

Robert D. Parmet
white attitudes seems hollow when, on the 40th anniversary of Shelley Kraemer, we are left asking: How long to achieve what? The search for a magical prescription that would lend stability to mixed communities, given the contradictory, impractical, and otherwise questionable suggestions put forward here, seems similarly fruitless. In sum, the Goering collection offers provocative essays of varying insight and perspective, a stimulating look at the confusion and disarray currently plaguing fair housing advocates, and little hope for the immediate future.

Arnold R. Hirsch
Department of History
University of New Orleans


As Robert Fishman demonstrates, suburbanization is not a recent phenomenon. In Bourgeois Utopias he illuminates its late 18th-century English origins and then traces its evolution to the present, concluding with Los Angeles as its culmination. Dennis Gales, in Washington, D.C., studies one city's patterns of "inner-city revitalization" as well as suburbanization from the late 1960s through the mid-eighties. Though Gale seems suburbanization as a continuing phenomenon, Fishman finds that it is ending and that a "new perimeter city," the "technoburb," is taking its place.

Fishman and Gale have crafted very different kinds of books. Fishman has produced a beautifully written and highly interpretative account of the Anglo-American bourgeoisie and its quest to create family-centred residences in park-like settings away from urban workplaces and the working class. Approaching its subject from a different direction than Kenneth Jackson's history of suburbanization, Crabgrass Frontier, Fishman's work focuses on cultural transmission from England as an important factor in the development of suburbs in America. Thus he devotes much space to the "English precedents" which inspired such "American voices" of suburbanization as Catharine Beecher, Andrew Jackson Downing, and Calvert Vaux. In particular he cites England's "Evangelical domestic theology and the picturesque tradition of style." He also engages in extended discussions of such prototypical English suburbs as Clapham, Park Village, and Victoria Park.

Bourgeois Utopias offers insights into the middle class of several cities. It begins with the merchants of London, "the world city of the eighteenth century." Their "growing repulsion" toward their "city of commerce and small shops" helped drive them to its outskirts. Then there was Manchester, the classic industrial city with workers' housing surrouding an industrial core and the middle class in flight to rural land at its periphery. On the other hand, in France the bourgeoisie of Paris flocked to the centre of their city when it was reconstructed by Louis Napoleon and Baron Eugène-Georges Haussmann. They sought to occupy new, luxury apartment houses along broad boulevards created by cutting through existing streets and razing structures standing in the way. There the working class wound up in suburbs surrounding the bourgeoisie in the city. Following the English example, in America the middle class of industrial Philadelphia sought rural property. As rail transportation was convenient, suburbanites could commute to and from residences far from native workers and European immigrants. "Virtually unhampered by previous traditions and settlements," the middle class of Los Angeles, wedded to the automobile, a freeway system, and the single family house, created a "suburban metropolis." The "detached suburban house" became "the central element in the structure of the whole city."

Much narrower than Robert Fishman in his scope and more statistical in his approach, Dennis Gale addresses the complexities of race and demography in studying Washington, D.C. With a dozen maps and twenty-three tables to support a highly factual text, his book cannot be read quickly. Examined carefully it may be regarded as an important study of a significant city, and it may indeed be valuable for understanding and anticipating developments in comparable urban areas.

Washington, D.C. examines the capital of the United States in the aftermath of the urban riots of the 1960s, and finds it to be a changed place. Beyond the era of the Great Society's programs and caught in the current of private market forces in the 1970s, the city demonstrated considerable resiliency and experienced a revival. The decline of its mainly black inner core was reversed, and blacks made a significant move into its inner suburbs, though they could not change the character of the "largely white and middle-class outer suburban ring."

Gale's study is of blacks and whites often in motion and sometimes in dispute. Their moves frequently seemed to be according to age and class. For example, the revitalization of downtown Washington in the 1970s, which offered numerous "middle- and upper-class opportunities," was marked by the in-migration of relatively young and affluent whites who offset the out-migration of less affluent blacks. As Gale observes, class disparities "often take on racial dimensions."

Politics and public education were additional factors affecting migration and racial interaction. Conflicting attitudes in these areas generated division in both the city of Washington and its Virginia and Maryland suburban counties. The voter registration
drive conducted by the Reverend Jesse Jackson during his unsuccessful bid for the 1984 Democratic presidential nomination, by adding blacks to the election rolls, immediately afterward enhanced the black voice in suburban politics. Another effect of ethnic politics is the reflection of Washington’s black-majority population in the city’s governmental and political structure, a phenomenon akin to the Irish domination of urban political machines in the 19th-century. Regarding public education, middle-class blacks also followed patterns set by whites by leaving the city for better schools in suburbia. Though there are “disparate perceptions among white and black parents about educational needs” in the city, the result of great socioeconomic differences between the races, there was a great degree of agreement on public education issues among the more uniformly middle-class suburbanites in the increasingly black Prince George’s county, Maryland.

Fishman and Gale view the future of the city from different perspectives. Fishman sees the suburb as already becoming the technoburb, a decentralized city without boundaries. Inhabited by “multidirectional” commuters dependent on the automobile and communications technology, it “has become the true centre of American society,” he argues. This “new city” is part of a “techno-city,” a “whole metropolitan region that has been transformed” by its arrival. On the other hand, he admits that urban factory zones and workers “too poor to earn admission to the new city of prosperity at the periphery” will prevent present cities from disappearing “in the foreseeable future.” Yet it is clear from Gale’s study that the traditional city has far greater vitality than Fishman concedes, and that the process of suburbanization is continuing. Much of Washington’s improvement, Gale points out, was accomplished without governmental initiative or assistance, and many of the new suburbanites are middle-class blacks. Haussmann’s American heirs are revitalizing Washington and other cities while the American descendants of late 18th- and early 19th-century English merchants and manufacturers are dreaming of a “bourgeois utopia” in the countryside.

Robert D. Parmet
Department of History and Philosophy
York College
The City University of New York


The study of English Restoration politics has entered a new era, with a number of recent books and articles challenging old orthodoxies about the re-establishment of the monarchy, the church settlement of 1662, and the growth of organized political parties in the 1670s and 1680s. While historians have also become more aware of the importance of popular involvement in political crises, they have generally been reluctant to move beyond the records of the central government to document the reactions of ordinary citizens to the world around them. Tim Harris’s study of the politics of the crowd in Restoration England, therefore, is welcome. Basing his account on a wide variety of published and archival sources, and making good use of the rich collection of visual propaganda (pictures, woodcuts, playing cards, and public spectacles) generated by a succession of economic and political crises, he provides sound study of the ways in which common people reacted to politics, and how politicians in turn reacted to them.

Harris posits a number of these in his introduction, which he then defends through several chapters. The first, and easiest to argue because it fits in with the current nominalist mood of historiography, is that there was no such thing as the crowd in the 17th-century, only individual and occasional crowds. This is difficult to quarrel with, and Harris offers ample evidence to show that different crowds were motivated by different grievances. Harris’s second point is that anti-Catholicism has been overstated as a unifying political creed. Hatred of popery has generally been assumed to have provided a common ideology for the political orders, and to have furnished the restoration regime with the extended honeymoon it enjoyed till the late 1670s, despite occasional spats over bungled wars and the King’s periodic attempts to suspend the laws against Catholics and Dissenters. Harris argues, to the contrary, that “anticatholicism was not a consensual tradition but could equally well provide the justification for bitter division.” His analysis of several mob risings, such as the Bawdy House Riots of 1668 in which crowds attacked the London brothels, demonstrates that most Protestants could agree on disliking papists while disagreeing on much else. The same holds true for attitudes at the other end of the religious spectrum: distaste for dissent, whether of the moderate Presbyterians or of the various sects that had sprung up in the Civil War, was not the monopoly of the Tories, but could be shared equally by their Whig opponents, most of whom were particularly anxious not be thought subservive of the established religion.

So far, so good: Harris offers plenty of proof that fundamental divisions along religious lines existed as early as 1662. He also disproves that notion that London itself was predominantly a Whig town during the Popish Plot of 1678 and its aftermath, the Exclusion Crisis of 1679 to 1681; he adduces a great deal of evidence to show the existence of Tory crowds, which may have helped the Tories gain the upper hand in 1681 before the government put new restrictions on assembly, thereby squashing crowd activity for the balance of the reign. Harris is on thinner ice, however, when he attempts to argue that the activity of the crowd (he is reluctant to use the term “popular,” primarily