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O’Connor, Michael. *Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries: Motive and Method*

Paul F. Grendler

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to rearrange and produce original creations. Keith Sidwell offers similar advice on editing Neo-Latin texts, but shifts the discourse to early modern Ireland and other less traversed areas of Latinity. On the question of whether to correct and standardize orthography, he favours keeping all the variant spellings, punctuation, and markings of original printed texts while providing an explanatory apparatus. He also insists that any edition or translation of a Neo-Latin work requires detailed commentary and that collaboration is essential, as the classical philologist has to understand in depth the particular historical context. Kallendorf’s and Sidwell’s advice and lists of resources and websites for Neo-Latin texts is an essential starting point for serious study in the field.

This book—in particular, all the chapters on different genres—decisively gives the lie to the prejudices against Neo-Latin literature that have hampered the field for so long. Critics, including C. S. Lewis, have dismissed Neo-Latin compositions as slavish imitations and insincere showpieces devoid of content and obsessed only with hyper-classicism. On the contrary, as vividly shown in these essays, Neo-Latin literature abounded in variety, creativity, and a depth of thought connected as much to an author’s own world as to models of classical literature.

ANTHONY F. D’ELIA
Queen’s University, Canada

O’Connor, Michael.
_Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries: Motive and Method._

Tommaso de Vio (1469–1534), usually called Cajetan because he was born in Gaeta, Italy, was a Dominican cardinal, the ablest Thomist of his day, and a papal diplomat. He met Martin Luther at Augsburg in October 1518 but failed to convince him to change his views. In subsequent years Cajetan wrote treatises refuting Luther’s views, while simultaneously urging the papacy to adopt church reform measures that would have accommodated some Protestant demands. His advice was ignored. In 1524 he withdrew to Gaeta, where he devoted the
last ten to eleven years of his life to writing an enormous biblical commentary whose volumes appeared year after year. He commented on the entire New Testament and about three-quarters of the Old Testament until his death in August 1534. Republished in Lyon, 1639, the entire work consists of 2,800 double-columned folio-sized pages. It was the largest single-author biblical commentary of the sixteenth century and one of the most interesting. Previous scholars have nibbled at it; O’Connor is the first to examine the entire work.

In the first chapter, O’Connor summarizes Cajetan’s career and writings before 1523. He establishes the large role that Scripture played in Cajetan’s approach to church reform. Cajetan was a reformer, not a counter reformer, and committed to a humanistic approach to the Bible. This did not emerge from nowhere. Summarizing the scholarship of others, O’Connor outlines the strong Italian biblical humanist movement in Italy that reached maturation between 1510 and 1520.

O’Connor explains Cajetan’s humanist ad fontes approach in chapter 5, “Correcting the Text.” Cajetan accepted Scripture as the word of God, but he realized that God used human agents to write the Bible and, being human, they made mistakes. He concluded that the Vulgate (the universally accepted Latin translation attributed to St. Jerome) had numerous textual errors and needed to be corrected on the basis of the Hebrew and Greek sources and grammatical analysis. He also understood that non-Catholic sources, such as the ancient Greek pagan classics and the rabbinical tradition, had to be consulted. Because his ancient Greek and Hebrew skills were limited at best, Cajetan brought experts to Gaeta. Unfortunately, he did not identify his helpers, and the names of only two have surfaced, neither of them Hebrew scholars; moreover, as was common at the time, Cajetan did not identify the contemporary texts of the Bible on which he relied. As O’Connor shows, however, he made good use of the New Testament text and annotations of Erasmus and the biblical scholarship of Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples. For the Old Testament, Cajetan relied on new editions of the Hebrew text and Latin translations by the ablest Christian Hebrew scholars of the day, plus the rich medieval rabbinical tradition.

But this was not scholarship by committee. Cajetan’s prior views, good mind, independent judgment, and consistency were always evident. He fearlessly tackled major textual, doctrinal, and interpretive issues and reached his own conclusions. For example, on the evidence of literary style, he decided
that Paul was not the author of the letter to the Hebrews. Against prevailing opinion, he doubted the canonicity of some books and passages, and subsequent scholarship has confirmed his opinions. Cajetan did not banish from the Catholic canon books that he found lacking. Rather, he divided the books and passages into primary and secondary canonicity, and relegated those whose authorship or authenticity he doubted into the second group. He wrote that matters of faith may not be decided solely on the basis of evidence from books or passages of secondary canonicity, but must be confirmed on the evidence of books or passages of undoubted primary canonicity.

As O’Connor explains, Cajetan’s overall approach was literal but leavened by a strong literary sensibility. Cajetan sought to understand exactly what the words meant—taking into account irony, metaphor, and linguistic practice. He almost always rejected allegorical and mystical interpretations, which were very popular at the time. Cajetan also paid very little attention to patristic writers, because he believed that Scripture was the best interpreter of Scripture. This meant that he tried to find explanations for doctrinal differences between texts by seeking to harmonize them through an understanding of the ancient world and its languages. His reliance on Scripture to interpret Scripture was a modified sola scriptura that induced Luther to gibe that Cajetan had become a Lutheran. It was not true. Nevertheless, Cajetan spent very little space condemning heresy, mentioning “Lutherans” only four times in 2,800 pages. And he ignored numerous opportunities to attack Protestants or to use biblical texts to support Catholic positions. Instead, Cajetan tried to present a better understanding of the Bible in order to renew Christian life for the individual and the church.

The immediate response was universally negative. Led by the conservative Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris, many Catholics saw Cajetan as a Protestant because he corrected the Vulgate, modified the canon, and did not find unequivocal biblical support for some cherished doctrines. A prominent fellow Dominican condemned the recently deceased Cajetan as a heretic. The Council of Trent affirmed the text of the Vulgate and its traditional canon, thus rejecting Cajetan’s scholarship. Nevertheless, his biblical works were printed and reprinted through the rest of the sixteenth century. O’Connor notes that scholars have yet to assess the influence of Cajetan’s biblical scholarship.

O’Connor correctly elevates Cajetan into the ranks of major biblical humanists and supports his judgment with many quotations from Cajetan. He
documents the deep penetration of humanistic philology into the mind of a major church figure usually seen as a Thomist scholastic. This book is a very welcome addition to our knowledge of religious scholarship in the Renaissance.

Paul F. Grendler
University of Toronto Emeritus


John O’Meara’s Remembering Shakespeare sets out a distinct path on which we live through Shakespeare living through Hamlet as tragedy—the turning point in Shakespeare’s career—and subsequent tragedies, and then through a romance like The Tempest. O’Meara seeks to explore what, for Shakespeare, is “the point of tragedy for himself” (1). By this, O’Meara means that the issues go beyond the will of the Ghost in Hamlet or of Shakespeare, even, and that “both the Ghost and Shakespeare would have had to submit to a universe that requires much more of us than we seem ever ready to admit” (1). O’Meara elaborates on this thesis by quoting Hamlet’s words to Horatio that in earth and heaven there are more things than his philosophy can dream of, as if that thought applies to Shakespeare (1). Like Hamlet, Shakespeare had to learn the lesson of not protesting and expressing words of outrage but of renouncing so much “to satisfy the will of the universe that, for our instruction, had taken him over” (1). The clause, “for our instruction,” is a little jarring and unexpected. It is as if Shakespeare had to accept the will of the universe for the sake of his audience. In a sense, he was trying to redeem us; his tragedy, for O’Meara, is that since his time we have not been instructed by his pains (1).

O’Meara thinks we need to open our understanding, especially of Shakespeare’s romances, and this failure to comprehend comes from our inability to live through tragedy (1–2). According to O’Meara, Shakespeare deliberately used Hamlet, Othello, Lear, and Macbeth to give him such an experience (2). What O’Meara has in mind is not catharsis but “fully passing through tragedy