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Egalitarianism, Safety, and Virtue in Education: A Response to Callan

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Egalitarianism, Safety, and Virtue in Education: A Response to Callan

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So here we are: two more white cis-hetero male academics discussing the practice of “safe space.” Is this practice necessary, we ask, to eradicate the academy’s long-standing exclusion and domination of people deemed different from us, or does it constitute an unacceptable attack on academic freedom and the right to free speech? Eamonn Callan opens his essay “Education in Safe and Unsafe Spaces” (2016) by briefly contrasting the arguments of each side before leading us on a search for middle ground between them. But I see much more truth in the first than in the second, and irony in the fact that we philosophize from our comfortable seats at the intersection of “ascribed privilege of certain kinds” (p. 64) on the efforts of the oppressed to liberate themselves from the very same systems of oppression that offer us such privilege.¹

Before directly addressing some of Callan’s points, I think it might be helpful to do the same justice to the history of safe space that Callan does to that of the Western conception of human dignity. Bell (2015) traces the origins of safe space to group psychotherapy and the sensitivity training that social psychologist Kurt Lewin introduced to corporate America for leadership building in the 1940s. Two decades later, humanistic therapist Carl Rogers “developed the idea into encounter groups which were more aimed at self-actualisation and social change” (Bell, 2015, para. 12).² It was around this time that the concept of safe space appeared in the women’s movement, claims Kenney (2001), where it was distinguished from therapy in that it was used with the aim of analyzing and changing women’s social conditions rather than individual women themselves. It was not so much an end as it was a means, and not so much a physical space as one “created by the coming together of women searching for community” (p. 24). Also, while it failed to provide refuge from violence and harassment from police or others, it “[implied] a certain license to speak and act freely, form collective strength, and generate strategies for resistance” (p. 24). In short, safe space, which had previously been a corporate tool for self-improvement, became by the end of the 1960s an activist tool for social justice.

From the women’s movement, the concept of safe space became central to the development of the lesbian movement, and subsequently the gay one. Hanhardt (2013) describes how the queer community in New York and San Francisco began organizing and agitating for such space after the 1969 Stonewall

¹ Freire (1970/1996) might add that the oppressed aim to free not only themselves, but also their oppressors, by destroying systems of oppression that dehumanize all involved. A quote variously attributed to Booker T. Washington expresses a similar sentiment: “You can't hold a man [sic] down without staying down with him.”

² Rogers is also noteworthy for his “person-centred” approach, which would inspire the “student-centred” credo that is, much like “safe space,” today so carelessly thrown around as a hollow buzzword in many educational circles.
riots, although these efforts emphasized individual instances of urban violence against community members rather than more deep-seated structural violence. So the emerging bourgeois white (liberal) gay mainstream allied itself with real estate developers and policymakers focused on physical safety through privatization and policing—the very same policing responsible for the raid on the Stonewall. Consequently, as this mainstream found power in homeownership (Kenney, 2001), it contributed to gay gentrification and the further marginalization of people according to race, class, and gender identity; working-class gender and sexual minorities of colour in particular either were excluded or excluded themselves from this community. Rather than using safe space to abolish systems of oppression, then, the gay mainstream used it to improve its own standing within those systems, as Callan (2016) says, “at the cost of oppressing others” (p. 67).

Boostrom’s 1998 essay addresses safe space as an emerging metaphor concerning all students in a general educational context, offering a definition of what was previously “not a topic of educational inquiry” (p. 398). But on the ground, at North American college campuses, talk of safe space at that time generally remained centred on gender and sexuality, though in an increasingly inclusive sense. For example, Montreal’s McGill University established its Safe Space Program in 2004, “[aiming] to enhance the acceptance and integration of people of all sexual orientations and gender identities” (McGill, n.d., para. 4). It seems that only recently has the notion of safe space been extended to address racism, the form of oppression with which Callan (2016) is most concerned. Also, many have begun to qualify it instead as “safer space”—much like “safer sex”—to avoid false expectations and acknowledge the fact that, despite our best efforts, safety is not absolute for everyone all the time but requires the continued commitment of all parties involved (Holley & Steiner, 2005; Haley, 2014; Turcotte-Summers, 2016). “Rather than individuals opting in,” suggests Bell (2015), creating a safer space has come to be seen “as something that should define acceptable public behaviour”; it’s “considered to be a social responsibility and you can opt out, but only by leaving” (para. 15–16).

Some who belong to the academic community in addition to groups directly affected by oppression (e.g. Cobb, 2015; Lafargue, 2016; and Khan, 2015) have been turning to non-academic media with strong rebuttals to the fashionable charges—commonly levelled by those of us with more privilege—that safer space and other such anti-oppressive practices are themselves oppressive or that the students who advocate for them are coddled, selfish, hypersensitive children who should stop whining and “grow up.” Because Callan’s (2016) argument is much more nuanced than that, and because of my own privileged positionality and limited experience with anti-oppression work, the rest of my discussion of safer space is focused instead on the following three of Callan’s points: (1) the assumption that egalitarian social relations require “liberal” institutions; (2) the premise that establishing “dignity safety” is the best means of promoting egalitarianism while respecting freedom of speech and academic freedom; and (3) the conclusion that education should prioritize the virtues of civility and candor.

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3 The relationship between the queer community and the police has been challenged more recently through such actions as the Black Lives Matter interruption of the 2016 edition of the Pride parade in Toronto. The local chapter of BLM had been invited to lead the parade, an annual commemoration of Stonewall, and staged a sit-in until organizers agreed to a list of demands among which was the exclusion of police floats.

4 Among the many post-secondary institutions with similar programs is the University of Chicago, despite the fact that it made headlines in the fall of 2016 when incoming undergraduates received a letter condemning the practice from Dean of Students Jay Ellison—who is listed, curiously, as a “Safe Space Ally” on that program’s website (Lourgos, 2016; LGBTQ Student Life, n.d.).
I’m happy to see Callan engaging with and bringing attention to such critical issues, perhaps after being confronted with them in his own teaching practice. I’m also grateful to the editors of this journal for inviting me to respond. But I’ve hesitated to do so, not wanting to contribute to the appropriation of space from those with less privilege who are better positioned to address these matters. On the other hand, as one female blogger of colour puts it (in a quote that has been circulated in social media without attribution), to expect those on the front lines of oppression to disregard their own emotions and put in the additional labour of calmly educating the rest of us “is the epitome of entitlement” (Thanapal, 2016, para. 18). She continues, “All privileged people need to take the responsibility for educating ourselves” (para. 20).

**A Liberal University for an Egalitarian Society**

Callan (2016) asserts that there is some “residual” oppression which is “apt to disclose itself with whom one interacts” (p. 69) in the form of stereotypes, generalizations, “performance-impairing social cues” (p. 70), and “subtle acts of derogation” (p. 68). In academia, contends Callan, this means that some individual students are sometimes victims of “insult and humiliation” (p. 64) by other individual students. Stengel (2010) goes even further in suggesting that some, such as those “with darker skin” or “with lesser resources” (p. 523–524), are not only sometimes but “regularly treated disrespectfully and harassed by other students and/or teachers” (p. 524). She laments that being different “is tough enough without getting a hard time in school” (p. 525). However, such accounts fail to make explicit that, beyond isolated interpersonal conflicts, many if not most students in the typical Western classroom face one or more forms of serious *systemic, institutional oppression*. I contend that the “liberal” education advocated by Callan does not do enough to address these oppressions and help realize egalitarian norms.

Like the liberalism of the gay community in the 1970s, Callan’s vision of the university eschews the collective for the individual and promotes deference to authority—as expressed, for example, in his possessive references to “my” rather than “our class” and more directly in his 2011 text “When to Shut Students Up.” In his view, it is the teacher who has sole agency to establish an authoritative “civility regime” in the classroom, illustrative of a banking concept of education whereby the teacher is the active Subject acting upon the passive student (Freire, 1970/1996). Callan’s model particularly objectifies students from oppressed groups by making them especially dependent on the teacher; they do not speak, but the teacher speaks for them, on their behalf, to defend them and “reaffirm [their] standing” when they are attacked by other students (2011, p. 15). Such an education fails to empower them and is actually complicit in maintaining and reproducing “the oppressor-oppressed contradiction” in the broader society; it is not, as Donovan Livingston (2016) pointed out at the convocation of the

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5 While readers of this journal will likely readily admit to the reality of systemic oppression, it’s worth keeping in mind that, as Sara Ahmed (2016) points out on her *feministkilljoys* blog, “[i]n no matter how much evidence you have of racism and sexism, … what you have is deemed as insufficient. The more you have to show the more eyes seem to roll. My proposition is simple: that the evidence we have of racism and sexism is deemed insufficient because of racism and sexism” (para. 1).

6 Especially revealing is Callan’s (2011) recommended assertion of teacher authority in the face of “uncivil” behaviour: “I won’t tolerate such appalling rudeness in my classroom. Now shut up” (Callan, 2011, p. 4, italics mine).
Harvard Graduate School of Education, what Horace Mann called “a great equalizer of the conditions of men.” Instead, oppressive conditions call for spaces where oppressed people, as Kenney (2001) described, can form collective strength and generate their own strategies for resistance. Such conditions call for more radical, liberatory, and genuinely democratic spaces—assuming “democracy” doesn’t mean simply once every few years voting in elections that supposedly “determine how we are ruled” (Callan, 2016 p. 66), but rather learning to rule ourselves.7

**Forms of Safety and Freedom of Speech**

It is natural, and desirable, for teachers to be preoccupied with students’ safety, especially for those of us who have been entrusted with young children, although Callan (2016) complicates matters by asserting that “[t]here are as many kinds of safety as there are threats to the things that human beings might care about” (p. 64). One of these kinds of safety, he posits, is “dignity safety,” which means “to be free of any reasonable anxiety that others will treat one as having an inferior social rank to theirs” (p. 65). I argue, however, that Callan’s notion of dignity safety—and his notion of safety itself, for that matter—is not the most useful construct for teachers seeking to help abolish systems of oppression.

To start with, one problem with the idea of dignity safety is that it encourages us to addresses symptoms without tackling the cause of the disease; it encourages us to addresses manifestations of structural inequality without tackling the fact of structural inequality itself. Treating each other in the classroom with the same level of dignity is one thing, but simply imagining that we all have the same social rank does not make it so, as the larger social context works to reinforce our unequal status. To the contrary, confronting the regrettable reality of this injustice is required in order to ensure that members of oppressed groups are offered the resources—including space—they need to combat their oppressions and dismantle systems that rank us in the first place. The idea of dignity safety, like that of “colorblindness” or of willful ignorance to other forms of othering, is counterproductive to these efforts and has no place in an actively anti-oppressive social environment.8

Safety, the way Callan describes it, can be defined as a lack of threats to things we care about or, more accurately, as a lack of anxiety about such threats. Stengel (2010) similarly contrasts safety with fear.9 Other authors writing on the topic also define safety in terms of feeling or affect, although these—as Barrett (2010) and Stengel (2010) both argue—hardly form a sound basis for policy, whether in a classroom or in a larger polity.10 Also, as suggested in the above discussion of “safe” versus “safer”

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7 “You and I have never seen democracy; all we’ve seen is hypocrisy” (Malcolm X, 1964/2016, para. 35).
8 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva has written extensively on this topic, including the book *Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States* (2006). However, the use of the metaphor “colourblind” in a postracial liberal context has been recognized by others as ableist.
9 Callan (2016) distinguishes between efforts for institution-wide safety, on which his authoritarian liberal argument is focused, and “self-segregated refuge” (p. 65) for particular groups within an institution. It is segregated safety that Stengel is talking about, although not self-segregation but segregation by authority figures. What interests me here is the fourth quadrant of this graph, which might be described as more self- or collectively-regulated inclusive safety.
10 I’m particularly cynical about the concept of safety as absence of that which is “offensive,” another term that has been used and abused much more than it has been critically analyzed.
space, there is little sense in interpreting safety as an absolute that we can guarantee to all people all of the time.

Callan (2016) tells us he has been pursuing “the most compelling interpretation” of safety in the face of calls for safe space (p. 68). In that spirit, I would here like to submit another for consideration, one that might prove more useful for egalitarian educators while also being more congruent with the common understanding of the word. I suggest that safety be interpreted not as metaphor but in the literal sense of the reduction of proven, demonstrable causes of harm. To cause harm to someone is not to cause them simply discomfort or even pain, but some kind of lasting and unnecessary damage or injury. One proven, demonstrable cause of harm is violence and, as Freire (1970/1996) points out, “[v]iolence is initiated by those who oppress . . . not by those who are oppressed” (p. 37). Therefore, in the context of safer space, we can further interpret safety as the reduction of behaviours that serve to reinforce or perpetuate longstanding systems of oppression. In other words, the less systemic oppression is expressed in a given space, the safer that space is. Now, how many forms of systemic oppression are there? What constitutes an expression of systemic oppression? If not the teacher alone, who exactly should have the power to decide? I think these questions may prompt interesting and necessary debate.

Anti-oppressive safer space doesn’t necessarily make everyone feel comfortable or stress-free or benefit everyone in any way at all, except to reduce the dehumanization that afflicts both oppressed and oppressor (Freire, 1970/1996). I here invoke the distinction between equality and equity: just because lifejackets make swimming safer doesn’t mean that everyone swimming needs a lifejacket. Looking at safety through an anti-oppressive lens, it might be argued that individuals like Callan and myself generally enjoy a relatively high degree of it most of the time in most social environments; we are able to swim in these environments and personally have little need for the lifejacket of safer space. In contrast, a queer woman of colour may face various intersecting forms of oppression in many different social environments, and in these rough waters may benefit much more from safer space. People like Callan and I may participate in safer space, but it’s essential that we understand that it may not be for us, and we should definitely not take it away from those who may be drowned without it—at least until the day none of us are forced to swim.

This view of safety makes it unproductive to distinguish, as several authors do, between physical and psychological safety, since the two are inextricably linked. While the Anti-Defamation League itself supports the state of Israel’s brutal subjugation of Palestinians, its “Pyramid of Hate” (2005) is useful in illustrating how seemingly minor expressions of psychological oppression like stereotypes and belittling jokes at the base of the structure support more severe manifestations higher up—physical violence and, at its peak, genocide. As Khan (2015) explains,

Racist speech leads to an environment that is conducive to racist [physical] violence. It marginalizes students of color and makes the university not “uncomfortable,” but unsafe. Anti-

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11 Lifejackets are a little individualistic; maybe a liferaft would be more a more appropriate metaphor for safer space, but it doesn’t work quite as well here.

12 Not only may safer space not be for people as privileged as Callan and me, but it may sometimes appear to be against us. Even when oppression is ended, Freire writes, “the former oppressors do not feel liberated. On the contrary, they genuinely consider themselves to be oppressed. Conditioned by the experience of oppressing others, any situation other than their former seems to them like oppression” (1970/1996, p. 39). Put another way in a quote variously attributed to Brian Sims, the first openly gay member of Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives: “When you’re accustomed to privilege, equality feels like oppression.”
LGBT speech makes campus unsafe, not merely “uncomfortable” for LGBT students. Misogynist speech creates an environment that is conducive to sexual assault. Any decent social scientist knows this. It is not about people being “uncomfortable” or “offended.” It is about people being unsafe and oppressed. (para. 15)

What does anti-oppressive safety mean for freedom of speech? Whose freedom, to say what, about whom? Khan (2015) points out that the concept of freedom of speech was originally used to protect the marginalized from repression by the powerful, but is actually much more often turned the other way around, instrumentalized to secure even further platforms for oppressors while the oppressed, and their critiques of their oppressors, continue to be left out of the discussion or silenced altogether. The freedom to offend the powerful, writes Cobb (2015), is confused with the freedom to bully the relatively disempowered. An anti-oppressive concept of safer space, and the more democratic processes that I believe it entails, should help to correct this. It should also help to address dictatorial interpretations of “academic freedom” according to which those with higher academic status have the freedom to impose their will to those with less. Just as independent and citizen journalists are breaking down the barriers to “press freedom,” egalitarian academics have a responsibility to help extend freedoms to all people, even beyond the confines of the ivory tower.13

Civility and Candor, not Equity or Justice

Callan prescribes civility and candor as virtues for those who speak in the classroom, and suggests open-mindedness and interpretive charity as virtues for those who listen. In advocating his authoritative liberal view of education, he appears to be primarily concerned with teachers cultivating these traits in students, or even imposing these traits on them, rather than cultivating them in themselves. While acknowledging their value, I would like to explore some of the drawbacks of focusing too much on civility and candor in particular as virtues to be cultivated in the classroom, and examine some alternatives that might be better suited to all members of the educational community for the purpose of addressing oppressions through the practice of safer space.

Barrett (2012), although she juxtaposes the two in advocating for a shift from one to the other, elsewhere argues for a discourse of classroom safety “predicated on the notion of student civility” (p. 9). Callan (2011) similarly proposes an authoritative “civility regime” to defend students’ dignity safety from occasional individual breaches of egalitarian orthodoxy. But we’ve already acknowledged that the more serious underlying problem is longstanding systemic oppressions, that his notion of dignity safety leads us to ignore these fundamental injustices within the walls of the institution, and that no teacher—especially not one so privileged as either Callan or me—should try to impose solutions to such injustices on our students. So, while civility is certainly not undesirable in a classroom, it’s clear that enforcing it should not be our foremost goal. Stengel (2010) seems to concur, citing Mayo’s (2001) contribution on “the Lure of Beautiful Manners” in asserting that occasional incivility brings necessary attention to problematic social relations and is “a precondition for democratic decision making” (p. 539). Similarly, Steven Salaita (2016), let go by the University of Illinois for speaking out for Palestine, calls on academics “to be uncivil to preserve academic freedom and take on the corporate university.”

13 The need to democratize knowledge is what makes quality open-access journals like this one so valuable.
Even Callan himself, in his 2011 paper, acknowledges that “[t]here are certainly much grander virtues than civility” (p. 10), though he declines to engage with them.

Is political correctness one of these grander virtues? Callan doesn’t think so, and neither do I—although maybe for different reasons. Political correctness, according to Callan, “is simply the label for the creed of the American academic left when it is armored with vices that insulate it from criticism” (2016, p. 75), although he adds that this label is also used opportunistically by the right. In contrast, others argue that the label’s use by the right is actually what has come to define it: what had previously been an inside joke among liberal academics making fun of themselves was seized by conservatives also seeking to make fun of liberals, and gradually inflated over a few decades into the right-wing boogeyman that Donald Trump employed in his presidential campaign (Schultz, 1993; Hess, 2016).

What about the virtue of candor? Callan introduces it toward the end of his most recent essay, distinguishing it from sincerity: while “[s]incerity means only that I must not say what I do not believe,” candor requires “that I say what I do believe” (2016, p. 75, emphasis added). Callan addresses candor at greater length in his 2011 text, calling it “a cardinal virtue in a democratic culture of free speech” (p. 13), one that must be encouraged “despite the threat that [it] will pose to students most vulnerable to stigmatization” (p. 15). Candor may be as welcome in a classroom as civility, but to prioritize its cultivation ahead of student safety seems an invitation, if not to open bigotry, at least to the hijacking of class discussion by relatively privileged individuals and to “concern trolling”—described on that venerable bastion of staunch intellectualism, Urban Dictionary, as critics in the guise of supporters making themselves appear sympathetic to a cause by expressing concerns, sincere or not, that in reality serve only “to disrupt dialogue or undermine morale” (thevineyard, 2007). Less privileged individuals, who may already be subject to civil but oppressive candor on a daily basis, are thus not only deprived of space needed to advance discussion on issues that are important to them, but trapped in a defensive posture. It’s not civility that should temper candor, as Callan (2016) suggests, but the exigencies of anti-oppressive safer space.

The difference between sincerity and candor may be what Holley and Steiner (2005) and Hunter (2008) refer to as a willingness to open up and take risks, which defines their notions of safety. Others might call this a willingness to be vulnerable, and I suggest it’s a somewhat more important virtue for anti-oppressive teachers to cultivate in their students and themselves. While no one should be forced into vulnerability by condition or circumstance, Callan (2016) regrettably dismisses it altogether as weakness to be eliminated. At the same time, researchers like Brené Brown are increasingly pointing to the inherent strength and courage involved in being vulnerable, soft, sensitive—in allowing oneself to be seen. Vulnerability makes us less likely to intentionally commit harm to others, and more likely to empathize with those who have been harmed. Maybe Callan would be more accepting of it if we were to reframe it as open-heartedness, to go along with his concept of open-mindedness. But rather than focus on “[eliminating] the vulnerability of vulnerable groups” (2016, p. 65), we should perhaps focus on exploring that vulnerability and preventing others from exploiting it and causing harm.

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14 A 2014 Washington Post column by Alexandra Petri helped popularize the term “concern troll.” Petri’s column centers on former New York Times editor Bill Keller gently chastising a stranger with metastatic cancer for the manner in which she chose to cope with her illness, and for not going quietly into the good night like his father-in-law. Another prominent example of concern trolling that comes to mind is Benjamin Netanyahu’s (2016) odious assertion that “I, the Prime Minister of Israel, care more about Palestinians than their own leaders do.”
If we recognize the necessity of creating anti-oppressive safer spaces, we may also recognize that the cultivation of vulnerability as a virtue is much more essential to this task than the cultivation of other desirable traits such as civility and candor. It’s impossible for a teacher to impose a “vulnerability regime” in the classroom; it’s a culture that must be patiently nurtured and grown alongside a commitment to equity and a love of justice—and of each other. These virtues are required not just of students but of all of us concerned with their safety and interested in taking apart systems of oppression.

The Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement

I have responded to Eamonn Callan’s essay “Education in Safe and Unsafe Spaces” (2016), in this issue of the same journal, with three main counterarguments. First, the correct response to the systemic oppressions faced by our students is not a more liberal but a more liberatory and radical education. Second, dignity safety is not a useful construct for such an education, nor are any constructs of safety based on psychological states; instead, I propose one based on reducing proven, observable causes of harm, especially the violence of systemic oppressions—an interpretation that may challenge the hegemonic view of free speech and academic freedom. Third, while civility and candor are desirable in a classroom, they should not be prioritized over virtues that are more essential to anti-oppressive harm reduction, such as commitment to equity, love of justice, and vulnerability.

Callan (2016) concludes his own essay by arguing that his vision of safe space “discloses a deep continuity with the civil rights movement” that was led by Black Americans in the 1960s. Further, he suggests that others’ claims for safer space might be “little more than an infantile parody of the epochal social movement” (p. 76). But Callan, who elsewhere accuses some of his students of “smug intellectual torpor” (p. 75), here makes himself seem rather smug by presuming to adjudicate on the legacy of that movement. On top of that, some of its best-known figures admonished white liberals like him, accusing them of being poor allies and, essentially, concern trolls themselves. Martin Luther King, Jr., in his *Letter From a Birmingham Jail* (1963/n.d.), wrote about approaching “the regrettable conclusion that the Negro’s great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen’s Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice” (para. 19). And Malcolm X (1964/2016) proclaimed “the government itself has failed us, and the white liberals who have been posing as our friends have failed us” (para. 18).

Our task is not to try to raise as many of the oppressed as possible to the status of their oppressors, or have the abused act more like abusers themselves, but to seek an end to destructive and dehumanizing relationships. There’s lively debate to be had about how we in the academy can best do this, how we can include all members of the community in this work, and what role the notion of safety should play. Some, including bell hooks, are now advocating instead for a conceptual shift from “safe space” to “brave space” (The New School, 2014). The most important voices in this discussion will not be those of white cis-hetero male academics like Callan and myself, but those of people directly affected by one or more forms of systemic oppression. I would urge our readers to seek out and pay greater attention to those voices—especially given the present historical context of rising far-right extremism.

Those who depend on Plato and Socrates for their understanding of the university are out of touch with an institution that now seems to draw more inspiration from hedge fund managers, CEOs, and PR
specialists. Members of oppressed groups who accept ever-increasing amounts of personal debt in order to pay rising tuition fees are likely (and understandably) just as worried, if not more so, about trying to make a decent living for themselves and their families as they are about any ancient European ideals of truth or wisdom. But it isn’t enough for the academy to enable a limited amount of social mobility within oppressive structures. Redmond (2010) cites Ng’s (1995) assertion that it isn’t, in absolute terms, a democratic place, but when it can’t at least be more so, when it can’t serve to dismantle systems of oppression but only reinforces and perpetuates them, then the time will come for the academy itself to be dismantled, and new institutions created in its place.15

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