As a fresh graduate teaching assistant, I stood once in front of an Introduction to Philosophy course, sly smile on my face, and told the class that, “Philosophers, when presenting or defending their views, give us arguments. Some philosophers,” I continued, “strongly object to what I just said.” (Pause for effect.) “Some even offer very good arguments to tell us why…” and so on. You get the gist. I am less cavalier about those words today, although it seems odd, to my analytical and Anglo-trained sensibilities, to think of philosophy without claims and arguments. But perhaps claims, arguments, objections, and so on need not appear as I am used to. That is, it seems odd to think that all philosophical work must conform to what I know, to what I deem familiar. Of course, what is unfamiliar may take more effort to understand, so much that almost by reflex, we seem driven to reject it, to give up before trying. We may even commit the ultimate sin and label the unfamiliar not philosophy, or what amounts to the same thing, not important, not worth the effort, not worth anyone’s effort. This behavior, so perfectly flawed and so perfectly human, seems bizarre when we consider that the people and works philosophers spent so much effort reading and talking about, be they called Socrates, or Shelley’s Frankenstein, were treated likewise by most of their contemporaries. A bit of patience and willingness, then, to look harder for the familiar among what at first seems strange, I am trying to say, is worth the effort. Using the (I hope) not too cryptic remarks above as segue, I will discuss Samuel Rocha’s book The Syllabus as Curriculum: A Reconceptualist Approach. In this book, Rocha analyzes his own course syllabi in philosophy of education to advance a philosophical reconceptualization of what the curriculum is. Note that Rocha avoids giving an exact definition that would “underdetermine” what he means by a “reconceptualization of the curriculum” (p. 8). As he is aware, though, this approach may invite the charge of “theoretical opaqueness” (p. 8). I don’t agree with the charge, however. Rocha may not make a linear argument, but the book is highly structured, dealing with concrete syllabi. In what follows, then, I will briefly discuss Rocha’s project, focusing on its aims and the way Rocha sets about reaching them. I finish with a brief critique of the overall project. First, though, I comment on matters of subject and form. One last remark before we start: the phenomenologically trained or inclined reader will perhaps have an easier time with this book. That is exactly, in my view, who the book is not intended for (more on this below). Again, for the rest of us, a bit of patience at first may be needed, but soon enough Rocha’s vision and project reveal themselves. Rocha’s project, the reconceptualization of the curriculum ideal, is in truth more of a “reconceptualization 2.0”; Rocha is quick to point out that an attempt was made in the 1970s to move away from what he calls the “textbook engineering” approach that came from the work of Ralph W. Tyler and others, but in his view, the project lost its way and failed to deliver (p. 8). Or rather, it delivered something undesirable: curriculum studies is now a discipline and field dominated by inquiry in the social sciences, accountability, and testing, incapable of appreciating, let alone carrying out, the task of reconceptualization. Like others before him, Rocha wants the humanities, broadly defined, to be at the center of curriculum studies. What is …
Appendices
Bibliography
- Laden, A. S. (2012). Reasoning: A social picture. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Rocha, S. D. (2015). Folk phenomenology: Education, study, and the human person. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers.