Anthony James Joes' most recent book on guerrilla warfare is written to teach the important elements of counterinsurgency to a primarily American audience. Joes feels counterinsurgency has been ignored by historians who write mainly of great battles and who romanticize the exploits of guerrilla leaders while ignoring the famous commanders of counterinsurgency. Joes also is concerned that although America's military is likely to be involved in future guerrilla style conflicts, possibly with increasing frequency, American strategists continue to concentrate on the blitzkrieg-style speed and violence that has come to be known as the American way of war. In order to remedy the situation, Joes has written a well-researched guide to counterinsurgency to show that with an intelligent strategy based on historical lessons America can fight and win asymmetrical conflicts.

As Joes admits, no two conflicts are exactly alike, and he pokes fun at those Americans who regularly protest "No More Vietnams." However, a serious look at history's many insurgencies, small wars, and asymmetrical conflicts does reveal certain truths about the nature of this type of conflict. The episodes in history covered by Joes begin with the American War of Independence and end with a brief epilogue on the current war in Iraq. Occasionally, Joes travels even farther into the past when he briefly mentions Roman operations in Spain, and "the brilliant exploits" of Judas Maccabeus against the Syrians. The most important truth revealed from history, the one most often forgotten by Americans dazzled by firepower and speed, is that insurgency and counterinsurgency are political phenomena, that victory comes through the restoration of peace, and peace comes from what can best be described as good government. In order to achieve peace one must, Joes says, reintegrate into society its disaffected elements through conservative military tactics, redressing grievances, making amnesty attractive, and erecting a legitimate government. "Its essence is maximum force with minimum violence. Its goal is to destroy the will of the enemy, not their lives, and certainly not the lives of civilians."

The political goal is to undercut the guerrilla leaders' relationship to the ordinary guerilla fighter, and undercutting the guerrilla's relationship to civil society in order to win civil society's neutrality if not their loyalty. A guerrilla force isolated from the population will be easy to pursue and destroy and will starve from lack of support. According to his research, Joes says this can be done by branding the guerrilla leaders as criminals, offering amnesty to the guerrillas who had no part in their leaders' criminality, establishing civilian security, and protecting their lives and property both from the criminal guerrillas and from the excesses of the counterinsurgents. Good government, being fair and just in the treatment of civilians, maintaining the rule of law, being responsive to legitimate civilian grievances, and what Joes repeatedly refers to as "rectitude," are the things that will divide civil society from the insurgents. In a way, Joes is arguing that the counterinsurgents need to be democracy builders. Joes even mentions that Che Guevara stated in his writings that guerrillas cannot defeat a democracy nor even a government that pretends to be a democracy. Joes recognizes the complexity of such a task, and notes that the patience and restraint needed for such a mission is in many ways diametrically opposed to the American way of war which places the emphasis on "maximum violence and swift results," and just as importantly the "notoriously impatient American public."

This is not to say that firepower and speed have no place in counterinsur-gency; they most certainly do. The direct actions against the insurgents Joes discusses includes committing to the fight "an abundance of well turned out troops" in an average of ten counterinsurgents to one guerrilla. He frequently references the US Marines Small Wars manual which calls for well armed, highly mobile "flying columns" to hunt down guerrillas in their sanctuaries and pursue them relentlessly. Joes also calls for isolating the battle space from outside support; developing timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence; draining the population of weapons; and the "rigorous punishment" of criminals found among the guerrillas ranks, guerrillas who fail to negotiate when they know their cause is lost, and civilians who live in government-secured areas but continue to aid the insurgents.

In addition to its overall theme as a guide to counterinsurgency, Resisting Rebellion offers a brief but thorough review of guerrilla strategy, and examines the causes and political environments that encourage insurgency. Joes dismisses several "myths" of guerrilla war. Guerrillas can be defeated. Mao did not win the People's War, but rather the Kuomintung was destroyed by the Japanese. American forces in Vietnam had in fact defeated the insurgency when they withdrew and left the government in Saigon to be defeated by a conventional invasion from the North. Guerrillas have lost in Venezuela and Thailand because they never achieved the support of civil society. Joes shows that, unlike the false Cold War belief that insurgencies are primarily fought by Communists, throughout history more often than not insurgents have been fueled by religion, no doubt a reflection of the importance of respecting and understanding Islam in America's two ongoing counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Overall, Joes' Resisting Rebellion is a masterful review of insurgency and does a great job of arguing for a democratic and sensible strategy of counterin-surgency. The fact that Resisting Rebellion is grounded in historical fact, is well organized and easy to read, and is just under 250 pages makes it even more valuable. It would be just as good a text for students being first introduced to the subject, as it would be a valuable addition to the library of an academic who has long studied the subject, as it would be a good read for those to whom Joes has dedicated the work, the warfighters who face the guerrilla where it truly matters.