Intelligence at the Learneds: The RCMP, the Learneds, and the Canadian Historical Association

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Article abstract

Much of the history of Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) security intelligence role has ignored domestic counter-subversion work in favour of more glamorous counter-espionage operations. “Intelligence at the Learneds: The RCMP, the Learneds, and the Canadian Historical Association” examines one small part of that neglected counter-subversion past. For nearly twenty-five years, from 1960 to 1983, members of the RCMP secretly covered and reported upon various meetings of the Learned Societies. Initially attracted by the presence of communists, by the 1970s the RCMP had changed its focus to members of the so-called New Left. Hounded by criticism in the aftermath of the McDonald Commission’s final report in 1981, Mounties returned to monitoring communists. Mounted Police coverage ended in 1984, when the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) replaced the Security Service. The paper concludes with a suggestion that CSIS may not be as free from its RCMP ancestor as some would suggest.
Intelligence at the Learned: The RCMP, the Learned, and the Canadian Historical Association

STEVE HEWITT

For a young academic on the make, the chance to present a research paper at the Learned is a golden opportunity to impress his elders and get a job . . . given the current tight academic job market, there is a great competition to present papers. . . .

To an outsider, many of the activities are boring. A typical session consists of lots of free coffee, the reading of one or two research papers, some discussion, some questions from the floor, and then more free coffee. The action goes on at the pubs. . . . An important factor is that government grants usually pay for the travelling costs of all participants so that for an academic the Learned are either a subsidized job hunt or a subsidized vacation.¹

Who was responsible for this description of the 1977 Learned conference in Fredericton? An alienated academic? A cynical graduate student? A sarcastic media person? The author was, in fact, an informant working on behalf of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service. What was a representative of the Mounties doing at the Learned? Strangely enough, he

¹ National Archives of Canada (NA), RG 146, Records of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Vol. 2910, File 97-A-00062, Learned Societies – Canada, Pt. 2, Re: Learned Societies – Canada, 4 July 1977. The name of the informant has been deleted under the Access to Information Act as has the name of his Mounted Police handler. While the identity of human “sources” will never be revealed, the deletion of the names of Mounted Police filing reports is a recent development. I have been told by someone employed by Access to Information at the National Archives of Canada that a former member of the RCMP Security Service living in the Sudbury area was harassed by an individual or individuals who obtained his name through material released under the Access to Information Act. I have yet to obtain any additional details regarding this incident. Currently, reports from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s are available with the names of the Mounties who wrote them. Versions of the same reports now obtained under Access requests will have these same names deleted. Greg Kealey has raised the question of the implications of multiple versions of the same report being released under the Access to Information Act. See Gregory S. Kealey, “Introduction,” in R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Depression Years, Part I, 1933-1934, Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker, eds. (St. John’s, 1993), 18.

Special thanks to Bill Waiser, Christabelle Sethna, Peter Marwitz, Greg Kealey, Paul Axelrod, Moira Harris, and those connected with Access to Information at the National Archives of Canada.
was there to learn: to learn about the activities of individuals and organisations they deemed subversive and, far less frequently, to gain knowledge that might help them on the job. The targeting of the Learneds is significant for what it reveals about the nature and sophistication of RCMP counter-subversion operations in a period of Mounted Police history that directly set the stage for the death of the Security Service.

Mountie reports on the Learneds covered nearly 25 years, from 1960 to 1983. They were a small part of a much larger history of security intelligence operations in Canada. That history began in the closing years of the First World War. This new intelligence-gathering function of the Mounted Police became increasingly significant as tensions across Canada grew in the concluding year of the War and in its immediate aftermath. A few months after the Winnipeg General Strike, the Borden government gave its blessing to the new Mounted Police. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, an amalgamation between the Dominion Police and the Royal North-West Mounted Police, came into being in early 1920, and the expansion of the state into the lives of ordinary citizens continued into peacetime, unlike in many other areas where the presence of the state contracted.

Slowly, a distinct RCMP security intelligence outfit was developing. It would not be until at least the mid-1930s, however, that this group would become a separate part of the RCMP. Until then, security duties overlapped with regular police ones. A Mountie detective could cover a communist meeting one day and investigate a local drug den the next.


4 Betke and Horrell, *Canada's Security Service*, Vol. 2, 380-83. The name of this service also changed frequently. Official names have included Intelligence Section, Special Section, Special Branch, Security and Intelligence Branch, and, finally in 1971, the Security Service. For the purposes of simplicity, Security Service will be used throughout this paper.

5 For an example of the mixing of these duties see C.W. Harvison, *The Horsemen* (Toronto, 1967), 58-96.
Any security service, especially a fledgling one, needs targets. Born in 1921, the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) became the main source of left-wing radicalism in Canada and the main focus of RCMP operations. The force’s concern in the interwar period was with communist activities among workers and ethnic and immigrant communities. With the appearance of communists at the University of Toronto in the 1930s, the exclusive focus of RCMP intelligence activity on campuses for more than three decades would be on the “Red Menace.”

When it came to communists on campus, it was neither the messenger nor the message that the RCMP ultimately feared. Rather, it was the impact of the message on the audience that became the main concern. Mounted policemen, in a reflection of the attitudes of the wider Canadian society, viewed university students as impressionable, naïve, and easily led. What made this situation even more dangerous was that these students were part of Canada’s future economic and political elite. Left alone, they would probably turn out properly suited for their role in society. But at university they were not alone. Students in the classroom, or so it was believed, were the captive audience of the presiding professor. Should that academic teach communistic doctrines, or even be a communist, then the potential for indoctrination was great. By the 1960s, the RCMP was warning the government of the danger of indoctrination at universities by pointing to the number of McGill graduates named by Igor Gouzenko.

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6 This focus is clearly evidence in RCMP reports from the 1920s. Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker, eds., R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Early Years, 1919-1929 (St. John’s, 1994).
8 Paul Axelrod, Making a Middle Class: Student Life in English Canada During the Thirties (Montreal, 1990), 133, 137-38; Doug Owram, Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby-Boom Generation (Toronto, 1996), 178.
9 This belief was neither unique to the RCMP nor to Canada. In the case of Australia, see Fiona Capp, Writers Defiled (South Yarra, Australia, 1993), 89-90. For a period reflection of such fears in the United States, see E. Merrill Root, Collectivism on Campus: The Battle for the Mind in American Colleges (New York, 1961).
as being part of a Soviet spy ring. And, of course, by the same decade two members of the famous Cambridge University spy ring in the United Kingdom had made highly publicized escapes to the Soviet Union.

It was also at the beginning of the 1960s that members of the RCMP made their first appearance at the Learned. Mountie investigators' interest in the 1960 meetings at Queen's University was focussed on one particular organisation, the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA). Inspector C.W. Speers of "A" Division in Ottawa sent his superiors a report with attachments that dealt with the CPSA's meetings. "In view of the number of communists and suspects who are associated with this group in Ottawa," Inspector Speers wrote, "an investigation is presently being conducted to establish the extent of their influence and infiltration into the organisation." Reports about the CPSA based on information gathered at the 1960 Learned were still being filed a year later. A list of executives for the organization was obtained from the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. An RCMP source connected with the CPSA reported no knowledge "of extreme left wing sentiment being displayed by association members in the local or national groups." There was a fear expressed in the report, however, that those active in the CPSA, especially in Ottawa, might become acquainted with high-ranking members of the federal government.

The interest in the CPSA continued throughout the 1960s. In 1964, RCMP attention apparently was drawn to a report that a suspected communist had indicated an interest in becoming a member of the CPSA's Ottawa executive. That individual may have been historian Frank Underhill. The Mounted Police had a file on Underhill that dated from the 1930s. In 1940, he was officially and inaccurately labelled a communist. This designation remained, even after Underhill's public notoriety over his opposition to Canadian participation in the Second World War faded. After a gap of over 15 years, Frank Underhill's file

11 Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess had escaped in 1951. The most famous member of the group, Kim Philby, defected in 1963. Anthony Blunt was discovered in 1979 while the final member of the group, John Cairncross, remained hidden until the 1980s. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (Toronto, 1990), 144.
13 Ibid., Canadian Political Science Association, 5 April 1961.
14 For more on Underhill and his controversial stance at the beginning of the Second World War, see R. Douglas Francis, Frank Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur (Toronto, 1986), 108-127.

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became active again in the 1960s. In December 1964, the RCMP began investigating the 75-year-old academic. His neighbour was interviewed about him; his file held by the Public Service Commission, which at the time employed him as the curator of Laurier House, was examined. His election to the Ottawa executive of the CPSA was reported upon. Finally, the fact that he subscribed to the *Marxist Quarterly*, as J.T. Underhill, which the RCMP labelled an "assumed name," was commented upon. Why he subscribed under the different name puzzled the Mounties who investigated him. It was decided that the subscription itself might be because Underhill had a "scholarly interest" in the journal.

Although initially interested in the CPSA's involvement in the Learneds, the RCMP found other reasons to continue monitoring the annual conference on a regular basis until 1983. It did so for most of the period as an unsophisticated observer of academia. In fact, Mounties were at a distinct disadvantage in such matters. Members suffered from a lack of education. A 1958 RCMP recruitment pamphlet sought policemen with a "minimum Grade 8 education. Grade 10 or higher preferred." In 1963, when the media broached the subject of the post-secondary background of his members, Commissioner C.W. Harvison replied: "I don't have time for all that research." Not until 1974 was a high school diploma a requirement for membership in Canada's national police force. The 1968 Royal Commission on Security had warned about this shortcoming; in response, a greater number of Mounties began to make the trek to universities (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of RCMP Security Service Members with University Degrees</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Constables</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


15 Because of a lack of activity, the file was deemed "closed" in 1943. "However, the matter will not be lost sight of and should anything materialize at a later date worth mentioning it will be immediately reported." NA, RG 146, Vol. 65, File 1027-97-A-00044, Pt. 2, Report of A/Cpl H.R. Jenkins, 3 May 1943.


17 RCMP, *Serve Canada with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police* (Ottawa, 1958). Thank you to Donald Inch for supplying me with a copy of this document.

By 1979, officers and constables increasingly had university degrees, with the middle ranks having less in the way of post-secondary experience (see Table 2).

### Table 2
**Percentage of RCMP Security Service Members with University Degrees by Rank, 1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even with increasing numbers of Mounties attending university, there was an almost incredible emphasis on one particular subject. Political science, perhaps reflecting the Security Service’s fixation on communism and political activities, led the way when it came to the discipline in which Mounties obtained degrees (see Table 3).

### Table 3
**Disciplines in which Regular Members Obtained Bachelor Degrees, 1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics &amp; Commerce</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoology &amp; Biology</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geology</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate Degrees</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite increasing university attendance, for many Mounties academe remained a distant and foreign land. Even in the 1990s, a Mountie drill instructor at "boot camp" in Regina felt it necessary to tell a group of incoming recruits that "[t]his is not a university campus. . . . There is no place here for free-thinking and individuality." ¹⁹ Unfamiliarity with the ways of academe could breed resentment among Mounties, many of whom did not come from the same background as the privileged who composed the student population for a good portion of the twentieth century. A 1967 comment scrawled on a Department of External Affairs document seems particularly revealing. In that year, External Affairs forwarded to the RCMP leadership a report on a series of meetings conducted between one of their officials and university faculty across western Canada. ²⁰ The only RCMP response was a hand-written comment noting "nothing of particular interest to the RCMP, except that it is gratifying to note [that the] author realizes the ideological hostility that prevails throughout the university community." ²¹

For several reasons then, the Mounted Police approached universities and academic activities such as the Learned as strangers. In 1965, prior to the conference in Vancouver, the decision was taken in headquarters to open a single file, specifically entitled "Learned Societies Canada," where all relevant material could be collected. ²² The reports that appeared about that gathering reflected two realities. First, and this was a style of Security Service reporting that would begin to change near the end of the 1960s, it was simply a case of reporting the facts with brief speculation occasionally thrown in. Little attempt was made at analysing what was being reported upon. The other aspect that stands out is the lack of sources directly connected with the conference. This undoubtedly reflected a restriction on recruiting human sources on campuses that had been in place since in 1961 and had been officially reaffirmed by the government of Lester Pearson in 1963. ²³ In Vancouver, for example, newspaper accounts served as the source for reports on what occurred at that year's

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¹⁹ Corporal Bernie Lajoie, as quoted in James McKenzie and Lorne McClinton, Troop 17: The Making of Mounties (Calgary, 1992), 19. A Security Service member who attended university in the early 1970s was struck by the "freedom of the campus" which was in "complete contrast to the military nature of the RCMP." Letter from anonymous, former Security Service member, 5 April 1998.


meetings.24 Accordingly, Security Service members lamented not having obtained "much information on what actually transpired at this conference . . . particularly on subjects which could be of interest to our branch."25 What they had collected, however, were papers presented by academics. The most important document they obtained was a list of "all the national organizations" affiliated with the annual event.26

The traditional RCMP concerns were also evident in Vancouver: the concentration on left-wing radicalism – the RCMP had yet to distinguish between communism and younger radicals who would eventually be labelled as members of the New Left – and the fear that it would have an audience. Even before the conference, a Mountie filed a report on the possible attendance of Stanley Gray, a New Left radical from McGill University. Headquarters was reassured that even if Gray appeared, "his audience would likely not consist of more than thirty to forty persons. Although there might be several hundred individuals in attendance who are interested in political science and affiliated areas, most of them are not keen on attending the Lectures, but would far sooner spend their time in some refreshment lounge, or hold private discussions with their friends."27

Mounted Police interest increased the following year when the University of Sherbrooke hosted the Learned. The RCMP submitted a wide range of materials from that year's gathering. These included a list of the publishers taking part in the book fair, the names of the reporters covering the event for the Canadian Press, a sampling of papers including the presidential address to the CPSA and one prepared by historian Ramsay Cook, the schedule of the Canadian Historical Association (CHA), a copy of a Canadian Association of University Teachers' brief about RCMP activities on campuses, and a list of all the CPSA delegates and their addresses.28

Coverage varied each year because of location and changing lists of participants. Over the years, there was a repeated effort made to help explain what exactly the Learned were. "It has been learned that Conferences of Learned Societies have been held annually in the past at various universities in Canada. The conferences are gatherings at which learned groups and intellectuals pre-

26 Ibid.
sent papers on topics of interest concerning activity and progress in their respective fields.” So reported Inspector L.R. Parent in 1965. In 1972, another report explaining the nature of the Learned's was filed about that year's conference at McGill University. The RCMP as an institution was learning about the Learned.

The focus on the Learned reflected two aspects of Security Service intelligence operations. Members, especially those in smaller centres, kept busy like pack rats collecting a wide range of materials at least in part to justify their own existence. Such collections also connected with a second aspect of RCMP work. The RCMP's red and white world was beginning to dissolve by the mid-1960s. Student protest was increasing in the form of the New Left, with tenuous links if any at all to traditional communism. Mounties had little training to deal with such complexities. They had been taught that communism was the top threat to Canadian security, and they continued to operate with such a mindset. In the case of the New Left, a deeper hole needed to be dug in order to find its red roots.

Reports on the Learned continued throughout the 1960s. A Mountie wrote a report about the 1967 conference in Ottawa, simply mentioning that a member of the Canadian Political Science Association had received an invitation to that year's conference. The report was a sly reference to the fact that the member of the CPSA also happened to be a member of the RCMP.

In 1968, the conference was held in Calgary and the number of reports grew from the year before. This change might reflect an increase in radical activity, a rise in RCMP efforts to combat radical activity, or a simple reflection that Security Service members in Calgary had more free time on their hands than their brethren in Ottawa. They compiled a complete list of registered delegates at the conference, although little seems to have been done with the list of names. The Alberta wing of the Security Service did not even cross reference the names against those listed in their “radical indices.”

Like increasingly seasoned Learned participants, the RCMP had gone through the Calgary programme rather closely to determine what deserved attention. Five associations were “of interest by reason of the attendance of persons known to this office.” Those five were the Canadian Economics Association,

31 It was also felt by some members that the more reports filed the better the chance of a promotion. Interview with Donald J. Inch, former Security Service member, 1 March 1998.
the Canadian Political Science Association, the Canadian Sociological and Anthropology Association, the Canadian Peace Research and Education Association, and the Canadian Historical Association.34 The CHA had its own file. Included were CHA programmes for various years of the Learned, but little in the way of analysis. Collectively the organisations targeted by the RCMP were from the humanities and social sciences.35 There was an accurate recognition by the Mounted Police that students and academics from the physical sciences and professional colleges were far less likely to challenge the status quo.36

In 1969, the meetings were held in Toronto. Much had occurred in universities since the previous year’s meetings. In the fall of 1968, students at Simon Fraser University (SFU) occupied the university administration building before finally being forced out by Mounted Police on the orders of SFU president, Kenneth Strand. The police arrested 114 students. Then in February 1969, students at Sir George Williams University occupied their administration building; a subsequent riot led to the destruction of the university’s computer records and to the arrest of several students. Instead of simply reporting on such events, the Security Service increasingly analysed them. This analysis centred on the notion that radical agitators, including some communists, were behind the disturbances; it was believed that many of these were either foreigners, evidenced by the large number of American and British faculty at Canadian universities, or foreign-inspired.37 One solution, and a traditional RCMP one, was to use the immigration system to deport them or prevent their entrance in the first place.38 Another was to continue to monitor radicals, especially faculty members, at events such as the Learned. After all, no one really knew when something

34 Ibid., Learned Societies - Calgary, August 1968.
36 New universities such as York and Simon Fraser were suspicious to the RCMP specifically because they emphasised new teaching methods and course content. “The very academic or scholastic foundation of York is such that it is conducive to individuals in whom we are or may become interested. A notable amount of emphasis is placed on the humanities, social sciences and cultural histories, particularly in the formative and guiding stages of a student’s higher education. Much of the instruction is carried out in the Socratic manner, and in particular during the first year, students will gather in several tutorial meetings.” RG 146, Vol. 2756, File 93-A-00051, York University, Report of Cst. W.G. Elkeer, 29 May 1963.
37 At the same time that the RCMP Security Service was increasingly blaming foreigners for discontent on campuses, nationalists in English-speaking Canada were criticising universities for employing too many non-Canadians. The leading figure in this movement was Robin Mathews, on whom the RCMP had a file. For more information on Mathews’ campaign, see J.L. Granatstein, Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism (Toronto, 1996), 192-216.
important might arise. Thus a wide range of material turns up in RCMP files, much of it apparently innocuous.

In the aftermath of the 1969 Toronto conference, headquarters in Ottawa sent the equivalent of a shopping list to the “D” Ops branch of the Security Service in that city.\textsuperscript{39} Information on activities of several organisations at the Learned was requested.\textsuperscript{40} The Mounties had noticeably broadened the list of learned associations that interested them. A report was filed on the University League for Social Reform, noting that it was still active and that Frank Underhill belonged to it. In the same report, information was supplied on the Committee for Socialist Studies which was deemed “considerably more radical than [the] ULSR. . . . The membership of this group are [sic] dedicated to discussion of current Canadian problems with a view to cross-pollination of ideas among faculty members and civil servants. [deleted under the Access to Information Act] . . . It is not known what influence these people wield in government circles but it appears indicative that several have been hired to advise or carry out studies on behalf of the government.”\textsuperscript{41} The Committee for Socialist Studies would be a recurring target for RCMP attention at the Learneds. The traditional blinkers came out regarding this New Left organisation as attempts were made to discover communist involvement in it. “At this particular time,” reported a Mountie in 1974, “it is difficult to assess any direct involvement. However, it is known that the C.S.S. is dominated by members of the C.P. of C. [Communist Party of Canada] from the U. of T. . . . As noted in paragraph 74, a C.S.S. Annual Meeting is slated for May/74, in connection with

\textsuperscript{39} “D” Ops was the segment of the Security Service that dealt with counter-subversion.

\textsuperscript{40} The organisations were the Comparative & International Educational Society of Canada, the Canadian Political Science Association, the Canadian Historical Association, the Canadian Peace Research Association, the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, the Canadian Association of East Asian Studies, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Humanities Association of Canada, the Humanities Research Council, the Canadian Association of Slavists and the Social Science Research Council. NA, RG 146, Vol. 2911, File 97-A-00062, Pt. 1, Ottawa to Toronto, 11 August 1969. The interest in the Canadian Association of Slavists seems to have been more of an academic one. External Affairs had forwarded a letter to the RCMP explaining the nature of the organisation. The Mounted Police filed a report on the organisation in September 1969. It too reiterated the non-political nature of the organisation. In fact, a Mountie underlined and wrote “good” beside a passage that identified the Slavists as “academics not political activists.” NA, RG 146, Vol. 2910, File 97-A-00062, Pt.1. European Division, External Affairs, to Information Division, External Affairs, Subject Meetings of Learned Societies: Assessment of Department’s Interests, 3 July 1968; ibid., Canadian Association of Slavists - Canada, 19 September 1969. The CPSA had already been reported on in July by a Mountie student who gathered information on the organisation from his university library. NA, RG 146, Vol. 2911, File 97-A-00062, Pt. 1, Report from Ottawa, 23 July 1969.

the Learned Society’s conference, and we will be affording suitable coverage at that time.\textsuperscript{42} That “suitable coverage” included an outline of the nature of the organisation, its goals and tactics, and predictions for its future. Security Service analysts determined that the CSS’s definition of “socialism is Marxist with an emphasis on radical change through political discussion and lobbying rather than through the tactics of violent confrontation.”\textsuperscript{43}

The RCMP Security Service, however, continued to have difficulty in breaking free from their training for security intelligence work, which although limited, strongly emphasised the threat of communism. Required reading for a new Security Service member often consisted of R.N. Carew Hunt’s *The Theory and Practice of Communism* or the report of the Kelloch-Tascherau Commission that investigated the Gouzenko affair.\textsuperscript{44} Not surprisingly, Mounted Police came to see everything in familiar terms. One expectantly reported from Winnipeg, where the Learneds were to be held in 1970, that the “Communist Party of Canada (C.P. of C.) will no doubt take an interest in the conferences of various societies and prominent C.P. of C. members from the academic community will be visiting Winnipeg during the month concerned.”\textsuperscript{45}

Through the 1970s, coverage of the Learneds became rather scattered. No reports on the Learneds appear for 1973, 1975, or 1976, or at least no reports were released under the *Access to Information Act*. The sporadic reporting reflected a decline in university-related unrest and a greater concern about events in Quebec in the first part of the decade. The coverage, however, did not end. In fact, in 1977 it escalated dramatically. That year was an important one in the history of the Security Service. In the spring of 1977, the Service began development of the Operational Priority Review Committee (OPRC) in order to bring more structure to its investigations. The new approach required greater justification before an investigation could be started.\textsuperscript{46} Another event with important ramifications for the Security Service would begin in the fall of 1977. The *Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police*, or as it is more commonly known, the McDonald Commission, was about to begin. The 1970s had not been a good time for the Security Service. Scandals, mainly associated with operations in Quebec, had

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., The Committee on Socialist Studies (C.S.S.) - Canada (K-S Education), 1 February 1974.
\textsuperscript{44} Testimony of Supt. Patrick Banning, McDonald Commission, Vol. 28, 4649-52; letter from anonymous, former Security Service member, 29 March 1998.
\textsuperscript{45} NA, RG 146, Vol. 2911, File 97-A-00062, Pt. 1, Learned at the University of Manitoba, 7 May 1970.
\textsuperscript{46} Interview with Peter Marwitz, former Security Service member, 21 August 1997. The OPRC survived the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. It was renamed the Threat Assessment Review Committee.
received widespread and embarrassing publicity. The Parti Québécois government of Rene Levesque had appointed its own commission to investigate some of the allegations. The Keable Commission was blocked from access to much of the evidence it needed. Then in July 1977, the Trudeau government announced its own commission.

With structural changes looming and an official investigation into Security Service operations about to begin, it would hardly have been surprising to have witnessed a reduction in work connected with marginal targets such as the Learnedes. This did not happen. Instead the 1977 conference in Fredericton was the subject of the most detailed and most remarkable document contained in the Learnedes file. The name of the individual who wrote the lengthy report is not known, but he was an RCMP informant, operating out of "O" Division in Southern Ontario and with a knowledge of the field of history and the University of Toronto scene, probably from the perspective of a student. Based on this report, ideology appears to have been his motivation for assisting the Force. His attendance at the conference would have been as a member of one of the associations holding its annual meeting. Since he was an informant with no apparent connection to the RCMP, he probably used his real name.

What he produced was a complex work of analysis about the Fredericton meeting. Early on in the report, the source explained why such conferences were important to the Security Service:

"The Learnedes are a useful opportunity to observe what's going on in academia – who the promising young scholars are, why types of academic organizations are being formed, why types of research are being done. In particular, these conventions provide an excellent opportunity to chart and observe the continuing growth of a marxist academic tradition in Canada, to discover who is involved, to assess them, to learn how they are organizing, what their long term goals are and what traditional academics are doing about it."

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48 For a study of the Keable Commission, see Robert Dion, *Crimes of the Secret Police* (Montreal, 1982).
49 This speculation as to the identity of the author of the Fredericton report is based on what he had to say, a hand written comment from a senior Mountie that the report demonstrated the "importance of having good permanent sources in academe," praise for the author of this report on a 1977 document about University of Toronto, and, finally, an interview with a former Security Service member NA, RG 146, Vol. 2910, File 97-A-00062, Pt.1, hand written comment appearing on Spooner letter, dated 28 July 1977; Ibid., Vol. 2673, File 96-A-00045, University of Toronto, Pt. 2, Officer i/c "Key Sectors" to Officer i/c Security Intelligence II, 8 Aug. 1977; Interview with anonymous, former Security Service member, 20 February 1999.
This explained the RCMP's interest in the activities of these academics. But why Marxists? The report recognised that there was no link between the CPC and the New Left. The author noted that in several sessions people on the political left criticised the CPC. He also acknowledged that marxists, many of whom had been radical students in the 1960s, were now working within the system instead of fomenting protest and conflict. So what was the problem with the Marxists? The Mountie source had an explanation for this as well:

The marxists are very realistic. Over and over again, their leading spokesmen repeat that they are involved in a very long process, that the hoped-for revolution will not occur overnight, that it will be a long struggle. But they are equally clear on their goals: to create a tradition of marxist academic scholarship in Canada; to get government funding for marxist-oriented research; to convert their students to marxism; to destroy the academic credibility of the capitalist social and governmental system . . . their goals might be called long range ideological subversion. [In the margin beside this last sentence appears a hand-written comment: "This is why we have to be 'long term' in orient and accuracy."] Through use of the travel grants and the usually suitable overlapping schedules the marxists are having some initial success. They can attend several meetings each year, renew friendships, plan strategy. And in Fredericton, despite all the adverse factors, location, schedule, weather, etc., the marxists did very well. At a conference where most sessions attracted 20 people, and some a lot fewer, the avowedly marxist sessions often attracted almost 100 people each, a very good turnout and an indication that marxist analysis is popular. Moreover, organizers of these sessions usually had more requests to present papers than they had spots on the agenda . . . .

The activities of Marxists at Fredericton became the focus of the report, although Quebec nationalism also received some attention in its concluding section. The informant noted that several English-speaking participants had observed that the PQ government was applying pressure on Quebec Francophone scholars to quit predominantly English-speaking associations and either start their own or join already existing Francophone ones.

Nationalism, however, was no match for socialism in the eyes of the RCMP reporter. In commenting on the attendance at the business meetings of the Labour History Group and the Political Economy Network, he remarked that "in comparison with the traditional academic societies, these two groups are much friendlier, much less formal in operation, and have a semi-religious fervour in the manner in which most members see almost a moral duty to use their intelligence and teaching positions to spread the cause of marxism."

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
double line was drawn in the margin beside this sentence. The report went on to describe two of the “key marxist organizers,” whose names were deleted under Access. The author of the report also informed his superiors that marxist scholars intended to try to access secret RCMP Security Service records, much like the one he was writing, and the RCMP had been accumulating about the Learnedrs over the previous 17 years. “[T]hey will claim that it is vital to their research,” wrote the learned informant, “but their goal, as stated several times in the company of other marxists, is to prove that the RCMP is in their terms, ‘an agent of state repression’ and thus to try to discredit the RCMP.”54 A cryptic hand-written comment, “They’ve missed the boat,” was added to the margin.55 This may have been a reference to the McDonald Commission which would indeed do an effective job of discrediting the RCMP, especially the Security Service. It may also have been a reference to the fact that sensitive RCMP documents detailing “countering” operations, such as Operation Checkmate, designed to destroy perceived subversive organizations, had been destroyed on 10 June 1977. 56

Even more remarkable than this report was the internal debate that it triggered in the Security Service. The information sent from Fredericton clearly represented an escalation of coverage of the Learnedrs just as other Security Service operations were coming under increasing scrutiny by politicians, the courts, the media, and the general public. The initial response to the report was quite positive. Four days after it was filed, a copy was forwarded to Inspector C. Scowen who observed that, in fact, the Learnedrs were not a target of the Security Service. Of course, there had to be a “but” to this, and it appeared in the next two sentences. “It is, however, a most convenient vehicle through which to keep abreast of specific people and groups in whom we have a continuing interest and to assess the degree of acceptance and impact their beliefs are having. Such a gathering also provides fertile ground and advance warning of new alliances and issues which may prove to be of interest to us and which eventually may surface outside the academic community.”57 In other words,

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54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. The lengthy report on the Learnedrs is dated 4 July 1977. In June 1977, the Commissioner of the RCMP, Maurice J. Nadon, had recommended to the Trudeau government that a Royal Commission be appointed. On 6 July 1977, Solicitor General Francis Fox announced the creation of the Commission.
56 The files of the RCMP’s Special Operations Group were destroyed on the orders of Supt. Gus Begalki. He informed the McDonald Commission that the destroyed files contained ideas that could lead to “great misinterpretation.” Testimony of Supt. Gus Begalki, McDonald Commission, Vol. 300, 300,096. Thanks to Greg Kealey for pointing out this possible explanation to the handwritten reference.

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the Security Service was not interested in the conference, just in those who attended and what they had to say. Superintendent M.J. Spooner, the Area Commander of the Southwestern Ontario Security Service, proceeded to praise the report to the Deputy Director General (OPS): "... [it] is an excellent example of an annual assessment which virtually eliminates interim coverage."58

It was at this point that some dissension about the report began to appear. Spooner's superior disagreed that the document demonstrated the utility of annual reporting on the Learneds. He did, however, think that it demonstrated the "importance of having good permanent sources in academe..."59 The most sustained critique, however, appeared in May 1978. Inspector J.H. Brookmyre argued that the attendance of Marxists at the Learneds was something that had to be tolerated in a democratic society. Brookmyre went so far as to suggest that such detailed coverage was outside the mandate of the Security Service and that the threat posed by those attending the Learneds was weak: "There is nothing to indicate these academics (intelligentsia) intend to use or encourage the use of force, violence or criminal means – or create or exploit civil disobedience."60 Similar intelligence, added Brookmyre, could be obtained simply by a close reading of newspapers.61

Even more surprising than the 1977 report and the subsequent debate over it was that it did not mark the end of reports about the Learneds. In 1979, a brief mention of the Learneds was made in the context of a report related to the Communist Party of Canada.62 A report on the CPSA also appeared in that year. Reports continued into the 1980s. In 1981, a report entitled "Communist Party of Canada (CP of C) Policy and Activity Re: Domestic Affairs" appeared, suggesting a return to the pre-New Left Mountie framework. Subsequently, the entire report, except for the title, was deleted.63 The final two reports from 1982 and 1983 indicated that the Learneds were once again being targeted for at least observation by Canada’s security/intelligence service. Both reports

58 Ibid., C/Sup’t M.J. (Mike) Spooner, Areas Commander S.W.O.S.S., to D.D.G. (OPS), 13 July 1977. Interestingly, both Scowen and the individual he forwarded the report to, C/Sup’t M.J. (Mike) Spooner, had attended university as students while members of the Mounted Police. Scowen had attended Wilfrid Laurier University in the early 1970s while Spooner was at Queen's University in the early 1960s.


60 Ibid., Insp. J.H. Brookmyre to I/C "L." Ops. (Attn: [deleted under the Access to Information Act]), Learned Societies, 11 May 1978. Emphasis in the original. The mandate of the Security Service had been redesigned in 1975 by the Trudeau government in an effort to shift its emphasis to targets that posed a direct threat of violence.

61 Ibid.


63 Ibid., Learneds, 11 August 1981.
barely escaped complete deletion by CSIS, but what remains is revealing. The 1982 version concerned the agenda for that year's conference, while the final entry was from 1983 and consisted of a two-and-a-half page deleted report concerning the Learneds held at the University of British Columbia; it was written in the aftermath of the conference. The Learneds-RCMP relationship ended that year. In 1984, CSIS replaced the Security Service.

What does all this mean? Ultimately, it is a good example of how an institution can generate an increasingly large web because it lacks clear guidelines for its operations, because it lacks sophistication, and because it is driven by ideology to the point where reason is displaced. But there is something even deeper at work here. The period covered by these records is an important era in the history of the RCMP Security Service. The 1960s marked the beginning of an era of protest which largely erupted outside the RCMP's traditional world view. The initial reaction of the Security Service, not surprisingly, was to attempt to fit the radicalism, especially the New Left, into its traditional model; hence the drive to discover the role of the Communist Party in various protests and at the Learneds. The RCMP Security Service was not unique in this response. The FBI in the United States followed exactly the same pattern to the point where it in part led to a major disagreement between senior agent William Sullivan, who argued against communist links with the anti-war movement, and J. Edgar Hoover, who was unwilling to accept that the Communist Party that he had for so long laboured against was not the villain once again.

In Canada, however, the Security Service relationship with the Learneds has even more serious ramifications for the nature of security intelligence operations. In many ways the 1960 to 1983 period should have had a Whiggish ending to it. The Security Service in this period, largely in response to external criticism, became more sophisticated and its members became better educated as the years progressed. The various scandals of the 1970s forced a revaluation of priorities and the establishment of the Operational Priority Review Committee. The 1977 report on the Learneds demonstrated increasingly complex analysis as witnessed by the acknowledgement of the wide gap between the CPC and the New Left; then there was the internal debate within the Security Service about the validity of such detailed reports, with Inspector Brookmyre arguing for academic freedom. And yet, despite all of these things and the revelations of the McDonald Commission, RCMP reports about the Learneds continued. Brookmyre gave an eloquent defence of intellectual freedom and argued that Marxist academics posed no threat of violence. The rest of his words, however, are also instructive; he did not rule out keeping watch on

64 Ibid., Learneds, 31 March 1982; ibid., Learneds, 20 June 1983.
the Learned. He simply argued that it could be done more effectively and with less risk to the Security Service through monitoring "the popular capitalist press, the vanguard and socialist press, periodicals and publications."66 The Marxists may not have been the devil, but it was still better to know them.

If considered within the extent of Mountie Security Service operations, the coverage of the Learned should not be considered an important component in the history of either the Security Service or the RCMP. It serves, however, as a counterbalance to the dominant portrayals of the work of the operations of Canada's intelligence service. The general public associates such work with secret agents and foreign spies, and most of the popular literature written about the Security Service perpetuates such views.67 But the RCMP security/intelligence operations also had a strong "counter-subversion" component which was directed at domestic targets, including universities. That work has received considerably less attention than the RCMP's more glamorous counter-espionage and counter-terrorism activities. Such work is far less subject to controversy since it is far easier to explain and justify surveillance against spies and terrorists, who in a sense are outsiders, than against "ordinary" citizens.

What, then, does the RCMP Security Service activity at the Learned reveal about it as an institution and about the nature of security intelligence operations in Canada? The Mountie fixation on communism was certainly evident; it was this focus that brought the Learned to the attention of the RCMP Security Service in the first place. But the RCMP Security Service arrived at the Learned at a time when the Communist Party of Canada was becoming increasingly marginalised in the face of the rise of New Left activity and other protest movements that were more centred on race and gender.68 Mounties, operating under a broad framework to pursue subversion, responded by initially explaining everything within their traditional anti-communist mindset.

Anti-communist paranoia and a lack of sophistication are not new charges against the Security Service. What is more interesting, therefore, is that even after members of the RCMP recognised that their official justification for collecting information on the Learned, the threat of communism, was no longer valid, they still found a reason to stay. Now members of the New Left threatened Canadian security; not today, not tomorrow, but at some point in the distant future. A justification for watching the Learned until the end of time had been created, and it had been created by an institution whose members were

67 Examples of this genre include several popular works of journalist John Sawatsky. A more recent example has been provided by academic historians. See J.L. Granatstein and David Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost (Toronto, 1990).
68 For a good general history of this period, written from the perspective of a participant, see Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York, 1993 [1987]).
becoming increasingly sophisticated, analytical, and urbane through access to
the same institution that they in turn focussed on as a target for intelligence
gathering. In 1978, a Mountie finally asked “why?” Not in relation to why the
Learneds were being targeted, but why excessive tactics were being used to col-
lect information. No one seemed to have thought to ask before why the
resources were expended against a particular target.

The case of the RCMP Security Service attention toward the Learneds sug-
gests that greater sophistication in an institution does not necessarily lead to an
equal sophistication in the selection of targets. Instead, it seems to lead to
greater sophistication in the coverage afforded the targets. Once the focus
begins, it seems difficult to halt it. Justifications are always found for continu-
ing operations, and a bureaucratic imperative to survive helps rationalise cov-
erage. To admit that it was a waste of time could legitimately lead to a
questioning of the use of scarce resources.

Finally, the work of the RCMP Security Service with respect to the
Learneds, especially the operations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, has impli-
cations for the operations of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.69
CSIS has been hailed as more sophisticated than its RCMP ancestor; for exam-
ple, more university graduates with more varied backgrounds have been
employed. There is also more civilian control and greater internal justification
needed before operations can commence. Yet many of the same circumstances
existed within the RCMP in the late 1970s. There were more university-edu-
cated members, more pressure existed to avoid excesses, and an internal mech-
anism, the Operational Priority Review Committee, designed to force more
justification before a target could be pursued, was in place. Despite all these
factors, targeting the Learneds continued into the 1980s with the records, but
not necessarily the coverage, ceasing only with the end of the RCMP Security
Service. CSIS was supposed to be different; in some ways it has changed, but
in many others there have been echoes of the institution that came before.70

69 For a history of the early days of CSIS, see Richard Cleroux, Official Secrets: The Story
Behind the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Toronto, 1990).
70 Political scientist Reg Whitaker has raised some questions about the handling of the Grant
Bristow affair by the Security Intelligence Review Committee. Reg Whitaker, “The ‘Bristow
Affair’: A Crisis of Accountability in Canadian Security Intelligence,” Intelligence and
National Security 11 (April 1996): 279-305. He also criticises CSIS over its investigation of
whether the South African government was attempting to channel money into the Reform
Party’s election coffers; the investigation, which for a period of time was under the heading of
“Preston Manning,” was sparked by hearsay. Whitaker describes this as either a “mistake” or
perhaps the result of political interference of the Mulroney government. Ibid., 296. There is a
third explanation that Whitaker does not address — such “mistakes” are an inherent and
inevitable part of the operations of a domestic security intelligence organisation. There have
been two recent examples of questionable practices by CSIS. “CSIS eyes animal activists [Sees
potential for serious violence by animal rights extremists],” Montreal Gazette, 15 December
Collectively, the RCMP example suggests that regardless of the safeguards put in place, the existence of a domestic intelligence agency will inevitably lead to excesses, to infringements of civil liberties, to targeting unpopular ideas and organisations. Far from being an aberration, RCMP work at the Learneds may have future echoes.

1997, A1-A2: "CSIS sometimes given extra bugging powers," Globe and Mail, 1 October 1997, A5; "Anti-spy agents OK’d their own wiretaps: judge rejects CSIS bid for wide snoop- ing powers," Toronto Star, 1 October 1997: A6. This latter case involved CSIS seeking a "basket clause" that would have allowed a number of wiretaps to be included under one search warrant and thus negate the necessity of applying for warrants for each individually. The RCMP Security Service sought a similar power in the 1970s but similarly failed to attain it. Sallot, Nobody Said No, 154-55.