The "Metropolitan Thesis" and the Writing of Canadian Urban History

Donald F. Davis

Article abstract

This article deals with the concept of metropolitanism as found in the writings of Canadian historians and geographers. It argues that, contrary to common belief, there is no single metropolitan "thesis." Rather there are different approaches to the metropolis-hinterland relationship, five of which are discussed in the article. These vary, it is shown, in their assumptions about individual autonomy, the power of the metropolis, the mutability of the metropolis-hinterland relationship, and the universality of the metropolitan phenomenon. The failure to recognize the variety of approaches to metropolitanism has, it is argued, retarded the development of urban studies in Canada. While admitting the possibility of progress once historians have clarified their differences concerning metropolitanism, the article suggests, nonetheless, that urban historians might do better by abandoning the metropolitan approach altogether, given its indeterminancy, its avoidance of fundamental class relationships, as well as its inherent manicheanism and spatial bias.
The “Metropolitan Thesis” and the Writing of Canadian Urban History*

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Résumé/Abstract

Cet article traite du concept de Métropolitanisme utilisé par les historiens et les géographes canadiens. L'auteur prétend que, contrairement à la croyance générale, il n'existe pas une seule et unique thèse métropolitaine. Au contraire, il estime que les relations métropole-hinterland comptent plusieurs approches différentes, cinq d'entre elles sont commentées dans cet article. L'auteur montre que ces diverses approches présentent des hypothèses variées à propos de l'autonomie individuelle, du pouvoir de la métropole, de la mutabilité des relations métropole-hinterland et de l'universalité du phénomène métropolitain. La non-reconnaissance de la variétés des approches au Métropolitanisme comme cause de retard du développement des études urbaines au Canada, constitue l'argument central de cet article. Tout en considérant comme un progrès potentiel le fait que des historiens aient clarifié leurs différences par rapport au Métropolitanisme, l'article n'en suggère pas moins que les spécialistes de l'histoire urbaine feraient mieux d'abandonner complètement l'approche métropolitaine, étant donné ses indéterminations et ses abstentions au sujet des relations fondamentales entre les classes, tout comme son manichéisme et son parti pris spatial.

This article deals with the concept of metropolitanism as found in the writings of Canadian historians and geographers. It argues that, contrary to common belief, there is no single metropolitan "thesis." Rather there are different approaches to the metropolis-hinterland relationship, five of which are discussed in the article. These vary, it is shown, in their assumptions about individual autonomy, the power of the metropolis, the mutability of the metropolis-hinterland relationship, and the universality of the metropolitan phenomenon. The failure to recognize the variety of approaches to metropolitanism has, it is argued, retarded the development of urban studies in Canada. While admitting the possibility of progress once historians have clarified their differences concerning metropolitanism, the article suggests, nonetheless, that urban historians might do better by abandoning the metropolitan approach altogether, given its indeterminancy, its avoidance of fundamental class relationships, as well as its inherent manicheanism and spatial bias.

Is there a metropolitan thesis? It must seem a strange question to ask, especially within the confines of a journal

devoted to urban studies. After all, it has been more than thirty years since the Canadian Historical Review first published the celebrated article by J.M.S. Careless on "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History." Conceived in part as an obituary for the frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner, the article also heralded the arrival of "metropolitanism" as a "vitalizing approach" to the study of Canadian history. Its impact was enormous: few other journal articles have been more widely cited or more frequently quoted. For most Canadian historians the article became, to quote Carl Berger, "the programmatic statement

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of the metropolitan approach, that is of the interpretation of Canadian development as a function of the "relationship between urban communities and their hinterlands." Metropolitanism itself came to enjoy considerable vogue in intellectual circles; indeed by the 1960s it, as Careless himself ruefully observed, "went on near-doctrinal status." People began speaking of a "metropolitan thesis" relevant not only to national history but also to regional development.

In the 1970s metropolitanism helped preside over the birth of a new sub-discipline, urban history. According to Alan F.J. Artibise and Paul-André Linteau, the articles by Careless on metropolis and region "marked, in some ways at least, the self-conscious beginning of urban history" in the Canadian academic profession. Indeed, the "metropolitan thesis" probably played a crucial role in legitimizing the new field of inquiry. First, it had the virtue of being "essentially homegrown" intellectually and thus a rarity in a sub-discipline otherwise noteworthy for its "dependence on imported ideas." Urban historians themselves must have felt uneasy about the extent of their borrowing from abroad, for they often accused each other of distorting Canadian urban history by trying to squeeze it into an American mold. The Canadianism of the "metropolitan thesis" thus constituted its greatest appeal. Metropolitanism also provided a bridge between the new field of study and the traditional terrain of national political history, for both featured the activities of urban-based elites. Moreover, a metropolitanist perspective ensured "relevance": the historian studying the rise of Toronto to national power seemed to have more to say to the political and economic enthusiasts who dominated the profession than did, say, the student of Hamilton's occupational strata in the nineteenth century. And finally, the metropolitan approach did not require quantification skills; it thus offered an alternative for urbanists who lacked the numeracy or inclination to undertake the "new urban history" then fashionable in the United States.

Even had it lacked these institutional advantages, metropolitanism would still probably have reigned supreme within the urban history profession in the 1960s and 1970s, for it seemed to address a central "truth" about our country's urban past; that is — to quote Careless — that "within North America, Canada turned out to be significantly different from the United States in the degree to which metropolitan power could be exercised quite directly over great regional sweeps of countryside, with much less mediation or internal competition along the way." The metropolitan approach thus has had great appeal because it highlights the contrast between Canadian and American urban development, and thus speaks both to Canadian nationalism and to the country's hopes and fears for the future of its cities.

For all these reasons the "metropolitan thesis" has developed, as Gilbert Stelter remarked in 1977, into "the most significant approach to Canadian urban history." The historical literature has become filled with allusions to "metropolitan competition" between cities and the "metropolitan ambitions" of hinterland towns and regions. Often the adjective has been used simply as a synonym for urban, and as G.P. de T. Glazebrook has complained, "metropolitanism" has sometimes been "hardly distinguishable from urbanization" in the historical literature. Yet urban historians have preferred "metropolitan" as their adjective, apparently on the assumption that their narratives have thereby gained in theoretical complexity. Through constant reiteration they have convinced themselves both of the existence of a "metropolitan thesis" and of its potency as an intellectual talisman. They have assumed, in other words, that there is a common theory to which all subscribe.

But is there? The leading historiographers have avoided talking of a "metropolitan thesis"; they have generally preferred to speak of an "approach." And J.M.S. Careless, acclaimed by most Canadian historians as its architect, has been quite adamant in rejecting the notion of a "metropolitan thesis." In a 1973 review essay he wrote: "I would disclaim and deny such a metropolitan 'thesis' of 'hypothesis' or any other such ennobling and entangling description." Even so, Careless in that same essay reaffirmed his faith in the utility of the metropolitan "approach" as "a way of ... picking out, phenomena that built up cities and regions in Canada and conditioned the lives of the network of interdependent, interreacting communities, concentrated and dispersed, all across the Canadian domain." There is significant insight to be gained, he has long contended, from studying "the complex of reciprocal relationships between the concentrated population centre and the extended community beyond it." Even so, he denied there was any single proposition or point of view concerning the metropolitan concept to which all scholars subscribed.

Despite his avowals, and the admonitions of historiographers, most Canadian historians have persisted in their faith in the existence of a single metropolitan thesis. This monocacy has survived in part because of the growing fragmentation of the discipline. Each sub-discipline has thus been allowed to evolve its own distinctive version of metropolitanism while contributing to the national myth that there is but one metropolitan thesis. Thus we find that urban historians have remained the most faithful to the metropolitan concept of J.M.S. Careless, the godfather of their subdiscipline. The names of other metropolitanists appear infrequently in their bibliographies. By way of contrast, another sub-discipline produced Studies in Canadian Social History, a 1974 reader that contained an article by Arthur K. Davis on "Canadian Society and History as Hinterland and Metropolis;" it failed, despite its announced theme, even to mention Careless's work.

Obviously a dialogue has not been taking place among the various students of metropolitanism in Canada. Instead there has been obfuscation and avoidance, a state of affairs...
likely to continue as long as faith in a single metropolitan thesis survives. In the meantime, the metropolitan concept has grown synthetically more imprecise, as historians try to meld together ideas drawn from contradictory interpretations. That is to say, the understanding of the process of city- and nation-building will only progress once historians have confronted the opposing tendencies which historians, convinced of the unity of metropolitanist thought, have hitherto overlooked. It is time for historians to start asking each other: “What kind of metropolitanist are you?”

It will be extremely difficult for anyone to answer this question, unless historians first agree upon a taxonomy of metropolitanist thought. Scholars need to clarify the principal points of agreement and disagreement amongst those who have used the metropolitan approach. As a first step in what will surely be a long process, this essay outlines five contrasting approaches to metropolitanism that Canadian historians and historical geographers have employed to explain the uneven development of the nation’s cities and regions. The five schools of thought may be labelled the (1) the entrepreneurial; (2) the hinterland variant on the entrepreneurial; (3) the ecological; (4) the dependency-exploitation; and (5) the heartland-hinterland. The “deans” of the five schools are Donald Creighton, Alan F.J. Artibise, J.M.S. Careless, Arthur R.M. Lower and Harold Innis respectively. The schools will be discussed in the order in which they became fashionable in historical circles; as a result there will be two significant departures from the normal chronology. First, note the transposition of Lower and Careless. While Lower discussed metropolitanism in Colony to Nation some eight years before Careless wrote his original essay, Careless had by far the greater impact on the profession’s understanding of the metropolitan concept during the 1950s and 1960s, as Lower’s dour vision of metropolitanism as intrinsically exploitative clashed with the optimism of the times. He had especially little appeal for urban historians, a group congenitally more interested in growth than in decline. Lower’s turn had to await the souring of the nation’s economy and mood in the early 1970s. Similarly, even though a strong case can be made for Harold Innis as the progenitor of the metropolitan concept, he will be discussed last. To be sure, his research in the 1920s and 1930s helped, as Careless has noted, to “establish” metropolitanism in Canadian historiography by providing evidence of the power of the centre over the development of the periphery. The great systems of continent-wide communications that he uncovered — the fur trade, the railway network — might even be considered the essence of metropolitanism. Yet Innis did not himself attempt to develop a theory of metropolitanism, and his most important contribution to Canada’s historical understanding — the staples thesis — did not become an integral part of metropolitanist thought until recently. Innis will accordingly be considered at the end of the essay, a fitting commentary perhaps on the circularity with which the metropolitanism debate has proceeded.

Chronology is not of great importance in any case, for all but the hinterland variant can trace their roots back to the post-World War I era when Canadian intellectuals began reassessing the country’s historic dependence on the mother country. Each school has attempted to respond to the same set of questions about the historic meaning of colonialism. The five approaches to metropolitanism differ markedly, as we shall see, in their assumptions about the ability of individuals to affect development, about the nature of the “power” of the metropolis, about the mutability of the metropolis-hinterland relationship, and about the universality (or particularity) of the metropolitan phenomenon. They are, in other words, five different visions of Canada. Let us then discuss them in logical rather than in chronological order, for each is likely always to have its proponents.

The Entrepreneurial Approach to Metropolitanism

The appropriate place to commence is with the work of Donald Creighton on the “commercial empire of the St. Lawrence.” As Deborah Harrison has recently affirmed, Creighton was “probably the first to advance a metropolitan interpretation, although the closely related ‘staples’ thesis had been put forward by Innis much earlier.”14 Creighton emphasized, according to W.L. Morton, “the preponderant role commercial monopoly and centralized business have played” in developing the Canadian nation and urban network.15 For Creighton, the “westward drive of corporations, encouraged and followed by the super-corporation of the state, is the major theme in Canadian life.”16 Thus the major actors in the drama of Canadian history were the Montreal businessmen, merchants and railroad promoters, who “struggled to win the territorial empire of the St. Lawrence and to establish its institutional expression, the Canadian commercial state . . . .”17 It was this central elite who in Creighton’s eyes built the urban network in this country and subordinated it to Montréal, the first domestic Canadian metropolis. Which is to say that Creighton’s interpretation of metropolitanism stressed the heroic entrepreneurship of elites operating out of the major control points of the world and national economies. His work thus points to the study of metropolitan elites as the essential task for historians wishing to understand the growth of urban centres and the linkages between them. Creighton’s “theory of metropolitanism” hence could be summed up quite succinctly: it was, he said, “the idea that culture, capital investment, political ideas, social organization — the whole thing — expands out from the main centre of cultivation into the interior.”18

Such an interpretation inevitably brought complaints from hinterland scholars that Creighton concentrated too exclusively on the role of central or metropolitan elites in building the national urban network. W.L. Morton, a prominent critic, charged that Creighton’s Laurentian model lacked any sense of the interaction or feedback between the metropolis and
hinterland and so misrepresented the history of both. According to Morton, "The metropolitan thesis (which he associated with both Creighton and Careless) seems necessarily to minimize the importance of the hinterland. Yet no metropolis lives by itself," Morton averred; "it is to the extent that it is metropolitan, rather than just urban, a function of its hinterland." Given its focus on the activities of metropolitan elites, the metropolitan theme . . . does not point the way," Morton insisted "to an interpretation that would explain at once the centrality and the regionality of Canada's actual history." In other words, a thesis with a centralist continental context. The critiques of Morton and others explain at once the centrality and the regionality of Canada's actual history. In other words, a thesis with a centralist continental context. The critiques of Morton and others explain at once the centrality and the regionality of Canada's actual history.

American historians simply have no interest in metropolitanism (unless as a political or administrative concept), for they consider the idea either passé or irrelevant. They associate it with urban ecology and have remarked that this kind of organic conception of the growth process fell out of favour in the United States more than a generation ago. Or else they have pointed out that urban competition in the United States did not have the feudal aspects depicted by Canadian metropolitanists. Rather it was a race between equals with victory going to the city with the best entrepreneurs.

Most American urban historians, it appears, still believe in the reality of equal opportunity. Thus, one popular text assures students that the "booster spirit . . . sealed the success or failure of many a city in America," while another advises that the "urban nation was accomplished by a relatively small group of entrepreneurs and farsighted people defying geography and common sense. These urban leaders," it proclaims, "were the heart and soul of their cities. The destiny of their communities were inseparable from the actions of these people." Thus the liberal ethos still reigns in American urban history circles, and Canadianists in an effort to reach out to their counterparts south of the border have been doubtlessly tempted to detail the exploits of their own "self-made cities."

The booster approach has had special appeal to Prairie historians, even though their region seems to have been unusually susceptible to external, "metropolitan" influences. The power of the railways and, to a lesser degree the Hudson's Bay Company, to make or break communities is well documented, and Lewis H. Thomas has summarized the literature by stating that, "Nowhere else in Canada [was] the development of urban centres . . . more influenced by the decisions of governments and railway companies." Still, in focusing its attention on the strategies and struggles of local town promoters, the booster concept downplays the role of outside forces and builds pride in western accomplishments. It may well be that the booster literature is simply a reflection of incipient western separatism, at least among historians. More likely, it represents an attempt to fix local responsibility for the region's successes and failures. Whatever their ideological colouration, western historians have had a common interest in recording the activities of the town boosters, for their accomplishments and priorities can be used to laud or to indict the era of high capitalism in which they flourished. While Artibise has always been quite critical of the world the boosters made, some historians have demonstrated such consistent filiopiety that they deserve themselves to be designated "boosters."

Moreover, the booster literature has at times been quite extreme in its claims for the power of hinterland entrepre-
neurs and business groups over the urban process. For example, an article by A.B. Kilpatrick on the contest in 1905 for the Alberta capital assumes that “before the urban pattern had crystallized, Alberta urban society was bluntly egalitarian; every community... had the potential, and the opportunity, of ascending to the status of metropolis.” Horatio Alger could not have said it better, and he would surely have applauded Kilpatrick’s conclusion that Edmonton won the capital “because its boosters were more aggressive, more energetic, and more adept... than were their counterparts in rival communities,” such as Red Deer, Calgary, and Medicine Hat. 25

The argument flirts with tautology, as does the booster approach as a whole. Kilpatrick’s conclusions beg the obvious question: why were such perspicacious, well-connected entrepreneurs attracted to Edmonton in the first place? The literature on boosterism itself hints at an answer; it contains numerous examples of town promoters who passed through several communities, boosting each fruitlessly in turn, before settling down at a site blessed with some initial advantage, typically its superior access to markets. These towns then served as magnets for the most enterprising individuals of the hinterland, who often brought considerable capital, even companies, with them. The hinterland towns they left behind then stagnated as their elites departed. Although few studies have as yet been written with sufficient scope to capture the circulation of elites between rising and declining centres within a region, the insights afforded by Roberta Balstad Miller’s work on Onondaga County, New York (Syracuse), and that of Edward Davies II and Burton Folson, Jr. on the anthracite region of Pennsylvania, as well as Gilbert Stelter on the Sudbury Basin indicate that communities did largely gain or retain the elites that circumstances warranted. 26

Another case in point might be called the “Oppenheimer syndrome”: an early mayor, and second only to the C.P.R. in his Vancouver real estate holdings, David Oppenheimer was the type of booster one might credit with the victory of Vancouver over Victoria in the struggle for paramountcy in British Columbia. Yet Oppenheimer was a Victoria resident when his Vancouver dealings began and it would seem that Oppenheimer’s strategic move into mainland real estate did not so much promote the rise of Vancouver as profit from it. With people like Oppenheimer playing both ends of the board, it becomes difficult to attribute the triumph of one community over another to its superior gamesmanship. 27

The booster approach also has had difficulty, William M. Baker has observed, in establishing recognized “rules for ascribing boosters and their urban centres to the categories of winners and losers...” In a pithy review of Town and City, a collection of essays on western Canadian urban development, Baker noted that, “In this volume Minnedosa is presented as a mild success story by Barry Potyondi, Lethbridge as a mild failure by Andy den Otter, and Strathcona as a failure by John Gilpin. Using different criteria one could challenge all of these judgements.” 28 Thus the booster concept, as used, has been both arbitrary and imprecise. It is, to be sure, not the only offender in this regard, for virtually all of the existing approaches to metropolitanism leave too much leeway to the researcher to establish his own idiosyncratic measures of success.

Arbitrariness also creeps into the booster model whenever the discussion turns to the growth strategies selected by urban elites. Once again William M. Baker has raised the key question: “Did winners attempt, or wish to do,” he asks, “anything substantially different from losers?” In Baker’s opinion, “it is difficult to detect significant differences in entrepreneurial goals, strategies and abilities; more important were the forces boosters could assist or exploit.” 29 Certainly urban elites were far less imaginative than the booster literature implies, for they generally rallied to the best and most obvious prospect for growth in their era. Thus town promoters built or solicited railways when that was the rage, and bonused factories when industrialization was in vogue. For some communities the strategy worked, for others it did not. It was impossible for even the most far-sighted of boosters to predict all the consequences of obtaining a railroad spur or a manufacturing plant. Not even growth could be assured, for sometimes a new railroad, especially in the congested counties southwest of Toronto, simply accelerated the loss of a community’s wholesaling function. 30 The unpredictability of boosterism should have given its chroniclers pause, for they have by dispensing plaudits and brickbats come perilously close to arguing — in circular fashion — that superior entrepreneurship was the principal source of urban growth, and that the proof of its superiority could be found in the growth achieved under its guidance. Historians of boosterism thus often find themselves celebrating rather than explaining the outcomes of past interurban struggles.

Although the more extreme statements of the boosterism school fail to pass muster, the more cautious approach adopted by Alan Artibise continues to have broad appeal in western Canada. His claims have been far more guarded than those of his more zealous followers. Thus Artibise has recently allowed that “the growth of prairie cities cannot be fully explained by internal factors, such as the activities of individuals and groups...,” but he continues to insist “that neither can the growth process be explained only by impersonal or mechanistic forces. In the case of Winnipeg, for example, location theory does not necessarily provide for the emergence of a single-city pattern in the Red River Valley. A more diffuse urban pattern might well have developed.” But it did not, Artibise argues, because of “initiative of civic and business leaders” in Winnipeg. In other words, while more prepared than most of the exponents of boosterism to acknowledge the role of “large-scale forces” in building the western cities, Artibise still holds that “in the final analysis only the skill and initiative of individuals... translated opportunity into reality.” 31 He has generated several articles to substantiate his claims, and there is no denying the “hopes,
beliefs, energy, community spirit, initiative, and adaptability" of local boosters "influenced the rate and pattern of urbanization." Yet conceptual problems nonetheless persist even in Artibise's temperate statement of the hinterland variant of the entrepreneurial approach to metropolitanism.

First, there is the problem of scale, a problem Artibise has himself recognized and discussed in a "conversation" with Bruce Stave, an American historian. Referring to the celebrated competition between Selkirk and Winnipeg to attract the Canadian Pacific Railway, Artibise admitted that "one can say whether it was Winnipeg or Selkirk that became the metropolis of the west is not an important issue in that the two communities are only a few miles apart . . . ." The same can be said of the much-documented rivalries between boosters located in Regina and Moose Jaw, Edmonton and Calgary, or Saskatoon and Prince Albert. Aside from the land speculators, did it in fact matter which of two neighbouring cities won out in the struggle for regional paramountcy? Was Canadian or prairie history changed in any fundamental way? Did westerners, a highly mobile populace, really care whether jobs were being generated in Lethbridge as opposed to Cardston? Historians of boosterism have not as a group addressed these questions, and even Artibise has confined his response to an appeal for a holistic interpretation of the urban growth process that discusses "the human and the accidental, the contingencies of events and personalities" as well as the "broad, impersonal factors such as resource bases and transportation systems . . . ." The principle being enunciated is unexceptionable: historians should indeed cast their nets as widely as possible but they should avoid, nonetheless, expending their time and resources reeling in small fry. Urban boosters, in other words, would have had to do more than shift a townsite a few dozen miles before they would merit the extended treatment they have received from the booster school. After all, the precise location of Calgary, whether its central business district was to develop on C.P.R. or Hudson Bay land, was much less significant than the kind of community life and opportunities it offered its inhabitants.

The lack of a clearly defined theory of entrepreneurialship has also limited the usefulness of the boosterism model of urban growth. Key theorists like Joseph Schumpeter and Arthur Cole have been almost entirely neglected, and core concepts like "innovation" and "adaptation" rarely appear in the booster literature. These are remarkable lacunae considering the model's emphasis on business elites. Consequently, the level of analysis has not gone much beyond Alan Artibise's contention that, "In general, leaders in 'losing' cities were more divided and complacent." Similarly, John Taylor has argued that Ottawa, a "failed metropolis," was held back by "elite fragmentation." The need for unity seems obvious enough, and yet Elizabeth Bloomfield has found that "Waterloo, the smaller and slower growing" of the Kitchener-Waterloo dyad, "tended to have a slightly more cohesive leadership group at all times . . . ." Burton Folsom Jr. similarly found that within the Lackawanna and Lehigh regions of eastern Pennsylvania the towns with the most socially homogeneous elites lagged in the urban steepchase.

The findings of Folsom and Bloomfield conform more closely to the current research being done on entrepreneurialship than does the emphasis placed on elite cohesion by the booster school, and that alone should give us cause to re-evaluate some of its basic premises. The current wisdom holds that social heterogeneity is more likely to induce a "creative response" — from an elite — than would homogeneity. More specifically, Everett Hagen has stereotyped the business entrepreneur as coming from a group "derogated in its own society — looked down upon unjustly and unreasonably, in its own eyes — by the social leaders of society." Successful innovators, Hagen asserts, have been "in a sense, 'outsiders,' but native outsiders," rather than immigrants. These conclusions compel us to re-examine the inordinate emphasis the booster school has placed on elite unity in order to see the underlying social divisions within each community, divisions that might have been even more important in impelling urban innovation. One could also infer from Hagen's analysis that the innovativeness of some western boosters may have been kindled by their sense of grievance against a society, eastern Canada, that had sired most of them, yet now considered them colonials. Feelings of derogation, however, may have varied from community to community, depending on the nature and history of its links with eastern capital, and may explain the complacency of some and the driving energy of others.

The mention of eastern capital brings us to our final critique of the booster approach to urban growth, and that is that it neglects the metropolitan half of the metropolitan-hinterland dichotomy. By standing Creighton's entrepreneurial approach on its head, the booster concept makes the same fundamental error of underestimating the contribution made by the interaction of metropolitan and hinterland business elites to the urban growth process. Inevitably, studies which confine their attention to the initiatives of local celebrities end up being quite impressed by their autonomy and freedom of action. The result is an urban history version of the Ptolemaic universe: the peripheral appears central. But the perspective changes once the historian, bursting the constraints of the booster approach, begins actively to search out the contact established between "clients" in hinterland cities and their "patrons" in the metropolitan centre.

Paul Voisey, a pathfinder in this quest, has already discovered that "someone dropped . . . a rope from above" to assist the "self-made" businessmen of the pre-1914 era to succeed in Calgary. Thus Pat Burns was able to transform Calgary into a major meat-packing centre because he had the help of "a boyhood pal," William Mackenzie, the railway entrepreneur, who awarded him with his first major contract to supply meat. Similarly, R.B. Bennett was able to
develop Calgary Power — thereby greatly extending the “metropolitan” influence of Calgary — only with the assistance of Max Aitken, the future Lord Beaverbrook, whom Bennett first met while articling as a law clerk in New Brunswick. Aitken in turn depended on his contacts in Montreal to supply Bennett and Calgary Power the needed capital.48 Such examples could be multiplied endlessly for each “self-made” person and city. They demonstrate the futility of trying to understand the urban growth process solely from the perspective of either the metropolitan or hinterland elites.

The Ecological Approach to Metropolitanism

By contrast, the ecological approach to metropolitanism devised by J.M.S. Careless has focused on the interaction between metropolis and hinterland. As with Creighton and Artibise, his early research has left an indelible imprint on his understanding of the metropolis-hinterland relationship. Thus while Creighton identified with the ambitions and dreams of the empire-builders whose exploits he chronicled, and Artibise exulted in Winnipeg’s success in promoting itself up through the urban hierarchy, Careless’s perspective has reflected his original research on Toronto’s leadership in the Upper Canadian reform movement of the 1850s, a cause he much admired. Obviously it was not exploitative for a metropolis to lead its region to liberal democracy. Hence Careless has tended to view metropolitanism as a benign force in Canadian history. To be sure, he has on occasion admitted that metropolises did exploit their hinterlands, but such negativism does not come easily to Careless. Certainly he has not highlighted exploitation; indeed, his 1969 article on “Aspects of Metropolitanism in Atlantic Canada” absolved Confederation and central Canada of responsibility for the post-1867 regression of the region’s principle cities. Unlike most recent historians of Atlantic Canada, he blamed the region’s difficulties on “new forces of continental dominance” which he attributed to changes in communications technology.45

Instead of exploitation, Careless has preferred to speak of “symbiotic patterns” of “mutual support and dependence.”46 Conflict was not the essence of metropolitanism, he decided; nor was the metropolis-hinterland relationship completely polarized, for “there are no discrete opposites here,” Careless asserted in 1974, “but interconnecting parts of a societal system — and what may stand as ‘metropolitan’ in one regional context may be seen in a hinterland relationship to another, broader ... frame.”47 Or, to recall the figure of speech Careless used in his 1954 article on metropolitanism, the metropolis-hinterland relationship can be conceived of as “a chain, almost a feudal chain of vassalage, wherein one city may stand tributary to a bigger centre and yet be the metropolis of a sizable region of its own.”48 The metaphor employed — feudalism — reminds us that Careless has always regarded interdependence as the essence of metropolitanism, even between lord and serf.

The feudal imagery also points to the original source of Careless’s conception of metropolitanism. According to Careless, he drew his inspiration “neither from Creighton or Innis,” as is commonly supposed, but rather from his “own background in medieval English and French social history” gained while studying at the University of Toronto and Harvard. In other words, his sense of metropolitanism is linked by a “chain of mutually dependent relationships ... derived from ... the communitas approach of medieval historians.” Indeed, his basic assumptions about the urban process had already taken shape by the time he began to specialize in Canadian history. Only, then, Careless relates, did he come across the book that was to have the greatest impact on his thought: An Introduction to Economic History by Norman S.B. Gras. Careless had hitherto concentrated on social and cultural history, and Gras provided the economic theory he lacked. The book “provided a very useful economic basis,” Careless recalls, “on which to structure general patterns of city-hinterland interplay within Canada itself.”49 Through his reading of Gras and of the urban sociologists from whom the economic historian had in turn drawn many of his core concepts, Careless developed the ecological orientation that has characterized his work ever since.50

Surprisingly, given their impact on Careless, Gras’s ideas on metropolitanism were little known or valued in Canada before the Second World War, even though his book had first appeared in 1922. Naturally Harold Innis had read it in the 1920s but he declared it of little relevance to Canadian economic history, a judgement that must have deterred potential readers.49 It was not until 1946, consequently, that Arthur Lower finally read Gras’s book, and only then because he had independently come to appreciate the importance of metropolitan forces in history and wished to compare notes.50 Interest in Gras did not become widespread until the publication in 1947 of The Rise of Toronto by Donald C. Masters. The book used a Grasian framework to structure Toronto’s history between 1850 and 1890, and it excited younger historians like J.M.S. Careless, who now had a theory around which to hang their own metropolitanist notions. Metropolitanism was thereafter clearly on the ascendancy and by 1954 Careless was able to declare it firmly established in Canadian historiography.51 Careless had himself emerged as the leading exponent of the metropolitan concept in Canada, as Norman Gras became an historian often cited but rarely read.

The key to Careless’s prominence lay in his apparent ability to meld together Gras’s themes with those of the Laurentian School, then regnant in the Canadian history profession. Although Gras was an American academic who ended his career at the Harvard Business School, his ideas seemed, nonetheless, quite “Canadian” for Gras was himself.
Canadian born and educated, and his appreciation of the metropolis-hinterland relationship had been formulated while posted at the University of Minnesota during an era of “hinterland” revolt against the economic and political dominance by elites resident in the Twin Cities. With these influences coming to bear upon his work, Gras inevitably produced a thesis with strong resonance for Canadians, especially as most scholars knew his ideas only through Careless’s exposition of them.

Yet Gras also drew his inspiration from the Chicago school of sociology, whose ecological approach has won few converts among Canadian historians. Where Gras focused on natural processes largely beyond human intervention, Canadian scholars have enunciated a remarkably strong faith in the power of human agency. And Careless, in attempting to cross-fertilize two historiographical models, one of which stressed the impersonal workings of nature, and the other the power of elites, has produced a relatively sterile hybrid. In other words, the approach to metropolitanism developed by J.M.S. Careless has proved to be of only limited usefulness in guiding research. Why that should be so can be seen from a closer look at the ecological notions of Gras and the Chicago school.

Gras’s thesis depicted the evolution of the urban system and of the internal organization of each city region as a collective adaptation of a population to its environment. Gras posited a direct relationship between the successive stages of technological development and the emergence of complex forms of human organization. Thus the “form of settlement” prevalent in any society constituted a response to new possibilities for securing a livelihood from the natural environment. Gras identified five stages through which society as a whole and individual communities developed into more complex organisms since pre-history. The fifth and final stage he designated “metropolitan economy.” It was characterized, he wrote, by a high degree of interdependence, specialization, and division of labour between communities. Even as society evolved into higher, more complex life forms, so too did individual communities within it, although not all in equal measure. The more complex the urban system became, the more specialized urban centres became, with the control function being taken over by a mere handful of cities, the metropolises. That is to say, the metropolises specialized in control activities.

Metropolises, Gras argued, developed through four evolutionary stages, each corresponding to the development of a basic urban function: namely, commerce, industry, transportation, and finance. As it grew larger and more complex, the metropolis became a nodal point for each activity; in other words, it came to dominate the urban systems of its region. Whatever connotations the word “dominance” has for modern scholars, Gras in using it did not intend to invoke images of exploitation or even of power. Dominance was an ecological concept, defined by Robert Park and Roderick McKenzie, who conceived of it as a coordination function which, in Park’s words, imposed a “sort of order” causing the “community as a whole (to behave) in many respects more like an organism than would be possible in the case of a mere aggregation.” Gras in similar fashion described metropolitan dominance as “the function of organizing business for a wide metropolitan area.” Gras also stressed the mediating role of the metropolis: through it, hinterland towns “established and maintained” their “normal economic relations with the outside . . . .” This emphasis was wholly consistent with the physiological definition of dominance developed by his close associates in the Chicago School who regarded the “location of dominance” as (to quote Park) “that portion of the organism . . . most responsive to stimuli from within and without the organism.” Simply put, a metropolitan city could be seen as dominating its hinterland much as the human brain coordinated the “complexly integrated parts of the body.” From an ecological perspective it made as little sense, therefore, to speak of metropolitan “exploitation” as it did to conclude that the brain benefitted unduly from the functioning of the organism it dominated.

Similar motifs and conclusions have shaped the work of J.M.S. Careless: “My own use of the metropolis-hinterland concept . . . could fairly be called ‘ecological,’” he has recently remarked, “in so far as that describes my stress on the interaction of mutually dependent or complementary relationships within an environment.” His ecological orientation, as well as his intellectual debt to Gras, are manifest in the now classic definition of metropolitanism he offered in his 1954 article:

. . . The rise of the metropolis . . . implies the emergence of a city of outstanding size to dominate not only its surrounding countryside but other cities and their countrysides, the whole area being organized by the metropolis . . . into one economic and social unit that is focussed on the metropolitan ‘centre of dominance’ and through it trades with the world.

Here Careless is clearly using the word “dominance” in its ecological sense as an “at base a neutral term” and not as a synonym for exploitation. As he has constantly reiterated, Careless sees interdependence, not conflict, as the essence of the metropolis-hinterland relationship. His interpretation thus fits the mould of “consensus” history; it reflects the optimism both of Americans in the 1920s when Gras first expounded his thesis and of the postwar boom of the 1950s when Careless and Masters popularized it in Canada.

But the boom has long since ended and Careless’s approach to metropolitanism has fallen on hard times. Perhaps it has simply too roseate a view of the urban process under capitalism to appeal to younger historians who find the pessimism and anger of the dependency school (to be discussed in the pages ahead) more appropriate to an era of recession and world tensions. Yet even those attracted by the
Arminianism of the booster school have shown little interest of late in Careless's classic formulation. Alan Artibise, for example, has decided that "the metropolis/hinterland concept" though "an important approach to the study of Canadian history generally" was "not really a theory that explain[ed] Canadian urban development."67 By inference it had, therefore, little relevance to urban historians.

It requires more than changing times to explain why Careless's approach to metropolitanism has fallen into desuetude in historical circles. What seems to have happened is that historians, including Careless himself, found it almost impossible to apply his "thesis" in practice. First came a challenge to the theoretical underpinnings of the Gras-Careless conception of metropolitanism. Research on Toronto, for example, caused Fred Armstrong and Jacob Spelt to conclude (in the words of the latter), "that there is no neat evolution through various stages, as suggested by N.B. Gras in his economic development theory."68 Urban functions had been apparently accumulated in a different order in Canada than in England, the country from which Gras had drawn most of the evidence for his hypothesis; consequently the stages he outlined bore little resemblance to the actual sequence by which the Canadian urban system has grown. As a result, the Gras-Careless statement of metropolitanism is weak on causality; it is more taxonomic than explanatory. Careless himself admitted as much in a 1979 article when he defended Gras's theory of stages as follows:

Nevertheless, if his four stages of metropolitan development are more broadly regarded as characteristic features of merging metropolitanism, then each can be associated with the rise of major Canadian urban centres to positions of economic dominance. Though the timing and degree of development might vary from city to city, their dominance was clearly marked throughout by the key attributes of metropolitanism discerned by Gras . . . .69

In other words, the theory identified the principal urban functions and a metropolis could reasonably be defined as a city performing all of these functions, especially finance, typically the last to emerge in a city.

The Gras-Careless interpretation of metropolitanism does afford scholars a system for classifying cities. Using the various indices of trade and commerce, industry and finance, and communications activity, it is even possible to designate some cities as national metropolises, others regional metropolises, and still others as industrial satellites of little commercial importance. Through the use of census data and various indices of economic activity (for example, wholesale trade receipts, bank clearances, value added by manufacturing, airport arrivals, port tonnages and the like) geographers and urban ecologists in both the United States and Canada have composed and periodically revised a statistical portrait of the urban hierarchy or system in each country.69 Such research has been useful in pinpointing the decline of Montréal as a national metropolis, and the rise of Edmonton and Calgary to regional prominence. Yet the data, while verifying change, are not much help in explaining why it happened. For example, it is difficult to discern from an ecological perspective the relative importance of natural "forces" and of political and economic elites in the urban development process, for social organization, one of the four cornerstones of the "ecological complex" (the others being population, technology, and environment) seems at base to be merely a by-product of innovations in technology and changes in the overall environment that are largely beyond the power of local communities to control.61

Indeed, the ecological approach has generally exhibited a strong technological determinism. It therefore makes sense for historians seeking to apply the Gras-Careless model to focus on the role of technology in transforming the urban system. Careless himself has stressed the influence of transportation technology — railroads, shipping, and the like — in developing the cities of western Canada and the Maritimes, and in determining their relative rankings.69 Yet the articles he wrote on these two regions were ultimately unsatisfactory since they largely omitted the human equation. Given the stress in ecological theory on the naturalness of urban development and the role of great impersonal forces in shaping the history of cities, the ecological interpretation of metropolitanism has had difficulty fitting the human factor into the history of urban development.

It is revealing that Careless in his studies of the Victoria and Winnipeg business elites ignored his own thesis. Instead, in his article on Winnipeg he asserted that "regional, national, continental, or global forces in the growth of Winnipeg are not in consideration here . . . .65 He then proceeded to write a standard elite study emphasizing the role of Winnipeg businessmen in building their city. The article lacks any sense of the interplay between Winnipeg and the metropolises that then controlled the Canadian economy. This is not surprising since business elites, the subject of the article, have little place in the thesis that Careless and Gras devised.

Secondly, the ecological concept of dominance offers no guidelines for the study of power as wielded by elites. And so Careless has in his own writing and research alternated between restatements of his thesis and its frank abandonment when he has come to study power at the local level. Then he has resorted to the booster approach, and the sense of urban growth as the outcome of interaction between metropolis and hinterland has been lost. As a result, Careless and the ecological approach have not been able to provide working hypotheses for those historians who wish to study both power and metropolitanism. They have instead been attracted by an approach that identifies asymmetrical power relationships as the essence of the metropolis-hinterland paradigm. That approach, known as dependency theory, has already become established in the historiography of Atlantic Canada, although urban historians even there have as yet
evinced little interest in it. Nonetheless, the dependency approach should be given a close look, since it has become so widely used by Canadian historians, sociologists, and political economists. The approach, as we shall see, can also be labelled the dependency-exploitation approach, for it emphasizes the power of the metropolis to exploit its hinterland. 64

The Dependency-Exploitation Approach to Metropolitanism

In Canada, it was Arthur R.M. Lower who pioneered the dependency-exploitation approach, although most younger historians would be more likely to cite André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, or one of the other third world theorists as their guide to the relationship between the metropolitan centre and the satellite periphery of world capitalism.

Lower’s interpretation evolved out of his life-long study of the timber trade in British North America, a trade he decried as exploitative of the hinterland, with eastern New Brunswick in particular being “squeezed dry and thrown aside like a sucked orange . . . .”65 The “essence of metropolitanism,” Lower argued, “is the concentration of power.” The essence of power in turn lay in the ability of the metropolis to set the terms of trade with the hinterland. The metropolis could dictate terms, Lower held, because its demand called into existence staples production in the hinterland and determined its rate of development. Typically the rate of growth was too rapid, without thought to conservation, and the hinterland was as a result ruined, its resources depleted.66

Lower’s interpretation of metropolitanism coincides with dependency theory in that both see the metropolis-hinterland relationship as essentially exploitative and leading to the impoverishment of the hinterland. In dealing with dependency theory, especially within the constraints of a brief historiographical review, there are numerous pitfalls to ensnare the unwary. First, as Timothy Harding has observed, “There is no such thing as a single unified body of thought called dependency theory, and any common ground between those who share the terminology of dependency tends to dissolve as the importance of the differences between them becomes greater.”67 Second, even the dependency theorist most favoured by Canadian historians, the Latin Americanist André Gunder Frank, has significantly revised his ideas since the first formulation twenty years ago; consequently, a brief summary cannot do justice even to his conception of the metropolis-hinterland relationship.68 Thus, the following thumbnail sketch of dependency theory chiefly derives from Frank’s earliest work, especially his 1967 classic, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. It was from this book that Bruce Archibald drew the conceptual framework for his 1971 article on “Atlantic Underdevelopment and Socialism,” a seminal place from which the Maritime historiography on dependence has germinated.69 It therefore bears close examination.

What becomes immediately clear is that Frank and Lower, while they agree for the most part, do differ in one vital respect: where Lower sees metropolitanism as a universal and timeless phenomenon, whose ultimate expression is the power of “one individual sitting in a small room” to control “all the inhabitants of the planet by . . . pushing the appropriate buttons,” Frank envisages it as the geographical expression of the “internal contradictions” of capitalism.70 Capital accumulation, Frank contends, requires the “polarization of the capitalist system into a metropolitan center and peripheral satellites . . . .” Through its power to impose unequal terms of exchange, “the metropolis expropriates economic satellites from its satellites and appropriates it for its own development.” Meanwhile, “The satellites remained underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus . . . .” It follows, then, that development of the metropolis and underdevelopment of the periphery or hinterland are “opposite sides of the same coin.” That is to say, underdevelopment is generated by the development of capitalism itself. Frank further argues that the periphery, if “firmly satellized,” cannot ever develop economically, for the continuing expropriation of its surplus capital through the mechanism of international trade assures its ever-deepening underdevelopment as long as it remains dependent on the “world capitalist metropolis.”71

As is readily apparent, dependency theorists like Frank are primarily concerned with the functioning of the international capitalist system, with metropolis and periphery usually defined as two different nations (eg. the United States and Chile) or world regions (eg. western Europe and Latin America). Yet dependency theory also purports to explain regional disparities within a single country, for Frank states that “a whole chain of constellations of métropoles and satellites relates all parts of the whole (capitalist) system from its metropolitan center in Europe or the United States to the farthest outpost in the Latin American (or for that matter Canadian) countryside.”72 One can readily appreciate, then, the theory’s allure for historians of the Atlantic provinces, an “underdeveloped” region in the Canadian context. It is more difficult to explain, however, why Canadian urban historians have as yet evinced little interest in the dependency approach, since its discussion of the “metropolis-satellite contradiction” echoes a long-standing tradition in the sub-discipline.

Why then the disinterest? No one has said, but it is possible to extrapolate some of the reasons from the objections voiced by the leading critics of dependency theory, most of whom are Marxists. Generally, they have taken exception to Frank’s departure from Marxist orthodoxy: his emphasis on market relationships as the lever by which capitalists in the metropolis have pried surplus value out of the grip of
dependent people owes more to Adam Smith and classical economics, they assert, than it does to Marx, who identified the capitalists’ control over the means of production as the mechanism by which the peasantry and working class were expropriated. Marxists have therefore accused dependency theorists of downplaying fundamental class relations formed in the sphere of production. In other words, a theory that focuses on external relations of exchange is an inadequate guide to understanding the internal social structure of either metropolis or hinterland, which naturally makes use of the theory problematic for urban historians.\textsuperscript{73}

Moreover, dependency theory typically sees the interaction between metropolis and hinterland as unidirectional, the former acting, the latter being acted upon. We have reviewed the objections Canadian urban historians have to this interpretation in our discussion of the entrepreneurial approach of Donald Creighton. A theory that has difficulty accounting for changes in the periphery has little to say to historians trying to explain the rise of Toronto to national prominence, or of Vancouver to paramountcy on the Pacific coast.

The bleakness of the dependency-exploitation approach may also explain its unattractiveness to Canadian urban historians, who with certain notable exceptions are in the business of recording the “rise” of cities. One would not expect scholars who spend their days reading promotional literature churned out by ever-optimistic town boosters to evolve a pessimistic view of the world. J.M.S. Careless therefore probably spoke for most urban historians in this country when he chastised Lower for over-generalizing from the experience of the timber trade. Careless pointed out that,

As one moves beyond the fairly primitive operations of a frontier experience like the transmission of timber, one can find . . . more varied developments and benefits accruing to the hinterland region. It may not have to be just the unprotected passive recipient of outside exploitation. It can shape response . . . and generate activities of its own — so that the logical outcome of metropolitan influence does not have to be the ruined stump field, the ghost town or the total export of resources under an unbridled capitalism.\textsuperscript{74}

Metropolitanism as exploitation simply does not strike a resonance with urban historians in Canada. Perhaps, as Maritime cities receive more attention, dependency theory will come to be used to describe not only the region’s de-industrialization but also the sluggish growth of its major urban centres. Still, the work done so far on the Maritime cities has stressed either the inadequacies of local boosters or the constraints imposed by a peripheral location and a narrow resource base.\textsuperscript{75} The dependency approach to metropolitanism clearly has not taken the urban history profession by storm, nor is it likely to, given the limited contacts between historians and sociologists, its chief proponents in Canada.

The Heartland-Hinterland Approach to Metropolitanism

However, geographers have developed a modified, somewhat attenuated version of dependency theory known as the “heartland-hinterland paradigm,” and it is bound to influence the future thinking of historians on metropolitanism. This prediction can be made with some certainty because of the close and abiding interaction between the two disciplines in Canada. An American urban historian, Bruce Stave, has even suggested that the “role of geography and geographers in the historical study of urban development” is one of the principal “factors that establish a distinct identity” for Canadian urban history. Both Alan Artibise and Carl Wallace have attributed the influence of geography to the novelty of urban history, the latter noting that geographers “had almost pre-empted the field by the time historians turned to the subject.” As a result, geography has been the historical science from which historians have tended to draw theoretical perspective on urban development; one would expect, then, that the geographers’ new “heartland-hinterland paradigm” will fundamentally affect the thinking of Canadian urban historians on the nature of metropolitanism.\textsuperscript{76}

The heartland-hinterland approach to metropolitanism is derived, according to L.D. McCann, a leading theorist, from “staples theory of regional economic growth and the core-periphery . . . conceptualization of regions,” wherein “the core supplies those factors of production . . . that are used to develop the resource base of the periphery. In return, the periphery exports staple commodities . . . to the source of demand in the core.”\textsuperscript{77} As the concepts being used indicate, the heartland-hinterland approach has two spiritual godfathers: the “core-periphery” concept comes from the work of John Friedmann, an American authority on comparative urbanization, who was himself quite influenced by dependency theory inasmuch as his research dealt with Latin America.\textsuperscript{78} As for the staples approach, it originated in two books written some fifty years ago by Harold Innis on the Canadian fur trade and the international cod fishery. These books depicted Canada’s early economic history as, to quote Len Gertler and Ron Crowley, “a process by which ‘hinterland’ Canada supplied ‘heartland’ Europe with a succession of staple exports, which in turn bolstered one regional economy after another . . . .”\textsuperscript{79} This conception of Canadian history as a function of — as Innis phrased it — the “discrepancy between the centre and the margin” is a fundamental maxim of the heartland-hinterland school of thought and Innis may consequently be considered its dean, at least in Canada.\textsuperscript{80}

Both Innis and Friedmann associate the heartland with secondary industry, the hinterland with staples production. As a corollary, heartland and hinterland cities also necessarily diverge in function: “In the heartland city,” McCann states, “manufacturing is emphasized because the core’s accessibility to national markets . . . [makes] possible the manufacture of a wide range of primary, consumer, and pro-
ducer goods..." By contrast, "Manufacturers of consumer and producer goods are generally lacking in hinterland cities... because cities of the heartland can meet national markets far more efficiently and economically." 85

Heartlands and hinterlands differ in power as well as industry: according to McCann, the former "are well-advanced along the development path and possess the capacity for ‘innovative change’; and they are able to influence and usually control — through the ‘power of the metropolis’... decisions of national importance." 86 Hinterlands are, however, the obverse: they comprise the "regions lying beyond the heartland whose growth and change is determined by their dependency relationships with the heartland." The flow of profits from periphery to core (aided and abetted by corporations headquartered in the latter) make "it difficult," McCann adds, "to raise development capital within the periphery. Such occurrences lie at the root of the underdevelopment problem, and are difficult to overcome without state intervention..." In other words, "for a region to achieve heartland status, it must advance beyond the phase of merely supplying staples to an industrial core"; and this can be achieved only through the retention of capital derived from the export of staples and its re-investment "in a programme of regional diversification..."

The debt to dependency theory is obvious, both in the terminology deployed and in the emphasis on the “deleterious actions” of the metropolis. Yet these two approaches to metropolitanism differ in two important respects: first, the influence of Innis and staples theory have made the architects of the heartland-hinterland paradigm keenly aware of the broad range of multiplier effects produced by each type of staples trade, and they are far less convinced of the inevitability, therefore, of continuing hinterland dependency. Secondly, the heartland-hinterland approach seems to view dependency relations through its own special filter provided for it by John Friedmann.

Although he utilizes a dependency approach, Friedmann nonetheless stresses the creativity as well as the destructiveness of the metropolis. He defines the core in terms of its "high capacity for generating and absorbing innovative change" of the type that brings development to the entire system, and consequently the potential emancipation of the hinterland. Friedmann explains: "... A continuous stream of innovations diffuses from the core to the periphery where it ultimately helps to create conditions that lead to demands for at least a partial restructuring of the fundamental dependency relation." 87 Similarly, McCann states that a major city becomes "clearly recognizable as a metropolitan centre" only when it becomes innovative, "... in effect, challenging and recasting traditional dependency relationships in its favour..." 88 Given its heavy reliance on Innis and Friedmann, it would appear, then, that the heartland-hinterland approach is sui generis, departing substantially not only from dependency theory but from all other approaches to metropolitanism as well.

Certainly it disagrees fundamentally with the ecological school, that is with Gras and Careless, concerning the importance of secondary manufacturing. The heartland-hinterland paradigm defines centrality as a function of industrial diversification, as does dependency theory; whereas ecologists insist on the primacy of the "commercial-financial complex." 89 According to Gras, industry is the least reliable indicator of metropolitan stature; indeed, his definition of a "fully developed metropolis" specified "a relatively large proportion of workers engaged in wholesaling and relatively few in manufacture, when compared with other large cities..." Accordingly, Gras denied metropolitan ranking (in 1922) to Pittsburgh and Detroit, two specialists in heavy industry: "Although the capital, surplus, and deposits of the banks in both cities are large," Gras wrote, "neither can claim that it performs important banking functions for the surrounding territory. Both of these cities must be classed as industrial tributaries of metropolitan centres, Detroit of Chicago, and Pittsburgh of Philadelphia and New York..." In other words, Pittsburgh and Detroit lacked "commercial dominance over a wide area" and therefore remained "manufacturing towns," despite impressive population statistics. 90

The distinction Gras drew between industrial towns and the metropolis has deep roots in the historiography; indeed, in Britain it can be traced back to an 1840 report by the Committee, on the Health of Towns. 91 And, as Otis Dudley Duncan pointed out, it remains "the consensus among students of metropolitanism... that the exercise of commercial dominance is much more diagnostic of the organizational role of the metropolis than is the sheer volume of goods produced." 92 Thus, the emphasis placed on industry by the heartland-hinterland concept does constitute a significant departure from traditional thought on metropolitanism. Is the departure warranted?

Personal research on Detroit has indicated a negative response and the historians of Glasgow, Pittsburgh, and Manchester, England would probably dispute the supposed "centrality" of secondary manufacturing. 93 Their fate reveals that industrial specialization has its own perils comparable to the infamous "staples trap." Indeed, one could — if the theory did not decree otherwise — even speak of the ever-deepening dependency of cities like Glasgow, once the second city of the British Empire, and now increasingly a supplicant for charitable donations from the British state. Sidney Checkland ascribes the decline of Glasgow to the universal "tendency, where circumstances have permitted, to develop a high level of mutually confirming specialisations, to press the advantages of such a situation, to be blind to warnings of its precariousness, and to seek opiates that will allow it to continue." 94 Thus cities get into difficulties when one industry so flourishes that it, like an upas tree,
prevents the growth of new manufacturing of shoots beneath its branches.

Jane Jacobs has also remarked that cities, once they have reached this impasse, offer few opportunities for local re-investment of the profits generated by their dominant industry; and they are, consequently, drained of their economic surplus as surely as are hinterland regions. In both the United States and Great Britain it is difficult to sustain the illusion that secondary manufacturing is intrinsically metropolitan in character: there are simply too many giant industrial cities in apparently irremediable decline.

As for Canada, it is likely that the mounting problems of cities like Windsor, Ontario, already suffering a drop in population, will soon force a re-evaluation of the undue emphasis heretofore placed on industry by the heartland-hinterland paradigm. "Manufacturing is no longer a dominant growth sector in the national economy," Larry Bourne reminds us, and with its manpower and skill requirements greatly reduced by the application of semi-conductor technology to the production process, it will increasingly become a hinterland activity. As industry relocates to the Third World and the low-wage regions within North America, the nature of "the power of the metropolis" will be clarified: that what counts is not industrial primacy but rather control over the "epoch-defining activity" of each historical era, that is, wholesaling before 1870, manufacturing between 1870 and 1930, and the tertiary and quaternary sectors since then. Moreover, Michael Conzen's research on the American urban system between 1840 and 1910 indicates that even in its heyday as a builder of cities, manufacturing was less successful than wholesaling in generating the correspondent banking relations that American urbanists usually consider the acme of metropolitanism. The last word, however, on theories which identify industry as the essence of metropolitanism should perhaps go to A.V. Hill, an urban ecologist, who in 1955 wrote:

It might be said that the word metropolis has outgrown the maternal metaphor and today merely refers to an urban region of more than a certain size. Detroit, for example, has nearly two million people. It is therefore a metropolis? A mother city of what — automobiles?

Conclusion

We have seen that the concept of metropolitanism is considerably more complex than commonly imagined. This essay has identified five different and distinctive approaches to metropolitanism, and assuredly there are others yet to discover. Quite clearly there is no single metropolitan thesis, no lodestar by which historians can unerringly steer a common passage through the vast literature on urban development and the relations between city and region. Undoubtedly, the general assumption that a single metropolitan thesis exists has impeded communication between urban historians, thereby retarding development of the sub-discipline. Recognition of the substantial points of disagreement among metropolitan theorists may initiate a potentially fruitful discourse and renewed interest in the metropolis-hinterland paradigm.

But the theoretical disarray depicted by this paper points as well to the conclusion that urban historians would benefit even more by turning to themes less burdened by the weight of interpretation and reinterpretation. In 1970 Peter Filene advised American historians to cease their quest for the elusive "Progressive Movement," and the rationale he gave for suspending the search seems to apply equally well here: "If sustained research has produced less rather than more conclusiveness," he opined, "one may well suspect that it is a false problem because historians are asking a false question."

Certainly, S.D. Clark highlighted a fundamental conceptual problem with the metropolitan approach, when he declared in the midst of his debate with J.M.S. Careless at the 1974 meeting of the Canadian Historical Association on the "Character of Canadian Urban Development," that "it serves no useful purpose to work with such categories or concepts as metropolis and hinterland when what is metropolis can also be considered hinterland and what is hinterland can also be considered metropolis." In other words, he was accusing metropolitanism of being inherently impressionistic and therefore lacking in analytical and diagnostic power. The indeterminancy of metropolitan and hinterland status seems theoretically inescapable, most analysts of necessity agreeing with Donald C. Masters that "Metropolitan status is a relative, not absolute term as no urban centre has ever established complete dominance over its hinterland..." The concept's relativity means that, ultimately, metropolitan stature like beauty lies in the eye of the beholder. Granted, metropolitanists often bring a barrage of statistics to bear on the subject, but since metropolitanism is still largely a matter of individual definition and preference, the data can be used to prove a pygmy a giant and to accuse the latter of debilitating gigantism. That is to say, metropolitanism is such a vague concept that one authority, J.M.S. Careless, can decide that, "By 1873,.... Winnipeg, late a village, was already displaying aspects of metropolitan dominance over a widening Manitoba hinterland," while yet another authority, Arthur Lower, could decide in 1939 that while Vancouver and Montréal where clearly "metropolitan centres" the "status and support" of Toronto was "still uncertain." Both historians are undoubtedly correct according to their own rights, but what are scholars to do with a concept so malleable and indeterminate that it can be used to refuse Toronto, then the second largest city in the country, a status more or less conferred on a frontier hamlet?

In his debate with Careless, Clark raised a second important problem. With dependency theory apparently in mind, Clark charged that "left wing ideologists...compelled to
recognize the inadequacies of the Marxist conception of a society structured in terms of a dominant capitalist class and an oppressed working class" had deliberately recast the Marxist dialectic as the metropolis-hinterland dichotomy. Thus Clark joined (somewhat incongruously) with Marxist critics of dependency theory in accusing metropolitanists of failing to deal with fundamental class relations.

The critique is well taken, but this evasion does not begin with the neo-Marxists, but rather with the original formulation of the metropolis-hinterland concept by Gras and the Chicago school of sociology. The latter have lately been accused by Manuel Castells and other Marxist scholars of being more ideologues than social scientists, inasmuch as they deliberately contrived dichotomies — metropolis/hinterland, community/society, folk/urban — designed to blame the ills of urban society on ecological forces and thereby to exculpate the capitalist system. In other words, metropolitanism could be characterized as a sub-type of what Castells has labelled the "urban ideology," which he defines as "that specific ideology that sees the modes and forms of social organization as characteristic of a phase of the evolution of society, closely linked to the technico-natural conditions of human existence and, ultimately, to its environment." Castells thus makes the same kind of allegation against urban ecology as Clark did against dependency theory. Both versions of metropolitanism stand accused, then, of deliberately avoiding the problem of dealing with the internal social structure of the city, except as it related to economic decision-making.

The fundamental evasion lies in the ascription of "metropolitan ambitions" to cities rather than to the individuals to whom they properly belong. Ambitions, like dominance and power, are attributes of elites not cities. Nor do cities exercise economic control; entrepreneurs and business corporations do. Metropolitanism is therefore best understood as a relationship linking peripheral elites with the "core groups" whom sociologists have identified at the centre of Canadian capitalism. It follows, almost as a corollary, that social networks are as important to an understanding of urban growth and decline as are the urban networks which Canadian urban historians have hitherto made their concern. To understand the fate of any particular city, it is necessary to know as much as possible about the networks of kinship, amity, and clientage through which local businessmen (or boosters) raised the capital need for development.

Furthermore, urban historians would be well advised to focus their research on the information flows between core and peripheral elites, and between networks. The utility of such an approach has recently been re-confirmed by Ronald Rudin's article on "Montréal Banks and the Urban Development of Québec, 1840-1914," wherein he has used communications theory provided him by Allan Pred, an American geographer, to argue plausibly that the industrial development of hinterland Québec was impeded by "barriers of culture and language" that deprived anglophone banks of the kind of business information that alone would have impelled them to expand their activities in francophone areas.

Rudin's article attests to geography's continuing hold over the historical imagination in Canada; and it is clear that the historian's appetite for the theories produced by historical geographers can be extremely fruitful of new insights into the development process. Yet there have also been some unanticipated costs involved in this interdisciplinary ménage. Geography by definition must stress the spatial aspect of the problems it addresses; historians do not in theory labour under the same conceptual constraints. But in practice historians — especially those toiling in the urban field — have tended to accept the idea that the most compelling aspect of power is its spatial distribution. Hence an extraordinary amount of time and energy has been spent on dissecting the relationship between metropolis and hinterland, and much less attention has been given to the distribution of power within each.

This emphasis on the spatial dimension of power may make sense for capitalism's more sedentary phase (to borrow a phrase from Gras) in the nineteenth century when capitalists or boosters identified their fates with that of their home community; but the metropolis-hinterland paradigm in all its various formulations seems to be owning relevance to an era in which corporations and governments have become the arbiters of urban growth and decline. The major corporations are becoming increasingly foot-loose thanks to modern communications technology, and have, according to John Taylor, "no special loyalty to place. Their fortunes are not tied to the fortunes of a city or town, and indeed such ties can even be seen as counter-productive. The loyalty is to the organization . . . ."

If historians are to respond to the summons by Gilbert Stelter and Alan F.J. Artibise for a "usable urban past," then spatially-biased concepts like metropolitanism should be regarded as being at most "limited generalizations" applicable to but one stage of urban development. This certainly was W.L. Morton's conclusion, and both L.D. McCann and Alan Artibise have recently moved towards the position that, to quote McCann, "The traditional metropolitan interpretation, with its connotations of tributary status, economic dependency, and a steep cultural gradient, has surely become . . . a national myth." He and Artibise agree that Canada's hinterland regions, especially the west, have become more independent and innovative since 1950 with the result that, "The simple dichotomy in Canada of metropolis and hinterland is no longer valid." Artibise adds that even boosterism is a time-bound concept, pertinent primarily to the "initial stage of city-building" when communities, at least in western Canada, "faced very limited constraints on their growth possibilities . . . . This
formative stage was more or less complete by 1920," Artibise believes, "and boosterism declines rapidly as an explanatory force in western development" thereafter as the major corporations and government agencies chipped away at the foundations of municipal autonomy.107 Both Artibise and McCann have thus joined Morton in disputing the universality of the metropolis-hinterland paradigm, and their viewpoint is likely to spread as the growing complexity of Canada's urban system makes it too protean for its essence to be captured by a dualistic concept like metropolitanism. Moreover, even the chroniclers of Canada's earliest settlements, for whom the simple dichotomies of centrality and peripherality (or dominance and dependence) have the most heuristic potential, even they should avoid an approach — metropolitanism — that prejudges these relationships as quintessentially spatial in nature. There should, in other words, be more emphasis on society and less on geography.

In general, historians should avoid dualistic modes of thought, including what David Hackett Fischer has called the "fallacy of dichotomous questions."108 This essay for example, should not be interpreted as asking historians to choose between metropolitanism and urban solipsism. One does not have to treat cities as island communities in order to avoid the "metropolitan thesis." There is indeed, as Gilbert Stelter has recently reminded us, a need for more research on city-regions. But Alan Artibise and Paul-André Linteau are also correct when they observe that the past focus on the broad sweep of metropolitan power has diverted attention from the "relationship between metropolitan centres and their immediate hinterlands or suburbs; the rural or sub-rural areas."109 Metropolitanism is too gross a generalization, too manichean at its core, to be likely to help us understand the relationships between a central city and the numerous communities within its daily commuting area.

In the final analysis, it is time for us to heed the advice of J.M.S. Careless that historical concepts do outline their usefulness. A few years ago on educational television Careless discussed the process by which concepts become myths, their fecundity spent. Of the frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner, Careless said that "like any view of history which gets oversimplified, overpopularized, it becomes untrue; it becomes a myth, . . . with a lot of fallacious elements tied in with it."110 At that point the concept ceases to generate fruitful research. Just as the frontier thesis was abandoned by most scholars, so should metropolitanism, for it now impedes rather than promotes historical understanding. While both concepts clearly merit a place in the pantheon of Canadian intellectual life, the task of attending to them should hereafter be left to the historiographers.

NOTES

2. Personal communication, Careless to the author, 11 July 1983.
5. This has been particularly true in the literature on urban reform. See, for example, the comments by H.V. Nelles and C. Armstrong, "The Great Fight for Clean Government," Urban History Review/Revue d'histoire urbaine 2 (October 1976): 50-61; and James D. Anderson, "The Municipal Government Reform Movement in Western Canada, 1880-1920," in The Usable Urban Past, ed. Alan F.J. Artibise and Gilbert Stelter (Toronto, 1979), 73-111.
10. Ibid.
12. Edited by Michiel Horn and Ronald Sabourin.
17. Donald Creighton, The Empire of the St. Lawrence (Toronto, 1956), 3-8.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.


34. Ibid., 120.


59. Careless, “Metropolis and Region,” 109. Emphasis added. In the forementioned letter to the author, Careless points out that he had discarded Gras’s notion of “sequential stages of metropolitan evolution” even before supervising Fred Armstrong’s dissertation on Toronto (York). In his recent book on Toronto, however, Careless seems to have reverted to a Grasian orthodoxy, at least as far as the Queen City is concerned. He writes: “In Toronto’s case, the phases of economic metropolitan growth often overlapped or went on concurrently; but in broadest outline, they occurred most significantly in four successive stages.” Careless, *Toronto to 1918: An Illustrated History* (Toronto, 1984), 17. It might be added that Careless has company: both Alan Artibise and Gilbert Stelter have recently attempted to delineate the general stages of development in the city-region relationship. See Stelter, “A Regional Framework,” 200-201; and Artibise, “Exploring the North American West,” 20-44.


68. For some idea of the progression in Frank’s ideas and the extent to which he has conceded ground to his critics see André Gunde Frank, “Dependence is Dead, Long Live Dependence and the Class Struggle,” *Latin American Perspectives* 1 (Spring 1974): 87-106; and A.G. Frank, *World Accumulation, 1492-1789* (New York, 1978).


90. Checkland,
88. Otis Dudley Duncan, Heartland and Hinterland, 2
84. McCann,
81. L.D. McCann, 18.
86. Innis’s famous epitome of metropolitanism is found in his The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto, 1957), 385.
87. Artibise, “Exploring the North American West.” In a recent communication McCann has apparently objected to Clark’s criticism of the metropolitan thesis, arguing that his remarks are “akin to saying that human and family relationships are meaningless because a man can be a father, son, uncle, etc. at the same time. Family historians ‘treat family as a highly malleable social relation,’ and dealing with different levels of city-region relationships is really a kind of complex family history.” One might reply that Stelter’s analogy is most pertinent to those instances in which a city literally acts as a mother city or metropolis, as in the founding of colonies. Otherwise, urban and family relationships differ in one vital respect: family roles (at least before in vitro fertilization commenced) are scientifically definable, even if mutable. We know, in other words, when a woman is behaving as a daughter as opposed to a mother. The same cannot be said of urban roles: these defy objective classification, since they are not rooted in human biology or law. See Stelter, “A Regional Framework,” 194.
100. Ronald Rudin, “Montreal Banks and the Urban Development of Quebec, 1840-1914,” in Shaping the Urban Landscape, Stelter and Artibise, 82.
101. S.D. Clark, “Canadian Urban Development,” Urban History Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine 3 (June 1974): 19. Gilbert Stelter has recently objected to Clark’s criticism of the metropolitan thesis, arguing that his remarks are “akin to saying that human and family relationships are meaningless because a man can be a father, son, uncle, etc. at the same time. Family historians ‘treat family as a highly malleable social relation,’ and dealing with different levels of city-region relationships is really a kind of complex family history.” One might reply that Stelter’s analogy is most pertinent to those instances in which a city literally acts as a mother city or metropolis, as in the founding of colonies. Otherwise, urban and family relationships differ in one vital respect: family roles (at least before in vitro fertilization commenced) are scientifically definable, even if mutable. We know, in other words, when a woman is behaving as a daughter as opposed to a mother. The same cannot be said of urban roles: these defy objective classification, since they are not rooted in human biology or law. See Stelter, “A Regional Framework,” 194.
103. McCann, Heartland and Hinterland, 21.
104. McCann, Heartland and Hinterland, 4, 10, 12.
109. Artibise and Linteau “Evolution of Urban Canada,” 14. Jane Jacobs’ *Cities and the Wealth of Nations* might be an appropriate starting point for formulating some research questions. If her analysis is correct, the city-region is the fundamental determinant in economic growth.