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Wisner, Catherine. *Sweethearts: The Builders, The Mob, and the Men*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1980. Pp. 222. Illustrations. \$16.95 (cloth), \$7.95 (paper)

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[See table of contents](#)

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blocks in the centre of Montreal. Another potential contradiction is posed by his political role as a 'national' leader and representative of a working-class constituency and his material condition as a prominent bourgeois who possessed a valet, a coat of arms, and a country estate." A study of his life certainly does give insights into his class, but why should "rootlessness" be deduced from changes in residence and a failed marriage? What is incongruous about a "'national' leader and representative of a working-class constituency" who aspired to the upper classes? It happened all the time in the nineteenth century as it does today.

A few minor and surprising errors flaw the text. After 1849 the assembly of the Province of Canada did not rotate "every two years between Quebec City and Toronto." Young notes that at confederation "most provinces opted for unicameral systems." Actually, bicameral systems were initially established in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick as well as in Quebec. This pattern was subsequently followed in Manitoba and Prince Edward Island.

Quibbles of fact and interpretation aside, this book is a major contribution to our knowledge of the life and influence of George-Etienne Cartier. It should be read and used by those students and scholars interested in nineteenth century Canadian public policy and social history.

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Wisner, Catherine. *Sweethearts: The Builders, The Mob, and the Men*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1980. Pp. 222. Illustrations. \$16.95 (cloth), \$7.95 (paper).

Author Catherine Wisner through structuring her book *Sweethearts*, along the lines of its subtitle, *The Builders, The Mob and the Men*, tells a colourful tale of high level intrigue that intelligibly renders a byzantine plot in such a breath-taking way it would make many accomplished novelists envious. However, this format has limitations when applied to a task worthy of Sherlock Holmes. This mission is to firmly establish the often rumoured stories of the involvement of organized crime in the property industry of Metropolitan Toronto. While Wisner's trinity of developers, exploited workers and mobsters is a brilliant device in which to organize the book, too many anecdotes of questionable relevance take the place of the less glamorous, but often well documented, connections between the upfront world of "legitimate business" and the underworld of organized crime.

The first error that Wisner makes on the side of drama over substance occurs in her focus on the "handful of men who went to school together in the 1930s" at Toronto's Har-

bord Street Collegiate. This focus degrades the important subject of the book to the level of an old boys' network; a sort of poor man's Upper Canada College. The net is both too wide and too narrow for the task. Louis Rasminsky, Eddie Goodman, Phil Givens, Philip Roth and Herb Stricker are all tarred by the brush of having gone to Harbord and having an influence on the land development process. Although clever, this stroke is too sweeping to be convincing and leaves out important figures like the Tannenbaum and DelZotto families who, while relatively neglected in Wisner's book, were a focus of attention in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Certain Sectors of the Building Industry* written by Justice Harry Waisberg in 1974.¹

Although Catherine Wisner devotes considerable space to matters of peripheral concern such as union organizer Bruno Zanini's formative influences, remarkably little attention is devoted to the findings of the Waisberg inquiry and to the controversies which finally produced it after years of debate. Her description of Bruno Zanini's heroic struggles for the rights of ruthlessly ravaged Italian-immigrant workers makes exciting reading and is a worthy contribution to a neglected and unflattering aspect of Canadian history. However, so strongly does the portrait of the brave Zanini battling against corrupt contractors and international union officials run through her narrative, that Wisner tends to down play the significance of the role played by Morton Shulman. Shulman is castigated for ineptly denouncing Zanini for working to establish a Sweetheart union, a year after Shulman himself quit such efforts and was on the verge of creating an independent, Canadian concrete formers' union. While the most insightful and determined writers would have difficulty dealing with this Kafkaesque tale, Wisner's failure to examine the validity of Shulman's other allegations, especially those that were later substantiated by Justice Waisberg's conclusions, reduces considerably the value of her book.

While Wisner gives full play to Shulman's apparently bungled accusations of 28 October 1970, his more significant speech of 5 December 1972, leading to the formation of the Royal Commission which Zanini himself had been demanding for years, only received mention in her bibliography. In this speech, Shulman alleged that the illegal activities of contractors to obtain monopoly price fixing and fraudulent unions were accomplished through ties to organized crime and the provincial government. In detailing these sensational charges, Shulman focused on the bombing of the office of Acme Lathing. He asserted that these attacks were the work of Acme's competitors in the lathing business: Northtown Drywall, owned and controlled by the Cesaroni brothers, and C. Romanelli Lathing. Shulman added that the Vice-President of Romanelli Lathing was Elvio DelZotto (a former Liberal party provincial election candidate) and stressed, "Elvio DelZotto controls C. Romanelli — and Romanelli is responsible for the bombings." Furthermore Shulman stressed that Elvio DelZotto was "named periph-

erally" in an OPP report "as the representative of the contractors who went to meet the various people from the Mafia." In addition, Shulman claimed that the Continental, Guardian, Royal Exchange and Aetna insurance corporations had all co-operated "beautifully with the Mafia" by removing coverage from Acme Lathing after the bombing. Their protection was only restored after Shulman indicated he would expose the removal of coverage in the House. Far more sensational than these allegations was Shulman's description of a Cesaroni brothers organized Conservative party fund raising event attended, he claimed, by Attorney-General Dalton Bales, on the basis of evidence provided by private investigator Max Chikofsky.²

Shulman's charges against Bales were dropped after Chikofsky himself denied any knowledge of the fund raising affair. (Bales later resigned from the Cabinet over a conflict-of-interest controversy involving land speculation). However the sensation created by other charges resulted in the formation of the Waisberg inquiry into construction industry violence, which was formed on 20 March 1973, approximately four months after Shulman's dramatic accusations. On the basis of possible connections between violent Toronto and Ottawa incidents, and at the urging of Liberal MPP Albert Roy, the framework of the commission's investigation was extended to the Ottawa area.

In her account Wismer fails to examine the one significant piece of media response to Shulman's allegations; a "puff-piece" on Elvio DelZotto placed in a copyright story on the front page of the *Globe & Mail* stressing his heroic "fight for his reputation." The article, written by then *Globe* reporter Gerald McAuliffe (described as a crusading investigative reporter by Bill Freeman and Marsha Hewitt in *Their Town*) praised Elvio DelZotto as a "financial" and "physical giant."³ This media attack on Shulman's allegations makes the Royal Commission's unflattering family portrait of the DelZottos all the more significant; however, Wismer funnels her findings on the Waisberg report into six pages of her 196 page book. In this abbreviated account, full attention is given to the Commission's partial vindication of Zanini, but its focus on the activities of the DelZotto brothers and Cesido Romanelli, while acknowledged, is downplayed and disparaged. Typical of this treatment is Wismer's handling of what Justice Waisberg described as a "fateful meeting" in the spring of 1971 at the Mona Lisa restaurant between Angelo DelZotto and C. Romanelli. Waisberg concluded that as a result of this contact "a sinister array of characters" was introduced into the construction industry. While Wismer notes denials from C. Romanelli and the DelZottos that this meeting ever took place, she neglects to mention the Commission's conclusion that their testimony in this regard appeared "contrived." Waisberg even asked in the text of his report, "Why did Romanelli and DelZotto deny this meeting which quite obviously did take place?" Waisberg extended the significance in light of the denial to the hiring of Natale Luppino whom Elvio DelZotto

claimed he had not known was employed by his business associate Romanelli until "just before the hearing" at the time of his "interrogation by the *Globe & Mail*." According to the Commission's report Luppino "was hired at \$150 per week and expenses and supplied with a company car"; his "only duty . . . was to escort Romanelli" and serve as his "constant companion." Waisberg noted how this hiring took place despite the fact that Luppino had "no previous experience in the construction industry," but had been convicted of fraud, "assault occasioning actual bodily harm" and "possession of an offensive weapon." Another Romanelli escort Paul Volpe, godfather of Natale Luppino's son, according to the testimony of R.C.M.P. Superintendent Routledge, was among the leaders of the Canadian branch of "The Magaddino Empire of Organized Crime" which has as its "specialities . . . narcotics, extortion and gambling."⁴

As well as neglecting this tale of horror, Wismer ignores Waisberg's careful description of the remarkable absence of memory displayed by corporation executives. After attacks on his premises, Naftali Kanner, President of Acme Lathing, contacted Max Tannenbaum, partner with the DelZottos in the Deltan corporation. Kanner felt that Tannenbaum "could be of some assistance in ascertaining the source of violence," since, he was aware of Tannenbaum's partnership "in certain ventures with the DelZottos" and was "given to understand that the DelZottos were partners with Romanelli or his company." Although his first call was unreturned, Kanner again phoned Tannenbaum after the September 1972 bombings of Acme's offices; Tannenbaum replied that he was unaware of any partnership and consequently, according to Waisberg, could be "of no assistance to Kanner." Tannenbaum testified that he asked Angelo DelZotto about the alleged partnership and was told that he did not know if his family had any shares in this company since, "Elvio would be the chap that would know that," and "he was away at the time." To which Waisberg comments "I find it strange that these people who have large business interests in common adopt an attitude of knowing so little. It is just not creditable that Angelo DelZotto would not know they had a 30 per cent interest in Romanelli's company. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that they knew a great deal more than they were prepared to tell."⁵ Wismer also ignores an incident, which the first CBC Connections series on organized crime cited as evidence of how an honest person can indeed fight organized crime and win. This occurred in 1971 in Ottawa when DelZotto Enterprises was involved in the construction of apartment buildings for the Ontario Housing Corporation and, as usual, Romanelli did the related lathing and drywall contracts. On this occasion, Romanelli attempted to impose piecework on Local 124 of the Lathers and Plasterers Union by intimidating the local's business agent Jean Guy Dennis. Natale Luppino threatened Dennis: he "might never make it home tonight" if he did not consider Romanelli's proposals, while Romanelli himself offered the carrot approach of having another of his "escorts," one Joseph Zappia, "physically take care of dissident union members."

Both approaches failed even when Dennis' car was damaged, his aged mother threatened with death and his son struck unconscious on the floor of his home.⁶ Despite Waisberg's careful documentation of these and other illegal activities, Wismer concluded that his report "offered no conclusive findings" and "provided little hard information on the role of criminal elements" in the construction industry.⁷

Given the "cloak and dagger" nature of the subject, Shulman and Waisberg's conclusions on the source of construction industry violence are not the last word. However, Wismer's suggestions of other explanations lack force as a result of her neglect of critical details; the worst being a failure to mention the names of Natale Luppino and Joseph Zappia although the men are anonymously depicted as "the two men hired by Romanelli while trying to expand his operation."⁸ The most glaring weakness of the Commission's work was its failure to use its authority to subject the minute books and records of business corporations, as rigorously to examination as the documents of trade unions. While Waisberg examined the most sensitive and exact records of the unions under investigation for possible criminal activity, the Commission's investigation of similarly suspected business enterprises was restricted to papers listing corporate charters, by-laws and names of directors on file at the Companies Division of the Department of Consumer and Commercial Relations, which can be obtained by any citizen upon the payment of a small fee.⁹ Such class coloured workings of legal process also emerged in the only prosecution related to the inquiry, which involved the conviction of a former Ontario Housing official convicted of accepting "a benefit of more than \$500 from Angelo DelZotto." Similar action was not taken against the payer of the bribe.¹⁰ Innumerable other examples of the distortion of the judicial process by the inequalities of wealth and power in Canadian society could be cited; however, the most disturbing is the loss of corporate records vital to investigations of "white collar crime," although far thicker and illegally gathered files on political dissidents continue to mount. Some 4,118 corporate files vanished in a mysterious fire, while an estimated 100,000 corporate files have been destroyed since 1976, on the grounds of economy, permitted since December 1976 as a result of changes passed that month to the Corporations Information Act. The impact of this action upon future revisions to Wismer's account may be seen in the case of Pullman Holdings, whose records from 1954 to 1971 were among those extinguished in the name of economy. One of the few clear links that Wismer established between organized crime and land development was that of one John Pullman, a "courier in washing syndicate funds" and a key financier of Principal Investments, the leading land development corporation in Canada during the 1950s. Surviving records of Pullman Holdings show that John Pullman had a substantial interest in this firm, but the names of his associates in the period when Wismer postulates he played a crucial role in urban development, may now remain a mystery due to ministerial directives to destroy documents.¹¹

In fairness to Wismer, the flaws in her book are more a reflection on the sorry state of the Canadian journalistic and academic communities than on the quality of her writing. What is most surprising is that this is the first book on the subject; many of its omissions would never have occurred if it had not rested in such isolation. This is unfortunate as bizarre tales of financial manipulation and intrigue are not peripheral but near the heart of the Canadian real estate industry. Deltan itself was sold by the Tannenbaum and DelZotto families on 23 November 1973 (at the height of the testimony taken by the Waisberg inquiry) to the mysterious R.J. Prusac, identified by Peter C. Newman as an "important funnel for foreign funds into Canadian real estate through his Deltan Corporation"¹² and characterized by Toronto *Globe & Mail* business reporter Jack Willoughby as the "Howard Hughes of Canadian Real Estate."¹³ As Willoughby notes Prusac's meteoric rise "to power in the real estate industry" has "been a favourite topic for industry speculation" and can be traced to 1964 when he acquired W.B. Sullivan Construction, after it had gone into bankruptcy. According to the consulting firm of Medhurst, Hogg and Associates, two "noteworthy examples" of Sullivan's work are the subdivision at York Mills and Leslie Street and the Fairdale development at Woodbine Avenue, both in Metropolitan Toronto. In these two projects alone, Sullivan "was charged with over 70 building infractions and was convicted of faulty construction in some of the homes," ranging from leaking roofs and basements to poorly constructed roads.¹⁴ Prusac's business surged ahead in the early 1970s through the rapid acquisition of Y. & R. Investments, Imperial General Properties, Deltan and the Kashel and Morenish land development corporations. According to David Burstow, self-described as a "key official in Mr. Prusac's real estate operations" this amounted to assets "worth \$400 million to \$500 million," making it the third largest Canadian real estate empire — behind only the Trizec Corporation and Cadillac Fairview.¹⁵ After Prusac failed in his battle with Conrad Black for control of the Argus Corporation, he rapidly sold off most of these firms. Deltan was absorbed into the York-Hanover Corporation, presided over by one Karsten von Wersebe, who, as Henry Aubin notes in *City for Sale*, is also President of the secretive German controlled Polaris Realty (Western) Ltd., which manages \$200 million realty assets across Canada, but refuses to identify the location of any of these properties.¹⁶

Wismer's book falters because of its unfortunate attention to outward appearances, its avoidance of controversy while appearing to seek it, and a failure to examine the underlying societal values and economic interests at play.

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Many thanks to Ann Mason Apps, former editor of *Nexus*, a magazine of land, corporate, and community affairs, for her kind assistance in the writing of this review.

NOTES

- 1 Catherine Wismer, *Sweethearts* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1980), 6-8; Justice Harry Waisberg, *The Report of the Royal Commission on Certain Sectors of the Building Industry* (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1974), 42-48, 99, 121-130, 199, 207-221, 229, 230.
- 2 *Ontario House of Assembly Debates*, 5 December 1975, 5127-5150.
- 3 Gerald McAuliffe, "Elvio DelZotto: One Man's Fight for His Reputation", *Globe & Mail*, 8 September 1973, 1, 5. The three articles on the DelZottos and Waisberg inquiry contain several disturbing details when the later findings of the Waisberg Commission are considered in retrospect. McAuliffe indicated that Shulman's accusations "were all but ignored by the legislature." He further stressed that Ontario Solicitor-General John Yarkemo (like his predecessor Bales he would later be implicated in a land speculation scandal) and Metro Deputy Police Chief Bernard Simmonds had denied the existence of any material similar to Shulman's charges in police files. Yarkemo also denied that "organized crime from outside the province" was involved in the Toronto construction violence. In the interview Elvio DelZotto answered questions such as the firms he was a director of — material already on file with the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations. However, McAuliffe made a great underestimate of the number of DelZotto companies; his 90 figure would be far lower than the 168 uncovered by the Royal Commission; see Waisberg, *op. cit.*, 242-43. According to the testimony of Jean Guy Dennis, one reason for DelZotto's creation of Multi-corporations was to evade collective agreements with labour unions. Participating in DelZotto's interview was a public relations man formerly employed by both the police and the *Globe & Mail* who had spent the previous week "investigating the background and reputation" of Gerald McAuliffe; For a description of McAuliffe's role at the Hamilton *Spectator* see Marsha Hewitt and Bill Freeman, *Their Town: The Mafia, the Media and the Party Machine* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1980), 90-99.
- 4 Wismer, *op. cit.*, 136, 170-177; Waisberg *op. cit.*, 41-48, 143, 199-208, 229. Wismer stresses that DelZotto (she did not specify which brother: it was Angelo) did not know if it was his handwriting in the secretary's notebook which served as evidence of the "fateful meeting." She ignores the striking similarity admitted by Angelo DelZotto between a sample of his own hand writing and that in the notebook. Waisberg regarded Romanelli's characterization of the hiring of Natale Luppino and another escort, Joseph Zappia, as "contrived" and "unbelievable." Waisberg wrote, "They (Luppino and Romanelli) explained that Luppino, who had no previous experience in the construction field, went to a construction site in Hamilton, and as luck would have it found Romanelli" (p. 200). As for Elvio DelZotto's claim that he did not know Luppino until the time of his interview with McAuliffe, Waisberg wrote, "There was substantial evidence that from the moment Luppino was hired he was Romanelli's constant companion. Luppino accompanied Romanelli, not only in the course of the operation of the company's affairs, but also in the operation of farms, which were jointly owned by Romanelli and the DelZottos. I find it strange therefore that the knowledge of his employment was denied" (p. 47).
- 5 Waisberg, *op. cit.*, 210-212. Waisberg noted that, "Both Elvio and Angelo DelZotto tried to leave the Commission with the impression that their relationship with Romanelli was not a close one. That, however is not my opinion, taking into consideration all the evidence. In addition to their common holdings we find that Angelo DelZotto would, from time to time, take an active interest in the affairs of Romanelli companies."
- 6 *Ibid.*, 99-107. Zappia was also active in organizing for a Quebec based union leader Rosaire D'Aoust in the Ottawa area and threatened Jean Guy Dennis with death if he hindered these efforts. Waisberg also noted that Zappia was an "old friend" of Paul Violi of Montreal (p. 203). Routledge noted that Violi was Vice-President of Reggio Foods (in partnership with reputed Canadian Mafia chieftain Vic Cotroni. Reggio Foods would later be the centre of the Expo diseased meat scandal uncovered by the Quebec organized crime probe). Routledge also pointed out that Violi, Zappia, Luppino, were all in attendance together at the wedding of Domenic Luppino (brother of Natale) along with John Papalia and Giuseppe Settecasi, reputed to be the "high ranking" chief of the Mafia in Italy. This pattern broke the long trail of statements by Ontario attorney generals that organized crime in Ontario was not linked to groups outside of the province. This was stressed by *Globe & Mail* columnist Norman Webster, who upon the release of the report remarked "Yes John Yaremko, there is a Mafia."
- 7 Wismer, *op. cit.*, 177.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 173.
- 9 Waisberg, *passim*. Waisberg in the recommendations of his report urged that "a minimum standard be set for union books and records" but did not propose similar standards for business corporations.
- 10 Roger Worth, "Chemalloy Confusion Continues." *Financial Post*, 1 May 1976, 40.
- 11 Tom Smith, "Who Ordered the Destruction of Ontario Corporate Records?" Paul Weinberg, "Files too Costly to Keep", *Nexus* (2):3 Published as a supplement to the Toronto *Clarion*, December 1979, 2-4; Wismer, *op. cit.*, 60, 61. Pullman was characterized as the "financial brain" behind the Lansky syndicate — see Henrik Kruger, *The Great Heroin Coup; Drugs, Intelligence & International Fascism* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980), 99. Kruger cites another example of the loss of government files on individuals believed to be connected to organized crime. See *Ibid.*, 157. His allegations of an international network of political repression, drug and gun smuggling, and large scale financial manipulations helps place the picture Shulman painted of Ontario in a broader context. Part of Shulman's claim that the government was paying only 'lip-service' to combatting organized crime was that it had only two members on the OPP intelligence squad with university degrees. Consequently the force lacked the background and training to investigate "very clever financial schemes, such as skimming." No search was even done of the list of shareholders of one possibly Mafia dominated business. Of concern to historians is the fact that the changes to the Companies Information Act eroded the power of the Ontario Archivist under the Archives Act to decide on the "destruction or permanent removal" of any "official document, paper pamphlet or report in the possession of the public service." One possibility for future researchers that has not been destroyed are the OPP papers that have been transferred to the Ontario Archives. According to the finding aid to these documents, which are closed for 50 years, the collection clearly points to large scale organized crime activity in the provinces — apparently questioning the veracity of successive Ontario Attorneys-General as to the absence of such activity in the province. (I would like to thank Kevin Moloney, a doctoral history student at McMaster for bringing this source to my attention.)
- 12 Peter C. Newman, *The Canadian Establishment* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 299.
- 13 Jack Willoughby, "Unusual Restrictions Part of Prusac Deal," *Globe & Mail*, 12 January 1979. Prusac according to the CBC's *Canadian Establishment* series stayed longer at J.A. McDougald's grave than any other contender for his power. He made an unusual arrangement to a development close to McDougald's home including a special buffer mound 50 feet wide and six feet high, landscaped with scotch pine planted no more than 15 feet apart. Prusac was the target of complaints of conflict-of-interest from the minority shareholders of his firms. Complaints included two \$500,000 fees paid by Deltan to Prusac's Prudel holding company for "executive services." *Globe & Mail*, 1 July 1977. Prusac told one group of angry shareholders "You elect me to be Minister of Finance of this country and I will solve" the problem of the firm's declining prices.
- 14 Letter dated 24 February 1976 from Medhurst, Hogg and Associates to Ann Mason Apps of Downtown Action.
- 15 Patrick Howe, "Developer Holds Control of Three Major Firms But Plans to Continue Separate Operations," *Globe & Mail*, 27 January 1975. Burstow admitted that Prusac at one time had ties to the Ger-

man controlled Lehndorff group. This group has Canadian real estate assets estimated in the range of close to \$1 billion, which would make it the largest real estate operation in Canada. Three directors are linked to Trans Canada Pipelines, while the Chairman is also on the board of the American parent Chrysler Corporation. Henry Aubin, *City for Sale*, (Toronto: James Lorimer, l'Etincelle, 1977), 360.

16 Aubin, *op. cit.*, 166.

Breen, David and Coates, Kenneth. *Vancouver's Fair: An Administrative and Political History of the Pacific National Exhibition*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982. Pp. x, 192. Illustrations. \$24.00 (cloth).

David Breen and Kenneth Coates have made a useful contribution to the history of Vancouver and have raised points of general interest for urban historians as they sketch "the dynamics of the relationship between the fair and the city" (p. 5). Their study is much stronger on the fair's side than on the city's, a reflection of their reliance on an excellent collection of seventy-five years' of exhibition records and their unfortunately narrow focus, the political and administrative history of the Pacific National Exhibition and its predecessor, the Vancouver Exhibition Association.

The authors clearly delineate one of the perennial problems facing this urban fair: the conflict between those who favoured an agricultural fair and the "boosters" whose prime consideration was to promote industry and trade. Though claiming to be an agricultural fair, the Vancouver Exhibition Association's choice of a summer date and the construction of an Industrial Building as the fair's first major structure show where priorities lay. Indeed, agriculture appears to have been in the forefront of the fair's rationale only as a means of securing government funds, justifying operations during both wars, or obtaining tax or lottery concessions. By the 1930s, with the construction of such year-round sports facilities as the Forum, an ice hockey rink, the Vancouver Exhibition Association increasingly became involved not only with the management of a fair but with "an integrated year-round sports and entertainment facility" (p. 91). After the Second World War, the Vancouver Exhibition Association admitted that agriculture was not its main purpose, developed a new emphasis on industry and commerce, and changed its name to the Pacific National Exhibition, a title which suggested its provincial and international aspirations (p. 106).

Entertainment, of course, has always been part of the fair. The first Board of Management recognized that a carnival-like "skid road," horse racing and vaudeville acts were essential to draw visitors. The persistence of such entertainments brings into question the authors' observation that the first fair's "curious amalgam of vaudeville, agriculture, industry and hucksterism" illustrate Vancouver's transition from "a frontier settlement" to "a more settled community with metropolitan pretensions" (p. 30). From time to time,

moral reformers complained about these entertainments but apart from a passing mention of the ease with which Sunday opening was adopted in 1968, Breen and Coates do not exploit these moral issues to explore changing mores or the role of reformers in Vancouver.

In their introduction, Breen and Coates complain that in dealing with "boosterism," western Canadian urban historians have, at best, given only passing mention to fairs. In their first two chapters, they present persuasive evidence of the importance of "boosters" in establishing Vancouver's fair. Benefitting from the work of Robert McDonald on Vancouver's business community, their collective biographical sketch of the founding members of the Exhibition Association demonstrates how archetypal boosters, middle-rank businessmen whose personal financial interests were tied to the city, were largely responsible for establishing the fair. Breen and Coates claim that the "booster mentality that marked its origins" persisted in the fair (p. 106) but, apart from a table in the appendix listing subsequent presidents of the Association, they present no evidence to indicate the continuing presence of "boosters." That table does include a contractor, automobile dealers, retail merchants and real estate men who fit the "booster" mould but it also lists two University of British Columbia professors of agriculture and a fishing company executive as presidents. Moreover, the other members of the board are essentially faceless.

Vancouver's Fair includes some provocative comments on the city's relationship with its hinterland. Alas, except for a sketch of the Exhibition Association's views of the rival New Westminster fair, some passing references to smaller Fraser Valley fairs, and mention of co-operation with regional fair associations, the theme is not fully developed. The authors, for example, give little information about agricultural, industrial or commercial exhibitors nor do they indicate very clearly the source of competitors and displays. In contrast, the book provides good illustrations of intra-city developments including the debates of the last three decades on the question of whether major facilities for spectator sports should be downtown or at Exhibition Park. While these debates were going on, East End inhabitants, who had once been among the most enthusiastic supporters of the fair, complained of the commercialization of a residential area. Significantly, in 1973 a Vancouver East NDP Member of the Legislature introduced legislation making the Pacific National Exhibition more a provincial than a civic institution.

The book also offers some insight into federal politics as it argues that board members with Liberal connections had some success in getting federal funds for fair developments. Yet, the Exhibition did not always co-operate with Ottawa. In 1942, when the federal government wanted exhibition facilities as temporary housing for the Japanese who were being evacuated from the coast (not then being "deported" or "interned" as Breen and Coates seem to think), the Exhi-