

Terrorism and Political Violence: Taking Stock in Interesting Times

Ronald D. Crelinsten

Volume 15, Number 2, Fall 1995

URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/jcs15_02re01

[See table of contents](#)

Publisher(s)

The University of New Brunswick

ISSN

1198-8614 (print)

1715-5673 (digital)

[Explore this journal](#)

Cite this document

Crelinsten, R. D. (1995). Terrorism and Political Violence:: Taking Stock in Interesting Times. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 15(2), 129–140.

Terrorism and Political Violence: Taking Stock in Interesting Times

Hewitt, Christopher. *Consequences of Political Violence*. Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1993.

Clutterbuck, Richard. *Terrorism in an Unstable World*. London: Routledge, 1994.

May you live in interesting times. Ancient Chinese curse

With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the bipolar lenses through which many viewed the world of political violence and terrorism are gone. No longer can the complexity of this world be reduced to an international terror network of Soviet handlers, agents and proxies working in concert to destabilize the Western world. **The** definitional and typological complexities that were so cavalierly papered over during the 1970s and 1980s have begun to resurface in the discourse of those concerned with counter-terrorism. Cold warriors who forced a counterinsurgency model onto all things political and violent are now casting about to discern a new world disorder, a new agent of pernicious anti-Western threats. While the current favorite seems to be Islamic fundamentalism, as evidenced by the obscene haste with which commentators attributed the Oklahoma City bombing to Islamic extremists, other candidates include Columbian drug lords and a kind of multinational corporate mafia.¹ Indeed, the post-Cold War era is marked by a dizzying array of conflicts throughout the world and a panoply of actors willing to resort to violence in the name of a wide variety of causes. This is the context in which the US Director of Central Intelligence remarked in 1994 that the jungle is filled no longer with dragons, but with snakes. Yet, as one astute observer retorted, "I thought dragons were mythical beasts: snakes are dangerously real."² In other words, the dragons of the Cold War, at least in the context of terrorism and political violence, were more imaginary than real.

There is, nevertheless, a close connection between what we believe and what we perceive. While seeing is believing — our beliefs are based upon our perceptions — the opposite is also true. Believing is seeing in that we perceive what we believe to be there. If we believe that dragons exist, we will see them everywhere, even at the expense of seeing the snakes. If the communist threat is pervasive, it permeates all aspects of threat assessment, including assessment of the terrorist threat. Terrorist groups are sponsored or directed by communist states, even though they claim to be fighting for their own particular causes. **All** revolutionaries are communist puppets and are treated accordingly. Mujahadeen fighters are funded and armed so that they attack the Soviets in Afghanistan, despite their fundamentalist ideology and anti-democratic goals. Indigenous protest movements, land-reforming governments, local conflicts are all cast in the light of East-West tension and global Cold War strategy.

As with most self-fulfilling prophecies, there are very real consequences stemming from such definitions of reality. For example, revolutionary governments that are refused aid because they are perceived as Soviet puppet regimes become dependent upon Soviet aid. Anti-communist dictatorships that receive military aid sweep up a wide range of "communist sympathizers" in their nets of repression as they stretch the definition of "subversive" and "terrorist" to include all kinds of critics and reformers, fuelling public resentment and maintaining a pool of recruits for communist insurgents. Clearly, W.I. Thomas' dictum that if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences, is as pertinent today as it was when he made it, more than fifty years ago: because the mythical dragons were indeed perceived as real, and governments acted accordingly, those mythical beasts had very real consequences.

Now that the Cold War glasses have been removed, what does the world of terrorism and political violence look like? Has there been a paradigm shift or has an old paradigm simply ceased blinding us to what has been going on for some time? What new threats exist and what old threats persist? What new solutions are needed and what old solutions continue to be relevant? The two books reviewed here take quite different approaches to the current wave of stocktaking that has emerged in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Richard Clutterbuck takes stock by surveying the jungle for "snakes," cataloguing them,

and proposing primarily technological solutions for them. In doing so, he ranges far and wide and deals with an eclectic range of issues from drugs and weaponry to the more traditional counter-terrorist concerns of urban terrorism, guerrilla warfare and aviation security. Focusing explicitly on the end of the Cold War and the nature of conflict in the "post-communist world," his main concern seems to be the future and what to do about it.

Christopher Hewitt, on the other hand, looks more at the past, confining himself to more traditional terrain, i.e. political violence, which he defines as "rioting, terrorism and civil war." (p. 1) In particular, he looks at five countries that have been plagued with serious campaigns of political violence: Northern Ireland (1968-86), Spain (1975-86), West Germany (1967-81), Italy (1968-81) and Uruguay (1962-73). His cases represent two geographic regions, Western Europe and Latin America, where ethnic-nationalist and revolutionary-left violence were concentrated. His scope is narrower and more focused: the consequences of political violence in Western democracies. By means of comparative and longitudinal analysis of five cases where sufficient public opinion surveys and statistical data on economic, social and political indicators were available. Hewitt tests specific hypotheses concerning the range of consequences that terrorism and political violence can have for democratic society. By confining his analysis to five national case studies, he is clearly highlighting *domestic* political violence at the expense of *international* terrorism, which was the favorite subject of study for many scholars who wore the Cold War glasses of the 70s and 80s. This international focus was reflected in data bases as well, which typically did not show the high level of violence in Northern Ireland or Uruguay, for example, simply because purely domestic incidents were not recorded.

Published one year earlier than Clutterbuck's volume, Hewitt's volume makes no explicit reference to the post-Cold War era. Instead, Hewitt seems concerned to evaluate in as systematic a fashion as possible the short-term and long-term impact of terrorism and political violence on democratic societies. Such a look backwards, while not directly addressing the concerns of Clutterbuck and others, is nevertheless very timely. Knowing exactly what the consequences of political violence were in specific cases in the recent past might help us better evaluate the potential impact of current campaigns of violence and terrorism in today's "cursed" world. As such, Hewitt's study can be used to inform, so to speak, Clutterbuck's survey of hot spots and trouble areas and his prescriptions for dealing with them.

Both books have much to offer. Though a mere 144 pages, including a seven-page bibliography and a two-page index, *Consequences of Political Violence* is rich with interesting data and policy-relevant findings. Despite the author's own opinion that the limited scope of his research "makes it unlikely that the findings can be applied to non-Western societies." (p. 2) I think such applications can indeed be made, and Hewitt does at times refer to other nations, such as Turkey, Columbia, Venezuela, Argentina and Chile, when his data identify patterns that resonate elsewhere. After an introduction describing his approach and presenting the five cases and his methodology, Hewitt devotes separate chapters to the impact of political violence on the economy, the social order, the media and public opinion, party politics, and elections. In a concluding chapter, he looks at government and administrative policy and identifies three patterns of consequences that emerge from his study.

Terrorism in an Unstable World is a much longer volume, weighing in at 235 pages, divided into six parts and 20 chapters, plus a breakdown of bibliographic sources by chapter and a rather detailed index. The book is a pleasure to read, primarily because of the extensive cross-referencing, which helps the reader connect the many different strands explored throughout the volume. As will be discussed below, there is a consistent and unifying message that connects the disparate parts and the organization of the book allows the reader to grasp this quite readily. Clutterbuck surveys a vast amount of information. By far the largest part (Part II) looks at a wide range of technological issues pertaining to computers, weaponry, tactics and physical security. Part III focuses on the issue of drugs, Part IV on rural guerrilla warfare. Part V on urban terrorism, including airport and airline security, and Part VI on his overall conclusions. Part I, the introduction, presents the overall themes of the book, including a quick survey of the world's hot spots and the nature of conflict in the post-communist world.

Hewitt is careful to draw distinctions between types of political violence and to describe how "political violence varies between types of societies" and how its *impact* also varies according to type of society, (p. 2) For example, he demonstrates quite convincingly the different impacts of revolutionary and

nationalist terrorism, concluding that the former "has failed to generate a revolutionary situation in any of the countries that we examined," (p. 116) while "the long-lasting nature of [nationalist] conflicts . . . distinguishes them from revolutionary insurgencies." (p. 119-20) His overall conclusion is that "Western societies and their democratic institutions are resilient, and usually able to tolerate a considerable amount of political violence without serious consequences." (p. 127)

By contrast, Clutterbuck is much more prone, as we shall see below, to lump widely disparate phenomena into the same basket — "people killing each other." (pp. xii, 207) The overall tone of his argument is alarmist: "despite the end of the Cold War, tens of thousands of people die every year from various kinds of terrorism." (p. 3) Because he includes ethnic cleansing, drug trafficking and international crime, along with rural guerrilla and urban terrorism, his conclusions and proposals are equally wide-ranging. They include the use of NATO as an executive arm of the UN. (p. 211) modifications of legal procedure, such as a re interpretation of the right to silence, (p. 213) stricter control of the possession and movement of arms, ammunition and explosives, (p. 215) including tagging all explosives (a controversial measure in the US because of opposition by the National Rifle Association, among others), perpetual imprisonment of drug traffickers and compulsory treatment of drug addicts, (p. 217) and more research on detection of explosives, identification that includes the prevention of impersonation, and aids to intelligence, (p. 218) The overall emphasis of these proposals is on the use of science and technology, although the importance of the human element emerged clearly from some of the examples, particularly in the detection of explosives and the screening of airline carry-on baggage.⁻¹

Hewitt is probably the first to examine the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies over time.⁴ In *The Consequences of Political Violence*, he fills another significant gap in the literature by focusing on the impact of political violence on economic, social and political life, as well as the institutional and policy changes that occur in response to such violence. He is one of the few to attempt to measure, both in the short-term and the long-term, the *effects* of terrorism and political violence or the effects of counter-measures taken against them. Because he is interested in a wide range of effects and their interaction (for example, the impact of economic and social changes on public opinion), Hewitt limits himself to countries where public opinion surveys and accurate statistics were available. Because of these data requirements, his study is confined to the five countries mentioned above. For two cases, Northern Ireland and Spain, his data stops in 1986 simply because "it proved difficult to get many statistics after this date." (p. 5) Clearly, one of the chief limitations of his study, as with any quantitative study, lies in the incompleteness of his data. A separate appendix describes in greater detail the data used, in particular that pertaining to political violence and security force counter-measures, economic conditions. and public opinion polls, (pp. 130-35)

The limitations of quantitative measures are further highlighted by some of Hewitt's findings. For example, he measures cinema attendance and mass transit use in his five countries during the selected periods of intense violence and compares trends projected from the pre-violence period with actual results. (p. 35) In some cases, comparisons could not be made because statistics were lacking: e.g., cinema attendance for Northern Ireland and mass transit for Italy. In other cases, the results were difficult to explain: "the impact is curiously uneven, and does not seem strongly correlated with the degree of risk." (p. 36) While railway stations and cinemas were attacked in both Italy and Spain, railway travel declines only in Spain and cinema attendance only in Italy. As for the reliability of results, while Hewitt finds no decline in railway use in Northern Ireland, where the risk of victimization is greatest, he cites Northern Ireland rail officials as claiming that disruptions caused significant passenger loss. (p. 43, n. 8) To his credit, Hewitt does not strain to explain all his figures: occasionally, he points out why his figures might appear contradictory and suggests a resolution, such as the fact that railway use declined significantly in Uruguay despite the absence of attacks on trains, (significant decline in tourism) At other times, he simply admits the limitations of his findings. What is more, he provides rich descriptive data of a more qualitative nature, usually derived from such sources as *Time* and *Newsweek* or country studies. These serve to complement the quantitative data and to compensate for some of its inherent weaknesses and incompleteness.

On the other hand, some of Hewitt's measures seem forced. When he tries to measure political behavior, he resorts to counting "political acts." which he divides into executive actions, legislation, meetings and statements, (p. 72) In doing so, he misses the context within which these acts occur and, more crucially, their content. This renders some of his data unconvincing, such as the supposedly greater concern

expressed over rightist violence as opposed to leftist violence. (Table 5.3, p. 77) As for his measure of conflict/consensus, it is not obvious that agreement can be measured by the fact that politicians "meet with one another." (p. 79) Meetings can be hostile and can generate criticism of one another, as Hewitt himself demonstrates in the case of Northern Ireland, where "many meetings between Ulster politicians involved the two hostile groups in conference with a third party — usually the British government." (p. 92) While Hewitt acknowledges the crudeness of his measure (p. 79) it is clear that one can only go so far with the results.

One of Hewitt's most interesting findings concerns what he calls "cumulative effects" (p. 4) or "threshold effects." (p. 41) In describing the social consequences of violence in his five countries, Hewitt finds that the level of violence determines the extent of the social impact. Low levels of violence affect only the social activities of the elite. Higher levels affect the general public to a greater extent as normal policing becomes impossible and utilities and public services are disrupted. Finally, severe levels of violence lead to a breakdown of the social order, the deterioration of government authority and population movements. (see Table 3.4. p. 40) While Hewitt confines himself to five countries, it is possible to extrapolate such findings to societies where the level of violence approaches civil war, such as Sri Lanka, Turkey or Lebanon, or where communal violence threatens to undermine regional government, such as India.

When data permit, some of the results are compelling, such as the close parallel between the monthly death rate in Spain due to terrorism and the level of public concern about terrorism (p. 53, Fig. 4.1) or the temporary effect of terrorist violence on public opinion, (pp. 65-66) In nationalist conflicts, such as the Basques and Northern Irish Catholics, one impact of repressive policies is to generate a polarization in public attitudes toward security along ethnic or religious lines, (pp. 59-60. Table 4.4) Protestant support for various policies far exceeds Catholic support; Spanish support exceeds Basque support. Yet it is also interesting to see that 55 percent of Catholics support tougher measures, including 20 percent who support the death penalty for terrorist murders (vs. 95 percent and 69 percent for Protestants). It is also frightening to see 61 percent of Protestants supporting a shoot to kill policy and 86 percent approving plastic bullets (vs. 7 percent and 13 percent for Catholics). It is clear that in the case of ethnic conflict, repressive policies, particularly because they impact selectively upon the ethnic community from which terrorist recruits and supporters are drawn, can serve to exacerbate or perpetuate the problem by polarizing public opinion and increasing or maintaining support for the terrorists. This is why Hewitt, as have others,⁵ stresses the importance of propaganda in the fight against terrorism (p. 126) particularly in the form of vigorous public relations campaigns. Clutterbuck also alludes to this when he suggests that, in combating rural guerrilla warfare, governments would do well to take advantage of developing communications technology (such as the spread of television into remote villages) to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the public, (p. 148)

It is significant that the word "crime" does not appear in the index for *Terrorism in an Unstable World*, given that the word is paired with the word "terrorism" on almost every page, as are the words "criminal" and "terrorist." In fact, Clutterbuck's book does not confine itself to terrorism at all, as is made clear in his preface. In the last sentence (p. xii) he identifies those from whom science and technology (a major focus of the book) must protect us: terrorists, religious fanatics, drug traffickers, criminals and "ethnic cleansers." the latter being identified as an "old terrorist technique" in new form. (p. 163) Clutterbuck deals with them all, whether discussing weaponry, tactics, groups or prevention. For example, in discussing kidnapping (chapter 16 on Urban Terrorist Techniques, pp. 172-76), he spends almost half his time on criminal gangs (as opposed to urban terrorists). On p. 175, he states: "Both criminal and political kidnapping have proved effective enough in achieving their aims to make it likely that *this form of crime* will continue." (emphasis added) Here, we see how Clutterbuck subsumes both forms of kidnapping under the same rubric, "crime," even though he previously shows how different they really are. (p. 174) By contrast, Hewitt found that in Italy, only 8 percent of kidnap victims were abducted by terrorist groups, while only 0.1 percent of robberies in Spain, Italy and Uruguay and 0.04 percent of robberies in Germany were committed by terrorists. As such, he clearly distinguishes between terrorist crime and ordinary crime, pointing out that only in Northern Ireland did terrorist crime constitute a significant proportion of total crime, (p. 12)

This lumping together of different forms of violence in *Terrorism in an Unstable World* is not, I believe, the result of sloppiness or carelessness on the part of its author; it is too systematic. Nor is it the result of definitional fuzziness. On page 5, Clutterbuck demonstrates clearly that he is not prone to the kinds of definitional ambiguities that have plagued the literature.⁶

Terrorism is a technique . . . used by *all* sides: by guerrillas, by freedom fighters, by dissidents, by political activists of the left or right, by nationalists, by ethnic and religious groups, by Mafia-style criminal gangs, by drug-trafficking organizations, and - perhaps most of all - by authoritarian governments (whether they style themselves left or right), and by their 'death squads' to which they turn a blind eye or which they discreetly sponsor (emphasis in original).

Defining terrorism as "a lethal kind of intimidation," (p. 5) Clutterbuck does not fall into the common trap of basing his definitions on ends rather than means. His list of perpetrators covers the entire political and ideological spectrum, including state as well as non-state actors (with proper emphasis on the predominance of state terrorism), left and right, and criminal, religious and ethnic groups. From this, the reader might expect the book to deal with all these phenomena in equal measure. Yet in the very next chapter, in a paragraph that introduces the issue of security and intelligence, he commits a startling *non sequitur* that belies this assumption.

It is very easy to place bombs to kill the citizens of a free society going about their business, provided that the perpetrators have no conscience about killing indiscriminately, like those who placed a bomb under the New York Trade Center in February 1993, or bombed a busy shopping centre in England in March 1993. *In an increasingly tolerant society it is easy for young criminals to steal, rob and rape.* (emphasis added)

From the World Trade Center bombers and the IRA, he suddenly shifts to theft, robbery and rape by delinquents. That he includes such apples and oranges in the same basket is confirmed in the following sentence, when he states that "the law enforcement agencies can provide only a very slender barrier against *these people*." (emphasis added) He then goes on to suggest that "only two things can reinforce this barrier: a real fear among the *criminals and terrorists* of being caught, and of the consequences if they are; and active co-operation and vigilance by citizens prepared to face the risks of giving information and evidence to convict." (emphasis added)

In fact, as a former soldier and counterinsurgency expert (despite his claims to being a layman in the preface, cf. p. xii) Clutterbuck's model for combating terrorism *and crime* is a counterinsurgency one and his concept of the rule of law is reinforcing police and military intelligence and providing incentives for informers and *repentiti*. Nothing is ever said about protecting due process, only about how to relax it in emergency situations. Clutterbuck deals with the complex issue of balancing security needs with civil liberties and the rule of law in one brief concluding chapter, just over eight pages in length in a volume that exceeds two hundred pages. The bulk of this short chapter actually deals with measures that, should they be implemented, would *infringe* upon the freedom of individuals and institutions, such as freezing assets of suspected protection racketeers *and their families* (p. 214), or banning banks from transactions with any foreign banks not providing full right of access to records, (p. 218) And in the area of profiling, identification and preventing impersonation, Clutterbuck is categorical: any objection to compulsory, machine-readable ID cards "can no longer be sustained," (p. 220) given the extent of the threat. Yet, as he argues throughout the book, this threat goes far beyond the traditional realms of terrorism and political violence, to include the world of drug trafficking and international crime: "In the face of growing violence, drug trafficking and other crime, we can really no longer afford the emotional prejudice against citizens having to be identifiable." (p. 81) For Clutterbuck, it is simply an "emotional prejudice," an irrational stance unsubstantiated by reason or logic. It is really only in the last two pages of the volume that he makes any concrete proposal for the vague references to safeguards for civil liberties and these, too, end up to be technological, relying on computer recording of any officer's ID checks — presumably to avoid abuse.

In a chapter entitled "A Vulnerable Society," Clutterbuck identifies as "the interlocking themes running through this book," "the malign influences of drugs, violence and lust for money and power." (p. 21) While he focuses on a wide range of topics, it is his treatment of the issue of drugs that underscores both the strengths and weaknesses of this volume. By looking at issues such as drugs, money laundering and other crimes alongside the more traditional phenomena of political violence, Clutterbuck highlights the importance of criminal terrorism in the spectrum of violent intimidation. Yet, in doing so, he sidesteps the importance of political and economic solutions that look to the long-term and chooses to accentuate the technological solutions that may help in the short-term, but tend to create both political and economic problems in the longer term.

In the opening paragraph of Part III, entitled "Drugs, Political Violence and Crime," we are told that "the cultivation, processing, transport and distribution of narcotics is probably the greatest single generator of political violence and crime in the world In certain countries it is now a far more potent motivator of terrorism than Marxist ideology or religious fundamentalism." (p. 87) Here we see the collapsing of political violence and crime and the replacement of the old ideological threats with the new material/criminal ones. Yet the lust for money and power that Clutterbuck sees is uniquely that of the crime lords and the drug kingpins. The book is strangely silent, for example, about the arms trade, which involves many governments, including Western democratic ones.⁷ Nor does Clutterbuck mention the role of Western companies and corporations in the export of technology conducive to human rights violations such as torture. These, too, are symptoms of the lust for money and power, and they, too, generate political violence and crimes against humanity. Yet they do not fall within the purview of this apparently wide-ranging survey.

When he turns to solutions to the problems he identifies, Clutterbuck's arguments are well made, persuasively presented, and comprehensive, in that he does present counter-arguments and he does provide concrete suggestions for implementing his proposed solutions. Yet his arguments are based far more on unsubstantiated supposition than at first meets the eye, and some of his assertions hold only within the limited framework of his original premises. Too often, he fails to explore the counter-arguments that he raises and reverts to his narrow frame of reference. For example, his assumption that addicts have but two choices — crime or recruitment of further addicts (pp. 103, 106) — is maintained despite his own counter-argument (pp. 103-4) that legalization, licencing and taxation may be the best courses, "if all else fails." (p. 104) Clearly, crime and recruitment are direct offshoots of criminalization. Enforced treatment of addicts will not work. Nor will "life-means-life" sentences for pushers. If "prison spreads addiction rather than suppressing it," as Clutterbuck contends (p. 103), the implication is that pushers simply continue to ply their trade within the prison system.

Clutterbuck's call for "life-means-life" for "drug traffickers, couriers and pushers," (pp. 105, 217) is totally unrealistic and the author even recognizes this when he admits that prison officials would oppose such a policy, (p. 105) From a purely economic point of view, it is not feasible, given the government cutbacks that are sweeping the Western world. From a practical point of view, it makes more sense to legalize and control the production and distribution of drugs than to use the criminal justice system, the police and the prisons. As for the addicts, while Clutterbuck calls for compulsory treatment, he also states that "the majority revert to the addiction under stress." (p. 104) If this is so, surely the answer lies in long-term, wide-ranging social policy to address the sources of stress in these people's lives. Finally, his assertion that "hard drugs are much more damaging and addictive than alcohol" (p. 104) is just that: an assertion. Given the central role that alcohol plays in domestic violence and traffic accidents — two of the greatest scourges of Western society — he is probably even wrong.

As for the link with terrorism and insurgency, this is based on the assertion that the drug trade finances campaigns around the world: Columbia, Peru, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, to name a few. Yet Lebanon, for one, was maintained by much more than drugs, while Myanmar has one of the worst human rights records in the world. To characterize the latter's problems as caused by the drug trade is facile at best and tendentious at least. Clutterbuck seems to imply that these conflicts would disappear without the drug trade, but he completely ignores the central role of the arms trade and foreign aid by competing states and sponsors, both "East" and "West," in these conflicts.

Terrorism in an Unstable World is an informative and entertaining book, as anyone who has read any of Richard Clutterbuck's previous books will already know. There are some nuggets in this book, such as the succinct contrast between the French and British schools of counterinsurgency. (pp. 116-17) When applied to Peru, this distinction provides valuable insights into the general problem of how best to deal with insurgent violence in a variety of political systems. It is when he strays away from areas of expertise for which he is justly respected and begins to apply lessons learned there to the criminal area that Clutterbuck fails to persuade and, in fact, begins to alarm with his rhetorical flourishes.

In two cases of revolutionary terrorism studied by Christopher Hewitt, Italy and Germany, terrorism clearly generated increased support for repressive measures, (p. 64) substantiating a widely held view that the public usually prefers the inconvenience of repressive measures to the insecurity of terrorism and will generally accept some restriction of civil liberties and freedoms in the name of security. Clutterbuck clearly

bases his proposals for countering the post-Soviet threat on this assumption: "only the guilty have anything to fear." (p. 220) Yet the Uruguayan case presented by Hewitt reveals another dimension to this generally accepted truism: public perceptions of the terrorists remained fairly positive even "when terrorist killings were at their highest." (Hewitt, p. 66) Hewitt suggests that this was a result of government counter-measures which, unlike in Italy and Germany, were widespread and extreme, including mass searches and routine use of torture, and affected a wide segment of the population. This highlights the fact that repressive responses that undermine the rule of law can benefit the terrorist and maintain public support despite the level of violence. It is a cautionary tale for those like Clutterbuck who seem to feel that tough legislation that limits traditional freedoms are warranted in today's "unstable world." Many Latin American governments that are infamous for gross human rights violations, e.g., Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil, typically inflated the threat of terrorism, generalizing it to wider segments of the population and justifying routine use of torture or disappearances by arguing that a war was being waged against the state and even — in Argentina — Western civilization.⁸

Reading Clutterbuck's *Terrorism in an Unstable World*, one sometimes gets the uneasy feeling that a similar discourse is being developed, particularly as it relates to drug trafficking and international crime. By contrast, in *Consequences of Political Violence*, Hewitt takes a much more moderate approach, reminding the reader that "the most severe disruptions are produced not by political violence itself but by the governments' response to it." (p. 123) While Clutterbuck argues that special legislation should be held in reserve (chapter 20), Hewitt insists that "such policies should be used as little as possible." (p. 123) Elsewhere, I have argued that the most common route that governments responding to terrorism have taken toward an anti-democratic control model has been via the deformation of due process in the form of special laws and procedures.⁹ While Hewitt, in his earlier study,¹⁰ has shown that repressive policies do not work and can be counterproductive (see also the study under review here), others have shown that emergency legislation, such as the UK Prevention of Terrorism Act, have in practice become permanent and tend to permanently alter the constitutional order." As such, studies such as Hewitt's that attempt, despite methodological limitations, to measure over time the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism on political, economic and social life are invaluable to policy makers despite their limited generalizability. More wide-ranging surveys such as Clutterbuck's serve to highlight those areas where new developments may occur and new challenges to striking the proper balance between civil liberties and security needs may arise. While Clutterbuck, along with others,¹² assimilate the threat of terrorism with that of crime, particularly organized crime, recent events such as the Oklahoma City bombing or the Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Japan show that the threat of terrorism from the right or from fanatical cults is at least as important in the wake of the Cold War as the more popular shibboleths of Islamic fundamentalism, drug cartels and international crime syndicates.

Ronald D. Crelinsten

University of Ottawa

Endnotes

1. See, for example, Roy Godson, "The Crisis of Governance: Devising Strategy to Counter International Organized Crime." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 6, no. 2 (1994). pp. 163-77; William J. Olson, "The Crisis of Governance: Present and Future Challenges." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 6, no. 2 (1994), pp. 146-62.
2. Reg Whittaker, comments at Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) conference, Ottawa. October 1994.
3. In the Hindawi case, it was an alert Israeli security guard who detected the false bottom of the woman's luggage that contained the bomb. The luggage had passed through Heathrow's X-ray baggage check undetected, (p. 170)
4. Christopher Hewitt. *The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984). See also the work of economist Todd Sandler, and his colleagues, for example, Walter Enders, Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley, "UN Conventions. Technology and Retaliation in the Fight Against Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 2, no. 1 (1990), pp. 83-105.
5. See, for example, Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid. "Western Responses to Terrorism: a Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet." in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds.. *Western Responses to Terrorism* (London: Frank Cass. 1993), pp. 307-40. esp. pp. 322-30.

6. For more on such definitional ambiguities, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled." in Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart, eds., *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen, UK: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp. 3-23.
7. It is true that Clutterbuck does call for stricter control of the possession and movement of arms, ammunitions and explosives, as noted earlier. Yet the emphasis is on tagging explosives and no mention is made of the role of states in providing arms to insurgents all over the world.
8. Wolfgang S. Heinz, "'The Military, Torture and Human Rights: Experiences from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay,'" in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, eds., *The Politics of Pain: Torturers and Their Masters* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 65-98.
9. Crelinsten and Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism," pp. 333-35.
10. Hewitt, *The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies*, note 4.
11. Menachem Hofnung, "States of Emergency and Ethnic Conflict in Liberal Democracies, Great Britain and Israel," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 6, no. 3 (1994), pp. 340-65.
12. For example, Olson, "The Crisis of Governance," and Godson, "The Crisis of Governance," see note 1.