Volume 19, Number 3, July 1964

FR:

Dans cette étude, l'auteur montre comment l'intérêt public est engagé dans les relations du travail. Il expose dabord ce que l'on entend par « intérêt public ». Ensuite, il envisage comment doit se comporter le gouvernement dans les questions d'intérêt public.

EN:

Public interest is at stake in labour-management relations. Government intervention, which has been denied by the upholders of « laissez-faire » economy, is commonly accepted in all countries. However, what is meant by « public interest », and the degree and the form of government intervention lead to discussions.

PUBLIC INTEREST

Society as a whole is concerned with the establishment of labour-management relations in compliance with the fundamental rights of production agents and in the maintenance of public peace on one hand, and in the assurance of continuity in producing goods and services on the other. Public interest covers those two aspects at the same time. The first one consists in the existence and functioning of a convenient system of labour relations; the second one, in the possibility of satisfying the needs of the population.

At the society level, the needs for goods and services do not have the same importance ; therefore, they do not concern public interest in the same degree. Certain needs can only be satisfied by government initiative ; the satisfaction of others being taken care of by private initiative. In a country, as ours, where everything is not nationalized, the proper services provided by the State are a very function of general interest, and it is presumed that those assumed by the State also concern very much public interest. However, we must remember that other services, although exploited by private enterprise, also affect public interest : this is the reason why they have been usually called « public services ». Therefore, in any attempt to saveguard public interest, it is not so much the quality of the employer in labour relations which is important but the character of the service which is exploited.

In our labour-management relations system, collective bargaining is considered by all as being the most desirable means; it is an essential part of an economic system based on free enterprise, freedom of work, and freedom of association. Right at the beginning, it is admitted that divergent interests and viewpoints may exist, which are legitimate and may become conflictual. When the dispute cannot be solved through discussion, recourse is given to strike or lock-out in order to put a pressure on the other party. But a strike and lock-out lead to a stoppage in the production of a good or a service. The population or one part thereof is forced for a time to do away without that good or that service.

Any production stoppage involves some drawbacks for a third party. In what situation and at what time does a strike really affect public interest? When is common good really in danger ? Is it possible to determine it in advance, without taking into account all concrete circumstances ?

Public interest is a very difficult concept to define, as the concept of « good morals », « public order ». We have an insight of it, but to give a universally valuable and objective meaning is impossible. Public interest concept is essentially relative to time, places, to the state of civilization which a population is going through.

Public interest is without a shadow of doubt the interest of public at large, but there are many publics and their interests are sometimes incongruent or do not always command the same degree of importance. What is the proper scope of public interest is very limited. It is what is called « an emergency case », for instances, when public health or security is threatened, when the welfare of a population risks of undergoing serious and irreparable damage.

We are inclined to inflate the consequences of strikes and to call for immediate and radical governmental action, even when it is proven that those consequences do not present a threat to security and to the economy. Unconscious prejudices against strike utilization are easily hidden behind « reasons of common good », this one being not engaged as often as it is believed. Cyrus Ching, a man of experience, said : « A good case can be made for the statement that the nation has never really suffered seriously from a strike... There have been few, if any, real national emergencies resulting from labour-management conflicts... I can say, looking back on my own experience, pressure of that kind led me to refer matters to the President and we in the Federal Mediation Service proceeded on the basis that it was a national emergency. I confess that in regard to some of the instances there now is serious doubt in my mind as to the correctness of the label ».

STATE INTERVENTION

The legislative branch must at first establish behavior frameworks which will enable the parties involved in the field of labour relations to come to an understanding and bring their disputes to an end.

The government cannot take an attitude of non-intervention when facing disputes in essential services and vital industries at the very critical moment when common good is really threatened. In those cases of general emergency situation, the decisions rendered by production agents are so intimately related to normal living conditions that they see their character changed into one of a political nature. Consequently, they fall into the scope of State action.

Any kind of external intervention which can be relied on and anticipated by either party leads to hamstring and even to destroy collective bargaining, since an unavoidable tendency exists for the party which feels weaker at the dispute to seek support and help from government. A series of well-defined procedures on the part of government will tend to entice either party to evaluate the cost of the terms of a voluntary agreement in line with what it would probably get if it did not come to an understanding or if the government interfered.

In labour relations, no panacea exists and it is impossible to get rid of all evils. Certain drawbacks must be accepted beforehand, which are the ransom of democracy and freedom. Totalitarian regimes undergo other evils that are worse.

To withstand a work stoppage must be the opportunity for third parties to consider the constant benefits they draw from the usual collaboration between workers and management.

EN:

The purpose of this paper is to review the historical evolution of the concept of compulsory conciliation in federal labor law, and to suggest some four features in its history which appear to have been overlooked in the literature on the subject.

FR:

Durant plus de soixante ans, le gouvernement fédéral (et quelques gouvernements provinciaux) ont appliqué une politique de solution des conflits du travail basée sur l'intervention gouvernementale. L'expression « conciliation obligatoire » traduit assez bien cette politique. Conciliation obligatoire implique une suspension obligatoire d'un arrêt de travail jusqu'à ce qu'une investigation conduite par un gouvernement soit complétée. La procédure actuelle d'investigation prévoit l'emploi d'un officier et d'une commission de conciliation.

Le but de cet exposé est de présenter un panorama de l'évolution de l'expression conciliation obligatoire dans la législation fédérale du travail. L'auteur se propose de signaler quatre aspects de cette évolution qui semblent avoir été négligés dans la littérature sur ce sujet.

Premièrement, le système actuel de conciliation obligatoire représente le résultat d'efforts accumulés et reliés de la part du Fédéral pour développer un mécanisme de solution des conflits qui réduirait à un minimum le nombre d'arrêts de travail. Les « lois de conciliation » de 1900, 1903, de 1907 et de 1948 démontraient ce résultat.

Deuxièmement, dans la loi de 1800, le Fédéral exprimait déjà sa confiance dans la méthode de négociation collective obligatoire. De plus, le terme « conciliation », que la loi utilisait, signifiait ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui négociation collective. Dans les lois de 1903 et 1907, le Fédéral reconnaissait la faiblesse de la négociation collective sur une base volontaire et adopta le mécanisme d'investigation obligatoire pour la corriger. Plus tard, les deux mécanismes, investigation et négociation collective obligatoires, étaient combinés. L'intégration de ces deux mécanismes constitue le caractère frappant du système canadien actuel de solution des conflits industriels. C'est pourquoi, il faut distinguer entre la politique actuelle de solution des conflits et ses formes antérieures d'expression.

Troisièmement, le terme « conciliation obligatoire » ne décrit pas d'une façon précise la politique fédérale actuelle de solution des conflits. Il serait plus précis d'utiliser les termes investigation et médiation obligatoires; ou encore, médiation avec inventaire des faits et recommandations. Cette mise au point permettrait de distinguer entre la politique actuelle et politiques antérieures qui utilisaient le même terme « conciliation », mais dans des contextes tout à fait différents.

Quatrièmement, la politique du Fédéral en 1900 s'inspirait de l'expérience anglaise. Cependant, cette dernière fut plus tard délaissée pour faire place à l'expérience américaine en matière de politique de solution des conflits.

FR:

L'auteur analyse la portée des transformations technologiques sur les techniques de négociations collectives et de relations industrielles de même que sur le contenu des conventions collectives. A ce sujet, il décrit quelques règlements patronaux-ouvriers d'importance. Puis il traite de l'évolution de la politique gouvernementale en ce qu'elle affecte les relations industrielles, décrivant en particulier le nouveau Service consultatif de la main-d'oeuvre, au Ministère fédéral du Travail. Il conclut en parlant des transformations technologiques et notre régime de relations industrielles.

EN:

INTRODUCTION : BASIC CHARACTERISRICS OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL CHANCES

Although there is a great variety of opinions as to what the term « technological change » specifically means, there seems to be general agreement on at least two basic points: first, it is that the kinds of technological change we have experienced in the last decade have been introduced at a more rapid rate than those introduced in earlier years; second, it is that current technological change has far-reaching effects on industry's manpower requirements. In more concrete terms, the introduction of technological change in industry is generally associated with a substantial increase in the number of skilled, technical and professional occupations, and a slower growth rate for the semi-skilled and unskilled occupational groups.

If technological change, rapidly introduced, means that many workers, young and old, with little or much seniority, in good or poor health, with much or little potential, may rapidly become useless, how can the parties to collective bargaining design ways in which the effects of technological change on the labour force can be cushioned? Also, to what extent and in what ways are collective agreements today responding to technological change?

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON THE TECHNIQUES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

The first question involves both the techniques of collective bargaining and industrial relations, and the substance of collective agreements as well. In a context of technological change, the techniques of collective bargaining are bound to be subject to significant changes. For it is one thing to negotiate a short-term objective at the bargaining table, such as a wage increase, a higher overtime premium rate, or a more generous cost-of-living allowance. But it is an entirely different matter for labour and management to discuss and negotiate about the long-term employment effects that the introduction of technological change will have in a given plant or company. During the negotiation involving short-term goals, such as wage increases or more generous cost-of-living allowances, the parties to collective bargaining usually use statistics as weapons designed to support predetermined positions, and research in these cases, is directed at bringing together these statistics which will support those rigid positions. There is in these situations, very little, if any, problem-solving research.

On the other hand, negotiations and discussions with regard to long-term problems such as those associated with the introduction of technological changes, obviously cannot be solved by the strategic and superficial use of statistics. It is quite obvious that basic and important questions, such as training or retraining programs, or policies designed to ensure the mobility of those employees no longer needed in a given firm, call for more than short and usually tense bargaining sessions — if these questions are to be usefully examined. They require new techniques and new channels for labour-management consultation, as distinct from labour-management bargaining.

Because some current and important labour-management issues call for consultation rather than bargaining in the traditional sense, there might, of course, be a temptation to believe that objective labour-management consultation should gradually replace collective bargaining as a way of determining working conditions. A word of caution against such an over-simplified expectation is perhaps in order. Indeed, in our industrial relations system operating in an essentially private enterprise economy and in a context of free decision-making, tough-minded bargaining will always have a role to play. There will always be issues which, by their very nature, call for bargaining in the truest sense of the word rather than rational consultation. Furthermore, the process of collective bargaining, with its pressures, its tensions and its threats of possible conflicts, can inject a lot of realism in certain labour-management situations, and can induce people to act, people who otherwise would not move. It does not seem unrealistic for me to state that, even in some cases, the very principle of labour-management consultation and co-operation — and the principle of mutual respect which it implies — can be brought about as a result of a tense bargaining situation or even a work stoppage.

For example, in March of last year, after a seven-month long work stoppage, the Quebec Iron and Titanium Company and the National Metal Trades' Federation embodied the principle of labour-management consultation in their agreement by setting up a joint Human Relations Committee which would study and recommend solutions to mutual problems arising out of technological change. This example is merely used to illustrate the fact that in certain situations taking place within our industrial relations context, labour-management consultation and collective bargaining in the traditional sense can usefully play supplementary roles.

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

Turning now to the impact that technological change can have on the substance of collective agreements, let us quote what two prominent observers and analysts of the Canadian labour scene had to say in this respect:

• « … It does not seem to us too great an over-simplification to assert that one of the key effects of technological change in the immediate future will be to focus the attention of the parties, to a far greater extent than in the recent past, on questions of work practices and job and worker security. We are now entering a third phase of bargaining, in so far as the content of agreement is concerned, and that phase will see the growth in relative importance of the so-called non-wage portions of the agreement: items dealing with pensions, supplementary unemployment benefits, work practices, work rules, training, seniority systems, and the like. These issues will rise as changes in production techniques destroy established job categories, radically modify job descriptions, and create entirely new occupational groups. They are issues that are much more effectively handled on an industry-wide or market-wide basis. » ¹

It is obvious that many of the issues listed in the above statement will be effectively dealt with through labour-management consultation and research rather than tense bargaining sessions. For example, the widening of the seniority unit which, in cases of technological change, might enable displaced workers to transfer their seniority — related rights to other departments and plants, is a typical development that calls for more than an exchange of statistics at the bargaining table! In fact, it requires the joint labour-management examination of how seniority provisions are applied in the industrial establishments involved. Furthermore, if the widened seniority unit is to cover several plants or firms, its effective functioning may very well call for inter-company and inter-union consultation, a procedure which might, to a certain extent, dislocate the traditionnally plant-wide bargaining relationship.

SOME RECENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SETTLEMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE

At this point our second question should be asked: to what extent and in what ways are collective agreements to-day responding to the challenge of technological change? There are, of course, unquestionable signs that in some situations the parties to collective bargaining on this continent have responded to the challenge of technological change in a positive manner. There is, for example, the Long-Range Sharing Plan that went into effect on March 1, 1963 at the Fontana, California plant on the Kaiser Steel Corporation. This plan was developed over three years as a result of research conducted by a tripartite committee composed of company, steelworkers and public representatives. The Long-Range Sharing Plan is designed to promote employment and income security for production, maintenance, clerical and technical workers affected by advance in technology. There was also the agreement reached in 1962 between the major Canadian railway companies and the unions representing their non-operating employees. This agreement provided for the establishment of a job security fund which would be used to cushion in a variety of ways the adverse effects faced by long-service employees whose jobs are eliminated by technological change.

SHIFT IN GOVERNMENT POLICY AS IT AFFECTS INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. THE NEW MAINPOWER CONSULTATIVE SERVICE IN THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR.

There has also been in recent years, as a result of the impact of technological change on occupations and employment, a significant shift of government policy as it affects industrial relations. While, in the postwar period, the emphasis was on providing assistance to the parties so that they could reach agreement and settle their disputes, recent steps have been taken to bring labour and management together in order to discuss jointly their long-term problems in a broad economic context. May we draw attention here to the recently established Manpower Consultative Service in the Federal Department of Labour. There is no doubt that this Service could have a significant impact in the field of labour-management relations. Indeed, one of the key principles behind the establishment of the new Service is that apropriate steps must be taken well in advance of worker displacement resulting from industrial change. Another equally important principle is that where there is a union, a joint union-management approach should be followed with respect to research, assessment and plans for dealing with the adjustment process to industrial change. Of significance also, is the fact that the Federal Government will be prepared through this new Service to provide financial assistance to employers and unions for research on manpower development in advance of technological change. There is no doubt that the type of research involved here is of the objective kind; it is not the type of research that is geared to provide pleasing answers either to labour or to management, or to support rigid positions at the bargaining table.

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS TODAY RESPONDING TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE? IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RESEARCH

It will be admitted that the various signs reviewed above of positive response to technological change, as encouraging as they are, still leave our general question largely unanswered. This question was: to what extent and in what ways are collective agreements today responding to the challenge of technological change? It is strongly suggested here that if this question is to be usefully answered, a new research approach is needed in the field of collective bargaining and industrial relations. By new research approach, it is meant a shift from an analysis of collective agreements only, to an analysis of agreements supplemented by field research. For example, in our recent study on collective agreement provisions in major manufacturing establishments, ² provisions concerning « technological change » could not be tabulated. Indeed, it was discovered that the matters arising out of technological change were often dealt with in a variety of provisions that made no direct reference to technological change as such. What this actually means is that a major development such as changes in technology cannot b e examined in a study of collective agreements, based on documents only. However, there are many agreement provisions that raise a number of questions with respect to technological change.

For example, seniority provisions on layoff were found in almost all of the establishments covered by the study mentioned above. ³ Some of those provisions were formulated in this manner :

• « In the event of reduction of staff and rehiring of employees, seniority shall apply, provided the employee with the greater amount of seniority can satisfactorily perform the job he is assigned to, or can learn the job within a reasonable time. »

This type of clause was, of course, classified as one which provides that the senior employees will be retained provided their qualifications (or ability) to perform available jobs are sufficient. However, what is the true meaning of such a seniority provision in a context of technological change? What would be management and union policies followed in applying the seniority provision in cases of technological change? And, in the provision itself, what would « reasonable time » really mean? Would « reasonable time » be defined by management alone? Or by both union and management? Also, in cases of changing occupational requirements, would it be the policy of management to give an advance notice to the employees who may become affected by these changes so as to give these workers « reasonable time » to learn the new jobs to which they would be assigned? … One can immediately realize that these questions — as vital as they are — cannot be usefully answered on the basis of an analysis of collective agreements only. It is only through an analysis of agreements supplemented by field study that meaningful information could be supplied.

Similarly, the mere reading of a training or retraining provision in a collective agreement does not, cannot, provide enough information as to what impact such provision has on the skills of the work-force in any particular establishment. Which are the workers who benefit from this provision? How are these workers selected? The answers to these questions are, of course, not to be found in the agreement but rather in the establishment where the agreement applies.

CONCLUSION: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND OUR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM

In this article, a great deal of attention has been devoted to technological change as a development which can have dramatic and far-reaching effects on industrial relations and on the labour force. But technological change is also a major development through which our firms and industries and, indeed, our economy as a whole can effectively meet the challenge of increasing competition from foreign countries. It is, therefore, vitally important that the proper research techniques be applied to determine not only how the hardships that can result from the introduction of technological change can be cushioned, but also what adjustments can be brought to our industrial relations system so that technological change can become an instrument for economic expansion and increased human welfare.

(1) H.D. WOOD and SYLVIA OSTRY, Labour Policy and Labour Economics in Canada, p. 498.

(2) Collective Agreement Provisions in Major Manufacturing Establishments (1963), Economics and Research Branch, Department of Labour, Canada, pp. 31.

(3) Collective Agreement Provisions in Major Manufacturing Establishments (1963), Economics and Research Branch, Department of Labour, Canada, pp. 31.

FR:

L'auteur présente une analyse de la structure du marché des soins médicaux et du type d'organisation professionnelle qui paraît le mieux adapté à ce marché dans le contexte de l'évolution présente.

EN:

An analysis of the role of a professional corporation such as The College of Physicians and Surgeons of the Province of Quebec requires a certain analysis of the market for medical services.

THE MARKET FOR MEDICAL SERVICES

Can the market for medical services be analysed through the model of perfect competition? This question is an important one because if the answer is yes, the policy of the state should then be limited to an action which would permit the mechanisms of competition to function freely. The access to the market should be left entirely free and submitted only to the choice of the consumers.

It does not seem however that the perfect competition model is very well adapted to an analysis of this market even if some of the observed phenomena on this market can be analysed with such a model. This opinion is based on the following considerations :

1. Society considers access to medical services as a right for all.

2. The character of emergency and absolute necessity of certain medical expense sometimes leaves no alternative to the consumer, whatever his financial means. The insurance mechanism aimed at easing such situation also alters the competitive nature of the market.

3. The relative positions of the physician and his patient are not positions of equality. The ordinary patient evaluates imperfectly the efficiency of the treatment received and the quantity of care he buys is usually determined by the seller.

4. Medical services engenders internal and external economics which are not always fully appreciated by the consumer.

CONTROL OF MARKET

The particular structure of the market for medical care makes it necessary to have certain control established on this market e.g. compulsory vaccination, quarantine or confinement, and also quality control for the persons admitted to distribute the service.

A corporation such as the College of Physicians and Surgeons of the Province of Quebec exists primarily to exercise such control on the quality of medical services; control which is necessary to maximise the social efficiency of the system. The efficient exercise of this control however is function of some very important powers which must be granted to the corporation; especially the power to control the access to the profession i.e. the licensing power.

THE PHENOMENON OF SOCIALISATION

The distribution of medical services is presently experiencing rapid changes. Medicine is now less and less an individual matter and more and more a question of collective or social organization.

With the advent of insurance programs organized with or by the governments, the consumers of health services tend to be grouped in one or a few large organizations with definite monopsonistic features.

The equilibrium of the market requires that the sellers of the services also get organized. The question then is: « Can the professional corporation, whose role and power we just defined, assume the responsibility of defending the doctors' interests vis-a-vis the buyer of services? »

It does not seem possible to answer yes to this question without creating for the corporation a situation of conflict of interests. As a licensing body, the corporation controls to a certain extent the quantity of doctors and consequently has an indirect control over prices. On the other hand, the function of the structure responsible of defending the interests of the doctors would be to obtain the best possible working condition including remuneration.

EN:

Belgian trade unionism has always intensely attracted industrial relations specialists because of some peculiarities in its structuring and functioning. The object of the following paper is to impart some knowledge about the history of pluralist Belgian trade unionism, its foundation and relationships it entertains at different levels: religious, political, ideological.

FR:

La culture politique belge est intimement liée au syndicalisme chrétien. Malgré l'importance politique et économique des groupes libéraux, le libéralisme a peu d'attrait pour la masse ouvrière. Les socialistes et les catholiques dominent les organismes populaires et ces deux tendances ont leurs propres organisations pour les hommes, les femmes, les enfants, les étudiants, les fermiers et les ouvriers.

Le syndicalisme chrétien belge s'appelle la Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens et fait partie du Mouvement Ouvrier Chrétien qui englobe les associations éducatives, les sociétés d'assurance, les coopératives et les associations culturelles.

En Belgique, les divisions idéologiques coïncident d'une façon générale avec les différences culturelles, géographiques et linguistiques entre les Wallons et les Flamands. Toutefois, dans le mouvement syndical, on en est arrivé à une certaine coopération.

ORIGINE

Les unions belges remontent à 1850, mais, en 1880, les unions confessionnelles commencent à se fonder. Faisant suite à l'organisation de fédérations de métiers la première confédération nationale chrétienne fut fondée en 1909 et la confédération actuelle apparut en 1923. En 1945 les socialistes et les groupes minoritaires fondèrent la Fédération générale du Travail de Belgique.

LES STRUCTURES

La C.S.C. grandit plus vite que la F.G.T.B. ces dernières années. En 1961, la F.G.T.B. comptait 731,347 membres, la C.S.C. en comptait 771,576 en 1963 et les autres 100,000.

La structure de la C.S.C. est la suivante: 1 — Le Congrès; 2 — Le Conseil, 3 — Le Bureau. Un Comité exécutif de six hommes gouverne la C.S.C. et comprend le président, le secrétaire général et l'aumônier. La C.S.C. est une section du Mouvement Ouvrier Chrétien.

LA QUESTION RELIGIEUSE

Alors que la C.S.C. et les fédérations qui l'ont précédée sont des organisations de laïcs, les relations entre les unions chrétiennes et l'Église ont toujours été très étroites. Aujourd'hui, toutefois, l'Église considère que la C.S.C. est une organisation essentiellement socio-économique qui doit être dirigée et contrôlée par des laïcs. Pour être efficace une union ouvrière doit maintenir une distinction entre les activités syndicales et les activités religieuses.

LA QUESTION IDÉOLOGIQUE

Pour la C.S.C, la doctrine sociale chrétienne n'est pas une doctrine économique et sociale en ce qui a trait aux questions techniques, mais une éthique sociale en ce qui regarde l'organisation socio-économique de la société.

Cette conception de la doctrine sociale chrétienne permet à la C.S.C d'agir librement sur les problèmes journaliers tout en adhérant à une orthodoxie stricte sur le plan théorique.

LES RELATIONS AVEC LES AUTRES UNIONS

A cause de la différence marquée entre le socialisme et le catholicisme dans la société belge, le principe de la dualité syndicale est facilement accepté.

On tâche autant que possible de coordonner les politiques et les tactiques des deux confédérations dans leurs relations avec le gouvernement et les employeurs. Ceci se réalise par des contacts fréquents entre les dirigeants des deux centrales tout en limitant les activités conjointes au-dessous des officiers supérieurs.

LES RELATIONS AVEC LES PARTIS POLITIQUES

La division de la politique belge entre les socialistes, les chrétiens et les libéraux détermine la nature des relations entre la C.S.C, l'Église et la F.G.T.B., et rapproche la C.S.C, sur le plan politique au Parti social chrétien.

Les relations entre la F.G.T.B. et le Parti socialiste sont encore plus grandes que celles qui existent entre la C.S.C. et le P.S.C. La C.S.C. est intimement liée politiquement avec le P.S.C, mais il n'existe aucune connection organique entre eux, et, contrairement à la F.G.T.B., un officier de la C.S.C. ne peut détenir un poste politique important.

LA CULTURE POLITIQUE ET LE PLURALISME SYNDICAL

Les différences politiques minent les relations entre les deux confédérations et amoindrissent le pouvoir des travailleurs belges. Lorsque l'unité syndicale est détruite, les confédérations sont obligées de s'associer davantage à leurs alliés politiques. Quoique cela soit facile pour la F.G.T.B., cette association est plus difficile pour la C.S.C.

L'influence de la C.S.C. à l'intérieur du P.S.C s'est accrue graduellement, mais celui-ci n'est pas un parti ouvrier car les intérêts des classes moyennes et des agriculteurs y sont encore très importants.