Abstracts
Résumé
Ce papier explore le lien existant entre les ressources politiques d’entreprise et son efficience. Nos résultats montrent que la mise en valeur du mode de gouvernance clanique permet aux entreprises de survivre face à la crise, en mobilisant grâce à leurs connections politiques les subventions nécessaires. En fait, ce mode de gouvernance hybride correspond à un mécanisme d’extraction de rente, qu’on retrouve dans les économies avec un marché imparfait (pays en transition).
Mots-clés :
- mode de gouvernance,
- clan,
- Ukraine,
- oligarchie
Abstract
This article investigates the existing relationship between political resources of the firm and its efficiency. Our results indicate that the application of this mode of governance helps firms to survive when they face crises. Thanks to their political connections, firms achieve to capture necessary subsidies. This mode of hybrid governance corresponds to a rent-extracting mechanism that can be found in economies with an imperfect market (such as transitional countries).
Keywords:
- Mode of governance,
- clan,
- Ukraine,
- oligarchy
Resumen
Este artículo analiza el vínculo existente entre los recursos políticos de empresa y su eficiencia. Nuestros resultados indican que la aplicación de esta forma de gobernanza ayuda las empresas a sobrevivir frente a la crisis económica. Las empresas utilizan sus vínculos políticos para obtener subsidios necesarios. Este modo de gobernanza corresponde a un mecanismo de extracción de rentas que puedan surgir en economías con un mercado imperfecto (países en transición).
Palabras clave:
- modo de gobernanza,
- clan,
- Ucrania,
- oligarquía
Appendices
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