yet ready for this and that to hasten the process by missionary activity or assistance to rebels would contravene their principles. On grounds of the sovereignty of each nation, they held that it was as much the right of others to choose without outside incitement when and how much to change as it was France's right to proceed along the reform road without hindrance from abroad. For the men of 1789 both interest and principle counselled that liberty would spread not by arms or propaganda but by example.

II

War saw a retreat from this idealistic stance. Example yielded to propaganda as the revolutionaries decided that in order to undermine their foe they must attempt to hasten the process of change in certain places.

In the minds of the deputies of the Legislative Assembly, successor to the Constituent, the purpose of the war with Austria that began in April 1792 was to consolidate the revolution within rather than spread it abroad. If the war assumed the appearance of an ideological confrontation between France and all
Europe, it is in part because of Anacharsis Cloots, Prussian-born baron turned unrestrained cosmopolitan, who from his adopted Paris saw the war as a crusade to liberate mankind and found the universal republic. Different peoples, ran the argument of this self-styled "orator of humanity," were but fractions of a single sovereign people, mankind itself, and each, once free of its oppressors, would join in the universal republic based on the Declaration of Rights and governed by an ecumenical assembly. On grounds that the larger the theatre of war the sooner would everyone be free to create the world state, he called on France to provoke general upheaval through armed aid and proselytism. Even politicians responsible for policy, among them Brissot, journalist, deputy and chief advocate of war, indulged in fire-breathing rhetoric that gave the impression that they, too, envisaged a crusade to overturn the established order everywhere. Words, however, must be distinguished from actions. Policy makers were aware of the perils of a general conflict and wanted no additional enemies. While in the climate of the war debate they publicly anathematized kings, privately they sought their alliance, or at least their neutrality, by assurances that France was a responsible member of the international community with no intention of undermining their authority. The French hoped that mankind would be free one day but, more patient than Cloots, they considered the war not a cosmopolitan crusade to this end but a limited contest with Austria to consolidate their own freedom.

If the war was not meant to bring universal liberty, it nevertheless witnessed the beginning of official propaganda in certain foreign places. The rights of neutrals would be respected but in enemy lands an effort would be made to seduce subject from allegiance to sovereign. Europe was not to be set ablaze but small fires could be lit. While this decision represented a departure from the practice of not encouraging change abroad and gave the war an ideological colouring, it is important to note that it was prompted by practical considerations. Propaganda was to be a weapon of national defence, a means to an end not an end in itself. The revolutionaries reasoned that they must undermine their enemy by urging his subjects to overthrow his government and choose another. Convinced that at least some of these subjects were ripe for change — a conviction encouraged by refugees in Paris who had participated in abortive insurrections in their homelands — they saw collaboration with the "oppressed" as one way to overcome the foe who denied them the very rights he would take from Frenchmen. After expelling the enemy, the French would extol the virtues of their system in the hope that those they liberated would satisfy both their own aspirations and France's long-term security by choosing a similar one. This plan was suggested by Roederer, a judicial officer in the Paris Department, who told the Jacobins in December 1791 that in order to assist the peoples in the task of electing a government France must ensure that her soldiers' knapsacks were stocked not just with bullets but with "municipal codes" as well. His idea that warfare in a new age demanded a new means, that explanations to the masses were in order, was taken up by others, notably the deputies Brissot and Condorcet and the foreign minister, General Dumouriez. Underscoring the pragmatic basis of the idea, Condorcet wrote that the French had no choice but
to seek allies among a people whose government took up arms against them since, for the persecuted, "proselytism becomes a weapon that the right of natural defence requires them to use." 14

Chosen for liberation in the new manner were enemy territories which the French could readily reach. To begin with, this meant the adjoining Austrian possession of Belgium, and also the Bishopric of Liège, which cut Belgium in two and was considered Vienna's satellite. In the summer of 1792 the attempt to limit the war began to collapse: Prussia, Sardinia and a few states in the Rhineland joined Austria. Then France nominated new candidates for conversion, specifically the Rhenish states and Sardinia's frontier possessions of Savoy and Nice. 15 But for none of them was the plan to win the people well organized. No office to coordinate subversion was created. For Belgium and Liège Dumouriez appointed a few agents to make contact with dissidents, help arouse the population and provide revolutionary literature, but his successors made no similar arrangements for other areas. 16 Under these circumstances, generals commanding invading armies found themselves with this responsibility. Although they understood that they were to proclaim freedom, use slogans like guerre aux châteaux, paix aux chaumières and invite the people to make known their will, they received few directives on political warfare. 17 That the French made haphazard preparations may be ascribed to their embarrassment at this stage, despite disclaimers, at the idea of political intervention and to their belief that the peoples whose territories they were to overrun needed little persuasion. Sensing that whatever missionary work was needed would be best left to native revolutionaries, they concentrated on them, forming, for example, legions of Belgian, Liégeois and Savoyard exiles to march and to preach in the common cause. 18

As well as being loosely organized, the propaganda plan contained an ambiguity. At the same time as they pronounced the people arbiters of their fate, the French talked of the need of security for themselves. By arguing that France must "surround herself with a belt thirty leagues wide composed of free men," Roederer made it appear that security would be found only if the people opted for independence and freedom in what came to be called sister states. 19 Yet there was no more effort to define freedom or sister state precisely than there was to say what would happen if the claims of security for the liberator conflicted with the will of the liberated. The revolutionaries saw no need to provide definitions. If they made a modest departure from principle by deciding to propagandize, they did not intend to abandon principle completely by seeming to dictate a particular system. Moreover, if national interest now called for attempts to encourage the formation of friendly states along the border, it did not counsel force to achieve this because the suspicion thereby aroused among remaining neutrals that France was bent on dominating or annexing her neighbours would risk increasing the number of enemies. It sufficed, therefore, to offer assurances of respect for the right of foreigners to determine the character of their regimes, and a few of these issued from Paris, chiefly from the pen of Condorcet. 20 Notwithstanding the discordant note sounded by references to security, Frenchmen in the
summer of 1792 understood that they were about to enter foreign lands to persuade, not coerce, the people.

III

After the war began in earnest in the autumn of 1792, more was heard about the security of the state than about the rights of peoples. As the French occupied Savoy, Nice, Belgium, Liège and the southern Rhineland, their generals and native patriots proclaimed the Rights of Man, founded clubs and urged the populace to embrace the revolution. The Savoyards overwhelmingly — and with little prompting from Frenchmen — repudiated their Sardinian masters and even appealed for union with France, but elsewhere the invader found a disheartening response. Interested only in moderate reform and offended by the violent character that the French Revolution was now assuming, the Rhinelanders reacted coolly to the propaganda of a minority of intellectuals centred in a club at Mainz, the French headquarters. Several of the newly-elected administrations in Belgium and Liège were sympathetic in the main to French ideas, but most of these envisaged reform as a more gradual process than did Frenchmen. Worse still, other new administrations sought no reform whatever and proclaimed their loyalty to conservative institutions which accorded not at all with those of the liberator. Discouraging political responses and accumulating problems of military supply and finance provoked demands for a clear policy to guide the generals in their dealings with the peoples of the occupied territories. Discussion over what that policy should be began just as the Convention met in late September and continued intermittently for more than two months in an atmosphere made tense by the risk of counter-revolution within and, notwithstanding the successful offensives, by military perils outside. A mood of fear and suspicion, aggravated by parliamentary feuding, promised less tolerance than before for dissident opinion at home and abroad. Even as discussion over occupied territories started, suggestions for going beyond propaganda cast doubt on the sanctity of free choice.

On one side of the discussion were those who thought that revolutionary principles needed qualification. The deputy Delacroix feared that granting unrestricted freedom of choice might jeopardize France's chances of being compensated for war costs, and Danton counselled against it on the grounds that it would preserve monarchical governments inimical to the nascent republic. Danton's assertion that France must tell her neighbours that they could no longer have kings meant that regimes abroad had to be nearer in structure to the French model and governed by men closer in outlook to those at the helm in Paris than had earlier been thought necessary. General Custine, commander in the Rhineland, contributed to the eventual definition of such regimes by advice and action. Disillusioned at the failure of proselytizing endeavours, he first called on his government to abolish the feudal regime in all occupied areas and then, in his own zone, replaced the existing authorities (whom he had promised to retain until an election) with native revolutionaries whose commitment to
change in the French manner was public knowledge. Equally disillusioned French civil agents joined in the call for thoroughgoing revolution, and informed Lebrun, the foreign minister, that it would never be effected unless persuasion were supplemented with force. Eventually Condorcet himself expressed doubts about the strict application abroad of principles he had resolutely championed. Commenting on Custine's proposal for the abolition of feudal rights by fiat from Paris, the philosophe noted that while France must maintain existing laws until the people spoke the obligation did not extend to laws she believed unjust or "contrary to the rights of man".

Consideration of the policy to adopt towards liberated peoples took on a new dimension in November. The first hints were made that the republic would find an adequate guarantee for itself not by turning occupied areas into sister states in the French image but only by going a stage further and annexing them. This alternative was introduced during public debate over the Savoyard appeal for union. Cloots seized the opportunity presented by the alleged lukewarm response of politicians towards the appeal to promote his universal republic. Such a republic, he argued, created by the incorporation in France of one place after another beginning with Savoy, would be the salvation of the revolution, whereas sister states — "puny republics, isolated and protected" — merely allied with France would lead to collapse. It was not expansion itself but Cloots' unlimited interpretation of it that aroused criticism. Many who ridiculed the universal republic nevertheless now began to equate security with some expansion, and they suggested the Rhine and the Alps as the natural limit for this. The notion that nature had ordained the frontiers of France Cloots himself had suggested before the revolution, but he had subsequently abandoned it for his grandiose, French-centred world state. Michel de Cubières, a French poet, resurrected it in 1791 with the pronouncement that the "eternal Alps" placed Savoy within the French domain. Before the Mainz club on 15 November 1792, Georg Forster, a leading figure in Custine's German entourage, spoke of the Rhine as "the natural frontier of a great republic." More impressive endorsement was soon forthcoming. Brissot, while branding the universal republic a "bizarre disease," declared it his belief that France must shift her borders to the Rhine and the Alps. Forseeing that conditions might make expansion advisable, Courtois observed to his fellow Jacobins that if nature meant all peoples to be brothers she also divided them into families by barriers of sea and mountain. Grégoire, reporting to the Convention in favour of the annexation of Savoy, also spoke of the frontiers traced for France by "nature's hand," but he was as concerned with explaining why the republic might have to expand as with fixing its precise limits. For this reason he sought to discredit what he called "a widely-held antiquated notion" that republics ought to be small. He argued that the organization and constitutional forms of the French republic immunized it against the risk of despotism ordinarily present in large states. Liberty would be endangered not because the republic grew but because in certain circumstances it refused to grow. "When a state is exposed to attack by its neighbours," said Grégoire, "when a struggle with a great power necessitates extreme measures, it may be advisable for it to increase in size." He repudiated the universal
republic but considered that France could advance to the natural frontiers if those who lived within them agreed. Would they be free to determine this? Although Grégoire said that they could choose whatever government they wanted, his comment that “if my neighbour keeps snakes, I have the right to crush them for fear of being their victim” held out the threat that if the people merely replaced one tyrant by another France would intervene to install a regime acceptable to her. He did not add that if they persisted in their insurgeness France would take the further step of annexing them against their will, but his remarks that expansion might be required in the face of a foreign threat coupled with his justification of force in the name of national interest made this a real possibility. Would not an expanding republic be the only way to guarantee the extermination of reptiles?

Neither the threat to impose constitutions on neighbours nor the justification of expansion was to the liking of everyone. In the discussion over occupied places, a few revolutionaries argued against efforts to qualify principles and called instead for their reaffirmation. In their view, forcing the French system abroad would harm interest as well as violate principle. It would, for example, deepen the antagonism of belligerents and arouse that of neutrals by creating the impression that the nation had only “fictitiously renounced conquest.” It would also alienate the very peoples upon whose friendship France counted to achieve the desired security. The need for some reassurance about French intentions seemed urgent after General Anselme, commander in Nice, violated the sovereignty of his charges. He took possession of Nice in the name of France and then, through handpicked authorities and without a popular consultation, revolutionized it with a view to annexation. Troubled members of the Diplomatic Committee asked accordingly that generals be instructed to proclaim occupied places free to set up governments of their choice. As for whether expanding the state would make it secure, Condorcet, among others, was doubtful. While not opposing expansion in principle, he warned that nothing would be better calculated to prolong the war than to arouse fear that the nation was seized with “an annexationist mania.” But counsels of moderation lessened as the weeks of occupation slipped by, not surprisingly, since the prevailing climate made them appear unsuitable to national needs while their sponsors found themselves treated as lukewarm patriots, if not counter-revolutionaries.

Between opposing views on the problem of occupied territories, the Convention was unable to choose. Indeed, it nearly added to the problem when in a moment of enthusiasm it let itself be persuaded to promise assistance to any people seeking freedom. If executed, the fraternité et secours decree (19 November 1792) would have led the republic to occupy still more territories, but in fact the decree amounted to little more than a gesture of verbal solidarity with revolutionaries everywhere, since those charged with interpreting it rendered it virtually meaningless. One occupied area, Savoy, presented no problem, for her people had manifested their desire for change by asking to become French. In response the Convention applied the annexationist theory developed in debates over the papal enclaves and accepted the Savoyards on grounds of self-determination and
of national interest. However, it adjusted theory to circumstances by dropping references to public law; because France was at war with powers likely to take offense at her action, the deputies saw no need to humour foreigners in this case by adducing a basis for union they considered outmoded.38 Other than in Savoy opinion was unsympathetic and the problem of formulating a policy remained, yet the Convention substituted postponement for policy. It would not decide between free choice and coercion. On the one hand, its decision to investigate complaints in Nice indicated displeasure with General Anselme’s arbitrary conduct.39 On the other hand, its failure to reaffirm the rights of peoples as requested and its tolerance of General Custine’s high-handed approach in the Rhineland indicated that it had drifted further from strict interpretation of principle than had its predecessor when it adopted propaganda as a weapon of war. News coming from Belgium at the end of November was not calculated to put the Convention back on course.

IV

Reports of the plight of the army in Belgium ended the procrastination in Paris. This army had lacked equipment and provisions even when the campaign opened and despite the efforts of the French and those Belgians who sympathized with them the situation worsened. Lacking specie to pay for supplies, the military resorted to requisitioning or tried to use assignats, the fast depreciating revolutionary currency, which Belgians found unacceptable. Commissioners of an alarmed Convention, investigating in early December, confirmed the shortages, especially of specie, warned that they threatened to paralyze operations and, although admitting French administrative inefficiencies were partly responsible, placed the chief blame on Belgian refusal to share the financial burdens of liberation. After three key committees — War, Diplomacy and Finance — learned this and heard from Cambon, the leading figure on the Finance Committee, that the existing drain on specie was intolerable in light of the republic’s financial position, they sent Cambon before the Convention with proposals to enforce political conformity in occupied areas as a means of making them pay part of war costs. The Convention, already disillusioned by the liberated peoples’ political response and now convinced that their lack of cooperation on the financial problem not only betrayed ingratitude but put France’s safety in jeopardy, readily passed the proposals. Collectively these became known as the Decree of 15 December.40

According to this draconian measure, generals of the republic were to topple everything that smacked of the ancien régime: nobility, special rights and exemptions, all forms of servitude, tithes, seigneurial dues, existing taxes and political institutions. They would then institute political renewal by convoking the people in primary assemblies to elect provisional administrations, and to foil the enemies of the republic they would exclude from voting or holding office anyone who refused an oath to liberty and equality and who failed to renounce privilege.41 So that these same enemies would pay for the war, the generals were to
seize the property of the old government, the sovereign and his supporters, and the ecclesiastics, though its disposal was supposedly left to native authorities. Finally, to assist the military in the implementation of these essentially political tasks, the decree stipulated that both the Convention and the executive would send commissioners, who, it shortly became clear, would control not only the process by which provisional administrations were elected but all activities in which they subsequently engaged. If the decree marked the effective start of transplanting revolutionary ideology abroad, it also replaced persuasion with coercion as the means to that end. Sister states, metamorphosed, emerged as satellites.

Reason of state, not obsession with the propagation of principles, determined this change of policy. Earlier it had been argued that forcing revolution abroad threatened the interests of the state because this would antagonize the people, confirm enemies in their hostility and convince neutrals that the French were bent on domination. Now interpretation of interest was revised; it was concluded that a greater threat than these probable foreign responses stemmed from problems of supply and finance which forcing revolution on neighbours alone could solve. Cambon, knowing that dependable regimes would introduce assignats, and that this in turn would not only ease the drain on specie but lead to a rise in the value of the assignats themselves as confiscated property came on the market, bluntly told the Convention that liberty would be imperilled unless it prepared the way for change by sweeping aside privileged elements. He was even blunter about the practical basis of the decree when he told an Antwerp delegation, come to protest against it, that France could not prosecute the war for six months if expenditures continued at the existing level. When the delegation objected that the decree would bring total disorganization, Cambon is supposed to have retorted: "Our business is to destroy everything in order to recreate all."

More indicative of impatience with men he found stubborn than of a will to impose a system on them in contempt of reality, the remark is not typical of a man who, on the contrary, continually emphasized the republic's financial problems as the basis of his program. He and his colleagues were prompted by what they deemed were overriding practical considerations. Interested more in exporting problems than principles, they would revolutionize foreign places in order to render France solvent.

Revolutionizing these places in the manner prescribed in the Decree of 15 December violated the revolution's cardinal principle. By substituting their will for that of others to determine the abolition of one regime and the character and policies of its successor, the French abandoned popular sovereignty. How were they to explain this volte-face? They reasoned that with few exceptions their neighbours were incapable of taking the initiative in the institution of regimes now alleged vital. Numbed, as it were, by despotism, voters tamely followed the orders of a "nobiliary and sacerdotal aristocracy" and used their new-found right either to retain the old order or merely to replace it with what Cambon called "semi-freedom." The demonstrated incapacity to find freedom unaided meant that the republic must invest herself with pouvoir révolutionnaire, an
emergency authority through which her military and civil agents would sound the tocsin and summon the revolution into existence. 44 By strength and experience cast in the role of tutor to the uninitiated, she must assume a temporary guardianship to secure herself and her charges against the monarchical incubus. 45 The revolutionaries refused to admit that emergency power and tutelage constituted a volte-face and drew on all their intellectual dexterity to prove them compatible with doctrine. Sovereignty, they argued, still resided in the people but the old ruling classes formed no part of the people. On the contrary, they were its natural enemies, and the rigorous application of the maxim guerre aux châteaux by which they were removed from office and lost their privileges and property could not therefore be construed as an attack on the rights of the people properly speaking. Giving expression to this specious reasoning, the preamble to the new decree stated that the Convention’s very fidelity to the principle of the sovereignty of the people precluded the recognition of any institution which violated it.

V

Liberated peoples, particularly the Belgians, were unconvinced by the effort to reconcile principles proclaimed with policies pursued, and their protests against the decree and demands for its revocation prompted France to make her guardianship permanent. A representative protest came from the Brussels administration which answered the charge that Belgium was perpetuating an aristocracy of classes with the accusation that France was establishing an aristocracy of a different kind: her pouvoir révolutionnaire created “a new sovereign mythology which divided peoples on grounds of power into nations and half-nations as paganism formerly distinguished the Gods.” 46 But rebukes to the revolutionary conscience from abroad no more availed to effect a reversal of direction than eleventh-hour warnings at home about the international repercussions of fashioning other states on the French model. 47 Indeed, when neither protests nor difficulties in implementing the decree diminished, the revolutionaries decided on annexation, the alternative solution to their problem suggested weeks earlier.

Stimulated by timely support from foreign minorities, who were aware that independence would not guarantee the government they wanted, the partisans of annexation in the Convention used the arrival of an appeal for union from radicals in the city of Liège on 31 January 1793 to promote their plans. A petition for annexation, more representative of the popular will than that of Liège, had come from Nice three weeks earlier. 48 The impatient Cambon now accused the Diplomatic Committee of delaying the union of Nice and trying to suspend the controversial decree in order to appease foreign powers. He proposed that the Niçois be declared French forthwith. Danton provided momentum by intervening in favour of the Liégeois petition. Back momentarily from Belgium and Liège where he served as a commissioner, he was certain that the Belgians would follow their neighbours’ example, and he expressed the opinion that it was in France’s in-
terest to join them, too, once they had voted. His mind was on even more acquisitions than these. By arguing that the union of Belgium was implicit in the decision to restructure her in the French manner and by stating that the republic would attain the natural frontiers, he opened up the possibility of annexing all territory — occupied or unoccupied — as far as the Rhine. The deputies responded sympathetically. Although postponing a decision on Liège until evidence of the vote there was forthcoming, they took Nice on the basis of popular consent and strategic value and ordered the execution of the decree accelerated on the understanding that it would now be used to forward annexation. On the same day Lebrun committed the ministry to this interpretation. The foreign minister had been reluctant about expansion, particularly in Belgium, because he feared that it would push Britain into Austria’s arms, but in the knowledge that a rupture with London was imminent he cast aside his reservations and followed where the sovereign Convention led. He instructed the commissioners of the executive (national commissioners) in Belgium to advance the annexationist cause, and if he told them to stress only Belgian interests he did not neglect to mention the financial relief, expanded trade and increased population (including soldiery) that would accrue to France from the union of a place whose independence he had hitherto sworn to maintain. By the end of January both executive and legislature were converts to the view that only annexation would root the revolution and save the republic.

It remained to provide a rationale for their conversion. This was the task of Carnot who, in a report that built on foundations laid by Grégoire and Cambon, formally enthroned raison d’état as the basis for republican expansion. Nations in the political order, he argued, like individuals in the social order had inherent rights and interests, among them independence, and justice required each nation to respect those of others so long as it did not thereby compromise its own. If it was unjust to injure the interests of another state needlessly, it was legitimate to take any measure necessary for the safety of the state, since justice “obliged no one to sacrifice his own security to that of his neighbour.” From these maxims, Carnot deduced the conditions under which annexation could be effected. Like other spokesmen of the revolution, he stated that no increase in territory could occur if it placed national interest in jeopardy. But if he also reiterated their insistence that no annexation be permitted unless the people of the place concerned freely agreed, he now added that this condition could be waived if state security were imperilled. Having authorized annexation over popular opposition in the event of compelling need, he could offer only national honour and generosity as safeguards against the use of reason of state as a pretext for unnecessary violations of the rights of other nations. As for a limit to expansion, Carnot found this in the natural frontiers. If the inhabitants of occupied places between the existing and the natural frontiers opted for the French fraternity, his report made certain that they would be admitted, but in light of the decision previously taken that state interests required the union of these places the report made equally certain that popular consultations would be more form than reality. Indeed, the report sanctioned annexation by any method not just of occupied enemy lands.
within the natural frontiers but, if necessary, those belonging to neutral sovereigns as well.

Armed with the theory outlined by Carnot, the deputies brought a number of places into the republican fold as results of plebiscites reached Paris throughout February and March 1793. They incorporated most of Belgium and Liège, the occupied part of the Rhineland and, for reasons financial and strategic, a number of neutral places within the natural frontiers. In the latter category they included enclaves in eastern France, possessions of borderland Rhenish princes, Porrentruy on the Swiss border and Monaco on the Mediterranean. Before an enemy counter-offensive stripped it of many of its prizes, the republic had gone far towards attaining the frontiers called natural.

There is no doubt that most of this expansion was effected by coercion. True, the revolutionaries always alleged self-determination to be the basis for union, and they were unwilling to abandon formally the notion that they had converted their charges. Since a handful still liked to believe that the citizenry could be persuaded, and since others sensed the need to maintain the fiction that popular will was decisive, propaganda remained a republican responsibility. For Lebrun, propaganda — or "public instruction" as he called it — was vital among those whose long subjection to despotism made it difficult for them to imagine any other condition, and he ordered his commissioners to explain the revolutionary message directly to the masses, counter the arguments of opponents and watch for "improvements or deviations in public attitude" so as to learn where enlightenment was most needed. But if the rulers of the republic preferred to win citizens by persuasion, they had already resolved to gain subjects by force. Their agents therefore carried out their apostolates with the bayonet. To exclude opponents from the electoral process, they required the stipulated oath to liberty and renunciation of privilege, and, in some cases, when the opposition proved persistent they resorted to deportation. With the chief resisters cowed, they intimidated the electorate at large through threats and sometimes used an open display of power to make obstinate communes fall into line. They tolerated these and other abuses committed by local supporters, many of whom, like Forster in Mainz, acted in the conviction that liberty was "desirable at no matter what cost." If overwhelming victories resulted, it is to be observed that in most cases only a minority voted, but whatever the numbers participating the conduct of the elections mocked the verdict. So also did the fact that a large number of electors made approval of union conditional on financial and religious provisions which, not surprisingly, Paris ignored. That there was no fair consultation in most instances French participants in the electoral farce themselves admitted.

At home their admission occasioned no surprise and troubled few consciences. Precisely because of resistance encountered or anticipated, the deputies had reformulated their annexationist theory to allow for the collapse of the notion of consent that had once formed its base. Reason of state was now the chief arbiter of territorial acquisitions and to make this reversion to monarchical prac-
tice palatable the idea of tutelage over backward peoples had been added. When national interests were deemed compelling, consent must yield to "the despotism of reason" on the grounds that "an infant-like and imbecilic people" cannot judge what is best for it. 59 Constituting an elite in the revolutionary world, the French could force others into freedom, certain that in time they would be blessed for this salutary exercise of pouvoir révolutionnaire. Fortified in this way, they could abandon popular will as the basis of expansion and embark on conquest which, in the words of one revolutionary, had become "for the first time useful to the world and just." 60

NOTES

122 May 1790, Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur (hereafter Moniteur), 31 vols. (Paris, 1847), IV, pp. 402-03, p. 432. The dispute was between Spain, France's ally, and Britain.


7Moniteur, II, p. 351, III, p. 634.

8Anxiety over Austrian intentions caused the despatch of an emissary to Porrentruy, but to the dismay of her revolutionaries the conciliatory report that followed calmed all but their boldest French friends. Mission de M. Bacher, envoyé français auprès du prince-évêque de Bâle, A.N., D-XXIII.2. Moniteur, IX, pp. 538-39.

9On unofficial, non-governmental propaganda of individuals and groups, consult the illuminating chapter in J. Godchot, La grande nation; l'expansion révolutionnaire de la France dans le monde de 1789 à 1799, 2 vols. (Paris, 1956), I, pp. 99-127.

10Cloots anticipated a kind of holy war with uprisings from Spain to Scandinavia and from Ireland to Greece. See his remarks in an appearance before the assembly, 13 December 1791, and his Adresse aux Français, 22 May 1792, Moniteur X, pp. 627-28, XII, pp. 446-48.

11Examples are contained in Second discours de J.P. Brissot, 30 December 1791, Bibliothèque Nationale (hereafter B.N.), Lb40 666.

12As an instance of the foreign minister's effort to counter reports that the French were animated by proselytizing mania, see Memoire pour servir d'instruction au Sr. Audibert Caille allant résider à Turin en qualité de chargé d'affaires de France, 1 June 1792, A.N., D-XXIII.1.

13Discours de P.L. Roederer, 18 December 1791, pp. 2, 6, B.N., Lb40 657.

14Lettre de M. Condorcet à M. xxx, magistrat de la ville de xxx en Suisse, n.d., pp. 9-10, B.N.Lb41 85. Similarly, Dumouriez told the French minister in London that he saw no reason for complaint abroad over this conduct towards an enemy "that interest dictates we must weaken and overcome by all possible means." 14 June 1792, A.N., D-XXIII.1.

15Although in accordance with treaty rights the French occupied the gorges of Porrentruy at the outset of the war, they were no more prepared to assist local revolutionaries
in subverting the government of this neutral state than they had been the year before. On grounds that Porrentruy's strategic value made support for the revolutionaries imperative, Dumouriez made secret promises to them but he was unable to fulfil these because the assembly as a whole did not yet share his opinion. Relevant documents are found in A.A.E., C.P., Bâle 9.


16The war minister counselled the general preparing to invade Savoy to publish a manifesto announcing that the French marched only for the cause of liberty. Troops must conduct themselves as men "out to do battle with despotism and to seek friends among oppressed peoples." Servan to Montesquieu, 8 September 1792, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique (hereafter A.A.E., C.P.) Turin, 271. The guerre aux châteaux slogan seems first to have been used at the outbreak of war in the Chronique de Paris (22 April 1792), but the idea implicit in it of dividing subject from sovereign emerged from the debate over war in preceding months.

18The legions were formed largely from funds voted by the assembly for the foreign ministry's "secret business." Moniteur, XII, pp. 226-27, XIII, pp. 272, 287, 291, 309, 358. Tassier, Occupation, pp. 42-48.

19Discours de Roederer, pp. 6, 7. B.N., Lb40 657.

20See the declaration of principles drafted by Condorcet and accepted by the assembly in December 1791, the declaration of war of April 1792 and, for special guarantees that Belgium would never be taken or forced to change her constitution, Condorcet's remarks in January 1792 and Dumouriez's reassurances in March and April. Moniteur, X, pp. 755, 763, XI, p. 214, XII, p. 188; Tassier, Occupation, pp. 36-37. Two pamphlets of Condorcet (undated but probably issued in September and October 1792) eloquently champion the rights of foreigners. La République française aux hommes libres, pp. 2-3, and Avis aux Espagnols, pp. 15-17. B.N., LB41 129; LB41 134.


23A rift between conservatives and reformers occurred during the 1789-90 Belgian revolution and did not heal in the interval. Belgian response to the French is the subject of Tassier, Occupation. The same author treats the events of 1789-90 in Les démocrates belges de 1789. Etude sur le vonckisme et la révolution brabançonne (Brussels, 1930). P. Harsin's La Révolution liégeoise de 1789 (Brussels, 1954) includes a chapter (pp. 155-167) on Liège in 1792-93.


30See the despatches of Deshaquets (agent in Belgium) to Lebrun of 14, 21, 22, 28 November, 10 December 1792, A.A.E., C.P. Pays-Bas, 183.

31Chronique de Paris, 6 November 1792.


32 Ibid., p. 7.
33See the comments of Louvet to the Convention, 28 September 1792, Moniteur, XIV, p. 71, and two despatches from Lemaître (secret agent in the Rhineland) to Lebrun, 3, 4 December 1792, A.A.E., C.P. Allemagne 665.
34 October 1792, Moniteur, XIV, pp. 286-88 and Archives Parlementaires, Première Série, LII, pp. 654-55.
36 Lasource, who had reported for the Diplomatic Committee in favour of a free hand for the liberated areas, was called a foe of liberty. C. Rabaud, Lasource, député à la Législative et à la Convention (Paris, 1889), pp. 183-40. Condorcet deplored a situation in which those who thought France large enough or who envisaged allying with rather than annexing a neighbouring republic were treated as scoundrels, but after his own response to Custine’s proposal for interference in occupied countries he was no longer a forceful advocate of toleration. Chronique de Paris, 26 November 1792.
38 November 1792. Union was the “free and universal wish of the sovereign people” and “nature, contacts and respective interests” made it beneficial to Savoyards and Frenchmen. Moniteur, XIV, p. 588, p. 591. Penières opposed the measure on the general grounds that the political influence of each citizen is lessened as the state expands. Archives Parlementaires, Première Série, LIII, pp. 614-15.
39 Ibid., XIV, pp. 509-10.
41 An amendment excluding former office-holders and privileged persons from taking office in the first administration was passed on 15 December but rescinded a week later. Ibid., XIV, pp. 761, 810-11.
42 For the wide powers granted the executive’s national commissioners, see Instructions pour les commissaires en Belgique, Observations sur les mesures à prendre pour l’exécution de chaque article du décret du 15 décembre 1792, 8 January 1793; Aulard, Recueil, I, pp. 419-37.
43 Tassier, Occupation, pp. 257-58.
44 The term pouvoir révolutionnaire was borrowed from Belgian and Liégeois exiles who had interpreted it as the special authority used by local revolutionaries immediately after their country’s liberation to prevent anarchy and to provide for defence and elections. Ibid., p. 26. On 15 December Cambon broadened its interpretation and made Frenchmen responsible for exercising it.
45 According to the executive, agents of the republic had “tutelary supervision” of provisional administrations. Instructions pour les commissaires; Aulard, Recueil, I, p. 430.
Adresse des représentants provisoires de la ville de Bruxelles à la Convention nationale de France, 24 December 1792, A.A.E., C.P., Pays-Bas 183.

See the Convention's sessions of 27 December 1792 and 8 January 1793. Moniteur, XIV, p. 855, XV, p. 88.

Nice had voted on 16 December 1792, after the investigation into General Anselme's conduct by commissioners of the Convention. The commissioners espoused annexation, but the voters seem to have expressed a genuine desire to join France. Ibid., XV, p. 108; Aulard, Recueil, I, pp. 314-15; J. Combet, La Révolution dans le comté de Nice et la principauté de Monaco (1792-1800) (Paris, 1925), p. 49.

Moniteur, XV, pp. 322-23, 328; and Fribourg, Danton, pp. 267-72. The Convention had received only unofficial word of the Liégeois vote. A plebiscite in the city, organized by the administration at the prompting of the local club, French military personnel and commissioners Danton and Delacroix, favoured union, but the extent of participation (c. 50%), pressure exerted on voters and the conditional nature of affirmative votes cast doubt on the result. Harsin, Révolution liégeoise, pp. 161, 162-64. Tassier, Occupation, pp. 260-63. On the use of force, see Smitz (Liégeois radical) to Lebrun, 3 February 1793, A.A.E., C.P., Liége 74.

Circulaire aux Commissaires Nationaux de la République, qui sont actuellement dans la Belgique. 31 January 1793, A.A.E., C.P., Pays-Bas 184. See also Rapport des commissaires nationaux du pouvoir exécutif sur leur mission à Mayence, 13 August 1793, A.A.E., C.P., Mayence 70.


Belgian provinces, towns and communes were annexed between 1 and 23 March 1793. A few Liégeois communities (and some enclaves within the bishopric) were incorporated on 2 and 4 March but the bishopric as a whole was added on 8 May, after the Austrians recaptured it. Moniteur, XV, pp. 590, 496, 606-07, 611, 613, 616, 636, 637, 648, 667, 775-76; XVI, p. 336. Charavay, Correspondance générale de Carnot, I, pp. 386-92, 394-97, 401, 408-09; Décret relatif à la mission en Belgique, 19 March 1793, Aulard, Recueil, II, pp. 404-05.

30 March 1793. Moniteur, XV, p. 840, XVI, pp. 5-6, 8; and Archives parlementaires, Première Série, I.X, pp. 713-17. Included were places from Landau to the Moselle and the Rhine, notably the left-bank parts of three ecclesiastical states, Mainz, Speyer and Worms, as well as the free cities of Speyer and Worms.

They were preparing to take the left-bank part of the Palatinate, last neutral state of any consequence between the frontier and the Rhine. Typical of the confused political geography of the Rhineland, places in the Palatinate were wedged between those of the already occupied Electorate of Mainz, and commissioners argued that annexation of such places was necessary for the creation of a "sound political organization." How, they asked, "will we manage to get assignats in circulation in such a jumbled zone? And, without the circulation of assignats, how can we continue the war?" Commissioners of the Convention to the executive council, 8 March 1793; Aulard, Recueil, II, pp. 290-92; and Simon (ntl. comm. in Mainz) to Lebrun, 9 March, Lebrun to Simon, 20 March 1793, A.N., F1e.40.

14 February, 2, 14, 20, 23 March 1793, Moniteur, XV, pp. 451, 455-56, 607, 715-16, 759, 764, 776. Persuaded of the need to include part of Porrentruy in their defense network, the French, already in partial occupation (see n. 15 above), finally supported a revolution there in October 1792 and subsequently decided on annexation. When this led to diplomatic difficulties, caution vis-à-vis neutrals reasserted itself. Part of the bishopric was linked to the Empire, part to the Swiss Confederation, and the French, interested only in the former, rejected schemes to annex places connected with the Confederation lest this pro-
voke the Swiss to join the enemy and set another frontier ablaze; Aulard, Recueil, II, pp. 93-101, Lebrun to Mandar (ntl. comm. in Porrentruy), 17 February 1793, A.A.E., C.P., Bâle 10; Extrait du registre des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif provisoire, 19 March 1793, A.N., A.F., III, 83; Procès-Verbal de la Convention Nationale, 7 April 1793, IX, pp. 128-29; Lebrun to Barthélemy (French minister to the Confederation), 25 March (with attached documents), 8 April 1793, Kaulek, Barthélemy, II, pp. 157-58, 178-79.

56Instructions pour les commissaires; Aulard, Recueil, I, 421-22. On propaganda efforts of the often indefatigable commissioners, see (for the Mainz region) Simon and Grégoire (ntl. commns.) to Lebrun, 7, 20 February 1793, Lebrun to the national commissioners, 3 March 1793, A.N., F15, 40; (for Belgium) Tassier, Occupation, pp. 295-303; (for Porrentruy) Clerget (national commissioner) to Lebrun, 8 March 1793, A.A.E., C.P., Bâle 10, Commissioners of the Convention to the Convention, 1 March 1793, Aulard, Recueil, II, pp. 232-34.

57Cited in Droz, L’Allemagne, p. 209.


60P. Chépy, ntl. comm. in Belgium. Cited ibid.