Abstracts
Abstract
To get a better comprehension of the nature of argumentation, we need to understand the context in which this practice produces its particular benefits. I hold that this context consists basically in the presence of two conditions: 1) the need for cooperation, and 2) the possibility of dissent. I argue that contributing to the coordination of collective action is the particular benefit argumentation is able to produce in this context and that obtaining this benefit constitutes its main function. Thus, the main function of argumentation is not epistemic. Truth is important when we argue, but epistemic improvement is not the main aim of argumentation, even if this benefit may be a common result of it.
Keywords:
- adversariality,
- collective action,
- coordination,
- function of argumentation,
- reasons,
- testimonial injustice,
- truth
Résumé
Pour mieux comprendre la nature de l'argumentation, il est nécessaire de comprendre le contexte dans lequel cette pratique produit ses bénéfices particuliers. Je soutiens que ce contexte repose essentiellement sur la présence de deux conditions : 1) le besoin de coopération ; 2) la possibilité de dissidence. Je soutiens que contribuer à la coordination de l'action collective est le bénéfice particulier que l'argumentation est capable de produire dans ce contexte et que l'obtention de ce bénéfice constitue sa fonction principale. Ainsi, la fonction principale de l'argumentation n'est pas épistémique. La vérité est importante lorsque nous argumentons, mais l'amélioration épistémique n'est pas l'objectif principal de l'argumentation, même si ce bénéfice peut en être un résultat courant.
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Appendices
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