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Should We Teach Students to Resist?

Joyce Bellous, McMaster Divinity College

Introduction

To respond to the question, Should we teach students to resist? two dimensions of the term “teach” are important—namely, its formal and informal aspects.¹ Its formal aspect refers to what we consciously or intentionally (programmatically) set out to do; that is, we teach something to someone so that our selected educational aims can be realized. The second aspect includes those practices that characterize our teaching; on the basis of these practices, students pick up certain ideas along with formal instruction. As an example, our students may pick up the idea that we like them and care that they learn what we intend to teach them. The information that we like and care for students is not part of the programme that we outline when we consciously consider teaching mathematics or English. Rather, it is what students pick up by being in our presence. It is not always easy for them to identify why they believe their teacher likes them and cares that they learn, but students seem particularly adept at garnering these messages.² It is common to think of the expression the “hidden curriculum” when problems of this sort are described, but I am not at present interested in making relations between the practices I pick out and the notion of the hidden curriculum except to note that these practices have to do with enculturated and unreflective ways of exercising power as much as they have to do with domination and the resistance that domination inevitably calls forth.

I propose that both the formal and informal aspects of teaching *should* inspire students to practice resistance that is directed towards the development of authenticity and agency. I will first identify and discuss reasons to support the proposal and then spell out a relationship between resistance and a concept of voice that is central to the empowerment of authentic participation in democratic cultures. Finally, I examine three types of practice that shape the exercise of power. The motivation for the proposal that effective teaching should inspire a particular kind of resistance comes from the confidence that teachers can and must learn to pay attention to the ways they open or close up the possibilities for democratic participation and practice in the classroom.

Resistance and Integrity

I have two reasons for saying that the formal and informal dimensions of teaching should educate students to resist. The first is that our pedagogic practices should support rather than contradict our formal assertions about what we value in the teaching-learning relation. By this, I mean we should *do* what we *say*. It is possible to take one of two paths to maintain educative integrity. Teachers could set out to promote student participation and their classroom practices could support this formal assertion. Resistance would take the form of reminding a professor or teacher when teaching practices were dismissive of student participation and perspective. In this instance, resistance would be carried out in league with a professor’s or teacher’s formal position on the value of student participation. Students would participate in keeping us on the straight and narrow, for it is certainly the case that their participation is a constraint on

doing what we singlemindedly want to do as teachers. The issue here is whether we think of students as a distraction from, or the main point of, our educational efforts.

The second path teachers might take is to assert that student involvement is not permitted, giving students their reasons, and informal teaching practices would support non-participation. In this approach, we would be doing what we say, but, with respect to its legitimacy, I assume that the development of democratic skills requires practice in participation so that reasons given would have to be credible in the context of Canadian political culture which does make this demand. Democratic skills rely on a developed capacity for involvement in public conversation. Despite our beliefs about Canadian society and the teaching environment, I suggest it is common for students to experience a failure of pedagogic integrity; that is, they experience the pedagogic hypocrisy of our saying one thing and doing another and the practice of signalling that student participation is not important while giving them no good reasons for silencing them. Pedagogic hypocrisy opens the door to a "culture of silence," as described by Freire and Shor; this is a culture that works against the development of skill in democratic conversation.³

At university, as an example, students are very good at sensing whether professors mean it when they say that classroom discussion is an important part of the course experience. We all remember classes in which we quickly realized that a professor did not want to be interrupted by our questions. While we may have misled ourselves about a professor's motives for silencing us, we learned to sit still and say nothing. When we consider resistance, the passivity and submissiveness that is exemplified by the university classroom example matters a great deal. How is it that one person, who says that classroom discussion is important, can silence a group of 10, 20, 30 or more students through the deployment of practices that students recognize as a signal to sit still and say nothing?

I want to look more closely at ways of maintaining pedagogic integrity and at the same time *working with* student resistance. I am assuming that student resistance is more educative than passivity because passivity stifles democratic participation and conversation. Passivity locks us into immaturity and, as a way of responding to someone who knows more than the student knows, can stick with people for life. In order to explicate its benefits, the educational dimension of resistance needs to be distinguished from its merely political aspects. Political resistance has drawn on practices that seem necessary in the face of an exercise of social power that limits people's maturity in ways they find insupportable. That is, there is a relationship between a particular exercise of power and the response of resistance. Throughout his analysis of modern power relations, Foucault argues that domination—the exercise of power that reduces the one dominated to an object,⁴—calls forth resistance. But he goes on to assert, *contra* Sartre, that the exercise of power is not automatically evil. To Foucault, power is a strategic game. He uses the example of the pedagogic institution and says:

I don't see where the evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given game of truth, knowing more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits knowledge to him, communicates skills to him. The problem is rather to know how you are to avoid in these practices—where power *cannot*

not play and where it is not evil in itself—the effects of domination which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher, or put a student under the power of an abusively authoritarian professor.⁵ (Italics added.)

Foucault suggests that the possibility of domination is a constant threat to the well-being of the teaching-learning relation, but that power can be exercised according to practices of freedom that limit domination. I agree with Foucault at this point. Yet, the practical problem we have with the idea of resistance is due to the models we typically use to describe liberation. For example, Foucault posits that liberation on the model of the colonizer/colonized relationship does not serve as a generalizable model for resistance. Fanon spells out the colonial relation and posits the need for violence in the act of liberation.⁶ He offers a position that influenced Freire's thinking as well. In this view, liberation requires violent opposition because the colonial relation originates in, and is sustained by, violence. Violence calls forth violence. The colonizer must be eradicated and replaced. In Freire's work, there is an oppositional relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed in which the oppressed must liberate themselves and their oppressors through an act of love; although Freire leaves open the possibility for violence.⁷ Violence also grounds the model that Shor uses when he describes classroom realities as he sees them. He asserts that:

There is a "symbolic violence" in school and society which imposes silence on students. It is symbolic because it is in the very order of things, not an actual physical beating, but an environment of rules, curriculum, tests, punishments, requirements, correction, remediation, and standard English, which establishes the authorities as the ones in charge. The environment is symbolically violent because it is based in manipulation and subordination. It openly declares itself "democratic" while actually constructing and reproducing inequality. . . . For individual students, it becomes hard to see alternatives to "the way things are and have to be."⁸

Shor's point about passivity and submissiveness is similar to Foucault's analysis of schooling in *Discipline and Punish* (1979), where Foucault places so much emphasis on the exercise of power in practices that constitute our experience.⁹ But later, in 1984, Foucault says that the model of political liberation does not serve us adequately when we are trying to figure out how to live well with the freedom that liberation secures for us.¹⁰

I would say that if we picture resistance as constituted in an atmosphere of violence, we cannot make good *educational* use of its practices. Empowerment provides a better model for teaching because empowerment is grounded on a view of power that suggests models for power relations that have everything to do with maturity and partnership.¹¹ Models for resistance that are grounded in violence remain within what I call a dominator paradigm for power relations; within this view, an essential antagonism structures the pedagogic relationship, an antagonism that Foucault celebrates rather than eradicates but which Freire tries to eliminate through the loving opposition that the oppressed must engage in.¹² Models for resistance which remain within a dominator paradigm for power describe social relations in terms of violence and perpetuate the project of overwhelming the dominator, who is perceived as less than human and deserving of replacement. While this description of the oppressor is accurate and important to make, I suggest that the project of replacement is insupportable

under the conditions of an empowering partnership model for power relations and under the conditions that inhere in trying to live well with freedom once it is founded.

In order to distinguish between resistance grounded in violence and resistance as a companion to empowerment, we must pick out the differences between power and empowerment. Although both terms seem to rely on the same root word, the practices associated with each are incompatible. If we use the term power in its traditional sense, power is grounded in an *economism* that operates on the basis of a commodity model so that power refers to *zero-sum* games in which one individual or group loses something while another individual or group gains something. What is lost or gained is power, sometimes expressed as a gain or loss of position, privilege, or status. I suggest that what is lost may be more importantly conceived as a loss of confidence and self-knowledge; a loss that is best spelled out as a failure of "personal power." Personal power refers to the feeling or belief that I am someone who can say and do those things that are congruent with the conception I have of myself. If power is thought of as a commodity, the individuals or groups who gain something in an exercise of power do not gain in personal power, as it is spelled out above; rather, they gain a double portion of power as commodity that amounts to the ability to get their own way at the expense of others whose personal power is depleted or not developed in the first place. The reason that someone's personal power is not developed in the first place can only be understood in terms of the socially-constituted vulnerability that characterizes some people's lives due to conditions associated with gender, race, and poverty. In addition, on the view of power as commodity, resources may be scarce. Since power is a scarce resource, distributions of power must be passed among some individuals and exclude others. These distributions have typically coincided with divisions between gender (male versus female), race (white versus non-white) and money (those who have it and those who do not). In each case, power as commodity benefits those indicated by the first term in each bracketed pair.

When we use "empowerment," its root word picks out an entirely different exercise of power in social relations. Here power is not a scarce material resource, nor is it the redistribution of a commodity that leaves some people out. Power is a kind of social energy which has no limit and is relational not material. If A empowers B, then personal power is created in B and is neither diminished nor exaggerated in A. The creation of power is not an *ex nihilo* act but is, rather, the excavating of the personal power that rightly should inhere in B's capacity to be human from the layers and layers of disabling social experience under which B's attempts to exercise power are buried. This assertion picks up Shor's belief that passivity is not natural. When passivity characterizes people, it is as a result of practices that constitute their social vulnerability and pin them to passivity. To suggest that resistance is related to democratic competencies is to distinguish this aspect of resistance from resistance that is primarily negative and frequently aggressive. Again, aggression is "inevitable because passivity is *not* a natural condition of childhood or adulthood."¹³ In terms of negative resistance, student aggression may be effective at sabotaging the ease teachers have in using power to silence, but students are not able to use negative aggression to "change education in favour of their constructive freedom."¹⁴ That is, aggressive efforts to resist the culture of silence are self-

defeating for students in the long run because this resistance is grounded on a traditional view of power as the capacity to invade and take away, to destroy or get, without regard for the other. In this form, power does not provide young people with the skills they need to live well with the adult freedoms and responsibilities associated with democracy. It is a response that should not be necessary in a democratic society.¹⁵ Additionally, in passive or aggressive resistance, mistrust is ubiquitous and inevitable. In summary, our educational intentions and practices should unite to permit and affirm resistance that is aimed at exercising the democratic competencies that are necessary for the development of personal and political voice in future citizens.

Resistance and Trust

The second reason that formal and informal aspects of teaching should teach students to resist is connected to the building of trust that becomes possible in pedagogic integrity; that is, the congruence between what we say and do as teachers. If students learn to resist in the context of pedagogic integrity, they can trust that what we say is what they will get in formal pedagogic programs as well as in informal classroom practices. Resistance would be motivated by a democratic urge to be mature, participating citizens. Under these conditions, resistance takes the form of posing authentic questions; in addition, resistance is free to take the form of listening to reasons given and assessing these reasons in light of democratic ideals and challenging these reasons openly when they do not match up with the knowledge and perspective of the learner in the teaching-learning relation. I am not assuming that students will be good at these question-posing, listening, and assessing skills at first; rather, it is what they have to learn through practice. Their skill at contributing to the educative teaching-learning relation is influenced by the practices that have already shaped them. I will return to this shortly. Regardless of their skill, trust in the context of pedagogic integrity produces an environment in which resistance can come to be educative because it is exercised *with* rather than *over or against* others. Educative resistance can only take place in the absence of oppression and in the presence of an empowering teaching-learning relation. While trust, which must flow from students to teacher as well as from teacher to students, is not the only characteristic of an empowering pedagogic relationship, it is at its core. An empowering pedagogic relationship is also directed towards the development of human maturity and focuses on the development of the creative individual. Two-way trust is central to both these projects. Passivity and submissiveness in the presence of hypocrisy and oppression do not foster creativity and they frustrate the development of trust and human maturity.

The aim of resistance in the context of trust is toward developing maturity in students through the recognition by both teacher and students that a teacher's perspective is learned and authentic rather authoritarian and is situated within a horizon of significance that may not be the same as the students'.¹⁶ Students must come to realize (bring into being) their own thoughts and reflectively constituted perspectives, and to speak and act from within these perspectives. In this way, a student's unique personal capacities are enlivened through the teaching-learning relation. This is a highly complex educational task. At this point, I only want to pick out the role that resistance and empowerment play in its realization.

Resistance and the art of voice

The central and unifying aim of empowerment is human maturity. The goal of empowerment is the realization of the mature, creative individual who practices personal power and encourages it in others; the development of human agency and authenticity is central to maturity, partnership, and participatory democracy. Resistance, in this view, does not presuppose the eradication of hitherto powerful members of society through oppositional practices to unseat them from their position; rather, this view assumes that human maturity is distorted in all such members of society and human power is misunderstood by them. Cooperational practices are directed by the determination to uncover self-knowledge through articulating agency and authenticity in a persistent and resilient exercise of personal power. The resiliency of personal power is expressed in the concept of voice.

Voice refers to the articulation of critical opinion aimed at making our legitimate interests known; voice is direct and straightforward as opposed to protest that is a private, secret vote.¹⁷ Voice refers to any attempt to change, rather than escape from an objectionable state of affairs through working collectively or individually.¹⁸ Voice implies being able to sense and say what we want and to provide others with our reasons. In terms of personal power, the art of voice conveys to others the plans and purposes we have for ourselves. If voice is related to empowerment, then the capacity to speak our identity clearly and to object to what is objectionable is not grounded in mere self-interest but it is related to the interests of others. Voice is an economic concept that has been applied to other contexts as well.¹⁹ On this view, there is a complex relationship between voice and escape or exit such that the art of voice does not develop if exit is either too easy or too costly. There is a relationship between voice and escape or exit if it is applied to the classroom setting. In the classroom, physical exit is costly. Students are generally in classrooms out of compulsion. If a culture of silence predominates in North American classrooms, an art of voice is not likely to develop in students. The art of voice implies discernment that comes through practice; an art of voice is not stubborn or short-sighted; neither is it negatively or passively aggressive. Voice develops in a context in which educational practices permit students to understand and value what is going on in order to provide the teacher with insights about how the teaching-learning relation affects them. An art of voice enables us to sense, address and resolve the conflict that will inevitably come up if we take seriously the dialogical aspect of the teaching-learning relation. Each time conflict crops up, the exercise of power in the teaching-learning relation is capable of silencing or instilling the art of voice.

Practising Education

In order to distinguish the oppositional practices that seem necessary in the face of domination and violence from the cooperational practices that are possible in an empowering pedagogic relationship (in which we express resistance to secure authenticity and agency), I want to identify three types of school and home practices that are influential in determining how students turn out. These practices may be coercive, laissez-faire, or empowering. In making dis-

tinctions among these, it is important to note that these practices are embedded in the informal dimension of teaching. Teachers would not express formally the beliefs about the teaching/relation that are exemplified in the first two types of practice. We must listen to Canadian students, who are so well-tuned to the informal aspect, and examine their subjectivities in order to judge which of these practices have predominated in their schooling.

Coercive practices can be identified by their characteristic dependence on force, whether this is epistemological force (through deception), psychological force (through threatening talk or behaviour), or physical force (through violence).²⁰ In analyzing coercive practices in the pedagogic situation, adults (parents, teachers, and professors) exercise power on the assumptions that they do and should have all the power and students or the young have none, that power is a commodity that resides in their position which may be passed out or withheld at will. If students operate on these same assumptions, the outcome of coercive practices is demonstrated in their docility and utility and the young become useful for the purposes of others: those who are coerced become either passive and aggressive, or passive and inaccessible. As an example, students' work may be used by professors with little recourse on the part of students and teachers may use students in a variety of ways including taking sexual advantage of them. The net result of these practices is an exercise of power which becomes an end in itself. In a coercive practice, the adult struggles for power in such a way that all other ends become secondary, or are eclipsed entirely. As Simone Weil observes:

Power-seeking, owing to its essential incapacity to seize hold of its object, rules out all consideration of an end, and finally comes, through an inevitable reversal, to take the place of all ends. It is this reversal of the relationship between means and end, it is this fundamental folly that accounts for all that is senseless and bloody right through history.²¹

What must be picked out is that for Weil, as well as for Foucault, the exercise of power is never complete or absolute. Always, there is the possibility of resistance or escape on the part of the one being dominated. But the resistance and/or escape is shaped by the coercive practices themselves. That is, students' possibilities for resistance are directed through these coercive practices so that they come to resist in ways which are self-defeating. As result, they do not acquire authentic self-knowledge and a capacity for cooperation. In addition, they have difficulty imagining a world different from the coercive one in which their experience has been constituted. That is, students engage in passive or aggressive resistance mentioned earlier. The outcome of this kind of resistance in the context of coercive practices is students who procrastinate or oppose, who are hard to draw out or hard to guide, and feel worthless and unloved (perhaps unlovable). In short, they do not have a developed sense of personal power; they have no voice.

Laissez-faire practices are sometimes taken up by those who are appalled by coercive practices but who have not been sufficiently reflective about the limitations inherent in the practices they feel compelled to use. In laissez-faire practices, students are given all the power and the adult abnegates his or her right to exercise power over students, a pattern which may also structure the relationship between parents and children. That is, power is conceived by the

adult as evil and its use is abhorred. Oddly, the adult sees no problem in permitting power to be exercised in an unrestrained fashion by children or adolescents, although both teachers and parents may come to express fear of the young. What is lost in laissez-faire practices is the developed ability in the young to feel and show respect for others. At the core of laissez-faire practices is a neglect of adult responsibility to exercise power in the inevitable but temporary asymmetrical relationship that exists between adult, child and adolescent. This inevitable but temporary asymmetry is picked out in Foucault's example, provided earlier, in which he asserts that in the pedagogic relation, the exercise of power is not necessarily evil in itself. Typically, good parents are sensitive to the need to gradually transfer power to their children in an appropriate and measured way. In laissez-faire practices, domination from above is avoided at all costs, but the price we all pay for our failure to guide the young towards attitudes and practices of respect and cooperation is immeasurable. The offspring of laissez-faire practices cannot respect others and do not understand themselves and their own compulsive need for control. They cannot bear to have people say no to them. They become people who cannot find a sense of place in community with others. They are persistently marginalized because of this incapacity. In them, personal power is distorted. In terms of the resistance that is possible for them, blind resistance becomes the emblem of all social interactions. If children and students who suffer coercive practices are hard to draw out, children subjected to laissez-faire practices are impossible to control and, perhaps, impossible to be with at all, even with themselves. The laissez-faire child's incapacity to respect others is a burden that can last a life-time. At bottom, the neglect of adult responsibility that inheres in laissez-faire practices misdirects the child's sense of personal worth. The inability to be at peace in the presence of others conveys to this child just how unlovable he or she must be. The art of voice cannot grow or flourish in a vacuum of respect for others; these young people do not find an articulate voice.

In contrast to the first two types, empowering practices can lead children and students into mature, responsible, and responsive relationships with their social world. Empowerment results in the development of personal power and is grounded in reciprocity and respect. If coercive practices have force at their core, and if laissez-faire practices have neglect at their core, attentiveness is at the core of empowering practices. Attentiveness is that pedagogic stance in which the teacher or another adult is engrossed in the other in such a way that the one attended to is capable of sensing his or her own abilities, interests, responsibilities, and inclinations in a context of care, respect, fairness, and eventual partnership.²² Self-knowledge is made possible through attentiveness conveyed through a reflectively constituted world-view inclusive of a world-openness that is capable of prizing the authentic differences expressed in the child or student. That is, attentiveness is directed towards perceiving and prizing genuine and salient differences in the child's perspective. The child's resistance is educative because it is directed towards the development of agency and authenticity in the context of a coherent and plausible reality that at the same time is capable of countenancing these differences. Additionally, in empowering relationships, power is neither finite nor fixed in either player in the social relation; it is not hidden, as it is in Rousseau's *Emile*. Power is not manipulative; the adult speaks clearly, confidently, personally, and directly. Unlike

Rousseau's insistence that we must never make a mistake when we interact with the young or the entire relation is lost (a recipe for guilt), the empowered and empowering adult admits mistakes and works out conflict and is reflective in practice so that many mistakes are seen in advance. In general, nothing of force grounded in violence, nor neglect, is found in empowering relationships; resistance is understood to contribute to the development of authentic differences between adults and youth so that participation in civil partnerships becomes possible.

In summary, the resistant response is ambiguous. At bottom, to resist is to say "no"; but if we listen to those who resist, we may hear, "absolutely no," "not now," "not me," "not this way," "not according to my experience or knowledge." All these responses are potential expressions of agency and authenticity. The virtue of empowering educative resistance is grounded in a student's ability to sense and articulate good reasons for resisting something. For example, suppose a grade-one child is told by a teacher that a tomato is a fruit.²³ In the child's experience, tomatoes have been treated as vegetables. The child resists the category that the teacher puts forward. Perhaps the child argues with the teacher. Empowering teachers listen for the type of resistance the child is expressing and ask: What does this child know? What does this child want? What is this child feeling and thinking? Empowering teachers find a way to ask the child these questions to draw out their perceptions because they do not presume to know the child's answers in advance. A bureaucratic teacher will not attempt to decode this resistance, but will try to find a way to manage it so that the child's resistance is snuffed out. If this happens, the child's experience is excluded from the classroom and does not become part of the information that the child uses in developing the critical reasoning necessary for the art of voice.

Students who enjoy empowering pedagogic relationships are capable of respecting others and themselves and develop skills necessary to participatory democracy. Such students would be good at resisting bureaucratic practices that promote passivity and submissiveness to the will of others in the absence of any good reasons. It is entirely possible that the partial resistance inherent in empowerment would be a nuisance in bureaucratic schools. So much the better for education.

Notes

¹A version of this paper was presented at the Learned Societies Conference, June 1993, at Carleton University, Ottawa. I appreciated the comments and questions of Evelina Orteza y Miranda, William Hare, and John Portelli.

²I am not suggesting these messages cannot be consciously considered, but that they often are not.

³Ira Shor and Paul Freire, *A Pedagogy of Liberation: Dialogues on transforming education* (New York, NY: Bergin & Garvey, 1987), 121-141.

⁴Michel Foucault, "The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom," in James Berbauer and David Rasmussen (eds.), *The Final Foucault* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1988), 12.

⁵*Ibid.*, 18-19.

⁶Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (London and Sydney: Pluto

Press, 1967); *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, NY: Grove Press Inc., 1968).

⁷Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York, NY: Continuum, 1988), 42.

⁸*Pedagogy for Liberation, op. cit.*, 123.

⁹I explore Foucault's contribution to our understanding of power and experience more fully in J.E. Bellous, *Empowerment, Power and Education*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Alberta, 1993.

¹⁰*The Final Foucault, op. cit.*, 3.

¹¹Joyce Bellous and Allen Pearson, "Empowerment and Teacher Education." Invited submission to *Studies in Philosophy and Education* (forthcoming).

¹²Violence is a deeply problematic response in minority experience. The passivity that typifies, for example, the colonial relation is only ended when the oppressed become enraged enough to end their passive tolerance of harm to themselves; this rage seems to me to be a crucial step in articulating self-worth. It is an anger that shouts: "This is enough. I am no longer to be spoken to this way or treated in this manner." This anger, which moves those who are deeply disprivileged to prize their human dignity, is appropriate anger. If the structures that perpetuate and benefit from oppression do not recognize the legitimacy of this anger, violence appears as the only possibility to make the minority point. Since those who are in positions of privilege are numb to the acts or threats of violence that secure their position, they can be oblivious to the meaning of this anger.

¹³*Pedagogy for Liberation, op. cit.*, 123.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁵The point is examined carefully in Paul Willis' *Learning to Labour* (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House, 1977), especially pages 119-137. As Willis spells out, students' conception of the future is instrumental in the way they reproduce their past. In addition to thinking about our concept of democracy, we need to pay attention to how our students think about their own future.

¹⁶Charles Taylor, *The Malaise of Modernity* (Concord, Ontario: Anansi, 1991), 31-41.

¹⁷Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 15.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁹Carol Gilligan explores the idea in *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) and in *Mapping the Moral Domain* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); as does Susan Moller Okin in *Justice, Gender and the Family* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989); Elisabeth J. Porter, *Women and Moral Identity* (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991); and George Fletcher, *Loyalty* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993).

²⁰J.E. Bellous, Masters Thesis, *Towards a Philosophy of Multicultural Education*, University of Calgary, 1988, 27.

²¹Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J. Seidler, *A Truer Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), 194.

²²I am not suggesting a model for the pedagogic relation in which the child has equal power to the teacher. See, for example, Jesse Goodman's *Elementary Schooling for Critical Democracy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992). I agree with the position taken here that "teachers and students should not be 'equals' within elementary schools," 106. The trick is to lead children toward adult participation eventually and to decipher the patterns of power exchange that contribute to that development.

²³This example was given to me by John Portelli and I believe his child's experience is common if not characteristic of schooling. I know of a young woman whose parents were employed in a Third World country where orange trees grew. They returned to Canada so that their daughter could attend primary school. When the child was asked to colour a picture that had oranges in it, she coloured the skins green. The teacher corrected her and made her colour the orange skins orange. In fact, in the country of her pre-school years, the oranges on the trees did have green skins. Yet, her first-hand knowledge was dismissed as impertinent resistance.