Abstracts
Résumé
Cet article se propose d’étudier si les caractéristiques de gouvernance des entreprises socialement responsables diffèrent de celles des autres entreprises. A partir d’un échantillon d’entreprises socialement responsables (classées dans Business Ethics magasine) et d’un échantillon témoin pour la période 2006-2009, nous avons cherché à savoir si la responsabilité sociale était un levier déterminant qui contribuerait à l’amélioration de la qualité de gouvernance. Sur les échantillons concernés, la démonstration n’a pu être faite d’un lien entre la responsabilité sociale et la gouvernance.
Mots-clés :
- Gouvernance,
- Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises
Abstract
This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their corporate governance. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to enhance corporate governance practices. Using Business Ethics lists for 2006 to 2009, we have constructed a sample with 350 U.S. companies receiving an ethics rating and 350 other firms (considered as matching firms and not considered as socially responsible firms in any CSR ratings). Our results show no differences in corporate governance characteristics between the two samples of firms.
Keywords:
- corporate governance,
- corporate social responsibility
Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo es establecer si las características de gobernanza de las empresas socialmente responsables difieren de las de otras empresas. Basados en una muestra de empresas socialmente responsables (clasificación Business Ethics) y en una muestra testigo por el período 2006-2009, hemos intentado establecer si la responsabilidad social es un factor deter- minante que contribuye al mejoramiento de la calidad de la gobernanza. Sobre la base de dichas muestras, no se pudo demostrar que existe un nexo entre responsabilidad social y gobernanza.
Palabras clave:
- Gobernanza,
- Responsabilidad Social de las Empresas
Appendices
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