Rubini, Rocco. The Other Renaissance: Italian Humanism between Hegel and Heidegger

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of Queen Anne in 1714. One wonders, though, how easily this book might graft onto today’s syllabi. In English departments, Restoration drama is frequently lumped in with surveys of eighteenth-century theatre (even if that means that the majority of the plays studied, with the notable exceptions of Sheridan, Goldsmith, and to a lesser extent perhaps Foote, were produced between 1660 and 1737, when the Licensing Act came into being). This puts teachers in the unenviable position of either fitting the plays to the supplement or the supplement to the plays: teach only “Restoration” drama and use Roberts in tandem, or teach the whole “long” eighteenth century and use other articles and books to cover the decades not addressed by Restoration Plays and Players. This already is a magnificently proficient and economical addition to any syllabus, but had Roberts chosen to extend his coverage a mere twenty-three years, to 1737, his book would have more easily aligned with the syllabi of most courses on drama from this period.

Despite the small limitations of its coverage, Restoration Plays and Players will be a welcome addition to any syllabus that touches upon drama written and staged between 1660 and 1714. Roberts is particularly good at bridging his close readings of individual plays with the political, social, financial, commercial, managerial, and professional worlds these works circulated in, were shaped by, and shaped themselves. For this, Roberts should be commended and his book liberally used. I have little doubt teachers will return to Restoration Plays and Players again and again in the decades to come.

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Rubini, Rocco.
The Other Renaissance: Italian Humanism between Hegel and Heidegger.

The Other Renaissance is a story about the relationship between Renaissance historiography and the philosophical tradition of Italy between the nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War. It is also a story about loss. In his personal attempt to reconcile the interpretations of Renaissance humanism
offered by Eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller, Rubini has isolated a historically-informed strain of thinking: an Italians' Renaissance lost partly as a consequence of postwar efforts to distance Italian intellectual culture from the memory of fascism and partly as a consequence of Neo-Kantian philosophical procedure. This forgotten tradition, inspired by the writings of Giambattista Vico, modified over time by Hegelian and Heideggerian thought and then associated with Giovanni Gentile, was dephilosophized in the postwar era, its account of man and his place in the world set aside. Rubini urges readers to attend to this lost tradition, seeking as he does to reinsert Renaissance humanism into the genealogy of contemporary thought, particularly the tradition of continental philosophy or theory.

Chapter 1 explains how a “self-contained trajectory” of Italian philosophy first emerged from early-nineteenth-century Italian responses to the French Revolution. Wishing to nationalize philosophy in Italy, scholars such as Vincenzo Gioberti used a Vichian theory of history to assert a continuity of content between the ancient Italians, the Pythagoreans and Platonists, and the humanists of the sixteenth century, such as Giordano Bruno and Tommaso Campanella. These authors tended to disregard or denigrate the qualities of what historians would later call civic humanism. Francesco Guicciardini was a fine, discerning, prudent man, but all his achievements were born of self-interest rather than transcendent principles. Gentile, reacting against a Neo-Guelphist historiography of the Renaissance, sought to rehabilitate humanism generally, asserting that the writings of humanists represented a philosophical attempt to reconcile man and God and to attain thereby excellence and dignity.

Chapter 2 details Gentile's thought during the interwar period, focusing on the gradual decline of Gentile's popularity while still arguing for his long-term influence into the postwar era. Interwar Italian philosophy marked a transition away from Hegelian idealism, a full move away from Bruno and Campanella, towards Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni. The chapter concludes with an account of Nicola Abbagnano's use of Heideggerian existentialism to connect the main concerns of Latin humanists, the concepts of human dignity, free will, and the superiority of virtue to fortune, with contemporary thought.

Chapter 3 looks at Ernesto Grassi, the recipient of Heidegger's famous “Letter on 'Humanism'.” Rubini shows that Grassi's “vivifying hermeneutical practice” owes more to the Italians' philosophy than to Heidegger's. Grassi looked to Vichian inquiry as the fulfillment of Renaissance humanism,
Vichianism being in his opinion a thorough anti-Cartesianism. Heidegger’s letter thus represents a repudiation of Grassi’s position rather than an affirmation of it; Italian humanism was not existentialism. Left in the lurch, no longer able to attach Italian philosophy to German thought, Grassi turned to Garin for assistance.

Chapter 4 tells how Garin, possessed of a stronger command of philology than his fellows, shared Grassi’s philosophical interpretation of humanism. Under fascism, Garin first used the historiography of Renaissance Platonism to criticize the idealism of his peers, but afterwards turned to the so-called civic humanists to elaborate a philologically-centred philosophy of moral improvement. Garin, influenced also by Ernst Cassirer, argued, contra Heidegger, that Renaissance humanism was a genuine philosophy after all.

Chapter 5 deals with Kristeller’s reaction to Garin; his move to disentangle philology and philosophy. Patronized by Gentile and influenced by Heidegger, Kristeller denied any sort of coherent philosophy behind Renaissance humanism, citing multiple humanisms, multiple Platonisms, etc. If there was philosophical progress during the Renaissance in any idealist sense it emerged from the pen of the eccentric Pico della Mirandola.

Rubini, in the conclusion of his book, notes that current Renaissance historiography tends to look down on humanism, treating it as empty rhetoric. Why? Rubini asserts that scholars have echoed Kristeller’s opinion without understanding its historical and philosophical context.

The Other Renaissance will be of immense interest to historians of the Italian Renaissance, especially to those who wonder how humanism, despite the term’s ubiquity in scholarship, became a bad word. Philosophers too, whether interested in German or Italian thought in the modern era, will benefit from Rubini’s account, especially if they tend to view philosophy in a transnational context and with an eye toward historical influences. If there is a strand of philosophical thought backstitched into Italian historiography but lost to historical memory, shaped by Vico, Hegel, Gentile, and Heidegger, then The Other Renaissance is the first, necessary step toward its fruitful recovery.

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