

# Regional Peacekeeping: An Alternative to United Nations Operations?

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# **Regional Peacekeeping: An Alternative to United Nations Operations?**

*by Carolyn M. Shaw*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The end of the Cold War has produced many changes in the international system. One significant change is the growing demand for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces to end hostilities around the globe. The nature and scope of these demands have strained the UN's ability to respond. In October 1993, the UN was managing 80,000 multinational troops in sixteen separate operations.<sup>1</sup> As the UN's tasks have increased in scope and number, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called for alternative peacekeeping operations to supplement UN sponsored missions. In his *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali proposed that regional organizations could play a larger role in resolving conflicts among and within their member states. This article will evaluate the advantages and limitations these two types of forces have in responding to similar conflicts. To evaluate whether regional peacekeeping forces are a viable, or perhaps superior, alternative to UN peacekeeping operations, I will compare the results of intervention in Liberia and Somalia by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and United Nations forces respectively.

## **Traditional versus "new" peacekeeping operations**

Before comparing regional operations to UN peacekeeping missions, it is important to distinguish between traditional UN peacekeeping missions and the "new" operations initiated after the Cold War. There are still several common elements between traditional and "new" operations, such as receiving permission from the host country before posting troops and conducting negotiations with the combatants to find a resolution to the conflict. Many other aspects, however, have been either expanded or significantly altered to correspond to current international conditions. A recent study by Mats Berdal describes the qualitatively different tasks of new operations. Traditional operations generally attempted to maintain law and order, to monitor ceasefire agreements, and to form a buffer zone between the combatants. New missions have taken on the additional tasks of humanitarian assistance, mine clearing, preventive deployment, force demobilization and collection of weapons, and electoral monitoring.<sup>2</sup>

Not only have the tasks required by new operations been expanded, but they are also occurring in new environments. Whereas traditional missions were driven by political and military priorities and were initiated when international security was threatened, many new operations are driven ostensibly by humanitarian concerns. Furthermore, where respect for state sovereignty once prevented the UN from intervening in civil wars, a growing international demand to alleviate human suffering has negated that limitation.<sup>3</sup> These changes place peacekeepers in entirely new situations (i.e., often civil wars) which, in turn, significantly affect their structural guidelines.

Traditional missions operated under the following guidelines: first, peacekeepers were armed only with light armaments; second, peacekeepers entered a combat zone only after a ceasefire had been established and had proved stable; third, peacekeeping troops avoided involvement in civil wars; and finally, the forces made every effort to maintain neutrality in the conflict by avoiding condemnation of either side and by avoiding military exchanges at all costs.<sup>4</sup> These guidelines have changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping troops now enter regions where no ceasefire exists and are compelled to arm themselves and use military strength to enforce peace. Berdal notes that the fundamental distinctions between 'enforcement' and 'peacekeeping' have recently become blurred. He warns that distinctions need to be maintained because peacekeeping relies on the consent of the disputants and on impartiality, which are difficult to achieve in enforcement situations.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, the use of force by peacekeepers can have unpredictable consequences, both military and diplomatic. Force may stop the fighting or may exacerbate it. Increased violence can hinder negotiation efforts, or can render the combatants more amenable to a negotiated settlement. An enforced ceasefire can compel the combatants to negotiate, but cannot guarantee

their cooperation. The peacekeeping forces in Liberia and Somalia are "new" intervention operations and have faced many of the difficulties identified above.

### **Comparison and evaluation**

The cases of Liberia and Somalia have been selected for two reasons. Not only is the nature of the two conflicts quite similar, but the actions of the regional and UN intervention forces in these cases are also comparable. The countries have been through similar phases of breakdown, violence, escalation and intervention. It should be noted, however, that the situation in Somalia is more extreme than in Liberia in several respects. There has been a total absence of government in Somalia since 1991, but Liberia has managed to establish an interim government to work and negotiate with the peacekeepers. The apparent level of catastrophe as well as the international response has been much lower in Liberia as well.<sup>6</sup> The nature of the conflicts in Liberia and Somalia and the "new" type of mission are key factors in the comparison of these operations. The character of the conflict shapes the structure of the peacekeeping force, which in turn influences the dynamics of the conflict.

Previous studies that have evaluated UN peacekeeping operations have frequently focused only on the military aspects of the mission and have neglected studying the mediation efforts to resolve the conflict.<sup>7</sup> It is important to distinguish between these different aspects of peacekeeping operations when evaluating their successes and failures. Sometimes, the military might be quite successful at keeping the combatants apart, while the mediators will fail to produce a settlement. Such a situation is often classified as a peacekeeping failure, when in fact a substantial goal of the mission — preventing further hostilities — was successful. Conversely, it is possible that the factions might eventually reach a negotiated agreement, although their forces remain engaged throughout the negotiations.

Keeping the distinction between mediation and military efforts in mind, this study defines three different approaches by which peacekeeping operations can be evaluated. First, the final outcome of the conflict can be examined. The question to be answered by this approach is: has the operation succeeded in ending the fighting or resolving the conflict? The assumption is that these are the "ultimate" goals of the intervention force, whether explicit or not. By evaluating only the final outcome, however, one does not have a temporal context in which to place the operation. If the outcome was a renewal of conflict and the removal of peacekeeping forces, then the operation could be judged a failure, even if it had been successful in preventing hostilities for some time before the conflict resumed. In the case of Liberia, which remains engaged in conflict and negotiations, this approach is not applicable. The recent withdrawal of peacekeeping forces from Somalia suggests a failed mission based on this approach, but does not explain this outcome.

A second approach is to examine the specific mandates of the operation and ask: has the mission achieved its specified goals? By making an evaluation based on mandates, one must recognize that frequently mandates become overly ambitious and the force is incapable of accomplishing the goals demanded of it. Thus, few missions that are evaluated only on their achievement of their mandates are considered successful.

A third approach to evaluating peacekeeping operations is to examine the actual accomplishments of the mission regardless of its specified goals. This approach asks the question: what military and diplomatic failures and successes has the mission had? If intervention forces stop the fighting in one region, but not in another, they have not fulfilled their mandate of stopping all of the fighting in the entire country, but have achieved some measure of success that should be taken into account. The second and third approaches will be used to evaluate the intervention forces in Liberia and Somalia after examining the specific context of each case.<sup>8</sup>

This study will first compare the nature of the conflicts in Liberia and Somalia, focusing on their historical roots, the uprisings against the ruling dictators, and the resultant struggle for power between the many factions in each country. By examining the origins of the conflicts, one gains a better understanding of the situation in which the peacekeeping forces are operating and the disputes that the negotiators must seek to resolve. An examination of the stages of these struggles illustrates the scope, complexity and intensity of the conflicts. Each of these factors shapes the peacekeeping forces and affects the peacekeepers' ability to resolve the conflicts.

The structure and actions of the peacekeeping forces will be examined next, focusing on the decision to

intervene. the mission mandates, and the pursuit of negotiated settlements. The impact of the structure and character of the peacekeeping forces on the conflicts will become evident in an examination of the breakdown in negotiations and the escalation of conflict. Rather than revealing the successes of these operations, however, the eventual renewal of negotiations reemphasizes the difficulties that "new" peacekeeping operations face when intervening in civil wars.

## **CASE STUDIES**

### **Historical Roots of Conflict**

State-society relations in Africa have been characterized as an ultimate struggle for political power.<sup>9</sup> The contest for state power has taken various forms, including violence and the manipulation of primordial loyalties. Those that hold political power struggle to maintain their control and to use their power for their personal benefit and/or to benefit their clients or ethnic groups. Social elements that are being deprived of political participation seek to gain some measure of political power from the state. This perpetual struggle takes many forms, including civil war. This characterization of state-society corresponds to the historical as well as to the recent experiences of Liberia and Somalia.

In Liberia in April 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe overthrew President William Tolbert and promised to end government corruption and redistribute wealth. Doe was a member of the Krahn tribe and his seizure of power marked the first time in history that Americo-Liberians had lost their privileged position in the state. It soon became evident, however, that the Doe regime was even more repressive than Tolbert and the Liberian people continued to suffer. After coming to power, Doe suspended the constitution, declared martial law, banned all political activity, dissolved the legislative and executive branches of the government, and usurped the judiciary. The economy deteriorated and many human needs were not met by the state social services.

Somalia suffered similarly under Siad Barre who took power in a bloodless coup in 1969. He implemented policies to enhance his own power and the power of his family clan at the expense of other clans. Although he provided favors for his own clan, Barre attempted to undermine the clan structure of the country. He disrupted the traditional clan functions of the elders by creating public administrative offices to perform negotiating functions between rival clans. Because of these tactics, Barre, a member of Marehan clan, faced opposition from the other clans in Somalia, including the Hawiye who formed the United Somali Congress (USC), the Ogadeni who founded the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the Issaq who established the Somali National Movement (SNM). Although these clans hated each other as much as Barre, they could unite briefly to plan his overthrow and the restoration of clan power.<sup>10</sup>

### **The overthrow of the dictators and the factional struggle for power**

As Doe continued to repress the Liberian people and perpetuated social inequalities, resentment grew within the population. Doe's regime was first threatened in November 1985, by an attempted coup led by General Thomas Quiwonkpa. Doe responded violently to the attempt by capturing and executing Quiwonkpa and killing hundreds of Gio and Mano tribesmen in the Nimba County region. He targeted these tribes because Quiwonkpa was a Gio. This violent response, targeting a specific ethnic group for revenge, initiated the division of the population by ethnic origins. Whereas the people had once been universally repressed by the Americo-Liberians, Doe redivided the population and reallocated the wealth of the state along ethnic lines. The military was largely composed of Krahn officers and the Krahn tribe received benefits from the state. This redistribution of the wealth toward only certain ethnic groups caused further resentment and unrest among the Gio, Mano and Mandingo tribes.

Charles Taylor, the rebel leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), manipulated this discontent and aroused support for his rebellion against Doe on 24 December 1989. Membership in the NPFL swelled in just a few months from 150 to several thousand troops, largely composed of Gio and Mano tribesmen intent on attacking the Krahn." The military under Doe responded to the rebellion by killing Gio and Mano civilians.

Battles raged between the Liberian army and the NPFL for six months before a peace conference was held in Freetown, Sierra Leone in June 1990. No agreements were reached, and Taylor demanded that Doe

resign while Doe insisted that he would remain in office until the scheduled elections in October 1991. Taylor refused to attend a second round of talks because he believed that his rebels could dislodge Doe from power through military means.<sup>12</sup> Throughout the summer of 1990, the NPFL and a breakaway faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) under Prince Yourmie Johnson, fought Doe's army for control of the capital city of Monrovia, but were unable to seize it. Doe nominally remained president, but had lost control of the country as well as his political power base. As all services stopped and the battles degenerated into the slaughter of civilians, neighboring states became alarmed by the conflict and began to discuss what actions to take to stem the violence.

The overthrow of Siad Barre in Somalia similarly degenerated into a chaotic situation in which no faction had control of the state, nor the power to regain control. Opposition to the Barre regime formed in April 1978, when Ethiopia militarily defeated Barre in a battle for the Ogaden region. The Majertten military officers attempted a coup, but failed. Further opposition to Barre formed in 1988, when he formally renounced Somalia's claim to the Ogaden region. The Issaq clan in the Ogaden opposed this decision and formed the SNM to challenge Barre. The SNM joined the USC and the SPM in August 1990 to overthrow Barre.

In January 1991, Barre fled Mogadishu as the united USC troops entered the city. Unlike the NPFU in Liberia, the USC seized the capital, but was similarly unable to establish a new government or bring the fighting in the country under control. Once Barre fled Mogadishu, the fight for political power became a battle between USC factions for control of the presidency. When Ali Mahdi, leader of the Abgal subclan, declared himself president, Farah Aidid, leader of the Habar Gidir subclan immediately refuted his claim. Fighting became particularly fierce in November 1991, and continued into February 1992, with an estimated 14,000 people killed during that four month period.<sup>13</sup>

Despite Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's declaration after he came to office that Somalia was a main priority for the UN, the UN met with little success in mediating disputes between Aidid and Ali Mahdi.<sup>4</sup> The two clan leaders signed an agreement in New York in February 1992, to observe a ceasefire starting at the end of February, but both sides reneged on the agreement. In April 1992, battles between USC forces and Barre's army forced Barre to flee into Kenya. As the fighting continued to rage and the humanitarian plight of the population grew more severe, the UN and the United States began to discuss the structure of a peacekeeping force that could restore order to the country and protect relief workers trying to feed the starving population.

Comparison of these periods in Liberia and Somalia indicates that the conflicts in the two states stemmed from similar roots and took correspondingly violent paths. The existence of past grievances and resentment as well as the high level of violence suggested that the peacekeeping troops would have a volatile, complex situation to try to resolve. Not only did these conflicts shape the structure of the peacekeeping forces, they also made the success of the operations uncertain. More importantly, they revealed that the peacekeeping forces would need to focus on the structural roots of the conflicts concerning social and political inequalities rather than on the conflict per se.

### **The intervention of peacekeeping forces**

As the situations in both Liberia and Somalia deteriorated to such a degree that the people were suffering severely and floods of refugees were fleeing the countries, international organizations decided to take action to alleviate some suffering and stabilize the countries. These intervention forces will be compared by examining first, the events that precipitated the intervention; second, the composition of the force and the interests — implicit and explicit — of member states in the conflict; third, the original mandate for the troops that established their operating guidelines and goals — both military and diplomatic; next, the modifications of the mandate over time in response to the dynamics of the conflict; and finally, the level of acceptance of the intervention force by the combatants. All these aspects had an impact on the overall success or failure of the operations.

The fierce battle to take the capital in Liberia induced ECOWAS to form an intervention force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in September 1990. Since ECOWAS is an economic organization prohibited by protocol from interfering in the domestic affairs of member states, the members refused to take military action until the violence reached such a level that it

threatened regional stability. The anarchy and abuses in Liberia had caused a massive flow of refugees to flee across the borders to neighboring states. Member states were also concerned about the safety of their citizens living in Liberia. Furthermore, some troops in the NPFL were members of dissident groups in neighboring states and these states feared that a 'domino effect' would threaten their own regimes.<sup>15</sup>

The original ECOMOG force included 12,000 troops from Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Togo, with Nigeria being the largest contributor with 5,000 troops.<sup>16</sup> Some states participating in ECOMOG had additional motivations to the ones listed above. Nigeria was not only concerned about regional stability and alleviating civilian suffering, it also sought to project its power abroad to maintain its regional hegemony.<sup>17</sup> Nigerian leaders directly opposed Charles Taylor and the latter, in turn, denounced Nigerian participation in the ECOMOG force. Sierra Leone supported the ECOWAS force because a rebel group backed by Charles Taylor was undermining its government. Thus, Sierra Leone also opposed Charles Taylor's faction in the conflict. Other ECOWAS states, such as the Ivory Coast, supported Taylor's position, causing disagreements within the organization concerning the operation. The president of the Ivory Coast played a significant role in the ECOMOG negotiations, but viewed Nigeria as a rival rather than a partner in the peacekeeping process. Other ECOWAS states, such as Libya and Burkina Faso, also influenced the conflict, although they did not have troops participating in ECOMOG. They supported Taylor in hopes of challenging Nigeria's regional superiority and undermining US influence in West Africa.<sup>18</sup>

These divergent interests among ECOWAS members created difficulties in defining a mandate for the ECOMOG forces, and particularly in determining a military strategy. The original mandate specified that the troops were to restore order and allow Liberians to choose a new government in free and fair elections. The troops were not to use their weapons except in self-defense. These goals and tactics changed when Taylor condemned the intervention force and shelled its positions in Monrovia in September 1990. ECOMOG forces responded by shelling NPFL positions. Not all of the fighting factions opposed the peacekeeping forces, however. The INPFL led by Prince Johnson welcomed the intervention forces and fought against Taylor's troops to help ECOMOG establish a position in Monrovia.

The violence of the conflict and the level of human suffering were also key elements behind the UN decision to intervene in Somalia. Thousands of Somalis were facing starvation while rival clans ambushed food aid shipments and prevented the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the people. The UN concluded that intervention forces would be necessary to secure humanitarian aid delivery when the February negotiation session in New York failed to secure a ceasefire between the factions, and clan violence blocked further efforts to import aid.<sup>19</sup>

The first peacekeeping force sent to Somalia — known as UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) — was composed of 500 Pakistani troops who were to protect aid convoys. They arrived in Mogadishu in August 1992, but were immediately fired upon by rival clan leaders in the city and were forced to retreat to the airport. Their mandate restricted them from taking any action except in self-defense, so they remained impotent until the Security Council established UNITAF (Unified Task Force), led by **the** United States.

The first UNITAF forces, US Marines, arrived in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. The Security Council sanctioned UNITAF to take actions in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This empowered the troops to use all necessary means, including military force, to carry out their mission. Their mandate was to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief. President George Bush sent troops to prevent mass starvation after claiming that war lords and bandits were looting 80 percent of relief shipments.<sup>20</sup> The Secretary-General, however, sought to broaden the mandate and use US troops to disarm the factions and to help in the process of nation building. The Bush administration was resistant to this expansion of duties and kept the scope of the mission circumscribed. When the UN took over UNOSOM II in May 1993, its mandate included many of the goals that Boutros-Ghali had previously sought to use US forces to accomplish.

Just as some factions in Liberia had welcomed foreign intervention in the conflict while others had opposed the peacekeepers. Somali clans were also divided in their support of UN peacekeeping troops. Ali Mahdi had called for international intervention in March 1992, but Aidid rejected the Security Council proposal for a small force. Boutros-Ghali respected Aidid's refusal to accept troops and did not send in the

Pakistani force until Aidid gave his consent.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, Aidid reversed his position shortly after the forces arrived and fired on the Pakistani peacekeepers, perhaps believing he had more to gain by military force than negotiations.

### Negotiations

As the peacekeeping forces attempted to halt the fighting in Liberia and Somalia and secure the capital cities, diplomats also labored to end the conflict by negotiating a ceasefire agreement. Negotiation of a ceasefire is one of the first steps taken by peacekeepers to reestablish order. Once a ceasefire has been established and has proven stable, negotiations concerning disarmament can proceed. If the combatants can reach a mutually acceptable agreement concerning these issues, the negotiations can then focus on a more permanent national reconciliation, the formation of a transitional government, and the election of a new government. Simply ending the fighting by negotiating a ceasefire is often a difficult task in itself. Once peacekeepers end the immediate fighting and bring the combatants to the negotiation table, the parties must deal with the underlying causes of the conflict that are often even more difficult to resolve. The negotiation process can be even more complex when the mediators are not accepted as legitimate negotiators because they do not act impartially or are not perceived as acting in a neutral manner in the conflict. In the cases of Liberia and Somalia, there have been many broken ceasefire agreements, as well as disputes between the factions and the mediators over the mediator's impartiality. The prospect of reaching agreements to resolve the political and economic inequalities that underlie the conflicts in Liberia and Somalia is remote as long as the combatants distrust the mediators and ceasefire agreements cannot be reached.

Negotiations also have a direct impact on military operations. A ceasefire is important not only for progress in reconciliation, but also for limiting military operations. It provides a suspension of hostilities during which tension can ease between the factions. Although a ceasefire is frequently used as a time for rearming, it establishes a situation in which the military strength of factions and control of territory are not in flux and thus cannot affect negotiations as easily. A ceasefire also provides a safer environment in which the peacekeeping forces can operate. Unfortunately, the UN troops in Somalia and the ECOMOG forces in Liberia have been forced to operate without such security and have been hindered in carrying out their original mandates by continuous violations of negotiated ceasefire agreements.

Shortly after the ECOMOG force entered Liberia in September 1990, diplomats from ECOWAS began negotiating with the factions. In November 1990, the NPFL, the INPFL and the remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) who had supported Doe before his execution, signed the Bamako Accord, a ceasefire agreement. It became clear, however, when Taylor set up his own government and capital in Gbargna and the fighting continued sporadically, that the factions were not ready to come to any further agreements. In December, at the Banjul Meeting, Taylor called for an All-Liberian Conference to elect an interim government, but reneged on the accord after the other factions had agreed to it. Taylor impeded the negotiation process again in February 1991. After the NPFL, INPFL and AFL signed the Lome Agreement, a ceasefire. Taylor rejected it.

Despite Taylor's continued refusal to cooperate, an All-Liberian Conference was held from 16 March - 2 April 1991. Delegates from ECOWAS, multiple Liberian political parties, and the AFL and INPFL factions elected an interim government and installed Amos Sawyer, a professor of political science, as president. Negotiations between Taylor and Sawyer proceeded through the summer until the Yamoussoukro IV peace agreement was signed in October 1991. This comprehensive agreement called for all factions to encamp and disarm by 15 January 1992 and scheduled elections for April 1992. Taylor also managed to acquire a concession from ECOWAS. The Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG that he violently opposed would be downsized in the near future.<sup>22</sup>

In January 1993, shortly after the US Marines arrived in Mogadishu as a part of UNITAF, fourteen Somali clans met in Addis Ababa and reached an agreement on a ceasefire and disarmament plan. Whereas the peacekeepers in Liberia had encountered difficulties when negotiating with Taylor, Farah Aidid was the most troublesome clan leader in the Somali negotiations. During the January meeting, the participants discussed arrangements for a national peace conference to be held in March, but Aidid refused to accept the negotiated composition of delegates. Although Aidid opposed the composition of the conference, the National Reconciliation Conference convened in Addis Ababa on 27 March 1993. This conference resembled the All-

Liberian Conference in that it established provisions for a Transitional National Council (TNC) to govern for two years. The clans also agreed to disarm within 90 days. Whereas the Liberian regional negotiators were concerned about addressing the underlying problems of the conflict to return Liberia to stability, the negotiators in Somalia were primarily interested in negotiating a ceasefire to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Few efforts were made to address the underlying disputes over political power.<sup>23</sup> Even efforts to negotiate the creation of a transitional government were not well coordinated. Important political actors in Somali society, including clan elders and women, were excluded from the negotiation process.

Although the UN and ECOWAS mediated negotiations between the combatants and secured initial agreements, the process of conflict resolution did not proceed directly from ceasefire agreements to a transitional government to elections. Ceasefire agreements were made and broken; arrangements for elections and transitional governments were discussed, disputed, and rejected. The negotiations never reached a point where the underlying causes of conflict could be seriously addressed. In both Liberia and Somalia, the fighting between factions after the overthrow of the dictator quickly became a full-scale struggle for political power and the national control that accompanied that authority. The factions paused to negotiate but also to rearm, and then launched new attacks, trapping the peacekeepers in an all-out war.

The peacekeeping troops had very limited options available to them once they intervened in the two conflicts. Since the combatants were unwilling to comply with ceasefire arrangements, the peacekeepers had to use military force to accomplish their mandate to stop the violence. The presence of the peacekeeping troops unfortunately did not succeed in alleviating the violence, but instead exacerbated the tension in each country. The dynamics of the conflict also hindered the negotiators. The level of violence as well as the political stakes were high, making negotiations difficult because the combatants were reluctant to compromise. Those faction leaders that were unwilling to negotiate used the military actions of the peacekeepers as an excuse to end the negotiating sessions and renew the violence.

### **The breakdown of negotiations/escalation of conflict**

In Liberia the first breach of the Yamoussoukro IV agreement of October 1991, occurred in March 1992, when United Liberation Movement (Ulimo) rebels attacked Taylor's forces near the Sierra Leone border. The Ulimo rebels were largely ex-AFL Krahn tribesmen who opposed Taylor. Taylor accused ECOMOG forces of complicity with Ulimo and attacked the ECOMOG peacekeepers. In June, six Senegalese soldiers were killed by the NPFL and Senegal decided to withdraw all of its troops from the operation. This withdrawal illustrated the vulnerability of the peacekeeping forces and did nothing to strengthen their authority over the Liberian factions. By August, the ceasefire of the Yamoussoukro agreement had completely unraveled, and fighting between Ulimo and the NPFL increased significantly. In October 1992, Taylor launched Operation OCTOPUS. This operation involved a direct attack against the ECOMOG forces surrounding and protecting Monrovia. After this attack ECOMOG was forced to abandon its professed neutrality and Nigerian jets bombed the NPFL heavily.<sup>24</sup> ECOMOG's impartiality in the conflict was further compromised when it was forced to cooperate with AFL and Ulimo forces to repel Taylor's attack. Throughout October and November, the battle against the NPFL waged by the united AFL, Ulimo and ECOMOG forces continued. By December, Taylor controlled most of the countryside, but ECOMOG had reestablished a defensive perimeter around Monrovia. Once Monrovia had been secured, ECOMOG, with the cooperation of the AFL and Ulimo, went on the offensive against Taylor.

In June 1992, ECOMOG forces found 300 bodies of civilians mutilated by the NPFL. Ulimo and the AFL were also committing human rights violations that brought sharp criticism against ECOMOG for allowing these abuses to go unpunished. It is doubtful, however, that ECOMOG had any restraining ability over these forces, since it had been unable to confront the NPFL without their assistance.<sup>25</sup> By July 1993, the Interim government had come to believe that the only option available to the peacekeeping troops was strong military force not further negotiations. Sawyer believed that Taylor had broken too many agreements and could no longer be trusted in any negotiations for national reconciliation.<sup>26</sup> As ECOMOG struggled against the guerrilla attacks of the NPFL and managed to make little progress in negotiations, many members of ECOWAS began calling for the UN to take a more active role in mediation of the conflict.

The situation in Somalia similarly degenerated into violence after the National Reconciliation Conference in March 1993. The conference had addressed the issues of forming a transitional government, but had not



satisfactorily resolved the struggle for political power among the clan leaders. Not only were the disputes between clans still unresolved, the attitude of Somalis toward the UN peacekeeping troops was growing increasingly hostile as the troops were perceived as outsiders to the conflict and thus became the target of clan attacks. It has been noted that, although the clans opposed each other, historically they united when outside forces threatened the country.<sup>27</sup> On 5 June 1993, twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers were killed by members of Aidid's clan. Pakistani troops violently confronted Somali protesters and killed several of them. After this confrontation UN legitimacy and neutrality were severely compromised. The UN troops launched an aerial attack against Aidid's command center on 12 June and bombed his residence on 17 June. The UN's first priority became the arrest and trying of Aidid for war crimes. Securing roads and distribution sites for humanitarian aid became a secondary priority and many relief organizations indicated that security decreased significantly as the UN forces engaged Aidid's guerrillas.

The hunt not only isolated the UN forces from the Somali people, but also caused a division among countries participating in the operation. Italy, in particular, was critical of US efforts to turn the mission into a military campaign, complaining that such tactics limited the chances of negotiating a settlement with the clan leaders. The Italians' concerns were quite legitimate. The UN's credibility as an impartial mediator in the negotiation process had suffered severely after the shift in the mission to capture Aidid. As a new round of talks began on 30 November 1993, many regional organizations became mediators in the negotiations, taking over where the UN had failed to achieve a final settlement.

The battles that broke out between the peacekeepers and the combatants were quite detrimental to the overall success of the peacekeeping missions and were largely unavoidable. The high level of violence and the absence of a ceasefire placed the peacekeepers in a difficult position from the beginning. The intractable nature of the conflict and uncooperative faction leaders made the negotiations just as difficult. Once the negotiators had lost their status as impartial mediators, they were unable to gain further military or diplomatic cooperation from the combatants. New mediators had to be introduced before any further progress could be made in resolving the conflicts.

### **New negotiations**

After a period of escalation that drew the peacekeeping forces into active military engagements with the combatants, negotiation efforts were resumed in both Liberia and Somalia. As the peacekeeping forces lost their legitimacy as mediators, other organizations entered the negotiation process.

In Liberia the UN took over the negotiation process and helped to shape the Geneva II agreement of July 1993. The agreement on a ceasefire and disarmament strongly resembled the Yamoussoukro agreement and elections were scheduled to be held after seven months of transitional governmental rule. Although some aspects of this agreement were similar to previous arrangements rejected by Taylor, there were several points on which this accord differed from previous agreements. The presence of the UN relieved Taylor who had been highly critical of the neutrality of ECOWAS and its interests in the outcome of the conflict.<sup>28</sup> The UN mediators did not actively participate in the negotiations, but allowed the NPFL, ULIMO, AFL and the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) to conduct discussions face to face in earnest. These changes in negotiation tactics were perhaps the deciding factors that allowed all parties to abide by this agreement rather than violating it.<sup>29</sup>

The negotiated ceasefire took effect on 1 August 1993, and held throughout the fall. In September, the factions engaged in further negotiations, but could not resolve the political issues involved in forming a national government. As a result of negotiations in November 1993, an interim Governing Council was finally sworn in in March 1994, but was immediately crippled by the NPFL representative's refusal to take his seat. Accusations by various factions of ECOMOG's lack of neutrality continued throughout the summer of 1994. In the fall, however, the UN, in cooperation with the new chair of ECOWAS, Jerry Rawlings, made further progress in negotiations. The Akosombo Accord was signed in September 1994. Despite deteriorating security conditions and the reduction of UN Observation Forces, the Accra Accord was signed in December with a ceasefire going into effect on 28 December 1994. Continued factional disputes over the nature of the new Council of State continued into the spring, however. At the Abuja Summit in May 1995, a communique called for a delay in the establishment of a council until all parties have agreed to a permanent ceasefire and full disarmament occurs.

Despite this endless cycle of only partially productive negotiations and continued violence, there have been some encouraging signs of progress. The public does not share the persistent mistrust of ECOMOG that the factions do.<sup>30</sup> As civilians become more involved in the peace talks, ECOMOG's reputation is improving. Ironically, ECOMOG's recent military action securing a Monrovia highway from Ulimo control has improved its image in the eyes of other factions who have argued that ECOMOG favors Ulimo. As the dynamics of these complex relations between the factions, the ECOMOG forces, and the UN continue to shift, with ECOMOG regaining the vital element of impartiality, it is difficult to see when peace might finally come to Liberia.

In Somalia, after the UN had lost credibility, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League mediated peace talks in Addis Ababa in November 1993. Unfortunately, despite the presence of regional mediators not affiliated with the UN, these peace talks collapsed in mid-December when the clan leaders refused to compromise on issues of political reconciliation. Faced with such intransigence in negotiations and hostility on the ground, the US withdrew all of its troops from Somalia in March 1994. Throughout the spring of 1994, the UN made only slight progress in negotiations as clan factions continued to dispute the shape of a national government and wage attacks on each other. The fighting weakened some leaders, including Aidid, causing problems of legitimacy in determining who had the right to attend negotiations. Despite a policy of "nonconfrontation," the UN military forces were perpetual targets of attack. They were never able to regain their neutral status that might protect the military forces and facilitate negotiations. By 4 November 1994, the Security Council resolved to withdraw the forces and conclude the operation with the last of the troops leaving in March 1995. With the end of the UN operation the power struggle continues. In June Aidid once again claimed the Somali presidency, only to have his rivals as well as UN and OAU officials repudiate him. Under the current conditions, any national reconciliation in Somalia remains a distant hope.

## **EVALUATION OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Comparison of the conflicts in Liberia and Somalia has illustrated the fundamental roles that the nature of the conflict and the structure of the peacekeeping force play in shaping the success of peacekeeping operations. After examining the similarities between these two operations, an evaluation of the way they were performed can be made to determine if either operation was more successful than the other, and to ascertain whether success is based on their regional and international differences. Two of the three evaluative approaches discussed above will be combined to evaluate these operations. By examining both the mandates and the actual accomplishments of the operations in Liberia and Somalia, one can gain a better understanding of the effectiveness of each operation based on its military achievements and diplomatic performance.

### **Liberia: the operational mandate of ECOMOG**

The ECOMOG forces in Liberia had four different declared goals to achieve according to the ECOWAS mandates. The peacekeeping forces were to restore law and order; negotiate a ceasefire agreement; establish an interim government; and finally, make provisions for the free and fair election of a new government.<sup>31</sup> These goals have not changed throughout the course of the conflict, but the strategies which the forces have used to implement them have altered in response to their reception by the Liberian factions.

### **Liberia: military achievements**

The military forces did not have a decisive strategy for restoring law and order when they entered the country. The only clear tactical restriction was that they were to use military force only in self-defense. Since the NPFL opposed the presence of ECOMOG in Liberia and promised to resist any foreign intervention, Taylor's troops immediately challenged the ECOMOG forces. When the NPFL shelled ECOMOG positions in September 1990, ECOMOG's military directive was substantially expanded and they responded by shelling Taylor's forces. Evidently more aggressive tactics were needed to force the factions to stop fighting. A second tactic adopted by ECOMOG forces to help restore order to the country was to attempt to disarm the factions and force them to encamp in order to enforce ceasefire agreements.

The fact that the ECOMOG forces have largely been confined to operating in and around Monrovia while Taylor and other factions have controlled the countryside illustrates the failure of ECOMOG forces to achieve any semblance of law and order in Liberia. ECOMOG has been unsuccessful in restoring order by military force for several reasons. The primary reason is that the troops have been forced to directly engage in military action against Taylor. In addition to having to fight against Taylor, the ECOMOG forces have had limited material capabilities. Participating states have been hard pressed to adequately supply their troops against Taylor's armaments.<sup>32</sup> Although Nigerian troops have had substantial previous 'professional' peacekeeping experience with the UN, the ECOMOG forces have occasionally engaged in looting and harassment of civilians, which has discredited their authority and also undermined their ability to restore order in the country. Fortunately, this situation has changed recently as civilians increasingly appreciate the efforts of the ECOMOG forces.

Despite ECOMOG's inability to end the chaos in Liberia by either policing methods or by military force, there have been some limited successes. After the fierce struggle in 1992, between the NPFL and ECOMOG, Monrovia remained relatively peaceful and some aid reached the inhabitants. Disarmament of the factions has occurred periodically, particularly after the Yamoussoukro agreement in October 1991. ECOMOG gained the cooperation of several faction leaders, including General Hezekiah Bowen of the AFL in April 1992, and Prince Johnson of the INPFL in October 1992, after his defeat by the NPFL and subsequent surrender to ECOMOG forces. Nominal cooperation with these two factions and with Ulimo has relieved some of the strain on the ECOMOG forces and helped them to go on the offensive against Taylor. It must be kept in mind, however, that ECOMOG has exercised very little control over the rebel troops that have continued to commit human rights violations with impunity. It appears that these leaders have agreed to cooperate with ECOMOG not because they accepted ECOMOG's authority in the conflict, but to achieve the defeat of Taylor as a rival for political power.

### **Liberia: diplomatic accomplishments**

The diplomats have been actively engaged in negotiations since ECOMOG entered Liberia, seeking to achieve a stable ceasefire agreement, to establish an interim government, and to prepare for free and fair elections. The multiple agreements reached throughout the course of the conflict have repeatedly addressed these issues. These agreements, however, have consistently broken down and fighting has resumed. There are two significant factors that have rendered the negotiations unsuccessful: the factions have been reluctant to negotiate seriously with each other, and they have rejected the legitimacy of the mediators. The faction leaders, particularly Taylor, have used this second issue as an excuse to fight rather than to negotiate. The factions have rejected the legitimacy of the negotiators because the military operations of ECOMOG and the interests of neighboring states in the conflict have compromised the peacekeepers' impartiality.

Despite the perpetual struggle against Taylor's attacks and boycotts, the negotiators were nevertheless able to bring the combatants together successfully to conclude several significant agreements, including the Bamako Accord, the Lome Agreement, the All-Liberian Conference, the Yamoussoukro Agreement, the Geneva II Accords, and the Akosombo and Accra Accords. The issue of establishing a transitional government to rule Liberia until elections can be held has been a controversial point throughout the negotiations. The negotiators were particularly successful however, at the All-Liberian Conference in 1991, when they installed Amos Sawyer's interim government in spite of Taylor's resistance. Yamoussoukro encompassed more issues than previous agreements in an attempt to achieve consensus among the combatants. The negotiators also succeeded in scheduling national elections during the Yamoussoukro talks, but as violence escalated these elections were postponed indefinitely. The negotiators were successful in achieving each of their objectives, but these successes were reversed by the cyclical nature of the conflict. Geneva II, negotiated by the UN, was largely successful in ending the fighting and progress has been made at Akosombo and Accra. The vague statements issued at Abuja and the decision to delay forming a Governing Council, however, indicate that the parties remain estranged on substantive political issues.

### **Somalia: the operational mandates of UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II**

Somalia is a more complex case to examine because three different peacekeeping missions have operated there since the conflict began. In August 1992, UNOSOM I, consisting of 500 peacekeepers and 50

observers arrived in Mogadishu. In December 1992, command of the peacekeeping operation was turned over to the US and UNITAF began. In May 1993, UNOSOM II was initiated as the US made plans to begin troop withdrawal. Unlike the ECOMOG operation, the mandates for these three operations in Somalia have changed many times over the course of the mission. The primary motivation for intervention was to secure the provision of humanitarian aid to thousands of starving Somalis. Each of these operations, however, has been guided by mandates that implemented this goal in different ways.

The Security Council mandate for UNOSOM I specified that the troops were to monitor a ceasefire agreement and provide security for humanitarian aid. When UNITAF was established its mandate was more forceful and specific than UNOSOM I because the situation in Somalia had deteriorated into anarchy. Since UNITAF was a UN operation under US command, there were two different mandates given for the mission, one from the Security Council and one from the US government. The Bush administration planned a circumscribed mission, concentrating on securing ports, airports, roads and aid distribution centers to alleviate the famine. Further security was to be achieved by negotiating ceasefire agreements with the clan leaders to protect the peacekeeping forces, aid workers and civilians. Security Council Resolution 794 of December 1992 also focused primarily on securing the delivery of humanitarian aid to the region. The UN mandate repeated its call for all parties to cease hostilities and for peacekeepers to restore stability and law and order to the country. Once American troops entered Somalia in force, however, the UN Security Council began to push for an expanded mandate. The activities outlined in Resolution 814 of March 1993 included: rehabilitating political institutions and the economy, promoting political settlement and national reconciliation, repatriating refugees, training a Somali police force, disarming factions, and defusing mines. The US, however, refused to take on these additional tasks and focused on securing humanitarian aid shipments, thus addressing the consequences but not the causes of the conflict. When the UN took over the operation from the US in May 1993, UNOSOM II began to operate under the mandate outlined in Resolution 814.

### **Somalia: military achievements**

UNOSOM I was limited in several aspects. The mandate, to monitor a ceasefire agreement and secure humanitarian aid, did not give detailed directives to the troops concerning implementation of this mandate, thus making the mission vague. The operation was further limited by its extremely small size. Faced with an anarchic situation, there were too few troops to be effective. Aidid had opposed the presence of peacekeeping troops in Somalia, but in August had permitted them to enter Mogadishu. Shortly after the troops arrived at the airport however, Aidid's forces confined them to the airport. The peacekeepers played virtually no role in the conflict and failed to carry out their mandate.<sup>33</sup>

UNITAF relied on a strong military force to successfully carry out its mandate. The presence of UNITAF troops in Mogadishu and the surrounding countryside succeeded in guarding relief shipments and distribution, but also had the adverse effect of arousing resentment among the Somali people and providing a foreign target for the factions to rally against. Violence continued, but was redirected at the peacekeeping troops more than at rival factions, particularly in Mogadishu.

UNOSOM II also relied heavily on military force, but continued violence against peacekeeping troops forced the mission to alter its emphasis. After members of Aidid's clan killed Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993, an intensive search for Aidid began, which shifted the mission's focus away from securing humanitarian aid. The shift in the mission resulted in a double failure. Not only did security for humanitarian aid workers decrease, but the troops also failed to capture Aidid. These failures can be attributed partially to the fact that the UN forces overextended themselves with too many comprehensive missions. The growing resentment among Somalis toward the foreign troops also hindered the mission, forcing the troops into combat situations. Once the UN troops used military force against Somalis, both clan fighters and civilians, they compromised their position as neutral forces and made themselves targets for future violence.

### **Somalia: diplomatic accomplishments**

The UN engaged in negotiation efforts as early as March 1992, before UNOSOM I troops entered the conflict, but achieved little success in negotiating a stable ceasefire with the clans. The failure to achieve a

ceasefire during this period of the conflict was based largely on the nature of the combatants. The clan leaders had very little legitimacy and could be abandoned by their supporters any time as alliances shifted. This volatility made negotiations difficult because a leader could be negotiating from a position of strength at one point and become impotent soon afterwards, allowing other leaders to take advantage of his weakness.<sup>34</sup>

When UNITAF forces arrived in Mogadishu in December 1992, the clan leaders began to cooperate in negotiations because it was no longer possible for them to achieve their goals by fighting. The presence of UNITAF forces prevented them from looting and from seizing further territory. In January 1993, at the Addis Ababa Conference, a majority of the clans agreed to the composition of representatives to attend the National Reconciliation Conference. These clans also agreed to a ceasefire and a disarmament process. At the National Reconciliation Conference, agreements were reached on an interim government and on disarmament. Although the UN headed these negotiation sessions, Ethiopian mediation proved very helpful because of the bitter Somali attitudes toward the UN.

UNOSOM II's diplomatic mandates were so expansive and the renewed conflict so violent in June 1993, that negotiators faced substantial barriers to success. Throughout the summer of 1993, negotiators had little opportunity to meet with clan leaders as the military forces searched for Aidid and fought off attacks by clan soldiers. As the US began preparations in October to remove its forces, the Americans altered their tactics. US envoys met with Aidid's representatives and tried to secure an agreement that would end the hostilities between the peacekeeping forces and Aidid's troops. As the hunt for Aidid subsided, negotiations began again in Addis Ababa in November. These negotiations, despite mediation by regional organizations, were unsuccessful. Since the underlying causes of conflict had not been resolved and the clans were still unwilling to compromise, the negotiators could not take any further actions to bring them together. This lack of cooperation resulted in no substantive progress in negotiations throughout 1994 and early 1995, before the mission ended in March.

## CONCLUSION

After examining the successes and failures of these two operations, one finds little evidence to suggest that a regional organization is a superior alternative to UN peacekeeping operations. The case of Liberia particularly supports the conclusions reached in a similar study by Paul Diehl regarding the advantages and risks of regional peacekeeping.<sup>35</sup> He finds that although regional organizations have some advantages in theory, such as greater consensus and greater support, in practice these advantages do not often materialize. Although ECOMOG as a regional operation was not very successful, the UN operation was not any more effective at peacekeeping. The case study comparisons demonstrate the constraints imposed on the peacekeeping missions by the nature of the conflicts and their operational structures. Although the operations faced similar circumstances, each mission was successful in different respects, reflecting the unique characteristics of the two types of operations.

The ECOMOG negotiators were quite successful in persuading the factions to attend negotiation sessions and to sign agreements on ceasefires and political reconstruction. These negotiating sessions also tried to address the underlying problems of the conflict by discussing future political power sharing arrangements. The ECOMOG members could conduct significant negotiation sessions because they were familiar with the circumstances surrounding the conflict and understood the political culture of Liberia and the motivations of the various faction leaders. ECOMOG's ability to address the underlying problems of the conflict, however, did not help the diplomats persuade the factions to uphold the agreements they had reached.

Whereas the ECOMOG forces had formidable negotiation skills because they were composed of regional member states, the military forces were weak. ECOWAS was not structured to support a military peacekeeping operation. The lack of material and economic resources available to member states limited the operation. Furthermore, the participating troops came from countries that opposed Taylor and the NPFL. This bias against the NPFL likely influenced the troops in their decision to pursue their mandates with military force. The regional forces were not strong or numerous enough however, to overpower the factions and enforce a ceasefire. This use of force and direct military engagement with the factions impeded the negotiation process by destroying the ECOMOG states' ability to appear impartial in the conflict. Although

familiarity with the conflict aided the mediators in their negotiations, it hindered the military operations because the troops were not perceived as being neutral by the combatants. These weaknesses in the regional peacekeeping operation prevented it from maintaining impartiality, militarily maintaining law and order, and negotiating a resolution to the conflict that was agreeable to all of the factions.

In Somalia, the military operations were more successful than the negotiation process. The military resources available to the UN compared to ECOWAS were considerable and made the enforcement of a ceasefire possible for a limited time. The military forces were also more 'professional' in the sense that they had more training in peacekeeping tactics and did not have direct interests in the conflict that would affect their response to a direct attack.<sup>36</sup> The negotiators, on the other hand, were at a disadvantage compared to the ECOWAS mediators. The UN delegation was frequently criticized for not including all of the significant social and political actors necessary for reconciliation in the talks. The negotiators placed too much emphasis on Aidid and Ali Mahdi alone when they controlled a small percentage of the population and led only two of the fourteen clans engaged in hostilities. The military strength of the UN, however, ultimately drew the resentment of the Somali people who united against the 'occupying force.' The UN operation was unable to maintain neutrality which hindered its ability to produce a consensus for peace among the rival clans.

Neither force has proved more effective nor successful in these conflicts. Although each operation could attribute some success to its regional or international composition, both faced similar difficulties that neither type of operation could adequately address. Diehl's study concludes that UN peacekeeping has a comparative advantage in most circumstances, but a best case scenario might include a joint operation to combine the benefits stemming from both the UN and regional organizations.<sup>37</sup> These benefits were evident when the UN intervened in Liberia and the OAU aided the UN in Somalia, but did not succeed in resolving the conflicts. The struggles of both operations stemmed from the type of conflict they confronted, which in turn increased their chance of failure. They were forced to abandon many of the precepts of 'traditional' peacekeeping and operate using new peacekeeping principles. By sending forces into civil wars without a stable ceasefire agreement in place, each operation increased the risk of having to militarily engage the combatants to restore law and order. When they were attacked, ECOMOG and UNITAF/UNOSOMII troops became participants in the conflict rather than neutral third parties. Their military actions against Liberian and Somali citizens respectively caused resentment among the people and severely handicapped the peacekeeping process and the negotiations. Once the forces' impartiality was compromised, further progress in negotiations could only be made when third parties took over the mediation process.

The different successes of these two types of operations suggest a linkage between military and diplomatic strategies in peacekeeping. It was noted above that the efforts to negotiate a settlement are linked to the ability of the troops to end the fighting, which in turn are dependent on the arrangement of a ceasefire. In Liberia, the negotiations were relatively successful until the military failed to maintain its neutral character resulting in less productive negotiations. In Somalia, the military forces were briefly successful in limiting the scope of the conflict, but their forceful tactics and eventual manhunt compromised the negotiation sessions. The two cases suggest that a ceasefire is a key element for conflict resolution, but that an enforced ceasefire may not, by itself, be sufficient to produce successful negotiations. The fact that third parties have been unsuccessful in ending these conflicts illustrates one final aspect of these conflicts that has rendered peacekeeping ineffective. It has been argued that a crisis can only be resolved if the people are willing to resolve it themselves.<sup>38</sup> The UN acknowledges this fact in its multiple resolutions regarding Somalia, stating that the Somali people are ultimately responsible for reconciliation.<sup>39</sup> As long as the Liberian factions and Somali clans believe they can gain political power through conflict and are not yet willing to negotiate substantial settlements, the struggle will continue. Future peacekeeping operations, both UN and regional, will likely intervene in conflicts similar to those in Liberia and Somalia. While neither operation in this case study proved more adept at peacekeeping, the constraints on each type of organization as well as the lessons learned about neutrality and the complexities of the conflicts should be kept in mind by future peacekeeping operations.

#### Endnotes

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anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

1. *The New York Times*. 11 October 1993. p. A1.
2. Mats R. Berdal. "Whither UN Peacekeeping?" *Adelphi Paper* 281. (October 1993), p. 12.
3. Stephen John Stedman. "The New Interventionists." *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 1 (Winter 1993). pp. 1-16.
4. See, for example, Sydney D. Bailey. *The United Nations: A Short Political Guide* (London: Macmillan. 1989); Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1993); and F.T. Liu, *United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force* (Boulder. CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
5. Berdal. "Whither UN Peacekeeping?," pp. 10-11.
6. *The New York Times*. 3 May 1995. p. A3.
7. See Ernst B. Haas. *Why We Still Need The United Nations* (Berkeley. CA: Institute of International Studies. 1986); and K. Venkata Raman. "United Nations Peacekeeping and the Future of World Order." in Henry Wiseman, ed.. *Peacekeeping, appraisals and proposals* (New York: Pergamon, 1983), pp. 371-401.
8. For further discussion on the military and diplomatic aspects of peacekeeping as well as on evaluation standards, see Diehl. *International Peacekeeping*.
9. Robert Fatton, Jr.. *Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa* (Boulder. CO: Lynne Rienner. 1992).
10. Samuel M. Makinda. *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia* (Boulder. CO: Lynne Rienner. 1993).
11. Bill Berkeley. "Between Repression and Slaughter." *The Atlantic*. 270, no. 6 (December 1992). p. 54.
12. George Klay Kieh, Jr.. "Combatants. Patrons. Peacemakers, ar.d the Liberian Civil Conflict." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 15. no. 2 (April/June 1992). p. 135.
13. Peter Biles. "Anarchy Rules." *Africa Report*. 37, no. 4 (July/August 1992), p. 33.
14. Russell Geekie, "UN Truce in Somalia. But When Will the Fighting End?." *Africa Report*. 37, no. 2 (March/April 1992). p. 9.
15. The country was thrown into greater turmoil on 9 September 1990, when Doe was ambushed, tortured and executed by the INPFL. See William O'Neill. "Liberia: an avoidable tragedy." *Current History*, 92. no. 574 (May 1993), pp. 213-18.
16. Stephen P. Riley. "Intervention in Liberia: too little, too partisan," *World Today*, 49. no. 3 (March 1993). pp. 42-44.
17. Kieh. "Combatants. Patrons. Peacemakers." pp. 131-32. See also Riley. "Intervention in Liberia." pp. 42-44.
18. Kieh. "Combatants. Patrons. Peacemakers." p. 132-33.
19. Biles, "Anarchy Rules." p. 31.
20. Aid agencies, however, have since declared that the US largely exaggerated this figure to justify intervention. Figures were actually closer to 10-50 percent according to the United Nations World Food Programme deputy director. Gemmo Lodesani. See Mark Husband. "When Yankee Goes Home." *Africa Report*. 38. no. 2. (March/April 1993). p. 21.
21. John R. Bolton. "Wrong Turn in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs*. 73. no. 1 (January /February 1994). p. 57.
22. Peter da Costa. "The forgotten country." *Africa Report*. 39. no. 2 (March/April 1994). pp. 28-31.
23. Mats Berdal notes that this is a common problem when operations have only short-term goals in complex situations. See "Whither UN Peacekeeping?" p. 31.
24. See Mark Husband. "Targeting Taylor." *Africa Report*, 38. no. 4 (July/August 1993). pp. 30-32.
25. Janet Fleischman. "An Uncivil War." *Africa Report*. 38, no. 4 (May/June 1993). p. 58.
26. Husband. "Targeting Taylor." p. 30.
27. Makinda. *Seeking Peace from Chaos*.
28. Taylor had considered ECOWAS' goal of democratic elections hypocritical, since dictators ruled many of the member states.
29. Peter da Costa. "A[nother] Plan for Peace." *Africa Report*. 38. no. 5 (September/October 1993). pp. 20-23.
30. Lindsay Barrett, "A flicker of hope." *West Africa*. (29 May-4 June, 1995) pp. 837-38.
31. O'Neill. "Liberia: an avoidable tragedy," p. 216.
32. Libya largely supplies Taylor's weapons, violating UN Security Council Resolution 788, which calls for an arms embargo on all factions in Liberia. G.K. Kieh. Jr. believes that Libya hopes to undermine Nigerian hegemony in the region by discrediting the abilities of the ECOMOG forces to restore stability to Liberia. See "Combatants. Patrons. Peacemakers." p. 132.
33. Although the number of troops was increased to 3,500 in August, these forces were not yet in place by December when UNITAF was established.
34. Makinda. *Seeking Peace from Chaos*.
35. Paul F. Diehl. "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options" *Armed Forces & Society*: 19. no. 2 (Winter 1993). pp. 209-30."
36. Some scholars have debated the "professionalism" of the UN force and raised questions regarding violations of human rights by UN troops in Somalia. These alleged violations however are not nearly as extensive as the violations by ECOMOG troops and the factions united with them against the NPFL. See Alex De Waal and Rakiya Omaar. "Doing Harm by Doing Good? The International Relief Effort in Somalia."\* *Current History*, 92, no. 574 (May 1993).
37. Diehl. "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN Peacekeeping," p. 219.

38. Makinda. *Seeking Peace from Chaos*.
39. United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992.

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