Introduction[Record]

  • Gaëtan Ferrara and
  • Niki Siampakou

Scientific Coordination of the INSIDE Workshop, Niki Siampakou holds a PhD in International Law from Aix Marseille University, Gaëtan Ferrara is a PhD candidate at Aix Marseille University, Centre d’études et de recherches internationales et communautaires (CERIC).

We are pleased to present this volume entitled “State Compliance with International Human Rights Law: State-of-the-art, Improvement and Challenges” which is the outcome of the homonymous workshop. When Professor Hélène Tigroudja and Professor Ludovic Hennebel proposed us to supervise the organization of a workshop on Compliance Theories in International Human Rights Law, we were aware of the obligations that this would entail, but we never imagined that we would have to face a global pandemic. As the states entered successively into lockdowns, our speakers, scattered around the globe, were prevented from joining us in Aix-en-Provence. Despite the lockdown, we decided to carry out this project. This volume is, therefore, the acts of a workshop initially programmed to take place on 2 April 2020 in Aix-en-Provence but eventually postponed, to be held in the future. Same theme. Same place. Same persons. The articles in this volume are part of the A*MIDEX INSIDE (International Socialization and Democracy Through International Law) project led by Professor Hélène Tigroudja and Professor Ludovic Hennebel. This project focuses on assessing the compliance of states with universal standards for the protection of human rights. The fundamental postulate of the INSIDE rests on the idea that international law is a tool used to socialize states. The doctrine attempts to identify, by invoking both theories of international relations and those of international law, the ways and effects of such socialization. The intended research to be carried out in the context of the INSIDE project finds its foundations in this framework and is based on a broad empirical field on international human rights law. One of the objectives of the project is to construct analytical tools, including for the purpose of assessing and measuring compliance with states commitments. Many theories and models already exist for understanding the behaviour of states. The articles in this volume have the advantage of applying and criticizing these hypotheses in the light of state behaviour on the topic of international human rights law. Although the legal scholarship that aims at theorizing why and when states comply with international law has been productive, there is no agreement on one coherent compliance theory. Most international lawyers continue to believe that international law matters, in the sense that it affects or influences the conduct of states. According to Andrew Guzman, Understanding why states comply with their international obligations, therefore, appears to be the main way to secure the foundations of public international law. Compliance theories are usually categorized into two broad categories. There is a rough distinction between those based on rationalism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other hand. Rationalists believe that compliance with international law can be explained by the fear of sanctions or the prospect of benefits. The basic model for explaining international relations is based on the theory of rational choice: states act according to their interests (like individuals). The direction of international policies is the result of a comparative cost-benefit calculation of an action. Rationalist scholars take up Thucydides’ formula: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” The maxim can be applied to international law and it can legitimately be assumed that in international human rights law for instance, in the absence of reciprocity in treaties, financial or strategic sanctions and incentives for the respect of human rights, each State is free to act as it wishes, privileging its interests. Accordingly, the basic assumption of rationalists is to consider that the norms of international law do not explain per se why states respect their commitments. When a State does comply with international law, it is because …

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