

## What's the English for *Approche floue*?

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La traduction, qu'est-ce à dire? Phénoménologies de la traduction

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[See table of contents](#)

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Article abstract

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# WHAT'S THE ENGLISH FOR APPROCHE FLOUE?

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## **Résumé**

*L'auteur commence par s'interroger sur les difficultés d'une définition de la traduction et sur les inévitables variations qu'entraîneront les différentes perspectives. Donnant l'exemple d'un travail traductif à partir de l'expression «approche floue», proposée par Alexis Nouss, elle conclut à la nécessité d'une orientation à la fois rigoureuse et ouverte. Elle donne à cet égard trois exemples de classification possible du champ théorique : Europe/Amérique (linguistique/sciences humaines), empirisme (scientifique)/pragmatisme (subjectif) et approche traductologique de l'extérieur/approche de l'intérieur. En guise d'application, elle s'attache enfin à l'étude d'un cas : la réception en anglais de Jean-Paul Sartre, à propos de la traduction de son *Idiot de la famille*. Elle montre ainsi le développement du courant qu'elle baptise néo-littéralisme, nourri de deux modes d'écriture qu'elle désigne comme existentialisme et déconstruction, offrant comme nouvelle norme de traduction l'authenticité.*

“Neither Out Far Nor in Deep.” Robert Frost’s title fits Translation Studies, nor is the rest of this poem too skewed for metaphoric purposes.<sup>1</sup> Translating *qua* translating requires an attitude of attention. Translating, intermittently tiresome and exhilarating, is a mental operation. The mentality is usually human. It invariably involves receiving a message in one language and sending it in a second language.<sup>2</sup> It is doubtful that we shall ever agree on any more detailed a definition, and it is equally doubtful that such a lack will harm translating.

Suppose we are engrossed in translating, text in language B on a reading stand, hands on a keyboard, with a text in language A beginning to show on the screen. Someone asks, “What are you doing?”

We answer, “translating.” Usually that is the end of the matter.

But suppose someone asks next, “What’s translating?”

Then we are confounded like the sea-gazers lost in the spaces of Frost’s poem. (L. 3: “They turn their back on the land./They look at the sea all day.”) We are safest if we venture neither out far nor in deep. (Ll. 13-14: “They cannot look out far./They cannot look in deep.”) A great deal of generalizing, conceptualizing, theorizing in Translation Studies is like that: safe forecasts of short distances and shallows. Going out further or looking deeper takes risks. Intellectual risk-taking is heroically mind-stretching, so long as it does not distract us unduly, in this instance, from the task of the translator.

We could turn around and look back (L. 9: “The land may vary more”). Philology serves a purpose. Yet since the source of translation is linked to the origin of language, the trail vanishes somewhere behind the archives of recorded history. The prehistory of language can only be conjectured. Some languages of wide dispersion like classical Greek and Latin, once extensively employed, are no longer used; we call them dead. Egyptian requires special scholars; Sanskrit likewise. The Minoan Greek of Linear B (1400 B.C.) was not unlocked until 1954.<sup>3</sup> No stele comparable to the Rosetta Stone has disclosed Etruscan. Even Biblical Hebrew and classical Arabic have restricted venues. In any event, philology and historical Linguistics and individual language histories, which

also embed heroic enterprises, have not yielded all the keys to the mysteries of language and translation.

So, more often, we turn our face toward the open horizon. The horizon of translation, like that of language, cannot be fixed, retreating apace with the speed of the pursuit. Since the horizon is, in a sense, a territory in the beyond, there is territorial behavior in its pursuit.

There is, as social scientists would say, a geopolitics at play here. How the strategies are conceived and implemented depends upon which translation component is foregrounded (*e.g.*, origin, essence, process, product). That foregrounding in turn is linked to which aspect of that component is foregrounded (*e.g.*, whether seeking the origin, analyzing the essence, inculcating the process, or determining the type of product, etc.). These hypothetical abstract transfers are conditioned by factors at the origin (*e.g.*, the motives within the patronage system, the psychohistory of the translator, the anticipated expectations of the audience). These transfers are especially vulnerable if the translator is translating *out of*, rather than *into*, his or her native language. Any set of conditions will be affected by the disciplinary context of the translating. For example, whether the goal is to be neutral, *i.e.*, scientific in the traditional sense, or true to taste, whether prevailing or idiosyncratic. Then, too, the conditions of inquiry will be affected by the disciplinary research methodology, *e.g.*, whether the goal is to observe parsimony, having as few and as inclusive categories as possible or to strive for completeness with exhaustive exceptions. There may be competing or overlapping dynamics, group loyalties, professional affiliations, disciplinary methodologies that privilege one strategy over another, influencing assessment and selection of data.

An epistemological hazard of looking into the horizon is that the object of our gaze is unstable (Ll. 5-6: "As long as it takes to pass/ A ship keeps raising its hull"). So is our gazing. Intensity brings distortion (L. 7: "The wetter ground like glass").

Alexis Nouss' introductory hope that Translation Studies can be multifaceted *sans [...] succomber à l'esthétique facile de l'objet fuyant qui exige une approche floue* is more polysemic than first appears. Is he issuing a warning? *I.e.*, he hopes the field won't come to that? or is he wistful, perhaps nostalgic? for some bygone era in the history of ideas when Western scholars were confident that the ultimate taxonomy would be revealed?<sup>24</sup> Perhaps translating into English will help. After all, don't many of us claim that to understand a text in our B (or C, or D, etc.) language we must be able to translate it into our A language? "Without... succumbing to a facile aesthetics of the fleeting object that requires... an *approche floue*." How can an *approche* be *floue*? When we put it into English, will we know what we have said? and once we know, should we forestall its actualization?

To resume translating, *approche* is not problematic. "Approach" should do, in the sense of "critical methodology." But *floue*? A false friend like "fluid" and all its related concepts like "fluid> flexible> flowing> moving> mobile" sounds rather reassuring (and fits perhaps too well with the conceit borrowed from Frost). A near-homonym like "frou" brings in an accretive sequence like "frou-frou> frivolous> trivializing." Etymology is futile: either as adjective ("yellow> faded> withered"), or as a verb stem ("to deceive".) The dictionary helps with "vague, blurred, unfocused, loose, fuzzy," the last-named, we presume like "fuzzy set" theory, again, not a bad model. Such an approach would be erratic, lackadaisical, fluctuating, fragmentary, unprincipled, unfocused, wavering.

Tentatively amalgamating these possibilities, aided by having read Nouss in both French and English, I wager that Nouss hopes we shall exercise some rigor despite a body of data both elusive and expansive. "Elusive" because outside the simplistic samples used by formal logicians who take up translation, we can hardly get beyond the

simple definition I used at the outside (*i.e.*, transferring a message from text B to form a message in text A) without having the material roll away in all directions like beads of mercury. "Expansive" because once we get outside the hypothetical sender and receiver, the ramifications are limitless. Again, "elusive" because within a single translator's head the process reaches a point where analysis and self-awareness cannot follow. "Expansive" because nearly every discipline (and consequently most of their subdisciplines) uses language and deals with information transfer among natural languages, and every discipline will define translating by its own needs and logic. Although most disciplines I know about have discrete methodologies, their translation premises can be further translated and collapsed into approaches that at worst are complements; at best, mutual overlays.

Most of us — and this is to the benefit of Translation Studies — continually scan the horizon for a definitive taxonomy, a taxonomy that will keep the horizon open while accommodating, chiefly by identifying, the changes occurring on it. Each taxonomy provides a map showing some sites we already know and some new sites we want to explore, to further our own quest. Consider the following three.

### THREE DICHOTOMIES

Albrecht Neubert and Gregory Shreve introducing volume 2 of their *Translation Studies* series, *Translating Slavery*, divide the field between the European and American traditions. As they see it, the European tradition, Linguistics-based, pursues Translation Studies as an empirical discipline. The American tradition, from their point of view, emerges from the Humanities and follows the methodology and pedagogy of whatever discipline has the particular scholar's first allegiance.<sup>5</sup> Obviously, where a scholar is educated is often quite influential. Just as obviously, scholars do not stay put. Information travels even faster, and ideas are shared. What seems to have nurtured this undeniable dichotomy is that educators on the continent and Russia, by geographic necessity compelled to train students to translate both *into* and *out of* their native language(s), are consequently compelled also to identify and codify transfer operations. Their empirical goal is both admirable and understandable. Nor is it surprising that Canadians with an official language policy must rely on comparable training and empirical procedures. Some kind of stability in usage is the goal. Jean Delisle in *Les alchimistes de la langue*, a history of professional translating in Canada,<sup>6</sup> concludes proudly that Quebec translators have preserved and purified French, purging it of Joul and protecting it from anglicisms. We could conclude that a geographic division like American and European tradition probably requires too many qualifications.

However, geography like politics does affect needs. In the United States translators generally translate *into* their native language (usually English or Spanish),<sup>7</sup> and everything legal must eventually be translated into English. Except for the formulary, students are usually taught to translate only *into* their native language. This means that emphasis is placed on developing a sense of usage (*i.e.*, what sounds right). American students who come into translator training from a foreign language major are encouraged to take courses in English or about English-language literature so that they will internalize past and present norms of usage. (American students who come from English majors, on the other hand, have source language courses and immersion prescribed.) Translation practice thus stems from general practice. Whether cause or effect, theory and concept concentrate on change and cultural differences.

Accordingly, it might be argued, a preferable division could be made between the Empiricists and the Pragmatists.<sup>8</sup> The Empiricists, either European-trained or based in Linguistics, have a traditional view of science as objective and replicable. They proceed

to codify and to set up tests for completeness of information transfer. The Pragmatists, however they got that way (e.g., through personal experience or systematic *Kritik*), utilize the subjective in some way either while translating or thinking about it. They include a very broad spectrum of scholars from the learned yet intuitive like Gregory Rabassa and Eric MacMillan to lifelong students of theory like Willis Barnstone and Eugene Nida, not to omit the sympathetic yet neutral Sián Reynolds and the openly partisan Barbara Goddard and Lawrence Venuti. But Pragmatists so defined would be too inclusive, I suggest, to be meaningful. Because of the inevitable confusion with Pragmatism, such a grouping would be misleading as well. Anyone knowing something about Pragmatism could reasonably expect translators so labeled to be concerned with results, i.e., what the receivers did as a result of the message. On balance, it would seem that a division like Empiricists and Pragmatists would blur (*flouer?*) the contours of the field.

Truer contours might, paradoxically, be found in a broader division: object-oriented and subject-oriented Translation Studies. Object-oriented Translation Studies not only consider the text an object, but treat it that way as well. Its scholars, coming from such fields as Linguistics, Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, and, occasionally the national languages, adapt many of the methods of the physical sciences, e.g., analysis, description, usage quantification. One has the impression that they are comfortable studying a text from the outside. (They may be intimate with algorithms, but, otherwise, they appear to be neither in deep nor out far.) These days they generally are computer experts, and personally very helpful. Even the most intuitive self-taught translator can profit from their on-line dictionaries, indexing, and the like that keep terms consistent. It is not only sci-tech that must be consistent within the text and among texts in the same field, but scholarly and literary texts as well.<sup>9</sup> Object-oriented scholars are organized, usually electronically. It is they who have developed Terminology as a discipline. Stability in usage, replicability, and, frequently, speed are their values.

Still, given the lurking ideologies, covert agendas, and overt political possibilities at play, subject-oriented Translation Studies has many proponents, although they are not so labeled. Its scholars come from the Humanities, especially Comparative Literature, Creative Writing, Continental Philosophy, and the Social Sciences which also allow for *Kritik* like Anthropology, History, Political Science, Sociology. Scholars in these disciplines identify with their objects and hence, when engaging in Translation Studies these scholars try get inside the text and generalize from that inner experience (rather than from the external descriptions, as is the case with the object-oriented scholars). Since they are dubious about objectivity anyway, they are free to engage in speculative thinking, even to consider idealisms. They are found among the Postmodernists and invariably cite Walter Benjamin.<sup>10</sup> They are both sensitive and receptive to change in lexicon and syntax.

Any of these divisions — and these three by no means exhaust the potential — clarify the mists on the horizon somewhat. Each division highlights similarities within a group and different contours between groups. All have the same aim: bringing a persuasive, self-perpetuating order to a horizon of dizzying perceptual depth and numbing distances.

Will any help me choose some appropriate English for *approche floue*? No, but adherents of each can tell me if my find fits. All will apply the concept of “norms,” popularized by the Polysystem. Some will do so deliberately; others, instinctively. *Sans [...] succomber à l'esthétique facile de l'objet fuyant qui exige une approche floue*. “Without giving in to an indiscriminate aesthetics based on a vanishing subject which responds only to an indiscriminate approach.”

In any event, without forewarning, readers of translations will rarely be able to identify a translator's disciplinary allegiance, let alone any Translation Studies prefer-

ences. Readers may, however, be able to tell whether the translator worked in the United Kingdom or the U.S.A. — and, sometimes, how long ago.

#### SARTRE AND FLAUBERT. (BARNES AND) COSMAN

Consider the case of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), on the brink of resuscitation because Carol Cosman completed her masterly translation of *The Family Idiot* (1985-1994; *L'idiot de la famille*, 1972-1975). Nor is it a disadvantage that publication of the final volume has coincided with a revisionism in Flaubert scholarship and reinforced it.<sup>11</sup>

The reception of this translation was helped also by U.S. readers, especially those who read books from university presses, having become accustomed to Postmodern discourse. When Hazel E. Barnes brought out her translation *Being and Nothingness* (*L'être et le néant*, 1943) came out in 1956, readers complained about neologisms and complex syntax. Twenty years later (1976) Gayatri Spivack's *Grammatology*, translating Jacques Derrida's (*De la grammatologie*, 1967) was faulted for its idiosyncratic style and orthography.<sup>12</sup> But by 1994, readers' expectations had modified. In hindsight we can assert that the translators of these breviaries of the Postmodern movements of Existentialism and Deconstruction were taking risks in the cause of authenticity. Making the text flow would have run the greater risk of trivializing.<sup>13</sup>

Indeed, now it would seem that for at least a quarter century — if not a half century — an influential corpus of French *belles-lettres* in translation has privileged the source texts. Sometimes these translations even sound like French written with English words. A norm I shall call authenticity has replaced that of fluency. By "authenticity" I mean a select few markers that show readers the text did not originate in English. But there is no formula. Authenticity is sensed when it is absent. *I.e.*, if a translation of Sartre — or Derrida — makes him sound like a native English speaker, we should suspect that the translator rewrote it. The best result is neo-literalism.

Let me make it clear that I am speaking of Existentialism chiefly as a world view that generated *belles-lettres* and of Deconstruction of a mode of criticism developed for interpreting *belles-lettres*. Both use hermeneutics (in the sense of moving in and out of the text from the reader's own time frame) at the expense of exegesis (in the sense of trying to recreate the author's time frame). Existentialism borrowed from traditional biographical and socio-historical criticism. Deconstruction can sound like *explication des textes*. Both mine Freud and Freudianism. The popular energy of Existentialism, we might say, was nearly spent by 1964 when Jean-Paul Sartre refused the Nobel Prize for Literature.<sup>14</sup> But by that time exemplars of Deconstruction were just finishing graduate studies. There is no consensus on when it began, but Michel Foucault's *Les mots et les choses* (1966)<sup>15</sup> or Jacques Derrida's *L'écriture et la différence* (1967)<sup>16</sup> are convenient markers.

In retrospect we can see that for these texts from Sartre to Derrida, translators have almost intuitively employed a neo-literal strategy. Such a strategy has resulted in translations which may jar conservative criteria for native English.

Further, the translators' neo-literalism with both generations points up the similarities and continuities between them. Lexically and syntactically, there is rhetorical common ground.

This common ground began to emerge on my horizon when I was examining the fifth and final volume of Carol Cosman's epochal *The Family Idiot* (1985-1994), her translation of Sartre's Flaubert study *L'idiot de la famille* (1972-1975). Because her translation sounds Deconstructionist, I first surmised that she must have used, perhaps somewhat inadvertently, the idiom of Deconstruction, because that is what she would have

read and heard in other contexts from 1978 onwards.<sup>17</sup> But when I compared her first four volumes against Sartre's complete study (The University of Chicago divided Sartre's three volumes into five), I found her translation carefully neo-literal throughout. Her translation corrected my psychologically skewed chronology. I considered Existentialism old-fashioned and Deconstruction just slightly *passé*, when in fact the generations overlapped. Deconstruction had been newsworthy in France for at least six years before Sartre published his first two volumes. He was using much the same lexicon and syntax he had always used. So were the Deconstructionists.

In short to make Sartre sound up-to-date, Cosman had "merely" to let his voice echo through. Yet we shall see that "merely" here covers an inspired grappling with a text that becomes increasingly verbose as its author succumbs to multiple infirmities. Sartre's voice speaks through four intersecting personae, and Cosman lets all variations echo through.<sup>18</sup>

Four examples will demonstrate.

Barnes, whose *Flaubert and Sartre* (University of Chicago, 1981) told U.S. readers what was in *L'idiot de la famille* before a translation was available, speculated that it might be a "novel."<sup>19</sup> In many ways it is. While continually reexamining its own facts like an extended *nouveau roman*, it proceeds also like an extended piece of genetic criticism and a detailed history of French literature from 1848 to 1880.

This means that Sartre speaks as himself but role-plays. (This is consistent with his contention that we play different roles.<sup>20</sup>) Cosman not only had to maintain a consistent voice, but let that voice be recognizable while acting the part of a nearly neutral novelist, a speculative psychologist, an opinionated cultural historian, and an impatient moralist. Cosman has succeeded to such an astonishing degree that a reader cannot justify any improvement.

We hear the neutral novelist when Sartre narrates a key episode in Flaubert's life, e.g., his first epileptic attack in January 1844. Sartre as third-person narrator is rendered perfectly.

One evening in January 1844, Achille and Gustave were returning from Deauville, where they had been to see the site of the new country house. It was pitch dark. Gustave was driving the cabriolet himself. Suddenly, in the vicinity of Pont-l'Évêque, as a wagon passed to the right of the carriage, Gustave dropped the reins and fell at his brother's feet as if struck by lightning. (IV, 3)<sup>21</sup>

We hear the speculative psychologist when he predictably moves into opinionated conjecture. Sartre reexamines evidence where it suits his thesis; dismisses it where it doesn't.

If the two doctors had allowed him to depart after the attack, Gustave's resentment would have prompted him to point out this huge professional error to Maxime, who would have taken pleasure in reporting it to us: du Camp's testimony, in fact, aims at denigrating Achille-Cléophas by presenting him as a disciple of Boussais, "who doesn't know how to do anything but bleed people." (IV, 6)<sup>22</sup>

As a cultural historian Sartre is opinionated also. When he reviews French literary history, he drops names only a *dix-neuviémiste* will recognize. He especially dislikes Flaubert's friend Maxime du Camp. Cosman reproduces Sartre's control of the subject.

As for Maxime, he is out of the game, swallowed up along with his ideas. He is still, however, of some interest: he *alone* posed the question of damages. And on what does he base his daring assertion that Gustave, without his "epilepsy," might have written better? On a critical appraisal of the novels? No, on the man's behavior.<sup>23</sup>

Of course, there is a substantial interliminal text, a kind of Lyotard *différend*, between Sartre's French and her English, that makes stereoscopic reading a rewarding exercise.<sup>24</sup> What cannot be replicated is Sartre's exploitation of grammatical gender. *E.g.*, when Sartre turns his wrathful gaze upon the cab scene in *Madame Bovary*, Part III, chapter I, he uses masculine and feminine nouns for the "same" object, like "le fiacre," "la voiture," and "la machine." Sartre intersperses his litany of indignation (dehumanization of the characters, abuse of the cab driver and his horse, and misuse of the cab itself as an instrument) with some of his most lyrical definitions of the act of love.)

What trick has he played on them, the wretch? Well, he has taken a man and a woman hot with desire, wholly alive, convinced of giving themselves freely to one another, and he has metamorphosed this entwined couple into a mere carriage. The transition is worked by means of an adroitly chosen commonplace: "The lumbering machine set off on its way." (III, 170)<sup>25</sup>

This type of "loss," is, more accurately, an example of the unavoidable obscuring of implicit meaning, imposed by the lexical mismatch of the two languages. Cosman compensates by making new the overall matrix of the text. In English Sartre sounds Foucauldian. Like Barnes nearly a half-century earlier (48 years between the dates of publication, to be exact) she presents Sartre in his integrity. *I.e.*, not French in English words, in my opinion, but what he would have written if he had known English quite well but was set on saying things his own way.

And on the matter of integrity, we must commend Cosman's patience. Sartre was struck with blindness from 1973 until his death in 1981. There was no question of revising, rewriting, tightening up, even if he had been so inclined.<sup>26</sup> Cosman kept herself at the task, so that we have an integral work. It is she who is responsible for this major contribution to the canon of Flaubert scholarship. If Sartre enjoys another period of glory as a genetic critic, it will be due to her transfer of the integral Sartre into English. Barnes gave him his first period of glory as a philosopher for the English-reading public. (French readers may have read Sartre chronologically, but in the English-reading world his philosophy gave him entry into dramatic repertory, and his theater led readers to his fiction.)

As translator exemplars Cosman had Barnes, and we have both. Both stared into the interliminal vastness between the Sartre text in French and the English text each had to produce. Neither flinched. Pursuing the mysteries of translation is rewarding in itself, no matter where or if dividing lines are drawn. No such pursuit will necessarily result in finer translations (since whatever that may be depends on factors outside the Academy's direct control). At public fora in 1993 Nouss pondered, "We want to encourage our students' creativity and, at the same time, teach them the rules of acceptability," and found a resolution in community;<sup>27</sup> while Anthony Pym lamented that translator training should turn out "real thinkers."<sup>28</sup> It comes down to the qualities of mind engaged in receiving a message in one language and sending it in another. No one can really prescribe the infallibly correct English choice for *approche floue*. That will always be out too far.

#### Notes

1. From *A Further Range* (1936) in *Collected Poems*, Garden City, New Jersey, Halcyon House, 1942: 394.
2. For a summary of translators' description of their own transferring, see my "Seeking Synapses: Translators Describe Translating," *Translation: Theory and Practice. Tension and Interdependence*, Ed. Mildred L. Larson, ATA Series 5, Binghamton University, 1991: 5-12. Respondents were participants at conferences in Montreal, Washington D.C., and Iowa City in October and November 1989. These intuitions are validated systematically and with sound statistics by Wolfgang Lörcher in *Translation Performance, Translation Process, and Translation Strategies*, Tübingen, Gunter Narr, 1986.
3. Alston Hurd Chase and Henry Phillips Jr., *A New Introduction to Greek*, Cambridge, Harvard, 3rd ed., 1961: xvi.



4. Postmodernists tend to return to the Enlightenment. It is presumably a comfort just to immerse oneself in intellectual optimism, if only to criticize it. In the early decades of our century, quintessentially Modernist Yeats extolled Byzantium of the fifth and sixth century A.D. Emily Dickinson's nostalgic comparison can be applied to a prior time of one's choice: "Those who died then/Knew where they went."
5. The paraphrase is mine. See "A House of Many Rooms: the Range of Translation Studies," *Translating Slavery: Gender & Race in French Women's Writing, 1783-1823*, Eds. Doris Y. Kadish & Françoise Massardier-Kenney, Kent State, 1994: vii-xiv.
6. Les Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1990: 412-414.
7. Binghamton, although a small upstate New York city, is a refugee and immigrant resettlement center. This means that the Binghamton University Translation Referral Service must serve speakers in more than 30 languages, including many varieties of Spanish, several languages of the former Soviet Union, and major East Asian languages. Still, the working goal is English.
8. Suggested by Lauren Leighton, University of Illinois-Chicago, in a personal communication, November 30, 1994.
9. An example from a current Binghamton project: in an essay collection on 19th century French literature: once there is an editorial decision to leave *féerie* in French, "theatrical extravaganzas" or "fantasy spectacles" should return to *féerie*.
10. Even though the Polysystem has a Comparatist connection (e.g., Itamar Even-Zohar, Gideon Toury, José Lambert), it is built on text description. If the text has an emotional charge, this should be verified by "inter-subjective" testing. It is an outside approach, for which the text is an object. In the mid 80s, I divided the field between the polysystematizers and the Benjamin mythicists: "Humanistic Translation Theory," *Building Bridges*, Ed. Karl Kummer, New Medford, N.J., Learned Information Systems, 1986: 33-49.
11. University of Chicago, 1985-1994. *L'idiot de la famille*, Paris, Gallimard, 1972-1975). This revisionism, initiated, at least in part, by a recovery of his maligned, sometime mistress Louise Colet, combines with Cosman's Sartre opus to reinforce a characterization of Flaubert as a bragging blackguard where women were concerned but an astute reporter of their social interactions. (Was this revisionism predictable? It is a result of the Feminist recovery of women writers that started in the late 70s and early 80s. These recovery efforts are results of the new Feminism in the Academy. In short, the revisionism that coincided with this translation was simply a part of a periodic cultural pendulum swing. In *Being and Nothingness*, (New York, Philosophical Library, 1956), there is more than a hint that Sartre's has a love/hate relation to Flaubert. He wants to understand what makes Flaubert a great writer, but he comes close to proposing that Flaubert's character flaws — and his guaranteed income -- were enabling. "If we were to consider him/Flaubert/as such, it would be necessary to choose: either *Flaubert*, the man, whom we can love or detest, blame or praise, who represents for us the *Other*... or he would be reduced to the simple bundle of these irreducible drives or tendencies. In either case the *man* disappears..." (p. 561).
12. *L'Être et le néant* (Paris, Gallimard). Baltimore, Johns Hopkins; Paris, Éditions de Minuit.
13. Indeed, when some translations of these two generations have made too many concessions to standard English rhetoric, retranslating has become the order of the day. A well-known example would be Matthew Ward's 1988 retranslation of Albert Camus's *L'étranger* (1942) which reads a little too well in Stuart Gilbert's 1946 translation (both from Knopf, New York). See my "Crossroads or Spectrum: Translators' Range of Relations to a Text," *Languages at Crossroads*, Ed. Deanna Hammond (Medford, N.J., Learned Information, 1988: 297-303). Other examples would be Ralph Manheim's improved Heidegger (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Doubleday Anchor, 1961; *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1953) which William J. Richardson partially restored in Thomas Sheenan's *Heidegger the Man and the Thinker* (Chicago, Precedent Publishing, 1981). Gustave Kahn's French translation is still standard.
14. T.S. Eliot's Nobel Prize, 1948, is a convenient date for marking the high recognition and subsequent decline of Modernism.
15. Paris: Gallimard; trans. A. Sheridan Smith, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, New York, Random House, 1972.
16. *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (University of Chicago, 1977). This is an example of the chronological slips in translation. Bass' translation did not have nearly the impact of Gayatri Spivack's *Grammatology*.
17. I am indebted to Carol Cosman for her candid and timely responses to my queries. Her generosity is as exemplary as her translation.
18. The case could be made more conclusive if I brought in brief samples from Foucault and Sheridan Smith, Emmanuel Lévinas and Alphonso Lingis, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Thomas Tresize.
19. John Weightman, reviewing only the French vols. 1 and 2, for the *New York Review of Books* (April 6, 1972), termed it a "kind of delirious philosophical novel."
20. "Let us consider this waiter in the café [...] All his behavior seems a game [...] We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café" (Barnes: 59)./Considérons ce garçon de café [...] Toute sa conduite nous semble un jeu [...] Il ne faut pas l'observer longtemps pour s'en rendre compte : il joue à être garçon de café."

21. Un soir de janvier 44, Achille et Gustave reviennent de Deauville où ils ont été voir le chalet. Il fait noir comme dans un four, Gustave conduit lui-même le cabriolet. Tout à coup, aux environs de Pont-l'Évêque, comme un roulier passe à droite de la voiture, Gustave lâche les rênes et tombe aux pieds de son frère, foudroyé. (II, 1781)
22. Si les deux médecins l'avaient laissé repartir après l'attaque, Gustave n'aurait pas manqué, par ressentiment, de signaler cette énorme bévue à Maxime qui se serait fait un plaisir de nous la rapporter : le témoignage de Du Camp, en effet, vise à déconsidérer Achille-Cléophas en le présentant comme un disciple de Boussais «qui ne sait rien faire d'autre que saigner.» (II, 1784)
23. Maxime, lui, est hors jeu. Englouti, avec ses idées dont nul n'a cure. Pourtant il n'est pas sans intérêt de revenir à lui : il a *seul* posé la question des dégâts. Or, sur quoi s'appuie-t-il pour oser dire que Gustave, sans l'«épilepsie» eût pu mieux écrire ? Sur une appréciation critique des romans ? Non : sur les comportements de l'homme. (15)
24. Term coined by JoAnne Englebert at the 1987 meeting of the American Translators Association Meeting in Albuquerque, N.M.
25. Quel tour leur a-t-il joué, le misérable ? Et bien il a pris un homme et une femme tout chauds de désir, tout vivants, convaincus de se donner librement l'un à l'autre et il a métamorphosé ce couple enlacé en un seul fiacre. La transition s'opère au moyen d'un lieu commun adroitement choisi : «La lourde machine se mit en route.» (II, 1283)
26. Marc Lebiez, reviewing Alain Renaut's *Sartre, le dernier philosophe* in *La quinzaine littéraire* (November 30, 1993), calls Sartre a "graphomane." Much of his exposition is redundant, bombarding the readers with slightly different phrasings of points already made. (Barnes called the style "self-indulgent.")
27. "Translation and Two Models of Interpretation," *Teaching Translation and Interpretation*, 2, Eds. Cay Dollerup and Annette Lindegaard, Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 1994: 150-163.
28. "On Market as a Factor in Training Translators," *Koine*, 3 (1993): 119.