The Dilemma of Liberalism

Charles N. R. McCoy
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Lionel Trilling, in a thoughtfull and provocative series of essays on literature and society, has remarked that it has seemed to him "that a criticism which has at heart the interests of liberalism might find its most useful work not in confirming liberalism in its sense of general rightness but rather in putting under some degree of pressure the liberal ideas and assumptions of the present time." 1 If, to be sure, all must applaud liberalism's "vision of a general enlargement and freedom and rational direction of human life," there is reason for concern that the "characteristic paradox of liberalism is that in the very interests of its great primal act of imagination by which it establishes its essence and existence... it inclines to constrict and make mechanical its conception of the nature of mind." 2 Speaking of the Kinsey Report, Mr. Trilling observes that "... the preponderant weight of its argument is that a fact is a physical fact, to be considered only in its physical aspect and apart from any idea or ideal that might make it a social fact, as having no ascertainable personal or cultural meaning and no possible consequences — as being indeed, not available to social interpretation at all." 3 The tendency of liberalism to constrict its conception of the nature of mind was observed in a remarkable study by the late Ernst Cassirer, whom all must recognize as having been a scholar of great profundity and an ardent apologist of the liberal tradition of the West.4 Speaking of those philosophers who, inspired by the theory of Evolution, made great contributions — in Cassirer's opinion — to the development of anthropological philosophy, Cassirer enters a caveat: "All these philosophers were determined empiricists; they would show us nothing but the facts." 5 And these facts have lent themselves to an interpretation that intends to "prove that the cultural world, the world of human civilization, is reducible to... causes which are the same for the physical as for the so-called spiritual phenomena... Owing to this development our modern theory of man lost its intellectual center. We acquired instead a complete anarchy of thought." 6 Liberalism's aversion from making intellectual distinctions perceptive of values and consequences thus curiously constricts its "vision of a general enlargement and freedom and rational direction of human life."

2. Ibid., p.xi.
3. Ibid., p.235.
5. Ibid., p.21.
How this paradox of liberalism is to be accounted for may very well be, as Mr. Trilling suggests, "the most important, the most fully challenging question in culture that at this moment we can ask." It is indeed the most important political question, for "it is no longer possible to think of politics except as the politics of culture, the organization of human life toward some end or other, toward the modification of sentiments, which is to say the quality of human life." An inquiry into the matter will reveal not only the reason for the paradox that Trilling speaks of; it will reveal a dilemma for liberalism that is not immediately suggested by the paradox itself.

Liberalism took its rise in the Seventeenth Century with the appearance of the modern scientific spirit, and the first postulate of that spirit was, as Cassirer has put it, "the removal of all the artificial barriers that had hitherto separated the human world from the rest of nature." These barriers were chiefly the notion of a Prime Intellect, "on whom depend the heavens and the world of nature" and the notion of human intellect as "separable indeed" although not existing apart from matter. Nature was no longer understood, as it had been by the classical tradition, as "a reason put in things by the divine art so that they may act for an end." All communication is severed between what traditionally had been thought of as the reason that is nature, the reason which is the cause of nature, and the human reason. This excision of reason from nature enhanced man's sense of freedom: Nature was no longer set against the Divine Mover; it no longer meant the created finite physical universe in which man is imprisoned. Nature was now equated with the inexhaustible and immeasurable abundance of reality. The new sense of "reason" is found in the reduction of "the material and mental spheres... to a common denominator; they are composed of the same elements and are combined according to the same laws." And this meant that "the autonomy of intellect corresponds to the pure autonomy of nature... Both are recognized as elemental and to be firmly connected one another. Nature in man, as it were, meets nature in the cosmos half-way, and finds its own essence there."

This theory of the autonomy of nature was expressed in classical fashion for political philosophy in the celebrated hypothesis of Hugo Grotius. In the De Jure Belli ac Pacis Grotius maintained that the

7. Ibid., pp.44-45.
natural law would be what it is even if, per impossibile, there were no God. How much Grotius intended by this hypothesis does not matter. What matters is that as it was subsequently interpreted and became the cornerstone of modern political philosophy it meant that nature, "hypothetically" cut from its dependence on the Prime Intellect, would be considered the sufficient and original formative principle of all that is. The meaning and implications of this hypothesis, both for the enlarged sense of freedom that it suggests and for its tendency to constrict the concept of mind, can be grasped only if we see how it meant a truncating of the traditional idea of nature and the law of nature.

In the classical and mediaeval understanding of natural law, law as an ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune (an ordination of reason to the common good) was taken to be an inclination toward the good conceived as consisting essentially in (a) the efficient and material principles presupposed to some form, (b) the form, by which a thing is what it is, and (c) an inclination to action in accordance with the form. Now this whole teleology, resting, as it did, on the concept of law as ordinatio rationis was essentially dependent on the Prime Intellect. Law being something that pertains to the reason and not to nature (unless it be a rational nature) there can be no natural law for non-rational beings except by way of similitude. If then law, as an inclination toward the good, consisted in material and efficient principles for the sake of some form and form for the sake of action, the elimination of the Prime Intellect upon which the order of things depends leaves the "substitute intelligence" of nature and removes the element of order to an end as such from the law of nature. Henceforth the "teleology" of nature will be truncated in such fashion that it will terminate where natural movement would terminate in the line of its hypothetical autonomy. The structure of liberal political thought is based on the conception of material and efficient principles "manipulable" indeed but no longer presupposed to any form or end.

The political and social consequences of this hypothesis of the autonomy of nature were fully and clearly perceived by David Hume, the father of modern liberalism. Liberal political and social philoso-

1. St. Thomas, Ia, q.5, a.5.
2. St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q.91, a.2, ad 3.
3. We may note that modern conservatism also has its roots in the principle of the autonomy of nature, but it emphasizes a different facet of this principle. It identifies the principle of action in political society with nature's action always or for the most part in the same way and for the best and without knowledge of the end. This is the way that Aristotle defines nature in the Physics but not in the Politics. Burke, for example, conceives the art of politics in a way that is proper to what tradition had distinguished as "operable" sciences that are classed under Physics — as operating in conjunction simply with a purely natural principle, as medicine and engineering do. Burke is untrue to the classical and mediaeval tradition here. The emphasis on natural properties and elemental force not
Phy is founded on the celebrated Humean principle that the contrary of every matter of fact is possible: There is no reason in nature why anything should be what it is or should not be what it is not. "The contrary of every matter of fact is . . . possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality." 1 This stretch of the liberal imagination was indeed proper enough: Nature, as signifying the inexhaustible and immeasurable abundance of reality must be taken to include the deflections from the regularity of its own actions as being ever so conformable to reality. This is the origin of liberalism's sense of "variousness and possibility," its "primal act of imagination whereby it establishes its essence and existence." It suggests to us why Mr. Trilling observes that "those who explicitly assert and wish to practise the democratic virtues have taken it as their assumption that all social facts . . . must be accepted . . .," and why Professor Sabine says of Hume that his critique of human understanding has made it impossible to describe values with even so loose a word as utility.

But precisely by contributing in this way to what Mr. David Riesman has called the "increased possibilities of being and becoming," Hume's principle that the contrary of every matter of fact is possible has the effect of constricting and making mechanical its conception of mind. We must notice a curious thing. In the Physics of Aristotle variation from the norm in natural operation is ascribed to a defect on the part of matter and not to the play of intelligence; the ground for this is that what happens always or for the most part seems to be in accordance with some intention. On the other hand, the varying of human artefacts is ascribed to an intention proceeding directly from an intellectual principle, on the ground that it seems to be characteristic of man to vary his artefacts. This indeed was the basis in Aristotle's teaching of man's capacity for self-government. Now if we accept nature as the original formative principle of all that is, then the "aberrations" in nature become just as "intelligent" as its apparent "intentions"; indeed — and it is what we most particularly should subject to the command of reason places the ends of human life on the same plane with the final causes in nature — something Aristotle explicitly warned against (Ethics, VII, chap.8, 1151 a). The result is to leave political matters free from the scrutiny of reason as ordering and directing. The explanation of this lies in the fact that the final causes in nature have no necessity in them except ex hypothesi, that is, they depend ultimately on the simple will of God. A perì, then, the ends of human life in conservative political philosophy are made dependent on the equally inscrutable human will — on the will of Carlyle's "Able-Hero," of Hegel's sacro-egoismo, of the Duce and the Fuehrer. The facet of autonomous nature emphasized by Nineteenth Century conservatism issued in an obscurantist spiritualism that opened the way to Hitler's "community homogeneous in nature and feeling" — die Einheit Deutscher Seelen — based on the primordial nature of race and blood.

notice — they become — by the law that reduces the material and mental spheres to a common denominator — the exemplar for freedom in the world of culture and civilization. The traditional idea of a free nature, namely, one that moves itself by an idea "conceived, and in a way contrived by it" 1 gives way to a concept of liberty based on the element of indetermination in nature. This is why Mr. Trilling observes that the democratic virtues require the acceptance of all social facts "in the sense that no judgment must be passed on them, that any conclusion drawn from them which perceives values and consequences will turn out to be 'undemocratic'." 2

How free indeed this nature is may best be seen by examining its status as it appears to modern physics where the proper exigencies of its method justify its special view of nature. The situation in modern physics is excellently brought out by Eddington in the following paragraphs:

I have settled down to the task of writing ... and have drawn up my chairs to my two tables. Two tables! Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me — two tables, two chairs, two pens ... One of (my two tables) has been familiar to me from earliest years ... How shall I describe it? It has extension; it is comparatively permanent; it is coloured; above all it is substantial ...

Table No. 2 is my scientific table. It is a more recent acquaintance, and I do not feel so familiar with it. It does not belong to the world previously mentioned ... My scientific table is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed; but their combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the table itself.

I need not tell you that modern physics has by delicate test and remorseless logic assured me that my second scientific table is the only one which is really there — wherever 'there' may be. 3

This is what the "teleology" of nature looks like when nature in the line of its hypothetical autonomy is cut from dependence on the Prime Intellect: when nature is no longer a "reason put in things ... so that they may act for an end." The new scientific developments have been marked by a scrupulous indifference to the "familiar world," the world of intelligible forms. In many respects this procedure is proper enough; it reflects, indeed, an exigency of experimental natural science, namely, that it get away from the world as "formed" or "given" and approach the cosmos from the point of view of the possibilities of its material and efficient principles. Thus the physical world

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appears to be bereft of specific natures and recognized “intentions.” Liberty of contrariety seems indeed to be the very essence of liberty. This certainly appears to be the meaning of liberty outlined for us by Judge Learned Hand in an address entitled “A Fanfare for Prometheus.” Judge Hand begins his inquiry into the notion of liberty by remarking indeed that it is “a naive opinion” that holds “that (liberty) means no more than that each individual shall be allowed to pursue his own desires without let or hindrance.” For this — he says somewhat surprisingly — is what characterizes those who believe in “indefectible principles”: “Human nature is malleable especially if you can indoctrinate the disciple with indefectible principles.” What Judge Hand apparently means in these obscure and cryptic passages is that if there were some definite shape to human nature itself (human nature would be especially malleable) one could then without “let or hindrance” pursue the work of its formation. But there is no such definite shape at all, Hand thinks. Human nature is indeed malleable, but it is properly such not — Hand tells us — because of the infinite variability of prudential judgments in attaining the mean of reason which is the appointed end of the natural reason, but rather because of the absence of any end appointed by the natural reason. Disciples of indefectible principles are compared to the bee or the ant who “appears to be, and no doubt in fact, is, accomplishing his own purpose.” Judge Hand sees in the regularity of the bee’s and the ant’s action for an end a rudimentary “liberty” the perfection of which is in proportion to the possibilities of deflecting from any fixed end. Since the possibility of deflection from a “natural intention” is notably greater in the case of human behavior, Judge Hand seems to think that the specific difference between human liberty and animal “liberty” lies in the absence in human affairs of any indefectible principles. And this absence of indefectible principles is the very essence of liberty — a liberty based on the element of indetermination in nature. As Judge Hand says, human nature is malleable especially if you can indoctrinate the disciple with indefectible principles; it is freer and not so malleable if it cannot be definitely shaped. But what human nature is if it has no recognizable shape at all is something for which it would appear to be hard to find a word: It is like Eddington’s “scientific table” — it is “there — wherever ‘there’ may be.” It is as Mr. David Riesman says: in our other-directed society we find ourselves by “radar.” And Mr. Trilling — to

2. Ibid., p.22.
3. Ibid., p.23. Italics mine.
4. Ibid., pp.22-23.
refer to him again — says that the American critic in his liberal and progressive character, prefers Theodore Dreiser to Henry James because Dreiser's books "have the awkwardness, the chaos . . . which we associate with 'reality.' In the American metaphysic, reality is always material reality . . . unformed, impenetrable . . ." 1 No more than does physics have anything to say about the "familiar table" that "lies visible to my eyes and tangible to my grasp" does liberalism have anything to say about the familiar world of moral, aesthetic, and political ends.

But we must notice what it is that prevents man, in Judge Hand's view, from pursuing his desires without let or hindrance. It is not "indefectible principles"; it is the delicate test and remorseless logic of facts: "In any event my thesis is that the best answer (to indefectible principles) is . . . that they are at war with our only truthworthy way of living in accord with the facts." 2

What are these facts in accord with which we must live if we want to be free? In regard to them we must take notice of an important difference between the physical world and the world of human culture and civilization. After telling us that modern physics has by delicate test and remorseless logic assured us that the "scientific table" is the only one which is really "there," Eddington quickly adds:

On the other hand I need not tell you that modern physics will never succeed in exorcising that first (familiar) table . . . which lies visible to my eyes and tangible to my grasp . . . No doubt they are ultimately to be identified in some fashion. But the process by which the external world of physics is transformed into a world of familiar acquaintance . . . is outside the scope of physics . . . The frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows is one of the most significant of recent advances. 3

The physicist is not disturbed by his inability to account for the "familiar world": it is there "without let or hindrance." The electric charges, sparsely scattered in emptiness and rushing about with great speed — these are undeniably, if mysteriously, directed to the forming of the "familiar table" — the coloured, hard, shaped table of a certain magnitude, "visible to my eyes and tangible to my grasp" — the table of Aristotle's "proper sensibles" and "common sensibles." The physical world is something "given" and something "governed." And because this is so the hypotheses employed by physicists to "save the appearances" are not unlimited in number: they must "increasingly explain the domain understood by the sensi-

ble impressions.” ¹ But the world of human culture and civilization is, on the contrary, a world that has to be constructed — not from nothing, but, unlike the familiar table, there is nothing there that cannot be exorcised. What is there are the ends of human life appointed by the natural reason (including truth, which is the end of the theoretic intellect) and the natural associations (the family, the state) which guarantee the ends of living. These are indeed indefectible principles in the sense that the liberty of contrariety whereby they can be exorcised is not a mark of the perfection of human nature. Indeed, as Aristotle says, it is vice that exorcises them. “Virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy the first principles, and in actions the final cause is the first principle as the hypotheses are in mathematics.” ² The self-liberation envisaged by liberalism is precisely that man may experience very tangibly the material infinity experienced theoretically by the modern physicist and free himself from the world of common experience — the world from which, as we have noticed Eddington and Einstein attest, the physicist never succeeds in freeing himself. If modern physics is taken to mean, indeed, that “the human intellect becomes aware of its own infinity through measuring its powers by the infinite universe,” ³ modern social science means that in the world produced by “human sensuous activity” man is freed from the imaginary boundaries of “indefectible principles” and “natural associations” so that he may experience practically and not merely theoretically the generic nature of his being: The Kinsey Report offers a “democratic pluralism of sexuality” and Mr. Riesman says that “the Bill of Rights requires permitting pornography and even Confidential to circulate,” ⁴ and Erich Fromm traces the genesis of “authoritarian ethics” to the family, where the individual is first separated from himself by the authority of his parents and where obedience is the

1. Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, *L’Évolution des idées en physique* (Paris, Flammarion, s.d.) p.286. “In the effort we make to understand the world, we are a little like a man who tries to comprehend the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the dial and the hands in movement, he hears the tick-tock, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he will be able to form a certain image of the mechanism, which will serve to answer for everything that he can observe, but he can never be sure that his image is the only one capable of explaining his observations. He will never be in a position to compare his image with the real mechanism, and he will not even be able to represent the possibility or the signification of such a comparison. But he believes most certainly that in the measure that his knowledge increases, his image of the reality will become more and more simple and will increasingly explain the domain understood by the sensible impressions.” *Ibid.* pp.35-36.


3. Ernst Cassirer, *Essay on Man* (Op cit., p.15). In classical metaphysics the human intellect was considered to be relatively infinite but to be simply speaking finite. Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, Bk III.

first virtue and disobedience the first sin.1 The “facts” which liberalism recognizes as providing the “only truthworthy way of living” must never be thought of as “explaining” the domain of that common moral experience which holds the same relation to the field of human behavior as common sensible experience holds in relation to physics. Pornography, Confidential, a democratic pluralism of sexuality, the radar-controlled, other-directed society of peers, the disappearance—not of a ruling class but—of what Mr. Walter Lippmann calls “the functional (arrangement) of the relationships between the mass of people and the government” (the substitution of veto-groups, Gallup-pollsters and inside-dopesters for genuine rule)—these things mean nothing less than what Judge Hand avows, namely, that “(indefectible principles) are at war with our only truthworthy way of living in accord with the facts.”2 Indefectible principles are not among the facts in accord with which we must live if we want to be free. The only facts are material and efficient principles, “manipulable” indeed, but no longer presupposed to any intelligible form or end. As Mr. Trilling says, ideas perceptive of values and consequences “are held to be mere ‘details,’ and what is more, to be details which, if attended to, have the effect of diminishing reality.”3 They have less relation to the world of morals and politics than does the “familiar table” to the world of physics; for the “scientific table” saves the appearances of the familiar one.

The growing awareness of liberalism that such ideas are not among the facts in accord with which we must live marks the transition of liberalism from what Mr. Riesman calls the phase of “other-direction” to what he calls “autonomy.” It marks the effort of liberalism to overcome its paradox, to “humanize” nature and to restore to mind its role of causality, its effectiveness as a governing instrument. It marks also its dilemma. For if liberalism’s phase of anomy and other-direction is characterized by the “facts” arising from indetermination of material and efficient principles in human behavior, its phase of autonomy is marked by the conscious overthrow of that common experience of moral ends and purposes that opposes its “free constructs.” This is liberalism’s necessary direction. As Judge Hand observes, “(Indefectible principles) are at war with our only truthworthy way

1. Man for Himself (Rinehart & Company Inc., New York) pp.10-13. Mr. Fromm even traces “authoritarian ethics” back to the teaching concerning the first parents, Adam and Eve, whose chief sin, he says (contrary to the formal teaching of theologians on this point), was disobedience. It is interesting indeed that theologians in fact maintain on the contrary that the first sin was not disobedience but pride—meaning thereby what Fromm means by “humanistic ethics,” namely, the inordinate desire for a spiritual good, which good desired was the “science of good and evil” and the inordinateness consisted in wanting to determine good and evil for themselves.
of living in accord with the facts." And Professor Arnold Brecht speaking of the liberal methodology ("Scientific Value Relativism") observes that this method does not doom us to indifference and apathy, for "it can often demonstrate that some type of political actions give the people a better guaranty than do alternative actions for getting what they actually desire and avoiding results that they actually do not desire..." It is exactly at this point that the devastating effects of liberalism appear. A people that has moved to autonomy by way of other-direction (and more remotely from inner-direction and tradition-direction) can only desire the overthrow of everything that stands in the way of their "free constructs."

Liberalism's path from anomy to autonomy can only be what it is indeed for Marx — the destruction of every hitherto-existing social form so that man himself may become "the totality... the subjective existence of society thought and felt for itself." There is more than a striking parallel between Mr. Riesman's description of autonomy as implying "a heightened self-consciousness" by which man realizes "increased possibilities of being and becoming" and Marx's final emancipation of man's "generic being" — a "being which relates itself to the species as to his own proper being or relates itself to itself as a generic being." Is this not the meaning of Riesman's "heightened self-consciousness" which, he tells us, "is not a quantitative matter but in part an awareness of the problem of self-consciousness itself, an achievement of a higher order of abstraction"? The separating of man's individual self from his generic self is expressly attributed by Erich Fromm, the distinguished defender of liberal humanism, to the institution of the family; man can be returned to himself (obviously by a "higher order of abstraction") only when the primordial relationship of the family community is rationalized and exorcised. The title of Mr. Fromm's book on humanistic ethics — Man for Himself — epitomizes this demand and is curiously reminiscent of Marx's italicized emphasis on a "complete, conscious return, accomplished within the interior of the whole wealth of past development, of man for himself..."

In short, liberalism's primal act of imagination whereby it established its essence and existence in the enhanced sense of freedom con-

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sequent upon the Humean principle that the aberrations in nature are ever so conformable to reality as its apparent intentions issued in anomy and other-direction. This condition is overcome by the profounder insight that, as we have noted, by the law that reduces the material and mental spheres to a common denominator the aberrations in nature become the exemplar for freedom in the world of culture and civilization. The way to autonomy then must lie, as Marx most clearly perceived, in destroying all the “intentions” of nature — the “forms and products of consciousness” represented by “‘pure’ theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc.” These are the presuppositions of Riesman’s “tradition directed” and “inner directed” societies and of Fromm’s authoritarian ethics — “religion, the family, state, law, morals, science, spirit, etc.” These are the indefectible principles and natural associations, and they are not among the facts in accord with which we must live — in a people’s democracy. But they are precisely the things upon which, in the classical tradition of the West, all free government has depended. And the reason for this is that all of these things are nothing but participations of that intellect that is “separable indeed but (does) not exist apart from matter” in the life of that Prime Intellect upon whose perfect freedom, indeed — as Aristotle well understood — “depend the heavens and the world of nature.”

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2. Supra, p.10, nn.3 and 4.