Abstracts
Résumé
Dans cet article, je traite de la nature des processus cognitifs sous-tendant nos attributions d’états mentaux aux animaux non humains. Selon la conception traditionnelle, nous n’avons qu’un accès indirect aux états mentaux d’autrui, qui doivent être inférés sur la base du comportement. Cette conception traditionnelle influence autant les débats conceptuels concernant l’esprit des animaux que les recherches empiriques sur la cognition animale. Or de récents travaux sur la cognition sociale humaine avancent plutôt une conception « interactionniste », selon laquelle les états mentaux peuvent parfois être directement perçus dans le comportement. J’applique dans cet article la conception interactionniste à l’attribution d’états mentaux aux animaux. Je conclus que celle-ci rend mieux compte des attitudes du sens commun à l’égard des états mentaux des animaux et est plus féconde pour la recherche empirique sur la cognition animale que la conception traditionnelle.
Mots-clés :
- Cognition animale,
- interaction sociale,
- cognition sociale,
- éthique animale
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss the nature of the cognitive processes underlying our attributions of mental states to nonhuman animals. In the traditional view, we have only indirect access to the mental states of others, which must be inferred on the basis of behavior. This traditional conception informs both conceptual debates about animal minds and empirical research on animal cognition. However, recent work on human social cognition has instead put forward an “interactionist” view, according to which mental states can sometimes be directly perceived in behavior. In this paper I apply the interactionist view to the attribution of mental states to animals. I conclude that this view better accounts for common sense attitudes toward animal mental states and is more fruitful for empirical research on animal cognition than the traditional view.
Keywords:
- animal cognition,
- social interaction,
- social cognition,
- animal ethics
Appendices
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