Bargaining to Achieve Teacher Control in Ontario

Lawrence M. Charles and Edward H. Humphreys

Article abstract
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Teachers' aspirations to professionalism are manifested in a desire to control educational decision-making. This research investigates success in achieving control of decision-making under formal bargaining, as defined by The School Boards and Teachers' Collective Negotiations Act, compared to non-formal bargaining used prior to 1975.

While teachers have long proclaimed their professionalism\(^1\) they have not been accorded a status equal to their proclamations because, as both Hall\(^2\) and Hanson\(^3\) point out, they lack one of the critical dimensions of the traditional professions; that is, they lack control over the conditions under which they provide their services. However, they do give evidence of four other professional characteristics noted by Hall, those being, commitment to public service, specialized skills, self-government (or control of the behaviour of the profession's members) and a high level of income. Nevertheless, lacking control, teachers have been generally classified as semi-professional. No doubt motivated by sentiments similar to those of Stanley's\(^4\), i.e., teachers have a long way to go before attaining full profession status, they have belatedly come to regard acquisition of control over

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their working environment, that is, the right of teachers to be involved in the decision-making process in such a way that school boards and administrators are obliged to obtain the teachers’ agreement prior to taking action, as a necessary first step towards reconciling their professional aspirations with the reality of their working lives. Teachers have chosen collective bargaining as the means of reconciliation as they attempt to enhance their control over policy making which relates directly to the provision of their professional service.

Weber insisted that the fundamental concept of professionalism cannot be sustained without substantial member influence in the process of policy formulation. Teachers have long sought a voice in school policy, but their demands have been frustrated by the reluctance of school system officials to allow such participation in decision-making. Even so, when teachers did negotiate they tended to place a premium on acquiring a substantial voice in the fundamental decision-making processes of educational governance. However, while the desire to improve their professional status through participation in decision-making was present, teachers had lacked the power, possibly the resolve, and certainly the tools to accomplish their goals.

Teachers have recognized that labour unions and other organizations have long used collective bargaining to influence decision-making about their members’ job functions. But while in the past, teachers had felt the need to gain a greater measure of control over their work place, they were reluctant to embrace collective bargaining out of fear that its association with trade unionism would tarnish the teachers’ image. With the passage in Ontario of The School Boards and Teachers Collective Bargaining Act, 1975 (Bill 100), teachers were given the tools they required. Now they embrace collective bargaining as a powerful tool for achieving control, and hence, more closely approaching professionalism.

Teacher endorsement of collective bargaining, however, has drawn both dismay and praise. Wellington and Winter expected unions to usurp power from publicly-franchised school boards. Lanoue and Pil have believed that “establishing school board policy through collective bargaining inevitably reduces the community of scholars to a negotiating committee and

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makes such decisions more hierarchically determined”. Lieberman⁹ con-
tritely acknowledges error in his earlier calling for teacher collective bar-
gaining and rejects the concept as opposed to the public interest. At the
same time, others see teachers as at least redressing the alienation endemic
to workers who have no control over their labour, or as gaining an effective
means of obtaining control over the work place¹⁰. However one sees the
granting to teachers of legal collective bargaining rights, there is consensus
that in Ontario, 1975 was a watershed year because of the passage of Bill
100.

This Bill, *The School Boards and Teachers Collective Negotiations Act, 1975*, permitted Ontario teachers to bargain all terms and conditions of
employment, thereby creating the opportunity for teachers to use formal
collective bargaining to increase their control over school system decision-
making. It provided the means to force recalcitrant negotiators, either
teachers or trustees to bargain, by permitting the imposition of sanctions,
either strikes or lockouts, thereby permitting the equitable transformation
of previously school board controlled decision-making processes. The sig-
nificance of 1975 in school board-teacher decision-making provided the op-
portunity for an analysis of gains in control over decision-making made by
Ontario teachers both before and after the passage of Bill 100.

This paper examines the effectiveness, over a ten year period, of teach-
ers in wresting control of decisions about their working environment from
school boards and their administrators, through the median of legal collec-
tive bargaining. It assesses the effectiveness of formal bargaining processes
instituted in Ontario in 1975, as compared with the more informal processes
employed before 1975.

**SAMPLE AND METHOD**

A purposive stratified random sample of five public secondary, four
public elementary and three Roman Catholic separate elementary school
systems were chosen proportionately to represent the population of school
boards in Ontario which had in excess of 2,000 students or 200 teachers and
had negotiated contracts between 1970 and 1980. A content analysis of each
contract agreed to through collective bargaining in the system during the
period was used to determine the degree to which control was held by teach-
ers or board/administration. Clauses were examined to determine the com-
mittees established, teacher membership of those committees and the level

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¹⁰ RETSINAS, *op. cit.*, p. 368.
of control inherent in such membership. The types of committees in each school and school system were selected on the basis of the areas defined in Table 1. Four major groups with 17 categories were developed from the "decision-making categories model" described by Hanson\(^\text{11}\).

**TABLE 1**

*Areas of Teacher Involvement in Decision-Making*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Sub-areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instructional programs(^a)</td>
<td>A. curriculum development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. selection of textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. teaching methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working conditions(^b)</td>
<td>A. pupil/teacher ratio (PTR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. class size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. instructional load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— assigned time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— unassigned time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel policies/practices(^c)</td>
<td>D. status and responsibility system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security(^d)</td>
<td>E. leave of absence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. teacher qualifications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. professional development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. hiring of new teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. surplus/redundancy procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. teacher personnel files</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. promotion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B. transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. staff utilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. teacher evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Instructional programs — salient, policy concerns which impinge on effective instruction and possibly job security.

\(^b\) Working conditions — concerns of organizational status, workload, job security and condition of life in teaching.

\(^c\) Personnel policies and practices — concerns for the development and selection of personnel.

\(^d\) Job security — concerns that relate to the availability and location of work both geographically and vertically in the system.

\(^{11}\) HANSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-65.
Teachers desire control of these areas because they are vital to the professional roles teachers wish to play in society. Their training and experience prepares teachers to have a crucial position in the process of education, and decisions in those areas which affect their pupil clientele, the effectiveness of their own work and the quality of the education program they can offer. Kronhouser\textsuperscript{12} noted that as qualified practitioners, teachers are best able to determine how specific functions ought to be performed, and that a practitioner must be free to exercise his own judgement in a specific case.

Trustees, on the other hand, are laymen who operate in the interests of the public and represent children and parents to ensure an effective and affordable school system. As representatives of the public they believe they must have the freedom to develop the kind of school system that society wishes and to provide resources in keeping with the public's willingness and ability to pay the costs of the system.

Control over the decisions that are so vital to education is deemed in this study to exist along a continuum extending from total teacher control to total trustee control. It is a zero-sum game, what one group wins the other loses. Control is exercised through attendance with an opportunity for speaking (voice or no voice) and for voting on decisions (proportion of members) in committees that are responsible for decisions concerning the issues. Control, then, is defined operationally in terms of teacher involvement by categories, which are treated in the analysis as interval measures, called levels of control. These include:

1. \textit{No voice, no vote}. No teacher involvement.
2. \textit{Voice, no vote}. Teachers participate in discussion only.
3. \textit{Voice, minority vote}. Teachers participate but have only weak control of policy.
4. \textit{Voice, parity vote}. Teachers participate and share control of the decision equally with trustees.
5. \textit{Voice, majority vote}. Teachers participate and control policy decisions through their majority of voting members.
6. \textit{Voice, vote, veto}. Teachers participate and can prohibit adverse policy decisions through exercise of their veto.

As this paper is interested in effects which occurred over a ten-year period, we define change over time as either upward, i.e. from level two to five suggests that teachers have attained greater control, or as downward, i.e. from level four to three suggests that teachers have lost control. Data is

provided which indicates the absolute position of the teachers on the scale of control and analysis examines the changes that occur in that position over time.

The categories of analysis are the listed levels of control. The recording units are the smallest segment of contract/policy clause content (key phrase) that could be characterized by placing them into the given categories. The categories (level of control), key phrases and some explanation were influenced by works of Roberts\textsuperscript{13}, Cheng\textsuperscript{14}, and Pisapia\textsuperscript{15}.

The design for the data collections and analysis follows Winer\textsuperscript{16}. Groups of school boards were nested within each type of school board. In the public elementary there were four school boards, in the public secondary, five, and in the separate elementary, three. Within each school board, there were four areas of control. In every school board, teacher control data by area by years were compared over ten years (1970-1980). The design was repeated once every two years yielding six replications within the ten-year period. The statistical analysis was structured to reflect the hierarchical nature of the design: board within type by area by years.

The design led to a complex model for the analysis of variance. The need for such a complex model was revealed in the results, where both areas and boards emerged as significant sources of variation. If not separately estimated and used properly in error terms, the resulting analysis could be suspect. Multivariate techniques were required to provide statistical tests given that there were numerous correlated dependent measures.

As noted earlier in this section, five levels of control were used for each professional sub-area (see Table 1) for each school board. As would be expected, these are highly correlated and under such circumstances a multivariate analysis is the most robust technique to use all the data\textsuperscript{17}. The "Multivariate" computer program\textsuperscript{18} was used as it accommodated the double nesting and different error terms in a multivariate analysis.

\textsuperscript{15} J.R. PISAPIA, "Professional Values and Faculty Unionism", unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of West Virginia, 1974, pp. 142-154.
Results

Table 2 highlights the results of the multivariate analysis. The mean levels of control by period are presented in Table 3 by types of board and in Table 4 by areas. From these tables, if teachers had either little or no control, preponderance of the school board would be reflected in a mean level of control between one and two, greater teacher control would be reflected in a mean greater than two, preponderance of teacher control of decision-making would result in a mean of six.

**TABLE 2**

Mean Squares for Univariate F-Ratios and Multivariate F-Ratios
for Multivariate Repeated Measures Analysis
Results are Shown for Two Alternate Transformations of the Repeated Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>—</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>4.24**</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>1.72**</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Univariate Mean Squares:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum over periods</td>
<td>42 111.57</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>554.50</td>
<td>16.83</td>
<td>78.19</td>
<td>25.28</td>
<td>80.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Interaction with periods using simple contrasts among periods:
| Period 1 vs. others | 88.68 | 1.50 | 3.70** | .22 | 1.95 | .63* | .39 |
| 2 vs. others | 41.04 | .05 | .61 | .28 | 3.23 | 1.06** | .36 |
| 3 vs. others | .35 | 10.54* | .79 | .81 | 2.20 | .92** | .34 |
| 4 vs. others | 12.01 | .11 | 1.21* | .57 | .77 | .28 | .27 |
| 5 vs. others | 22.33 | 1.71 | .49 | .21 | .89 | .62** | .31 |
| Interaction with periods using before/after 1975 transformations:
| After 1975 vs. Before | 231.89** | 8.37 | 7.82* | 1.08 | 8.06 | 2.78* | 1.28 |
| Within periods | 35.42 | 2.34 | 1.18 | .76 | 1.04 | .42 | .30 |
| Within periods | 2.82 | 2.32 | .19 | .68 | 2.56 | 1.00** | .30 |
| After/Before | 1.86 | .92 | .29 | .08 | .15 | .12 | .10 |
| After/Before | .24 | .18 | .34 | .05 | .28 | .18** | .07 |

Error terms for F-ratios:

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a  Bock, 1975, pp. 483-489.
b  Period a vs. average of other periods.
c  Periods 1 and 4 vs. periods 2, 3, 5, 6.
d  Periods 2 and 4 vs. periods 1, 3, 4, 6.
e  Arrow points from error term to numerator of F-ratio.
*  Sig. at .05 level.
**  Sig. at .01 level.
### TABLE 3

**Mean Control Levels** by Type of Board by Area by Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Before 1975</th>
<th>After 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₁</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₂</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₃</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₄</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₁</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₂</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₃</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₄</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₁</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₂</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₃</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₄</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**a** Mean control level is the arithmetic average of six scale levels of control (below) aggregated from 3 sub-categories of area 1, 5 sub-categories of area 2, 5 sub-categories of area 3 and 4 sub-categories of area 4.

**b** Control Levels as interval measures:
1 = No voice, no vote — no teacher involvement
2 = Voice, no vote — teachers take part in discussion
3 = Voice, minority vote — teachers gain access to, but only weak control of, policy information
4 = Voice, parity vote — teachers are assured of equal control over policy formulation
5 = Voice, majority vote — teachers control the passage of policy resolutions
6 = Voice, vote, veto — teachers can prohibit policies

**c** Areas:
A₁ = Instructional Program
A₂ = Working Conditions
A₃ = Personnel Policies and Practices
A₄ = Job Security
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1. Instructional Program</td>
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<td>1.1 Curriculum Development</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 Selection of Textbook</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>1.3 Teaching Methodology</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>A2. Working Conditions</td>
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<td>2.1 Pupil-Teacher Ratio</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td>2.2 Class Size</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<td>2.3 Instructional Load</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
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<td>2.4 Positions of Responsibility</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>2.5 Leave of Absence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
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<td>3.2 Professional Development</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>3.3 Teacher Hiring</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>3.4 Surplus/Redundancy Procedure</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.5 Teacher Personnel Files</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<td>A4. Job Security</td>
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<td>4.1 Promotion</td>
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<td>4.3 Staff Utilization</td>
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<td>4.4 Evaluation</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 = Voice, majority vote — teachers control the passage of policy resolutions
6 = Voice, vote, veto — teachers can prohibit policies
These data illustrate an overall gain by teachers, of control over the professional areas during the period examined, and particularly while negotiating under Bill 100. But generally as Table 2 indicates there was no significant difference in the attained levels by type of board (col. 2) or by type of board by area (T × A, col. 4). The significant contrast (p < .01, one tail t-test) of control attained by type of board, between period three and all other periods seemed to be a chance occurrence, possibly the result of an outburst of teacher militancy, evident, particularly in secondary education, at that time. Nevertheless, significant differences occurred in the levels by area column 3, row 1, but the degree of control varied in a complex way. Before/after 1975 transformations indicates the difference was significant between the periods before and after 1975 (col. 3, row 8) but not among the periods before 1975 and after 1975, although with simple contrast, significant differences occurred in periods 1 and 4 (col. 3, row 3, and row 6), when contrasted with other periods.

The significance of differences before 1975/after 1975 was not the same in every board (area by board within type — A × B: T — col. 6, row 1 and row 8). The significant effect was due to attainment of greater control by teachers earlier in some boards and later in others. In the pre-1975 phase, significant differences were noted in periods 1, 2 and 3 (col. 6, row 7). Significant before/after differences were noted for periods 2 and 4 as opposed to the average difference for all other periods, by area for board within type of board (col. 6, rows 10 and 12).

The analysis indicates (in general) that teachers have gained significantly greater levels of control over decision-making in all study areas following Bill 100 than they did before its institution, but the amount of change varied by area, board and type of board.

Table 4 shows control levels achieved by areas. The gains in control by areas, before and after 1975 (Bill 100) has already been noted as significant although gains by type of school board were not significant. Generally, teachers began the period with their highest level of control (mean 3.0) in the area of instructional program and achieved an increase over the period, even attaining majority control (mean 5) in some school boards, although generally they only attained or approached parity control (mean 4). Such high levels of control in this area probably resulted, at least in part, from a Ministry of Education post-1974 guideline guaranteeing teacher participation in developing curriculum. School boards were mandated to accord teachers participation in program development based on the guidelines.

In other areas (working conditions, personnel policies/practices, job security) teachers in some school boards achieved or approached parity control (mean 2-4) or joint decision-making but with slight differences in the
speed with which parity control was achieved. By the end of the study period, teachers had achieved substantial gains in control over working conditions but had been less successful regarding either personnel policies/practices or job security.

The study by Flango\(^{19}\) concluded that the major gains of teachers from collective bargaining were centered in the area of working conditions. While this may be the trend in other areas, the achievements in Ontario, in the area of instructional programs and the slight differences in the levels of control achieved in the areas of working conditions, personnel policies and job security make it difficult to reach a similar conclusion. The findings show that Ontario teachers' organizations negotiate with greater success on program issues and with less but still significant success in the other three important areas.

**DISCUSSION**

The anguished desire for professional status that in part is presently manifested in the thrust to control workplace decision-making has troubled teachers for several decades. Ontario's Bill 100 presented teachers with an opportunity to force the pace for attaining professional status that had never existed before. It arose, in part, because teachers were prepared to challenge conventional wisdom that rejected collective bargaining as unprofessional, and because teacher militancy was sufficiently strong to turn aside government policies that would have refused the right to strike to teachers. The challenge paid off with a substantial gain in the role teachers play in decision-making about the workplace.

The thrust toward greater control of decision-making is central to the attaining of the self-directing characteristics of a true profession. At the same time, teachers' attainment of control over the workplace implies a loss of control by trustees and their administrators. Wildman and Perry\(^{20}\) predicted that the passing of power from administrators, one begun may be expected to continue until a major realignment has occurred in the organization of schools. It is not surprising that the realignment taking place in Ontario would occur most clearly in the area of instructional programs. This is the area in which trustees require and respect teacher expertise. That the realignment would extend to working conditions, personnel policies and practices and to job security attests to the dynamism of the changes.


The implications of such fundamental shifts are indeed profound, particularly if the shifts run rampant throughout education. However, such destabilization is unlikely in a period when serious economic constraints are impinging upon all public services, when the public has a reluctance to wholeheartedly support its schools and when teachers themselves are reeling from a series of set backs from declining enrollments to curtailed job opportunities and over-supply of teachers.

While one might expect that a balance between teacher and trustee decision-making would result from the lessening of teacher militancy occasioned by the conditions noted above, other factors also will affect the balance of forces. The widespread demand for accountability that pervades public service delivery has not avoided education. The demand arises with the public in response to media coaching and deposits itself at the boardroom table, through popularly elected trustees, thereby creating a significant problem for the administrator. Not only is it a problem in the human relations sense but administrators lack the capability, in a technical sense, to assess effectiveness and hence to answer accountability arguments convincingly.

Accountability also poses interesting questions for teachers as they search for control over decisions that affect their role. The concept of accountability implies the notion that an individual cannot be held liable unless he has the right to make a decision for which he is to be held liable. As long as decisions were taken without teacher advice or acquiescence, teachers could hardly be held accountable for the outcomes that the decisions brought about. With control over decisions, even if only to a limited degree, teachers can be and indeed should be expected to accept responsibility for their outcomes, insofar as they have been instrumental in influencing those decisions. But teachers have traditionally rejected any inclusions in contracts that would lead to the measurement of performance, presumably because accountability could connote negative reward (dismissal) according to performance. But now boards are likely to demand written agreement with clearly defined evaluative procedures regarding teacher performance. Perry and Wildman21 advocated that a system mechanism for measuring input and output in the individual classroom situation through differentiated tasks, status, role and remuneration, may be used to measure accountability. This dilemma which by inference may be attributed to collective bargaining may never be solved without substantial developments in measurement and management practices. However, the expansion of teacher con-

trol that is emanating from the bargaining table presents a great opportunity for productive changes in school management through joint dealings in teacher-school board relationships aimed at enhancing the smooth functioning of the educational system.

Perry and Wildman\textsuperscript{22} viewed collective bargaining as an adversarial process with conflict based on power as the focus of the interaction between teachers and school management. While they would acknowledge that some compromise and concession-making on policy issues is possible, they believe that reason will not prevail. Conversely, Williams\textsuperscript{23} argued that through collective bargaining a new form of co-existence could be achieved, and Edelfelt\textsuperscript{24} described collective bargaining as a symbiotic relationship which significantly alters the behaviour of the parties. Symbiosis would stem from the compromise of interests resulting in the trade-offs which lead to the final collective agreement.

Collective bargaining qualified the \textit{de facto} role of school boards to make unilateral policies. As Perry and Wildman\textsuperscript{25} suggest it obligated school boards to access the degree of consensus among groups such as parents and taxpayers, and then to defend this consensus against teachers' demands. Teachers, however, could also gain some measure of persuasive power over the community and, consequently, over the school boards because the community, recognizing teachers as most knowledgeable about students' needs, could put pressure on school boards to reach compromises in collective bargaining. The short-term control over some of the resources of the school system which teachers as a group exert invests them with some degree of power over the community and over school system management anxious to placate communities that require teachers' classroom and custodial services. School boards could therefore be forced to abandon their role as intermediaries between the public and the teachers. During the post-Bill 100 phase there has been ample evidence of community pressure being used in Ontario to settle negotiations impasses. However, long-term outcomes are most difficult to predict.

The collective agreement is a joint decision. The parties jointly commit themselves to execute decisions reached at the bargaining table. In effect the agreement represents what Pisapia\textsuperscript{26} describes as "compromised profession-

\textsuperscript{22} Ibidem, p. 216.
\textsuperscript{25} PERRY, and WILDMAN, 1970, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{26} PISAPIA, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95.
alism”. Viewed this way, collective negotiations have gained, for Ontario teachers, greater control over many aspects of their working lives. But they have not yet achieved ultimate control; this they may never do, since management needs to control the resources of the publicly supported school boards. One can expect a new balance to be struck which recognizes the teacher as a joint decision-maker. If this trend towards teacher involvement in decision-making continues, the professional status of the teaching profession should increase, as account is taken of the increase in teacher influence in policy-making matters and procedures. In this fashion, the findings support Myers’ contention that professionalization will be advanced through collective bargaining.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Les enseignants et le contrôle de leur profession 
l'expérience ontarienne

Les enseignants proclament depuis longtemps leur professionnalisme. Toutefois, ils n'ont pas de signes distinctifs propres aux professions traditionnelles et c'est pour cette raison qu'on ne leur a pas accordé un statut égal à leur professionnalisme. Les écrits traitant du professionnalisme suggèrent qu'obtenir le contrôle sur l'emploi ou obtenir le droit de participer aux prises de décision avant l'application d'une politique constituent des aspects majeurs si l'on souhaite atteindre le professionnalisme. Cette étude examine jusqu'à quel point les enseignants se sont servis des négociations collectives pour améliorer leur statut en participant aux prises de décision et, en particulier, en exerçant une autorité en milieu de travail.

Les enseignants ont demandé longtemps une voix dans la politique scolaire, par l'intermédiaire de leurs fédérations. Ces demandes ont été rejetées par un refus évident de reconnaître les caractéristiques professionnelles des enseignants comme, par exemple, leur compétence tant académique que pédagogique et leur désir de contrôler les prises de décision en matière d'éducation. Les enseignants ont donc été amenés à considérer la prise en main de l'emploi comme étant la première étape requise pour réconcilier leurs aspirations professionnelles avec la réalité de leur vie professionnelle.

Cette étude considère le contrôle de l'emploi comme un aspect du professionnalisme. Les syndicats et autres organisations utilisent depuis longtemps les négociations collectives pour devenir maîtres des secteurs ayant trait à leur vie professionnelle. Si les enseignants eux aussi sont décidés à devenir maîtres de leur emploi et en conséquence à devenir davantage professionnels, ils doivent aussi utiliser cette arme puissante.

La Loi sur les négociations collectives entre Commissions scolaires et enseignants, adoptée en 1975, a donné aux enseignants ontariens la possibilité d'utiliser les négociations collectives pour atteindre leurs objectifs. La loi (projet de loi 100) a formalisé le processus de négociation collective et a donné aux enseignants un moyen de participer aux prises de décision qui n'appartenaient auparavant qu'aux Commissions scolaires. Cette loi a elle-même joué un rôle majeur dans ce changement puisqu'elle a permis aux enseignants de négocier leurs termes et conditions d'emploi. L'usage que les enseignants ont fait des négociations collectives pour atteindre leur premier objectif, à savoir contrôler leur emploi, et leur objectif final, le professionnalisme, a servi de base pour l'analyse des résultats obtenus par eux dans les efforts qu'ils ont menés pour devenir maîtres de leurs activités d'enseignant, après l'adoption de la loi 100.

Cette étude analyse les résultats obtenus en dix ans par les enseignants ayant ravi, aux Commissions scolaires et à leurs administrateurs, le pouvoir décisionnel relatif à leur milieu de travail. Elle évalue l'efficacité du processus formel de négociation, établi en 1975, par rapport à celui utilisé auparavant, qui était plus informel.

Les données ont été recueillies à partir d'un échantillon de Commissions scolaires ontariennes dont la population scolaire dépassait 2 000 étudiants, employant plus
de 200 enseignants et ayant négocié des contrats entre 1970 et 1980. On a étudié le contenu de chaque contrat établi suite à des négociations collectives durant cette période afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure le contrôle de l’emploi était détenu par les enseignants plutôt que par la commission ou l’administration.

Pour analyser la teneur du contrat, on a classifié le niveau de contrôle selon six catégories et quatre secteurs professionnels. Une analyse multivariée a servi à déterminer la variabilité des niveaux de contrôle que les enseignants ont atteint, en fonction des divers secteurs professionnels et des diverses Commissions scolaires. Les résultats montrent que les enseignants participent nettement plus aux prises de décision depuis l’adoption de la loi 100, le contrôle unilatéral que détenaient les Commissions scolaires ayant été remplacé par un contrôle paritaire ou un processus de prise de décision mixte.

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