

## **Determinants of Officers Militancy: The Case of the National Union of Teachers in Israël**

### **Le syndicat national des professeurs en Israël : une étude des déterminants du "militantisme" des officiers syndicaux**

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Article abstract

This study reports on an empirical investigation aimed at enhancing the understanding of the ways in which personal and structural factors contribute to attitudinal militancy of officers of a national union of teachers. The study sought to assess the relationship between selected personal attributes and selected structural characteristics in the union, and their effect on attitudinal militancy.

# Determinants of Officers' Militancy

## The Case of the National Union of Teachers in Israël

**Shimon DOLAN**

*This study reports on an empirical investigation aimed at enhancing the understanding of the ways in which personal and structural factors contribute to attitudinal militancy of officers of a national union of teachers. The study sought to assess the relationship between selected personal attributes and selected structural characteristics in the union, and their effect on attitudinal militancy.*

The concept of the militant professional is relatively new to many western industrial relations systems. Although professionals have long recognized the need for associations to protect their interests, it is only in the last decade that professionals have become increasingly willing to resort to tactics of militancy to support their demands for improved monetary rewards and working conditions. The issue of militancy among public sector professionals, seems to have wider immediate repercussions than among other groups of employees due to the fact that such militants seek public support for their claims against the public employer who, in turn, argues that he is defending the public interest.

The accelerating growth of white collar public unions in general and teacher's unions in particular in the last decade, is a world wide phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> During this period teachers, more than any other profes-

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<sup>1</sup> See: Albert A. BLUM (ed.), *Teachers Unions and Associations: A Comparative Study*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1969. In the U.S.A. alone, it is reported that teachers' unions have had the most rapid rate of growth in the entire American labor force movement, their membership has increased 344%. See: Martin ESTEY, *The Unions: Structure, Development and Management*, 2nd edition, New York, Harcourt Brune Jovanovich, Inc., 1976, 130 pp.

sional group, were involved in militant actions such as strikes.<sup>2</sup> The history of the American teachers association, for example, indicates a dramatic change in their structure and in their explicit formal goals. Observers of these changes remark that, at the outset, most teachers associations had mainly professional aims such as control over entry into the profession, improved job tenure, and professional training. In the early stages, "bread and butter" issues were of minimal concern to most teachers unions. Thus, their attitude with respect to economic matters at this point was usually reflected in platitudes about the need for higher salaries rather than in any real action such as demanding raises. Eventually, however, a conflict developed as to whether the unions should be implicated in the fight for better salaries and "non-professional" issues.<sup>3</sup> Recent studies suggest that the restructuring of the teachers unions clearly indicates their readiness to fight for higher salaries and improved working conditions, issues which have fully replaced professional issues as the unions main goals.<sup>4</sup> A similar trend appears to characterize teachers unions worldwide.

Although there have been numerous attempts made to study teacher militancy, the majority of these studies employ one sort or another of retrospective design which seems to limit their explanatory power. The result is that the whole concept of teachers militancy is poorly understood.

This study is an attempt to fill the need for conceptual definitions and approaches relative to the study of teacher militancy. The conceptual model suggested here, draws heavily on several assumptions recognized in the literature of organization theory. First, there is the notion of intra-union conflict which is attributable to the multiple goals structure of a large scale union. This might explain a differential attitudinal militancy on the part of different unions' officers with regard to the desire to achieve various goals. Second, there is the notion that the union becomes important to many of its officers not only because of its formal goals, but because the officers become "involved", "committed to" or "dependent" upon the union as a social structure.<sup>5</sup>

Based on these notions, it argued that the source of militancy in teachers' unions is derived from the conflict which arises as leaders try to

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2 For further elaboration, see: Jack BARBASH, "The Causes of Rank-and-File Unrest", in Josel SEIDMAN (ed.), *Trade Union Government and Collective Bargaining*, New York, Prager Publishers, 1970, pp. 39-79.

3 BLUM, Albert A., 1969, *op. cit.*

4 MOSKOW, Michael, "Recent Legislation Affecting Collective Negotiation for Teachers", *Phi Delta Kappan*, XLVII, 3, pp. 136-140.

5 See: Arnold S. TANNANBAUM, "Unions", in James G. MARCH (ed.): *Handbook of Organizations*, Chicago, Rand McNally Co., 1965, pp. 710-763.

simultaneously satisfy their personal goals of maintaining themselves in office<sup>6</sup> as well as the institutional goals of the union.

Therefore, the present research is premised on the assumption that unions' militancy may be associated with two major groups of variables:

- (a) personal characteristics of the unions' officers, and
- (b) several characteristics of the internal structure of the union as well as several structural characteristics of the officers in their respective employing organizations. These assumptions led to the formation of the following research questions:
  1. What are the structural and personal variables that can account for teachers' union militancy?
  2. What are the inter-individual differences as to the respective independent variables relative to militancy? That is: of the many independent variables studied which are of relatively greatest importance in explaining degrees of militancy?
  3. What are the relationships among the personal and structural determinants of union militancy?

To answer these questions, a questionnaire survey was conducted among all officers of a national union of teachers. The results of this survey provided the data base for the paper.

## DETERMINANTS OF UNION MILITANCY: A REVIEW

The relationship between militant behavior of a union vis-a-vis various independent variables has been studied for a number of years. There have been two principal directions of research. One has concentrated in examining the relationships between several environmental (external) variables and the frequency of unions militant behavior. The other has focused on a variety of unions' internal characteristics as the determinants of militancy. Broadly speaking, the first group of studies are more descriptive in nature while the second group are based on empirical research.

Among the external determinants that are often mentioned in the literature, the work environment is suggested as the prime predictor of militancy. Dubin, for example, suggests a model in which union militancy is related to the "attachment to work".<sup>7</sup> Others explain the growth of public

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<sup>6</sup> This notion was very well supported by the work of Michels. See: Robert MICHELS, *Political Parties*, New York, The Free Press, 1949.

<sup>7</sup> DUBIN, Robert, "Attachment to Work and Union Militancy", *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 12, 1973, pp. 51-64.

sector union militancy as influenced by structural changes in the government such as: increase of bureaucratization and restructuring of school and school systems<sup>8</sup>; increased professionalization and declining average age of the work force<sup>9</sup>; internal political struggles in the union movement itself and the more vulnerable economic position of the public employees<sup>10</sup>; and the politicization of the local educational administration through means such as community control and racial balances.<sup>11</sup> Most of these studies are descriptive in nature. Their contribution to the prediction of the variance in militancy seems to be quite limited.

The alternative research strategy focuses on intra and inter-group variations among members of a particular union. The majority of such studies are an attempt to correlate personal attributes of unions' members with some measure of militancy, with the remainder focusing on structural determinants of militancy.

Among the personal characteristics, the following are found to be significantly and positively related to militancy: sex<sup>12</sup>; age and teaching experience.<sup>13</sup> Weaker relationships to militancy are reported for social status and political affiliation.<sup>14</sup> There have been no consistent findings reported which correlate militancy with other socio-demographic characteristics such as marital status and income. In a single attempt to classify personality structure with militant attitudes the conclusion was that while interpersonal trust was positively and significantly related to attitudes toward strike, authoritarianism was found not at all to be related.<sup>15</sup>

8 CORWIN, Ronald, *Militant Professionalism: A Study of Organizational Conflict in High Schools*, New York, Appleton Century Crofts, 1970.

9 COLE, S., *The Unionization of Teachers*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969.

10 BARKIN, Solomon, (ed.), *Worker Militancy and Its Consequences*, 1965-75, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975, 408 pp.

11 UROFSKY, M., (ed.), *Why Teachers Strike: Teachers' Rights and Community Control*, New York, Anchor Books, Doubleday Co., 1970.

12 FOX, W.S., and M.H. WINCE, "The Structure and Determinants of Occupational Militancy Among Public School Teachers", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* Vol. 30, No. 1, 1975, pp. 47-59; and C. WINICK, "When Teachers Strike", *Teachers College Record*, Vol. 67, No. 7, 1963, pp. 593-604.

13 COLE, S., "Teachers Strike: A Study of Conservatism of Predisposition Into Action", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 74, 1968, pp. 506-520; Don HELLRIEGEL, Wendel FRENCH and Richard B. PETERSON, "Collective Negotiations and Teachers: A Behavioral Analysis", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1970, pp. 380-386.

14 COLE, S., "The Unionization of Teachers: Determinants of Rank and File Support", *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 41, 1968, pp. 67-87.

15 ALUTTO, Joseph A., and James A. BELASCO, "Determinants of Attitudinal Militancy Among Nurses and Teachers", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1974, pp. 216-227.

Job related variables are also suggested by several scholars as important determinants of union militancy. Three closely related determinants appear to be included in this context: job dissatisfaction, career dissatisfaction and feelings of professional deprivation.<sup>16</sup> However, results of these studies are somewhat inconsistent which negates the possibility of conclusive linear relations between these job related factors and militancy. Nonetheless, the addition of several moderator variables, such as cultural and economic factors, has improved the significance of the relationships found.

The literature dealing with the relationship between structural characteristics of a union and militancy is very scarce and fragmented. Several studies, however, have found that the frequency of several types of conflict within a union increases with union size and its total organizational complexity. Evidence for relationship between size and militancy is provided by several studies, although the direction of the relationships found is for the most part inconsistent.<sup>17</sup> Position in the employing organization can also be a structural determinant of militancy. Fisher reports that teachers in Oregon were more favourable toward sanctions than mere principals.<sup>18</sup>

## THE WORKING MODEL

The working model which guided this study is presented in Figure 1. Five major blocks of variables are identified as the major personal and structural forces affecting attitudinal militancy of the officers of a National union of Teachers. The initial selection of variables for inclusion in each block was based primarily on past empirical research referred to above.

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<sup>16</sup> See: Joseph A. ALUTTO and James A. BELASCO, 1974, *op. cit.*; S. COLE, 1969, *op. cit.*; Ronald CORWIN, 1970, *op. cit.*; H. COX, "Professional Attitudes and Militant Behavior: The Case of the Teachers", Paper presented at the *meeting of the American Sociological Association*, 1974; C.J. MARGEIRSON and C.K. ELLIOTT, "A Predictive Study of the Development in Teacher Militancy *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 18, 1970, pp. 408-417.

<sup>17</sup> Positive direction between organizational size and strike frequency was reported by: G.K. INGHAM, "Plant Size, Political Attitudes and Behavior", *Sociological Review*, Vol. 17, 1969, pp. 235-249, and D.W. BRITT and O. GALLE, "Structural Antecedents of the Shape of Strikes: A Comparative Analysis", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 39, 1974, pp. 642-651. Negative direction between organizational size and militancy was reported by: E. SHORTER and C. TILLY, "The Shape of Strikes in France", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 13, 1971, pp. 60-86.

<sup>18</sup> FISHER, J.R., "The Relationship of Sex, Level, and Position of Oregon Educators to Attitudinal Statements that Deal with Collective Negotiations and Sanctions", *Working Paper - Oregon School Study Council*, Eugene, University of Oregon, 1969, Vol. 13, No. 1.


However, the variables identified in each block are the result of an elaborate process of data reduction detailed elsewhere.<sup>19</sup> These variables are:

1. *Job/Employment Related Variables* - this block encompasses one structural variable - the level of position within the employer organization; and two personal attributes: job dissatisfaction, and professionalism.
2. *Personal Background Characteristics* - this block includes two subsets of variables: (a) socio-demographic variables such as: sex, income, ethnicity, marital status, age and religiousness, and (b) the occupational mobility factor.
3. *Union Related Variables* - included here are four sub-sets of variables two structural and two personal. They are, respectively: the level of position in the union and the degree of union centralization and attachment to union goals and dissatisfaction with the union.
4. *Social Comparison Inequity* - this block contains a single variable which provides individual officers' perceptions of the way others in society appreciate the work teachers are performing.
5. *External Environment* - Although identified in the model as potential predictors of militancy, this block of variables are not dealt with in the study for two reasons:  
 (a) The prime interest of the study is in identifying factors which contribute to the relative militancy of the officers and not the overall militancy of the union. In other words, it argued that external variables might explain changes in the mean of militancy but they are less important in explaining the variance in militancy. (b) If external variables are held *ceteris paribus*, the model provides for greater generalizations, hence the explanation is not constrained to the particular socio-economic environment prevailing at any given time. Holding the objective environment "*ceteris paribus*" is certainly limiting the scope of the study, but this is compensated by the inclusion of several variables pertaining to the subjective environment as will be discussed later.
6. *Militancy* - this concept is defined in terms of a multidimensional attitudes construct. Attitudinal militancy is the dependent variable for the analysis. The dimensions of militancy are empirically assessed in this study.

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<sup>19</sup> DOLAN, Shimon, "Structural and Personal Determinants at Militancy of Teachers' Union National Officers", *Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1977. Means and standard deviations of all the variables could be obtained by writing to the author.

**FIGURE 1**  
**Block Diagram of Determinants of**  
**Attitudinal Militancy of Teachers'**  
**Union National Officers**



## DATA, METHODS AND PROCEDURES

### The Setting

The subject chose for this study was the National Union of Teachers in Israel (hereafter NUT) which is the largest and oldest professional union in the country. It has about 45,000 members who elect representatives to the following officership levels within the union:

- (a) The center which is the main executive body of the union. It has 53 elective officers including the secretary general of the union.
- (b) The Regional Branch committees which vary in size according to the region. These committees are the intermediate executive body of the union. They handle primarily regional affairs.



- (c) The School Teacher committees which represent the basic trade union cell at the work place. There are thousands of such committees across the nation. None of the members of these committees are paid union officers.

Collective bargaining in Israel takes place with the Ministry of Education. Negotiation issues range from wages and working conditions to participation in determining educational plans. There is a single wage scale for all teachers within the country. Differences in wages are mainly based upon academic training and length of service on the job.

### **Field Work and Sampling**

The data used to generate the model relating personal and structural union characteristics to attitudes on militancy is taken from a survey of the officers of the National Union of Teachers in Israel (NUT), collected in March-April, 1973. "Union officer" was defined as any individual elected to any of the following union positions:

- a) member of the Union Center
- b) member of the Regional Branch Committee
- c) active member of the union's Committee at The Work Place (usually termed School Teachers Committee).

These levels of positions within the union officially constitute its main decision making bodies. While virtually 30 per cent of the top officers (members of the Center), are full time union functionaries, the majority of the other officers and those who serve on the Regional Branch Committees and/or School Teachers Committees, are engaged in full time teaching. They are unpaid part time officers.

Data was collected via self-administered questionnaires distributed to each officer in groups (a) and (b) above, and one representative from each School Committee. Completed questionnaires were received from 902 officers. The overall response rate was about 50 per cent, quite satisfactory when compared to response rates reported in most similar studies.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> In studies relevant to teachers surveyed, the response rate ranges from 44 percent to 55 percent. The sample was also tested for representativeness. The results after analysis were quite satisfactory. The full procedures for this testing is detailed elsewhere in: Shimon DOLAN, 1977, *op. cit.*

## Instrumentation

While all of the background information was ascertained from the questionnaire, a Likert type scale was employed for most of the attitudes variables.<sup>21</sup>

Sex, ethnicity, age, marital status, education and income were ascertained from the customary questionnaire item responses. Ethnicity was subgrouped according to a combination of information as to country of origin and race. Education was defined in terms of the last grade or degree the subject completed. Subjects' degree of religiousness was measured on a four point scale ranging from a value of 1 (very orthodox) to a value of 4 (secular).

The occupational mobility indicator was attained by measuring the difference between occupational standing of the father and son's. This measure is a variant of the measure suggested by Duncan<sup>22</sup> which in itself relies on the simple eight Census Bureau occupational categories devised by Edward.<sup>23</sup> Congruence scores were therefore derived from the rank differences between the subject and his/her father. Following computation of the scores four major mobility groups were classified: (a) negative or downward mobility (b) equivalent or no mobility (c) low medium or some upward mobility and (d) high or significant upward mobility.

Level of position within the union reflects on officer's affiliation with one of the three central governing bodies of NUT: the top national body (the Center), the intermediate body (the regional branch committee), and the local body (the school teachers committee). These are three mutually exclusive hierarchical levels of positions.

The centralization measure was developed in a manner similar to the one reported by Whisler et al.<sup>24</sup> Three items measured the perceived amount of influence possessed by various union participants over major policy making. The response choices were scored 1 (very much influence) through 5

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21 LIKERT, Rensis A., "A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes", *Archives of Psychology*, Vol. 22, No. 140, 1932.

22 DUNCAN, Ottis O., "Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Social Mobility", in N. SMELSER and Symor LIPSET (eds): *Social Structure and Social Mobility in Economic Development*, Chicago, Aldine Press, 1966.

23 EDWARDS, A.L., "Classified Index of Occupations and Industries", *U.S. Bureau of Census*, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1960.

24 WHISLER, Thomas L., Harold MEYER and Bernard H. BAUM, "Centralization of Organizational Control: An Empirical Study of its Meaning and Measurement", *Journal of Business*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1967, pp. 10-26.

(very little influence). An index of perceived centralization was performed in this manner. Cronbach's alpha, as an estimate of reliability for the centralization index was .72.

The degree of attachment on individual officer as to the union was measured by his "attachment to unions' goals". An index of attachment was constructed for each subject, based on his response to the question regarding the degree to which a given goal *should* be an important part of the unions' activities. Seven goals were considered as indicated in Table 1. The treatment of these goal-related issues relied upon the principal component factor analysis of the corresponding matrix interrelating the seven items. The pattern of the rotated loadings suggests reasonable, meaningful interpretations for each of the common factors. On the basis of these results three sub-scales of attachment to unions' goals were constructed, each of which was derived by summing the scores on the respective items with the highest loading. It was decided to drop one item whose loading was low for all the three factors.

Factor I, was labeled, Attachment to "Bread and Butter" Goals (ABBG). Factor II, was labeled, Attachment to Client-Pupil Related Goals (ACPRG), and Factor III, was labeled, Attachment to the Unions' Professional Goals (APRG).

Dissatisfaction with the union was measured by the extent of officers' dissatisfaction with the level of attainment of union goals. For development of an index of dissatisfaction with the union, the subjects were presented with a list of the seven goals, which they have indicated on a five point scale how much they believed each goal was *currently* emphasized versus how much they felt it *should be* emphasized by the union. The degree of related dissatisfaction was inferred by adding the absolute differences between responses concerning current and preferred values for each of the seven goals. Dissatisfaction with Unions's Goal Attainment (DUGA), has a Cronbach alpha estimate of reliability of .79.

Level of position with the employer is especially important in a study of union militancy in Israel. There, with only few exceptions, NUT officers are not paid by the union and they carry out their regular teaching duties with the employing organization. In addition, unlike the U.S. in Israel individuals acting in a supervisory capacity are not excluded from being unionized and participating in collective bargaining. The result is, that in NUT, school principals, superintendents and regular teachers belong to the same union. The "level of position" variable, then, related to the particular job the subject holds within the employing organization. Supervisors and

school principles were placed in one category, and ordinary teachers were placed in the other.

Job dissatisfaction (JOBDIS) was defined as the degree to which the officer has a negative orientation toward his work environment. Job-dissatisfaction was measured in a multifaceted form, to include subject responses on a 1 (very much satisfaction) to 5 (very little satisfaction) scale for the following items: teachers' status in the school; cooperation among teachers, "teachers-administration cooperation", teachers-supervisors relationships; and physical working conditions at school. The total score for the index was calculated by adding up the scores for the five items. Cronbach's alpha for this measure is .70.

Since no widely accepted single definition of the concept of professionalism was available, it was decided to develop an index based on several behavioral attributes of professionals.<sup>25</sup> Three behavioural criteria were selected: time devoted to professional reading; commitment to continuing search for better performance on the job; and time devoted to assignments above and beyond that detailed in the job description. All responses were again assigned values of 1 (for least frequent) to 5 (most frequent) on each item. The index was comprised of the summation of the scores on the three items. Cronbach's alpha as an estimate of reliability was .42 which is not particularly high.

Two items related to the perceptual measure of social comparison inequity (SCI):

1. a feeling that the public generally does not sufficiently appreciate the work teachers are doing, and
2. a statement pertaining to the idea that the majority of other white collar jobs (like: clerks, technicians, etc.) are more highly evaluated by the public than the profession of teaching.

Once again, the response to these statements was measured on 1 through 5 scale and added up. The higher the score on the index the higher the recorded feeling of social inequity.

Militancy, as the term is used here referred to the officers' attitudes on the preferred selection and frequency of use of a variety of collective

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<sup>25</sup> For general characteristics of the behavior and expectations of professionals in organizations, see: William KOURENHOUSER, *Scientists in Industry*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963; Another excellent source on professional attributes of teaching is reported in: Harold WILENSKY, "The Professional Persons in Public Organizations", *Educational Administration Quarterly*, Vol. 1, 1965, pp. 1-26.

bargaining tactics, particularly strikes. The measures of attitudinal militancy were developed in two stages. It was initially based on five questionnaire statements pertaining to support of activities indicative of militancy. The five questionnaire items were:

1. One should use more frequently organizational strategies such as strikes.
- \*2. The right to strike should not be granted to teachers.
- \*3. A union referendum should be always made prior to striking on a national level.
- \*4. Prior to striking by teachers, other union strategies should be carried on such as mediation or arbitration.
5. If the issue is adversary violation of a signed contract, one should announce the dispute immediately, and not pursue the case to a labor court.

Again subjects responded by choosing one of five alternative responses to each statement, as follows: strongly agree, agree, partially agree, disagree and strongly disagree. The standard Likert procedure was used for scoring. Weights of 5 (strongly agree) through 1 (strongly disagree) were given for each item. The procedure also used the reverse weighting for negative items, as indicated by a (\*) in the above listing.

In the second step, principal component factor analysis was used to derive meaningful sub-dimensions from the intercorrelation matrix of the five militancy items. The rotated solution suggests that there might be two subsets of dimensions that comprise the concept of militancy. Two composite militancy scales were built from the factor score coefficient matrix. It has been customary to build factor scales employing only those variables that have substantial loading on a given factor. Only those variables that were loaded .4 and above have been used to composite scale 1 of militancy, and .3 and above, for scale 2 of militancy. The relative advantage of these scales as a measuring device is primarily due to the use of vector of factor scores which takes into consideration standardized values of variables (their relative weight).

Factor I, was labeled - "General Positive Attitude Toward Strikes" (GPATS). This index is made up from three items pertaining to: (a) the right of teachers to strike in general, (b) the necessity to call for a union referendum before striking on a national level, and (c) the call for the use of alternatives to strike such as mediation or arbitration. Cronbach's alpha, as an estimate of reliability for this index is .60. GPATS has a mean of -.14 and a standard deviation of 1.27, which indicates a good variability.

Factor II, was labeled - "Specific Propensity to Strike" (SPS), and was made up of three items: (a) statement pertaining to the frequency of strikes to be implemented by the union, (b) the need for use of alternative strategies to strike as mediation or arbitration, and (c) an item which indicates preferences as to a strategy to use following adversary contract violations. Cronbach's alpha for SPS is .46, which is not particularly high. SPS, however, has a mean of -.08 and a standard deviation of .97, which again indicates a good variability of the scale.

## ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Data analysis for this study occurred in three phases. First, the dimensions of the criterion variable, attitudinal militancy, were derived through factor analysis as detailed above. Secondly, the refinement of a minimum set of predictors (independent variables) were derived through a sequence of correlation analysis, where intercorrelations within blocks and among blocks (figure 1) were reduced to a minimum thereby avoiding problems which might have resulted from possible multicollinearity. The third phase involved the use of multiple regression techniques which utilized each of the two dimensions of attitudinal militancy as the criterion variable. Categorical variables were included in the regression analyses by assigning "dummy coding".<sup>26</sup>

Table 1 report estimated regression coefficients and related statistics when all predictor variables are fitted into the equations. Equations reported in this table have been estimated using ordinary least square regression procedures. Analysis of the residual for each of the equations, suggests that the error term for each analysis has a normal distribution around the estimated mean,  $y$ . Cases being outside two standard deviations, did not exceed 3.8% for the equation reported for GPATS, or 4.5% for the equation reported for SPS.

Multiple R for GPATS is .398 which is not particularly impressive. Several variables were found, however, to be highly significant in relation to General Positive Attitudes Toward Strikes. They are: Sex, Ethnicity (in part), Religiousness, Centralization, Attachment to "Bread and Butter Goals" (ABBRG), Attachment to Professional Goals (APRG), and

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<sup>26</sup> The method of coding used in this study is called "effect coding". It is explained in: Gerrit WOLF and Bliss CARTWRIGHT, "Rules for Coding Dummy Variables in Multiple Regression", *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 81, No. 3, 1974, pp. 173-179.

**TABLE 1**  
**Regression Results for GPATS and SPS Factor, as Criterion Measures of Militancy**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Regression Coefficient</i>	<i>GPATS Beta</i>	<i>t-Value</i>	<i>Regression Coefficient</i>	<i>SPS Beta</i>	<i>t-Value</i>
Sex:						
MALE	.264	.206	4.514*	.224	.231	4.999*
Ethnicity:						
WIN	.276	.096	2.328*	.163	.074	1.787
Age	-.004	-.033	-.744	-.001	-.008	1.182
Marital Status:						
MARRIED	-.082	-.041	-1.132	.019	.013	.350
Religiousness	.111	.084	2.121*	.069	.069	1.732
Education:						
NEE	.384	.126	.888	-.219	-.095	-.659
NSE	-.215	-.100	-1.207	.166	.101	1.210
NTS	-.161	-.103	-1.069	.040	.034	.347
Income	.000	.059	1.311	.000	.160	-.400
Occupational Mobility:						
NOM	-.032	-.034	-.205	.203	.100	1.710
EOM	.021	.009	.178	-.100	-.057	-1.117
LMOM	.001	.001	.015	-.075	-.061	-1.247
Level of Position in Union:						
HLOPU	-.015	-.007	-.105	.094	.057	.877
MLOPU	.147	.097	1.588	.040	.035	.564
Centralization	.034	.072	1.95*	.014	.038	1.007
Attachment to Union's Goals:						
ABBRG	.144	.127	3.35 *	.076	.089	2.30 *
ACPRG	.049	.040	1.057	.011	.011	.300
APRG	-.098	-.096	-2.534*	-.048	-.062	-1.62
DUGA	.022	.103	2.708*	.176	.107	2.80 *
Level of Position with Employer:						
ADM	-.045	-.026	-.602	.016	-.012	-.281
Job Dissatisfaction (JOBDIS)	.008	.022	.577	.023	-.081	2.116*
Professionalism	.011	.019	.493	.010	.022	.588
Social Comparison Inequity	.015	.020	.551	.398	.071	1.945*
Constant	-2.095		-2.797*	-1.365		-2.377*

\*Significant at the .05 level and lower.

Dissatisfaction with the Unions' Goal Attainment (DUGA). In other words, these results suggest the following: if we control for the effects of all other variables then:

- (a) Male officers are significantly more militant than female officers on GPATS.
- (b) Officers who were born in Israel and belong to the "Ashkenazi" group are more militant on GPATS than officers who were not born in Israel.
- (c) Officers who perceive a greater centralization in their Union are more militant on GPATS Scale than those who perceive lesser degree of centralization.
- (d) Secular officers are more militant on GPATS scale than more religiously orthodox officers.
- (e) Strong attachment to "Bread and Butter" Goals (ABBRG) is positively and significantly related to militancy measured on GPATS. However, strong attachment to professional goals (APPG) is inversely related to militancy. This suggests that officers who have lower attachment to unions professional goals are the more militant on GPATS index.
- (f) Finally, it was found that officers who are dissatisfied with the unions' goal attainment (DUGA), are more militant than those who are satisfied with the above.

The multiple correlation coefficient for SPS is .372 which is again quite low. Five variables were found to be highly significant in explaining SPS. They are: Sex, Attachment to "Bread and Butter" Goals (ABBRG), Dissatisfaction with the Union Goals' Attainment (DUGA), Job Dissatisfaction (JOBDIS), and social comparison inequity (SCI). In rephrasing the findings the following is suggested:

- (a) Once again, male union officers are significantly more militant than female officers on the specific propensity to strike (SPS),
- (b) Officers who are dissatisfied with the union goal' attainment (DUGA), are more militant on SPS than those who are satisfied with NUT's goal attainment.
- (c) Officers who dissatisfied with their job (JUBDIS) are more militant on the SPS index than those who possess a lesser degree of job dissatisfaction.
- (d) Officers with higher scores on the social comparison inequity index (SCI) are more militant along specific propensity to strike than those with lower scores on SCI.



- (e) Officers with greater attachment to "Bread and Butter" goals are more militant on the SPS scale than those with less attachment to these goals. However, the other two indexes of attainment to unions' goals (ACPRG, and APRG), did not yield any significant relations on SPS.

Apparently several personal and structural variables do not serve as effective discriminators on either of the dimensions of militancy. The statistically insignificant performance of these variables detracts from the credibility of the model which considers them as predictors of attitudinal militancy. Nevertheless, the model does possess several interesting findings.

A summary of a stepwise regression analysis procedure predicting the explained variance in officers attitudinal militancy and compared for the two dimensions of militancy (GPATS and SPS) is presented in Table 2.

**TABLE 2**  
**Stepwise Regression Summary for**  
**Factors of Militancy (N = 902)**

<i>Dependent Variables (Factor)</i>	<i>Step</i>	<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Variance Increase</i>	<i>Variance Explained</i>	<i>F Significance</i>
(GPATS)	1	MALE	8.0%	8.0%	0
GENERAL	2	ABBRG	2.4%	10.4%	.00
POSITIVE	3	DUGA	1.1%	11.5%	.00
ATTITUDE	4	APRG	0.8%	12.3%	.01
TOWARD	5	MLOPU	0.7%	13.0%	.02
STRIKES	6	CENT	0.7%	13.7%	.02
	7	WIN	0.4%	14.1%	.06
	8	RELIGIOUSNESS	0.6%	14.7%	.02
		Constant			.00
(SPS)	1	MALE	7.2%	7.2%	0
SPECIFIC	2	DUGA	1.7%	8.9%	.00
PROPENSITY	3	JOBDIS	1.0%	9.9%	.00
TO	4	ABBRG	0.9%	10.8%	.00
STRIKE	5	MLOPU	0.5%	11.3%	.05
		Constant			.00

Table 2 demonstrates that sex was the single best predictor of both dimensions of attitudinal militancy. Sex accounted for 8.0% of GPAS, and over 7.0% of SPS. The second best predictor of GPAS was "Attachment to Bread and Butter Goals", which contributed an additional 2.4% to the explained variance. The third variable to enter the equation was dissatisfac-

tion with Unions' Goals Attainments (DUGA) which added a little over 1.0%. The other predictors which appeared in later steps, altogether predicted only 3.2% of the variance as GPAS, while each single determinant accounted for less than 1.0%.

With regard to the other militancy dimension (SPS), after sex, the dissatisfaction with the Union's Goals attainment appeared in the second step and added 1.7% to the explained variance. This was followed by Job Dissatisfaction 1.0%, Attachment to Bread and Butter Goals with less than 1.0% added explanation. Finally, the level of position in the union entered the stepwise regression in the fifth step, with only a 0.5% increment to the explained variance of SPS. Note that when the whole structure of the equation is examined (see Table 1), this variable does not become significant within the conventional .05 level.

## DISCUSSION

The comparison between pairs of predictors according to the order in which they have appeared in the stepwise regressions of the two criterion measures provide the framework for the first part of this discussion. To begin with, it is suggested that one should make the following distinction between the two dimensions of militancy we have studied, along a continuum of remoteness from direct action: While GPATS pertains to General Positive Attitudes toward Strike, a concept which is far remote from readiness to act upon, and therefore not necessarily an obligating action, SPS involves a much more affirmative level of readiness for action. The explanation of the ordering of the predictors in the stepwise equations will be made in reference to this distinction.

Sex of the respondent was the best predictor for both equations. As we wish at this point to concentrate on differences between the equations, this topic is tabled for later discussion. ABBRG, however, entered in the second step of GPATS regression and only on the fourth step on the SPS regression. The difference in entry might suggest that NUT officers regard their union right to use sanctions to the same extent as private sector unions, at least at the more conceptual level (GPATS). However, officers are more cautious and perhaps impose on themselves more constraints when it is required to support more affirmative commitment (SPS), in the use of strategies such as strikes. At the level of action commitment, factors other than goal orientation assume greater importance. Dissatisfaction assume greater importance as a guide to actions connected attitudes.

It is suggested that Attachment to Bread and Butter Goals is a more predictive factor on the level of more conceptual attitudes, and it is less predictive, yet significant, at the level of more immediate attitudes. Further, in a similar context, one might want to explain the negative direction found between the Attachment to Professional Goals (APRG) and militancy. APRG entered the regression in the fourth step on GPATS and did not enter at .05 significance level on SPS regression. Any explanation for such occurrence is purely speculative given the initial very low zero order correlation among these variables ( $r = .07$ ). Nonetheless, one possible speculation is that officers with higher Attachment to the Union Professional Goals are less likely to support militant movement on the part of their union, perhaps because of the fact that such act could be regarded as counter productive to the extent that it is against the code of ethics of professionals. Another possible explanation is provided later in the discussion.

The variable which enters the GPATS regression third, and the SPS regression second, is DUGA (Dissatisfaction with Unions' Goals' Attainment). DUGA has similar predictive power on both dimensions. It contributed 1.7 per cent to the explained variance of GPATS and 1.1 per cent to the explained variance on SPS. These findings generally support the contention that intra officer differences regarding level of attainable goals, conforms to a wide variance in the union, and may provide good discrimination on attitudinal militancy. It further suggests that in multiple goal seeking organizations, such as NUT, differentiation among its sub-units regarding the pursuit of the goals may lend good insight into the formation of attitudinal militancy.

Job Dissatisfaction, as a predictor of militancy, could also be explained along the lines of the distinction made earlier between the two measures of militancy. Worth noticing is the fact that Job Dissatisfaction appears only in the SPS stepwise regression. The question is why? Our answer amounts to a more elaborate frustration-aggression theory. In this case, the sources of frustration are traced to the job situation. It can be hypothesized, through deductive reasoning, that teachers acknowledge collective militancy, such as in the forms of SPS referred to in this study, as a legitimate process and potentially effective for reducing their sources of dissatisfaction and/or resentment about their jobs. Such a view is, of course, meaningless in the context of general conceptual militancy (GPATS) and was, therefore, discriminatory only on the more specific forms of militancy (SPS).

The results regarding the inclusion of Level of Position in the union in the two stepwise equations are not easily interpretable. These levels, which were incorporated in the analyses as dummies, did not all come up signifi-

cant. While middle level of position in the union (MLOPU) yielded significant relations on both dependent variables, the other levels included in the analysis did not yield acceptable levels of significance in the regression analyses. It is noteworthy that this variable was the first predictor from the class of structural variables to enter the equation. Thus its contribution to the explained variance of the two dependent variables was limited to 0.7 per cent for GPATS and 0.5 per cent for SPS.

In the two ordinary least square regressions, sex of respondent was the single best predictor of attitudinal militancy. This finding is consistent with the results obtained by Fox and Wince.<sup>27</sup> Their general explanation of the reasons for such occurrence seem to apply to the Israeli as well as American context. They state:

“Sex differences in militancy may reflect normative differences regarding aggression in American society, differences that may decline in the future due to the widespread resurgence of feminism...For more men than women, teaching is the sole of principal source of support for spouse and children. Thus different role demands are made upon male and female teachers such that a given income is likely to seem less adequate to a male than a female teacher...Thus, sex differences in militancy may be rooted in feelings of relative deprivation.” (p. 57)

Fox and Wince, draw heavily in their explanation upon the role of sex within the American stratification structure. Basically, they contend that employment is not a major source of self-identification for females, and therefore, they are less deprived than male teachers; consequently, they are less militant. Implicit in their discussion is the notion that the subordinate status of female teachers in the social structure seems to contribute to their acceptance of an inferior position among the white collar occupations, and the likelihood that they would struggle to change it through union militancy is very small.

Additional reasons for the emergence of sex as the best predictor of militancy in Israel, have to do with particular Israeli social stratification patterns, which regard teaching among the bottom of the professional occupations. The images of a male teacher is even lower in the public mind than that of a female teacher. This writer's observation suggest that the public holds two sets of values regarding teachers and teaching: first, due to historical reasons, males are not expected to teach within the primary school system. This job is intended for females (one such as nursing). In fact, over

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<sup>27</sup> FOX, W.S., and M.H. WINCE, 1976, *op. cit.*

70 per cent of the teachers in the primary school system in Israel are female. This domination of the profession by females has contributed to the "proletarianization" of the field, which results in lowering the image of the profession. The frustration of low status affects male teachers more severely than female teachers, because women's class positions are defined largely by their husbands' status, and to a certain extent, by total family income rather than by their job. Secondly, the public regards male teachers in the primary school system, as individuals who have failed to pursue a more "prestigious" career, and were therefore forced into teaching. The normative expectation in Israel is that competent individuals, should they select teaching as a career, should work within the secondary education system. Only university drop outs and graduates of semi-academic institutions, are expected to teach in elementary schools. The minimal requirements needed to certify teachers in primary education gives easy entry access to teaching for those who are less competent individuals. It should be clear from this discussion why teachers, especially in the primary education, do not enjoy broad public prestige. Characteristically, therefore, militancy of male teachers in NUT, is a product of their effort to fight the values that are held

by the public. Militancy could express a form of protest and demonstrating power, and could also serve as a means to attain several ends that are likely to raise the teacher's social status. Take, for example, an increase of wages, which is a major determinant of social status. If militancy can promise to improve salaries it could contribute not only to the officer's economic standing but also to his social standing.

Additional support for the thesis of male militancy is perhaps the fact, that male officers are more active in the officership of the union. In a union dominated by female membership, 70 per cent of the officers elected to the top positions (the Center) are male teachers. One may further hypothesize that to some extent the male officers who are elected to the key positions in the union are those who happened also to be the more radical. That is to suggest that within the NUT there is a self selected mechanism of electing officers who have expressed more belligerent attitudes. Such a proposition, of course, requires confirmation from future research before it can be confidently held. Partial evidence supporting this contention could be inferred from this study, should we decide to look at the combined effects of sex and level of position in the union. Along the SPS criterion measure of militancy, it was found that top echelon officers (HLOPU and MLOPU) are likely to be more militant than bottom echelon officers (LLOPU). And, from demographic union data reported elsewhere<sup>28</sup> one may also learn that as we

<sup>28</sup> DOLAN, Shimon, 1977, *op. cit.*

move up the level of position within NUT, the proportion of male officers increases significantly. These data considered in combination could give rise to the thesis that male officers are more militant and also more active in handling union affairs in the sense that they operate from superior union positions as compared with female officers.

Support for the just suggested explanation of militancy can be derived from another variable found to discriminate officers on the SPS index. This is the Social Comparison Inequity (SCI). The study indicates that there are large gaps among officers in the way they assess the extent to which the public appreciates the work they are doing as compared with other white collar occupations. The findings also suggest that high perceptions of social inequity contribute positively and significantly to militancy.

Religiousness was also found to be significantly related to militancy (GPATS). Secular officers are likely to be more militant on GPATS scale than orthodox officers. Perhaps the orthodox officers are predisposed to deterministic approaches. This suggests that orthodox officers strongly believe that much of their achievements and failures in life are not within their own control but it is rather according to God's will. The secular officers, on the other hand, place much more trust in their own efforts to push toward achievements in their union. The explanation just mentioned is severely limited due to very low zero order correlation between religiousness and militancy. Although it appears to be statistically significant in the regression equation, given its low correlation with the criterion, no single interpretable explanation could be offered with confidence.

In previous research on the effects of centralization on militancy, results were obtained which are inconsistent with those reached in this study. An explanation for this inconsistency is the large methodological differences existing among the various studies, primarily as to the measurement and meaning of both militancy and centralization. For example, both Roomkin<sup>29</sup> and Corwin<sup>30</sup>, found the relationship between centralization and militancy counter to our findings. Roomkin, which operationalized centralization as the interval in years between national union conventions, found centralization to be negatively related to militancy. That is, the probability of a strike by subordinates is inversely related to the interval between national union conventions. Corwin, in a non-union context, found that militancy, measured by the frequency of conflicts, decreased in cen-

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29 ROOMKIN, Myron, "Union Structure, Internal Control, and Strike Activity", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 29, No. 2., 1976, pp. 198-217.

30 CORWIN, Ronald, 1970, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-221.

tralized educational organizations. Our findings, on the other hand, suggests different directions regarding attitudinal militancy. Our explanation for such occurrence relies on general social processes, treated in much detail in the sociological literature, regarding the issues of power and conflicts in formal organizations such as NUT. Centralization in the union means that certain individuals, even though they are role holders, are excluded from participation in significant policy determinations. The question often raised is whether unions carrying out their primary function, collective bargaining, can make internal governmental democratic procedure their first priority, or whether there is an inherent conflict between the improvement of economic well being of the members and the centralizing of administrative and decision making policies? Much of the answer to this question depends upon the economic and structure of the industry. In Israel, since the government is the sole employer for all teachers, it is likely that power within the union becomes more concentrated at the top. While functionally such concentration of power may have its advantages, it also may alienate a large group of officers who do not share this power. As a result, it is speculated that centralization at all levels leads to the formation of militant attitudes. Militancy might be regarded as a strategy of some union officers to make the union leaders more responsive to the democratic demands of their constituents.

Officers' attachment to union goals has been found to be both positively and negatively related to militancy. While Attachment to Bread and Butter Goals (ABBRG) is positively related to militancy, Attachment to Professional Goals (APRG) was found to be negatively related to militancy. Elsewhere in the paper the explanation for these directions has relied heavily on sense of professionalism and professional self restraint. Yet another perspective is suggested here.

The study's major postulate was that NUT as an organization has the characteristics of what was termed a complex organization. One major element which characterizes complex organizations is the fact that it is a multiple goal seeking organization. That means that the organization is attempting simultaneously to pursue several goals, some which might be incompatible with each other. In the action of collective bargaining Dubin suggests that a union can mobilize its members to militant action only by focusing attention on a limited number of goals.<sup>31</sup> Perhaps officers in NUT are aware of this limitations and are willing to compromise secondary goals in order to avoid incompatibility that might reduce effective mobilization of militancy once it is needed, and therefore are trading off professional goals

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<sup>31</sup> DUBIN, Robert, 1973, *op. cit.*

in favour of Bread and Butter goals. In other words, it is suggested that findings regarding conflicting directions between the two types of attachment to goals and militancy be interpreted in terms of bargaining tactics and cost-benefit analysis on the part of the officers.

Another word of caution is required relative to this explanation. While conclusions regarding the effects of ABBRG and militancy could be drawn with some confidence ( $r = .12$  and  $.15$ ), the effects of APRG on militancy allows only for very cautious interpretation ( $r = -.04$ , and  $-.07$ ).

## CONCLUSIONS

### Summary

1. The conceptual model of union militancy received some confirmation to the extent that it provided further evidence that both personal attributes and structural characteristics are important elements in a theory of union militancy. The main purpose of a conceptual model is to provide a frame of reference to understand a phenomenon. As such, it might be concluded that the model as a whole allows the formation of a reasonable assessment of the amount of variation in attitudes which can be expected from personal and structural characteristic of officers of NUT, and illustrates which of the determinants studied are the best relative predictors of militancy.
2. A single personal predictor, sex of the officer, emerged very strongly from the multivariate analysis as predicting over half of the explained variance on each criterion measure of attitudinal militancy. It was also found that within the variate, personal attributes far outweighed measures of structural characteristics in predicting militancy. Such findings are consistent with the results reported by Allutto and Belasco<sup>32</sup>, and more recently, Fox and Wince.<sup>33</sup> The total amount of variance of the criterion measures explained by the predictors seemed to be generally low. This is, however, consistent with previous findings in research in this area.
3. Militancy was empirically tested for dimensionality, which resulted in the identification of two major sub-dimensions. The use of each dimension as separate criterion was very instrumental in distinguishing meaningful differences among the determinants of militancy.

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32 ALLUTTO, J.A., and J.A. BELASCO, 1974, *op. cit.*

33 FOX, W.S., and M.H. WINCE, 1976, *op. cit.*



### Limitations and Implications

This study has several limitations. First, and most essential, it is weak in its predictive ability. Only 16% of the variance on GPATS, and 14% of the variance on SPS was accounted for. Secondly, the study was conducted in a single country Israel, and used primarily attitudinal data. This imposes some constraints on the level of generalization permitted from the results.

Limitations on the type of data available inhibited this study from exploring additional predictors of officers' militancy. Future research in this area might consider the inclusion of additional structural and personal

characteristics. Moreover, the model neglected to include many social-psychological processes which are likely to operate within unions and have an impact on members' attitude formation. A more elaborate conceptual model which accounts for the dynamic relationships, including interaction with situational variables, is called for in the future.

The data for this study was collected in Israel. Despite the many methodological problems identified in the literature with regard to extension and application of a theory cross culturally<sup>34</sup>, this writer holds the opinion that, given the heavy reliance of the study on general processes operating in large scale unions, and the fact that the environment was held constant, several of the results obtained here could easily be applied to other unions in general and other teachers' unions in particular.

It appears that there are several common denominators between teachers union in Israel and their counterpart elsewhere, especially in the United States. One such common denominator is the phenomenon of rising expectations among union members resulting from an expanding economy. This study concludes that if rising expectations are not met through union activities, militancy will increase. A second denominator has to do with the similar composition of teachers unions in that such unions are dominated by females. A third common denominator has to do with the increased feeling of alienation among teachers worldwide. In addition, this study shows several sources of dissatisfaction to be positively related to militancy. If we synthesize these three types of dissatisfaction; one in the union context (DUGA), another in the job context (JOBDIS), and a third in the general societal context (SCI), they would appear to represent the sociological con-

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<sup>34</sup> For example, see: R.W. BRISLIN, W.J. LONNER and R.M. THORNDIKE, *Cross-Cultural Research Methods*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1973; J.W. ELDER, "Comparative Cross-National Methodology", in A. INKELES, J. COLEMAN, and N. SMELSER (eds.), *Annual Review of Sociology*, Palo Alto, California, 1976.

cept of alienation. Alienation appeared early in the writing of Marx, who has associated it with the development of a "proletariat". It is often said that school teachers constitute the "proletariat of the professional occupations". Consequently, there is no reason to believe that, should similar components of alienation emerge in other cultures, they would not yield the same relation to militancy as reported in this study. A final common denominator that might permit cross-cultural generalizations has to do with the simple fact that teachers unions in most western cultures represent public employees. Public sector unions cross culturally possess several common elements, such as limited scope of bargaining with the public employer, and the need to recruit public support to justify their strategies and tactics during the course of bargaining.

Several policy implications could be derived from this study as well. Policy makers, union as well as government officials who represent the employer, may gain mastery from this study by realizing that non-economic issues are as much an important factor contributing to teachers' militancy as economic factors which are naturally expected. Officials are urged to initiate steps which deal directly with the range of sources of dissatisfaction in order to combat militancy. More specifically, the author suggests an extension of the scope of the collective bargaining system to include non-economic matters. One possible remedy suggested in this direction would be a massive public educational program in an attempt to inform the public as to the nature and difficulties of the teaching profession. Such a program might increase public support which might in turn contribute to a reduction of teaching feelings of social injustice. Another course of action could involve exploring better job environments for teachers which would enable them to find opportunities to satisfy their intrinsic needs.

The finding that sex is the critical predictor of militancy is interesting in itself, but is of little value to policy makers. Of more interest for policy purposes is the relationship between militancy and the components of alienation. These variables, unlike sex, are susceptible to the control of policy makers. It is also believed that the differences in militancy according to sex may moderate or disappear in the future as the social role of the female wage earner comes to more closely approximate that of the male.

## **Le syndicat national des professeurs en Israël: une étude des déterminants du «militantisme» des officiers syndicaux**

Cette étude, par une investigation empirique, visait à faciliter la compréhension des moyens par lesquels les facteurs personnels et structurels influent sur le «militantisme» des officiers d'un syndicat national de professeurs. En général, dans cette recherche, le «militantisme» signifie le degré avec lequel les officiers, individuellement, favorisent la grève par opposition aux stratégies plus conservatrices. Plus spécifiquement, l'étude cherche à évaluer comment l'activisme des officiers syndicaux nationaux peut être prédit à partir de nos connaissances: (1) de certaines caractéristiques structurelles du syndicat national, tout en maintenant invariables quelques caractéristiques structurelles de l'employeur et de l'environnement, (2) et de certains attributs personnels des officiers.

Au début de cette recherche, deux objectifs intermédiaires furent énoncés: l'un est le développement d'un modèle conceptuel du «militantisme» et l'autre est un test empirique déterminant si le «militantisme» se conforme à une structure multidimensionnelle. Ces deux sous-objectifs sont discutés en détails dans cette étude.

Les données furent collectées en Israël (N-902) par questionnaires. Les officiers étudiés représentent trois paliers de la hiérarchie du syndicat: le palier supérieur (membres de l'exécutif central), le palier intermédiaire (membres des comités régionaux) et le palier local (membres des comités scolaires). L'analyse des données par des méthodes multivariées telles l'analyse des facteurs et les techniques de régression multiples sont utilisées pour tester le modèle globalement, et pour déterminer les interrelations les plus communes parmi les variables étudiées.

Les résultats montrent que:

- 1- Les caractéristiques personnelles et structurelles sont des éléments importants dans une théorie de «militantisme».
- 2- Quoique le modèle soit limité dans sa capacité de prévision, en terme relatif toutefois, les variables personnelles influencent plus que les variables structurelles dans la prédiction du «militantisme». Et plus encore, une des variables personnelles, le sexe de l'officier, ressort fortement de l'analyse multivariée en expliquant plus de la moitié de la variance du critère. L'aliénation est trouvée comme le second déterminant le plus critique du «militantisme» des officiers syndicaux.
- 3- Il fut démontré que le «militantisme» se conforme à une structure multidimensionnelle. Deux sous-dimensions du «militantisme» ont été identifiées et étudiées distinctement dans la recherche.

Finalement, plusieurs implications normatives furent dérivées, basées sur les résultats de cette étude, qui visèrent à réduire le «militantisme» parmi les officiers d'un syndicat national de professeurs.