EN:

In the last analysis, the firmest and deepest foundation of management rights is the need for an efficient coordination of multifarious activities and often divergent interests, with an aim to achieving the basic purpose of the business concern. Efficiency, however, is essentially a value whose définitions are all the more numerous and varied as science, in its present applications to industry, cannot lay claim to absolute certainty and accuracy. And even if it could, this would not alter in any way the political nature of decision-making. Such considerations lead to a re-examination of the notions of collective bargaining and joint management, as well as they induce new thinking on the specific function of management, which reaches beyond decision-making into the realm of coordination of means, activities, interests, and bargains.

FR:

Dans le contexte de droits de gérance qui se relient de moins en moins directement au droit de propriété, dans la perspective de définitions nombreuses et souvent divergentes de l'efficacité, devant les incertitudes et les inexactitudes évidentes de la « science » dans l'industrie, et compte tenu du caractère politique de la plupart des décisions d'ordre économique et technique, quel est le recours de la direction et du syndicat, pour ne parler que de ces deux groupes? La négociation, le marchandage, le jeu de puissance, le compromis à durée temporaire.

Le processus de la négociation collective est essentiellement participation partielle du syndicat à la gestion de l'entreprise. Comme il n'existe pas de limites de principe au champ de la négociation collective, il est normal que le dialogue entre les parties s'engage en matières techniques ou financières aussi bien qu'il se poursuit depuis plusieurs années en matières sociales et économiques.

L'attitude traditionnelle de la direction d'invoquer ses droits de premier occupant, de s'attribuer et de se garder tous les droits que ne réussit pas à lui arracher le syndicat, est fort généralisée. Et pourtant, elle fera place, au cours des prochaines années, à une attitude nouvelle, plus réaliste, plus positive et moins inquiète, fondée sur la notion élargie de rôle fiduciaire, de chambre de compensation au service de tous les intéressés dans l'entreprise.

Le syndicat, co-législateur avec la direction à l'étape des négociations directes (et c'est au nom même de l'efficacité qu'il invitera la direction à négocier sur un nombre toujours plus grand de questions), perfectionnera son rôle de gardien, pour ses membres, des clauses de la convention, laissant à la direction l'initiative de décisions contre lesquelles il pourra s'inscrire en faux, le cas échéant.

Ainsi la direction des entreprises, équilibreuse de préférences et d'aspirations nombreuses et fréquemment opposées, lieu de rencontre de tous ces accords à agencer, continuera d'être toujours plus efficace, mais dans un sens beaucoup plus large et plus fructueux, dans le respect des droits de chacun des membres de l'entreprise et dans la recherche du point d'équilibre qui, satisfaisant partiellement et provisoirement tous les intéressés, permettra à l'entreprise de fonctionner et de rendre son service.

Ce bon fonctionnement de l'entreprise, c'est justement la pierre de touche de la véritable efficacité.

* Le texte complet de cette étude est publié en français dans l'ouvrage Changements technologiques et droits de Gérance, Presses universitaires Laval, Québec, 1960.

FR:

L'auteur soulève le problème du syndicalisme minoritaire. D'un point de vue strictement académique, il oppose pluralisme syndical et syndicalisme majoritaire. Après une anayse de la législation québécoise sur ce point, il souligne les principales faiblesses du système actuel en matière de représentation ouvrière au niveau local, ainsi que leurs conséquences pour la démocratie syndicale et l'exercice du droit d'association. Puis, en se basant principalement sur l'expérience européenne, l'auteur propose l'adoption du pluralisme syndical comme moyen de réaliser une plus grande démocratie sociale.

EN:

Labor pluralism is based upon the freedom of workers to combine is association of their own choosing, to maintain, withdraw or change their support toward a particular organization. Essentially, the concept of labor pluralism infers that different associations are competing to represent a unit of workers and to act on its behalf. Where there is no such competition, like between unions with different jurisdictional rights, we simply deal with labor plurality. Labor pluralism may be considered at three levels: the first refers to rival union confederations; the second implies union federations claiming the same jurisdictional rights; the third involves many unions competing at the local plant or the work place.

This third level is at the base of labor democracy and labor pluralism at other levels. This is why the present analysis bears upon its application in the Province of Quebec. The Labour Relations Act (1944) provides us with a starting framework. Some select committees, appointed in 1943 to study this question, proposed almost unanimously a system of multiple unions representation at the local level. But, following the Wagner Act (U.S.), the law built up a system of single union certification. In order to reduce industrial strike and to insure the right of association, only one bargaining agent was to be recognized, and the employer was bound to deal with the union comprising the absolute majority of his employees. The law allows therefore a monopolistic power to the union that has been granted the exclusive right of collective representation. Consequently, a certain number of non-functional implications to labor democracy has to be deduced and pointed out.

In spite of minor concessions to the principle of labour pluralism, the law puts a restrain upon the workers' free choice of a union which conforms to their convictions, for the association choosen by the majority is the sole collective agent. The minority is compelled to work under the conditions imposed by the majority, and sometimes, to join the ranks of the union recognized. On the other hand, because of the union security clauses and the no-raiding pacts, it is becoming gradually more and more difficult for the workers to throw out the union that has once been legally recognized. The capacity of union members to withdraw from membership is restricted. Under a closed shop agreement, this capacity is almost non-existent, since the atempt to join a new association involves a possible lost of the job, a risk that most workers are not ready to take.

This situation leads to a gradual shift of power and control from the workers to the labor leaders and to a possible substitution of the institutional goals and ends to those of the workers. It may also lead, under certain circumstances, to corruption, racketeerism and collusion. Finally, it makes possible an unfair competition which favors big and powerful unions against smaller ones.

Moreover, many countries have adopted the system of labor pluralism. Their experiences are conclusive. The weaknesses previously enumerated have been minor problems in these countries. Union rivalries seem to have been kept to a minimum and powerful labor movements have developped throughout the years.

This is why, as a concluding remark, it is submitted that labor pluralism is workable in our system of industrial relations as a mean to achieve a greater social democracy.

FR:

Dans un article introductif au système Brown, l'auteur situe la discipline industrielle dans le processus administratif, en clarifie la notion et rattache les conceptions et types actuels de discipline aux différentes théories. Il rapporte et commente enfin succinctement la position syndicale vis-à-vis des règlements intérieurs.

EN:

In view of the fact that industrial discipline is so intimately related to human element in the enterprise, its implications are of the utmost interest for the researcher in industrial relations. Traditionally severe and irresponsible, industrial discipline has been synonymous of dismissal as the solution to all sorts of offenses especially up until the last thirty years. This article serves as an introduction to the so called « Brown » system and should help evaluating it. Discipline is first discussed as being part of the managerial process, either at the motivation or control level. From the suggested analysis, two consequences are drawn which can be summed up as following: industrial discipline in its application must first be sufficiently systematized in order to comply with administrative coordination and to satisfy psychological needs of individual employees; second, when considered as a control device, it must aim at improving the future behavior of the individual in the enterprise.

The notion of industrial discipline is thenafter dissected. In its broad sense, discipline refers to a condition or attitude prevailing among the workers with respect to company rules and regulations. In a narrower but more commonly used sense, discipline is defined as action undertaken by management to correct faulty behavior on the part of subordinates. Thenafter three different theories on discipline are summarized: authoritarian, anachic and judicial, the latter being compared with the human approach.

The last part is devoted to company rules. International experience is considered and the problems of negotiating and consulting with union on discipline matters, especially in setting company rules, are discussed. The author then remarks that even if not negotiated, company rules are not necessarily arbitrary because employers must always be in a position to defend their decisions on the matter before a third party since those decisions may be questioned though regular grievance procedure provided for in the collective labour agreements.

A concluding remark amongs others suggest that a systematized approach as such does not ipso facto conduct to objective judgment. Nevertheless, a system like the « Brown » system is not without helping management and the local union leaders to adopt a standardized pattern of behavior towards similar cases when arguing over a grievance on discipline.

FR:

L'auteur de cet article a participé activement à l'implantation d'un système de discipline, basé sur l'allocation des points cumulés de démérite dans une entreprise industrielle du Québec. Il en trace ici la genèse, décrit son contenu et l'évalue globalement à la lumière d'une expérience de près de cinq ans.

EN:

The purpose of this article was to outline the most important features of the so-called « Brown » method of administering industrial discipline. This system provides for the assessing of the employee record with demerit marks.

The author who has been personnally involved in and partly responsible for the introduction of the system in a large industrial concern in this province sums up the adopted administrative procedure and comments on a certain number of problems of communication with the individual worker and the local union leaders which have been encountered while implementing the « Brown » system of industrial discipline.