

Lassoed and Branded: The Calgary Exhibition and Stampede and the City of Calgary, 1889-1976

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Article abstract

There is a complex relationship between the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede (Stampede) and the City of Calgary. On the one hand, the Stampede depends on the municipal government for its very existence. On the other, its arm's-length structure and success in attracting power and influence lend an independence more typical of a private corporation. Since both agree on the value of the Stampede to the City, relations between the two have been far more co-operative than strained. However, in the two instances of public controversy over decisions made by both, the City has allowed the Stampede to take the burden of blame, with the result that the public's image of the Stampede has blurred while its aura of independence has been enhanced.

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There is a complex relationship between the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede (Stampede) and the City of Calgary. On the one hand, the Stampede depends on the municipal government for its very existence. On the other, its arm's-length structure and success in attracting power and influence lend an independence more typical of a private corporation. Since both agree on the value of the Stampede to the City, relations between the two have been far more co-operative than strained. However, in the two instances of public controversy over decisions made by both, the City has allowed the Stampede to take the burden of blame, with the result that the public's image of the Stampede has blurred while its aura of independence has been enhanced.

Résumé

La relation entre le Calgary Exhibition and Stampede (Stampede) et la ville de Calgary est pour le moins complexe. D'une part, le Stampede n'existerait pas sans le gouvernement municipal. D'autre part, sa structure propre et le fait qu'il réussisse à attirer des éléments de pouvoir et d'influence lui confèrent une indépendance typique des entreprises privées. Puisque les deux parties s'entendent sur l'importance du Stampede pour la ville, les relations qu'elles entretiennent sont davantage coopératives que contraintes. Toutefois, dans les deux épisodes de controverse publique sur des décisions prises par les deux parties, la ville a laissé le Stampede encourir le blâme. Il en est résulté que l'image publique du Stampede s'est estompée alors que son aura d'indépendance a pris du relief.

Introduction

No one would dispute the powerful influence of the Exhibition and Stampede (Stampede) on Calgary.¹ Every July, a ten-day celebration of heritage, cowboy culture, and western mythology transforms an energetic corporate metropolis into a relaxed, fun-loving "Cowtown." Its global publicity unrivalled in the country, the Stampede also contributes significantly to Calgary's identifiable—if controversial—urban image. Given this important connection, it is surprising that so little is understood about the relationship between Calgary's civic government and the Stampede. Solid studies like James H. Gray's *A Brand of Its Own: The 100 Year History of the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede* (1985), or more popular treatments like Fred Kennedy's *Calgary Stampede: The Authentic History of the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede*, "The Greatest Show on Earth" (1964) do not analyze this relationship. Others like Colin Campbell in *Stampede City: Politics and Power in the West* (1984) reiterate a common, largely unsubstantiated view that the

City is a pawn of elitist Stampede interests.² Popular perception, even among informed observers, is hazy about how the two corporate bodies actually interact.³ In 1966 a spokesman for a group of concerned citizens said that the Stampede Board was "some sort of quasi public body though no one is entirely sure."⁴ In reality, the relationship between the two is complex, and falls historically into three broad categories. The first concerns the powerful ties that have always bound them. Less obvious are their disagreements. Finally, they have managed to cultivate a separateness that is more apparent than real. This popular perception has prejudiced the Stampede more than the City.

Annual fairs and exhibitions are part of the European and North American historical experience. Their continuing importance today can be seen in the serious competition for world fairs and expositions. The German corporation Frankfurt Messe, for example, organizes over one hundred trade fairs a year throughout the world. In Canada, exhibitions historically filled a variety of needs. They enabled social interaction and provided important entertainment opportunities.⁵ Through press coverage they advertised regional wealth and potential to the outside world. They also brought global products to specific audiences. Most significantly in terms of the host town or city, they were mediums for civic promotion or boosting, particularly during the early twentieth-century settlement boom.⁶ Historian Paul Voisey has noted how fairs "served the boosters' purpose" in Alberta small towns of that period.⁷ While they varied in size and scope from blue ribbon events like the Royal Agricultural Winter Fair in Toronto and Vancouver's Pacific National Exhibition to smaller regional and local fairs like those in Brandon, High River, or Kelowna, these exhibitions were uniform in their desire to cultivate a close identification with the cities and towns that hosted them. The Calgary Stampede, as one of Canada's major exhibitions, has been no exception to this rule.

Calgary's economy was based first on livestock and later on its ability to serve as the major distributing centre for rural south and south-central Alberta. In the modern era, the city has added oil and natural gas extraction, tourism, and high technology activity to its economic portfolio. The Stampede has been the city's primary vehicle by which these economic priorities were promoted and consolidated, a fact duly recognized and abetted by civic government.

The Calgary Stampede is also a festival in that it exports a cultural product with roots in the past and it celebrates a specific localized perception of this heritage. This conscious deployment of cultural capital and the success of some cities in utilizing it has led to emulation and the rise of a festival industry. In short, cities worldwide, large and small, now seek to "sell" themselves by the deliberate manipulation of culture through festivals to enhance their appeal to tourists, potential investment capital, business interests, and affluent residents.⁸ Successful cities have managed to brand themselves through identification

The Calgary Exhibition and Stampede

with their annual festivals. To many, the names of cities like Rio de Janeiro, New Orleans, and Munich are associated with Carnivale, Mardi Gras, and Oktoberfest respectively. The same could be said for Calgary and the Stampede.

According to Harvey Molotch and John Logan in their study of the political economy of place, exhibitions and festivals are "growth engines." Their promotion and advancement are facilitated by a combination of specific interest groups who see mutual advantage in the attendant economic spinoffs.⁹ In this context, civic governments continue to be particularly supportive of exhibitions and festivals since they generate local spending, increase civic revenues, and offer employment opportunities. Mardi Gras, for example, is worth \$1 billion a year to the city of New Orleans. Japanese governments expect that their focus on cultural extravaganzas like the 1100-year-old Gion Festival in Kyoto will help boost tourist numbers to eight million by 2007. Each of the several events in Edinburgh's International Festival brings Scottish culture to an audience twice the size of the population of the city. In Canada, the Festival of Murals in Chemainus, British Columbia, has shown how a small town has managed to organize and sell itself to tourists by giving the flagging lumber industry a high heritage profile. In 2003, the Calgary Stampede informed the public that for every dollar of revenue generated from Stampede activities, another \$2.60 is spent elsewhere in the city.¹⁰

The Calgary Exhibition and Stampede owes its survival to the City of Calgary. In 1889, the federal government sold ninety-four acres in Victoria Park for \$235 to the Calgary Agricultural Society for exhibition purposes, with the stipulation that the land could not be subdivided into town lots.¹¹ The agricultural society subsequently mortgaged the land to build a racetrack, and in 1896 amid general depressed conditions had to relinquish the mortgage to Canada Permanent Savings Company. Following a four-year hiatus in which no fall fair was held, several local businessmen formed the Inter-Western Pacific Exposition Company Limited to revive the exhibition. Its first order of business was to petition the City to redeem the mortgage. In 1901, following negotiations with Richard Bedford Bennett acting for Canada Permanent Savings Company, the City took ownership of the exhibition grounds for the sum of \$6,500.¹² For the next nine years the City of Calgary maintained the grounds and collected entrance and rental fees. Through lease arrangements in 1911 the exhibition, now the Calgary Exhibition Company Limited, took over the management of the grounds.¹³ In 1933 the name was changed to the present Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Limited. Under this new title, the company assumed expanded powers under the *Companies Act of Alberta* (1929), except those limited by lease. This situation has continued to the present day.

In many ways, the Stampede functions like a private company. It comprises shareholders who elect a governing board of directors (currently twenty-five), which in turn decides on a president. In addition to the annual Stampede, the board of directors and permanent staff manage and operate the year-round activities

and events in Victoria Park.¹⁴ What is not so readily understood is the fact that the Stampede has always been a non-profit company. The board of directors receives no remuneration. No dividends are paid to shareholders whose holdings are limited to twenty-five shares at a dollar (now five dollars) a share. All surplus moneys are redirected to operations and capital investment. More significantly, the Stampede operates under a free lease. The City oversees its interests by including aldermen on the board of directors, two of whom sit on the powerful executive committee. The company owns no property within the city and pays no taxes. What has emerged is a strange relationship. On the one hand the Stampede enjoys little political interference by operating at arm's length from the City. On the other hand, the two are indistinguishable. One Stampede president went so far as to equate the Stampede with a city utility.¹⁵ In 1965, when the Stampede was applying for city-owned land in Lincoln Park, prominent real estate man Kent Lyle wondered how the City could treat the Stampede like a private party. To Lyle, the application was misleading and even moot since the Stampede and the City were one and the same.¹⁶

One has only to note the active presence of senior city officials within the Stampede organization. Not only the mayor and aldermen, but the city commissioners and other high-level officials were often associate directors and sometimes occupied positions on the Stampede Board of Directors during their tenure of office. The current City manager, Owen Tobert, is both a Stampede shareholder and a senior associate. Moreover, they usually retained these positions after relinquishing their civic duties. Others were shareholders. Conflict of interest was not a problem. Only in the two expansion issues did the public ever question the relationship between the City and the Stampede, and in both instances it was confined to the two communities most affected by the expansion plans. In practical situations, neither thought it was necessary to keep at arm's length. Here, a good example occurred in 1960 over a traffic access issue. In order for the City to "keep closely in touch with the Exhibition's plans," the Stampede agreed to make a City planner an associate director and then place him on its traffic committee. The same applied to Chief Commissioner John Steel so that he could serve on its grounds and development committee.¹⁷ To both bodies, this represented neither collusion nor conflict of interest. It was simply one agent of the City co-operating with another to effect better communication.

Another factor binding City officials to the Stampede was its high public profile, which was largely the result of its astonishing success in attracting wealth and influence to volunteer leadership positions. When Mayor J. W. Mitchell referred to arrangements for the 1912 Stampede as being "in the hands of our most wealthy citizens," he was articulating a pattern that was to be repeated over and over again.¹⁸ Drawn from exclusive business, ranching, social, and civic circles, the list of committee chairmen and associate directors was a Who's Who of Calgary and area. For example, in 1966–67 its directorship and committees boasted luminaries like Alberta Premier Peter

The Calgary Exhibition and Stampede



Courtesy Glenbow Archives NB 41-16

Figure 1: Victoria Park, 1911. Exhibition grounds to the left, Victoria Park community on the right.

Lougheed, Senator Harry Hays, prominent businessmen Max Bell and Carl Nickle, cattlemen Angus McKinnon and Don Matthews, and Justice M. M. Porter, to name just a few. The value of associating with such high-powered figures was not lost on city spokesmen. The aldermanic appointments to the Stampede Board provide a good case in point. Considered the plums of all appointed committees, they were hotly contested.¹⁹ In one year the committee charged with placing aldermen on committees came under attack in Council for assigning themselves to the Stampede Board.

The presence of well-known figures on the Stampede's board and committees attracted others like them. Four outcomes are discernible. In addition to elite recruitment, the Stampede moulded its leaders through its associate directorship and volunteer service, often making the point that the presidency could not be secured through influence or money. Second, these disparate but high-profile individuals were bound together through association and time by a firm belief in the Stampede's worthiness. In turn, they influenced the public to volunteer. Reinforced by a friendly press, this combination of broad citizen participation, elite recruitment, and focused leadership gave civic officials a host of reasons to support the Stampede. Finally, the prestige of its management bestowed an air of independence. In terms of public perception the Stampede appeared more as a dynamic, private organization than a subsidiary of the City, as demonstrated by the fact that today many believe that the Exhibition and Stampede is a private corporation.²⁰

The Stampede's success in cultivating an image of independence aroused periodic hostility within City Council. At times, aldermen challenged the Stampede's apparent indifference and high-handedness. In August 1943, Stampede President T. A. Hornbrook referred to relations between the two as warranting "a better understanding."²¹ Sometimes, civic departments voiced their displeasure when their budgets were impacted by



Courtesy Glenbow Archives NA 1604-83

Figure 2: Horseshoe-shaped flowerbed in front of main office, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede ca. 1930s.

Council decisions affecting the Stampede. On rare occasions, a civic department made adverse recommendations.

Co-operation

Co-operation between the City of Calgary and the Exhibition and Stampede was rooted in the belief that the latter benefited the former commercially. In 1896, the Board of Trade wanted the City to buy the Exhibition grounds because a fair would encourage and promote business interests.²² Frequent reminders underscored this practical value. The impact of the Stampede on streetcar revenues in depressed times is a case in point. The Stampede pointedly informed the City that they were worth \$25,008 between 1919 and 1921, and \$1,136 during Stampede week in 1935. Persistent rhetoric had the same goal. According to Guy Weadick, the man behind the 1912 Stampede, the event was "a great scheme for the publicity and general welfare of Calgary."²³ In 1919, Manager Ernie Richardson took pride in the fact that Calgary benefited from the Exhibition "to a considerable extent without any expense."²⁴ Stampede President C. M. Baker noted in 1935 that the Stampede was "taking a long stride forward in the development of the city,"²⁵ and in 1972, a Stampede document argued that it was "difficult to understate the importance of the Stampede to the citizens of Calgary."²⁶

City officials reciprocated with equal enthusiasm. In 1944 Mayor Andrew Davison said the Stampede had done more to advertise Calgary than any other single agency. His successor three years later noted that the Stampede "has been part and parcel of the life of our city," and in 1948 referred to its value in advertising Calgary to all four corners of the continent.²⁷ The press was equally supportive. According to Robert Konrad in his article "Barren Bulls and Charging Cows: Cowboys, Celebration in Copal and Calgary," the Stampede "has a recognized status as 'sacred cow' for the media."²⁸ This ongoing adulation contributed to a widespread opinion that the Stampede was somehow



Courtesy Glenbow Archives NA 3990-1

Figure 3: Sunshine Village Auto Camp ca. 1930s. Located just south of the McDonald Bridge on the banks of the Elbow River, the camp was acquired by the Stampede in 1955.

different and deserved special consideration. It mattered not that some thought the Stampede was not as good for business as popularly believed or that the tourist impact might not have been as great as the rhetoric indicated.²⁹ The City and the Stampede remained close partners in endorsing Ernie Richardson's prophetic words when in reference to the success of the 1923 Exhibition and Stampede he said, "Calgary has found something the people want, something peculiarly appropriate to our environment, . . . and we only have to use our unique opportunities to the best advantage."³⁰

The City has been generous with its leases to the Stampede. First it extended their tenure. The 1911, 1916, and 1921 leases were for five years. They went to ten years in 1924, to thirty-two years in 1947, and then fifty in 1960. Second, leases were renegotiated before their expiry. The 1921 lease was renegotiated and extended in 1924 in response to a request by the Stampede for City support on insurance premiums. Financial issues also motivated later negotiations. When Crown Trust expressed nervousness over lending \$500,000 to the Stampede for the construction of the Corral, the City amended the City Charter to allow a thirty-two-year lease.³¹ A fifty-year lease in 1960 through another amendment was arranged mainly for the same reasons. Third, lease provisions widened the powers of the Stampede. The 1960 lease is a good example. It allowed the Stampede Board to acquire land not directly adjacent to the grounds. The purchase of the Stampede Ranch near Hanna was one result. The initial land acquisition for expansion purposes south and west was another. The 1960 lease also removed stipulations on the disbursement of surplus moneys. Finally, it widened the Stampede's options in sports franchises and subletting of the grounds.³² In the mid-1970s, when the lack of expropriation power prevented Stampede officials from completing house purchases in Victoria Park, the City amended the enabling agreement and did it for them.³³

Money bylaws for capital and other projects were of inestimable value. Had not the City acquired the fairgrounds in 1901, the Inter-Western Pacific Exposition Company Limited might well have folded. Between 1902 and 1910, four money bylaws appropriated over \$75,000 for grounds improvements.³⁴ In 1911 another bylaw for \$55,000 was approved for a stock pavilion and horse barns. Then in 1914, ratepayers endorsed a substantial bylaw for \$360,000 to construct a grandstand, barns, and sale pavilion, and to reconfigure the racetrack.³⁵ However, the largest single expenditure occurred in 1968 through a bylaw granting the Stampede Board \$4 million over twenty years for expansion.

The City also furnished direct grants. Between 1908 and 1919 the Exhibition Board received over \$73,000.³⁶ Considering the fact that the Exhibition lost money in more years than not during this period, the City grants were crucial to survival. There would have been no Exhibition in 1915 had the City not provided money.³⁷ Manager Ernie Richardson told the Exhibition Board in 1919 that he hoped "the Calgary Exhibition has now developed to such a stage that it will not be necessary to ask the City for an annual grant."³⁸ Yet as late as 1951, when the recent construction of the Corral caused a shortfall, the Stampede Board again approached the City for financial help.³⁹

The City helped the Stampede financially in other ways. It used its favourable credit rating to secure low-interest loans and pass on substantial interest savings to the Stampede. The Dominion Works Programme on the Exhibition Grounds in 1939 was enabled by a \$46,950 loan at 2 per cent interest secured by the City for the Stampede.⁴⁰ In 1977, over \$100,000 was saved in interest payments when the City borrowed money from the province at 8 per cent and used it to defray a Stampede bank loan held at 11.25 per cent. The City also set up lower interest financing for capital projects through the Alberta Municipal Financing Corporation.⁴¹ It also lent \$700,000 in 1976 at lower than bank interest rates so the Stampede could construct the necessary green space buffer between its expansion boundaries and the rest of Victoria Park.⁴² In 1978, the City secured a grant for which the Stampede was ineligible and passed it on the Board to allow the construction of the Jaycees infield park.⁴³ Even when the City made the Exhibition Company pay insurance after 1921, it still provided a credit line of \$6,000 in case of default, and for a time in the 1930s re-assumed the cost of the premiums. In 1975, it gave \$25,000 towards a study by Stanford Research Institute that ultimately led to a Stampede master plan.⁴⁴ With Stampede expansion infringing on the Victoria Park Community Centre in 1975, the City paid \$65,000 for its relocation.⁴⁵ In 1950, the City took over responsibility for erecting the street decorations. Eleven years later it was persuaded to increase its financial contribution from \$4,000 to \$5,500, and in 1979 agreed to assume half the cost or \$100,000 over a five-year period.⁴⁶

Co-operation occurred in less significant areas. In 1956 the City acquired the Sunshine Auto Court east of the Elbow River for the reasonable sum of \$45,000 and then passed it on to the Stampede at the same price.⁴⁷ In the process, a potential buyer



Figure 4: Aerial view of Lincoln Park looking northeast towards the city, 1987. The Stampede grounds can be discerned to the right of the downtown area.

and member of the Stampede Board backed off so as not to prejudice the transaction.⁴⁸ Whether it be oiling thoroughfares and installing fire alarm boxes inside the grounds, erecting bandstands or supplying building materials, buying advertising space in a promotional brochure, allowing paid public parking on recreation areas during Stampede, lending fowl from the zoo for poultry exhibitions, or even tolerating construction “non conformities,” the City of Calgary was a ubiquitous presence in Stampede activities.⁴⁹

The Stampede reciprocated, generally making its buildings, equipment, and manager available upon request by the City. In the First World War, the grounds housed Canadian troops. Stampede buildings served as an isolation hospital in 1921, and a shelter and kitchen for the unemployed in 1932 and the On-to-Ottawa trekkers in 1935. During World War Two, the Provincial Institute of Technology and Art relocated some of its classrooms there. In the early years, the Exhibition acted as the City’s agent in preparing civic exhibits for other fairs in Western

Canada. Over the years, the Stampede became a focal point for organized sports and was a pioneer in encouraging competitive hockey in the city. Currently, the Stampede Foundation supports several local community youth and education groups.

Tensions

Despite their generally positive relationship, the two have had their issues. First, the elitist nature of the Stampede Board ruffled aldermen whose frequent requests for financial statistics indicated critical interest. Sometimes these questions amounted to direct challenges. Furthermore, the presence of City-operated facilities on the exhibition grounds was contentious and ultimately of financial cost to the Stampede. The most serious issue, however, was related to Lincoln Park.

The assumption that what was good for the Stampede was also good for the city aroused periodic hostility. Some aldermen and certainly segments of the public in proposed Stampede

The Calgary Exhibition and Stampede




Figure 5: Outline of Suburban Calgary 1964–1965. Distance from Lincoln Park to Stampede Grounds: 5 kilometres.

expansion areas saw the Stampede Board as an elitist, inconsiderate group indifferent to alternative opinion, and not averse to browbeating the City. For example, in spite of a public vote endorsing another name for the Corral in 1951, the Stampede Board stood firm.⁵⁰ In 1932, a labour newspaper called for a campaign to “get the parasites [Stampede] off taxpayers’ property.”⁵¹ Accusations of connivance were not uncommon.⁵² The notion of an “Old Boys Club” wielding enormous and indiscriminate leverage was exacerbated in Council by the Board’s admitted secrecy and lack of community consultation. For example, during the Lincoln Park controversy, one alderman felt that “the Board was controlled by a group of influential rich men who moved in exclusive circles.” Another thought that the Board was not close enough to the people.⁵³ Mayor Rodney Sykes’s executive secretary wrote in 1974 that the Stampede Board “was inclined to do as it wants.”⁵⁴ This perceived elitism polarized Council on sensitive issues. The Lincoln Park and Victoria Park expansion controversies are excellent cases in point.

An early confrontation set the stage for future dialogue. In 1911, the City audited the Exhibition Company’s books as a condition to its annual \$5,000 grant. The subsequent report showed laxity and improper accounting procedures. Some aldermen on City Council were incensed and called the Exhibition’s management practices into question. In angrily refuting these allegations, General Manager Ernie Richardson gave his accusers short shrift for their lack of experience or knowledge about running an exhibition.⁵⁵ The critics fell silent and a precedent was set.

Henceforth, the Exhibition and Stampede was to broach little interference by the City.

Another civic attack on the Stampede occurred in 1943 and was linked to projected spending on an artificial ice rink operation that had been sublet in the arena on the grounds. On 12 August, Stampede General Manager Charles Yule approached Council requesting a ten-year extension on the current lease due to expire in November. Yule argued that additional security of tenure was warranted before \$6,000 was expended on improving the heating facilities in the arena where the ice rink was located during the winter months.⁵⁶ A day later, Yule’s request was endorsed by the City commissioners. On 16 August, when the issue was brought to Council, Alderman W. G. Southern, a former Council representative on the Stampede Board, requested an audit of the Stampede books. Furthermore, by querying the City’s right to negotiate a lease at all, let alone at a nominal cost, Southern essentially called the Stampede’s right to exist into question.⁵⁷ Southern likely was incensed by the Stampede’s profiting through subletting what was essentially city property. Yet according to a fellow alderman, Southern had little knowledge of Stampede activities, attending only two meetings in four years.⁵⁸ A stunned Council complied by ordering a complete external audit and asked the City solicitor to advise on the legal questions.

On 20 August, the City solicitor upheld the existing leasing arrangements but cautioned that under its present terms the lease could not be terminated before expiry, except by mutual consent.⁵⁹ A week later an extensive audit revealed no irregularities in the Stampede’s books.⁶⁰ Southern then countered with a suggestion that the Stampede pay \$20,000 rent annually, an amount roughly commensurate with the annual interest being paid by the City on the capital debt on the Stampede buildings.⁶¹ Matters came to a head on 8 September during a meeting between the Stampede Board and City Council’s Legislative Committee. The Board had complied willingly with the audit request but balked at paying a \$20,000 annual levy on a new lease. Threatening to abandon the Stampede altogether, President T. A. Hornbrook informed the committee that “our board has reached a stage where it is prepared to quit right now and you can have it like that if you wish.”⁶²

Faced with this ultimatum, Council opted to save face. Though it agreed in principle to renewing the lease under existing arrangements, it also insisted on some modifications. In a new ten-year lease approved by a narrow 6–4 vote on 20 December 1943, the Stampede Board agreed to increase Council representation on its executive board from one to two, and to a clause that specified conditions by which a lease could be terminated before its expiry date. In its annual report released in November, Stampede Finance Committee Chairman E. D. Adams adopted a familiar refrain in censuring the City:

It is to be hoped that City Council while conducting the affairs of the city will allow the directors of the Stampede to continue their efforts without undue hindrance bearing in mind that the Stampede is only a voluntary company and that all its



Figure 6: Stampede Midway, 2005.

shareholders have but one thought in mind—to work for the good of the community, and spend what money they are fortunate to earn to be of benefit to the City of Calgary and the community at large.⁶³

Self-righteousness, and the emphasis on its voluntary and therefore unimpeachable intentions, was the Stampede's main weapon whenever its motives were called into question.

An ongoing area of contention between the Stampede Board and the City of Calgary was the location of non-exhibition facilities on the fairgrounds. Through time, the City appropriated about seven acres in the designated exhibition grounds for storage, a power house, and streetcar barns. The Exhibition had sought a legal opinion on this non-exhibition use in 1912 but was informed by Richard Bedford Bennett that the City's actions were within its power, even though they might be "contrary to the spirit of the patent."⁶⁴ By the 1940s the Stampede began running out of space for facilities. Following extensive and not always progressive dialogue, the City agreed to give up the space, but not without a price. It cost the Stampede \$50,000 to move the streetcar barns to Eau Claire in 1948.⁶⁵ Ten years later the Stampede had to agree to pay the City a further \$100,000 to free up the remaining space.⁶⁶ The idea of making the Stampede pay for land that was originally part of the lease ran counter to the usual co-operation extended by the City. In all likelihood, it was related to the affected civic departments that wanted to offset the costs of replacing the facilities.

The Lincoln Park Issue

The failure of the Stampede's Lincoln Park expansion proposal in 1964–65 was its greatest setback at the hands of the City. The extension of the Stampede from seven to nine days in 1966 and to ten a year later was a direct response to this failure and to the need to accommodate more people on the grounds. For the City it was a matter of weighing economic, financial, and



Figure 7: The day after Stampede, 2005. With the debris and other temporary items removed, this will be the prevailing daytime scene on the grounds.

political odds. In this balancing act, the Stampede emerged as a minor player. Also by this time, the City also had other relocation ideas for its "favourite child."

In December 1963, Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer announced in the House of Commons that the government was downsizing its RCAF facilities across the country. Calgary's Lincoln Park was one of the casualties. By July 1964, Council had decided to accept the federal government's offer of first choice on the 426 acres located in the Lakeview district in the city's southwest. Originally, the City wanted to maintain the facility as a municipal airport. In September, after the Department of Transport declined to operate the proposed airport, the City entertained vague notions of converting the land into a residential area and light industrial complex.⁶⁷ When Mayor Grant MacEwan and Chief Commissioner John Steel negotiated a price of \$750,000, the Stampede seized what it thought was a golden opportunity.⁶⁸ On 23 October it gave notice that it was prepared to buy Lincoln Park for the City and relocate its operations there. It even enclosed a \$75,000 cheque as a down payment.⁶⁹

Though this move was sudden and unexpected, the Stampede had already been influenced by prior civic action. By the 1950s the most serious problem facing the Stampede was a lack of space on the grounds.⁷⁰ Correspondence between the Board and commissioners indicated clearly that the former expected the City to furnish a solution either by providing a new site elsewhere, or by allowing expansion in its present location. It was also equally obvious by 1960 that the City preferred the second solution. In March, Commissioner Steel made this point quite clear in a meeting with Stampede officials.⁷¹

Using its expanded powers under the 1960 lease agreement and a bank loan of \$500,000, the Stampede began acquiring properties in nearby Lindsay Park to the south and west of the grounds in the spring of 1963.⁷² This program stalled for three



Author

Figure 8: 14th Avenue looking south into expansion zone. Building in the background forms part of the Round-up Centre. Also visible are some of the original houses in Victoria Park. The Stampede's long-range plans for them are uncertain.

reasons. One was the high price being asked by the largest landowner, Canadian National Railway. Difficulties also arose over the feasibility of diverting the Elbow River, which snaked its way through the area. However, the most formidable obstacle was raised when John Steel told the Stampede Board that the City was not prepared to consolidate the land parcel by effecting the necessary street closures.⁷³ Only hours after hearing this news the Stampede opted for Lincoln Park.

The Stampede's offer was received favourably by the City commissioners, who recommended the purchase of Lincoln Park to Council.⁷⁴ The aldermen, however, were not so sanguine. Instead, Council took the prudent route and ordered its Planning Department to undertake a study on the future of Lincoln Park. The \$75,000 cheque was returned.⁷⁵ The Stampede took its own precautions by hiring a consultant to prepare its brief to Council and to assess the feasibility of other sites.⁷⁶

Public reaction was quick and vehement. The 26 October meeting of City Council was faced with an audience of 150 unhappy Lakeview residents, whose noisy interjections almost caused Mayor Grant MacEwan to clear the chamber.⁷⁷ In addition to threatening legal action if the Stampede were allowed to relocate in Lincoln Park, the Lakeview Community Association protested everything from odours and traffic congestion to water problems and falling land prices. Also, other parties soon expressed their interest. ATCO Industries was prepared to pay \$750,000 for only one hundred acres. Robin-Nodwell wanted thirty-seven acres for a tracked-vehicle plant. Developers interested in a shopping complex offered over \$2 million. Mount Royal Community College saw Lincoln Park as a possible site for its relocation. In all, twenty-three applications were received for property parcels including two museums, and a Bible college.

The Stampede's cause was not helped by a bitter controversy within Council. Since all four aldermen on the Stampede Board had voted in favour of the proposal, they were excluded from voting or even discussing the issue in Council. George Ho Lem and Ernie Starr sought a judicial declaration that they were not disqualified under the *City Act* from voting on "questions affecting a company of which they are directors." Under an injunction granted on 17 May 1965, Council debate on the subject was suspended pending a decision. The issue went to trial after the City tried unsuccessfully to challenge the injunction. The judge's ruling on 10 June upheld the City's decision to exclude the aldermen from voting and came just a few days before the release of the Lincoln Park study.⁷⁸ The Stampede Board could not have been happy with the publicity. In the trial proceedings it had been revealed that both aldermen had been shareholders as well as directors.

The Stampede pressed its case in a spirited campaign. In a brief to City Council in late March it unveiled detailed and grandiose plans for the new facilities at Lincoln Park. It also lobbied heavily for public support. The \$45,000 spent on advertising was accompanied by radio broadcasts and the first phone-in television show in Calgary.⁷⁹ President Don Matthews and several directors toured the affected communities in an effort to make their case personally.⁸⁰ These measures, however, were countered by mounting public opposition and demonstrations. With the tide turning, the Stampede tried to persuade Mount Royal College to relocate in Victoria Park. During a series of secret meetings, Stampede officials focused on the college's interest in remaining in the downtown area, and intimated that the province might be willing to provide 90 per cent of the cost or \$5.4 million to relocate the college there.⁸¹

The Lincoln Park Report was released on 16 June. Of the four proposals considered, the Stampede's was ranked last.⁸² The report recommended that the land be given over to housing, high-rise apartments, ATCO Industries, Mount Royal College, and other public facilities. As for the Stampede, the report noted, "it is the least compatible. It yields much less direct benefit to the city than all the other alternatives and carries with it the smallest economic benefit to the city at large."⁸³ Also revealed was the City's preference for future Stampede expansion. According to the report, Stampede needs would be best served through expansion "in contiguous areas—perhaps in conjunction with pending urban renewal plans."

Why did the Stampede lose Lincoln Park? To many civic administrators, it seemed like a logical solution to a vexatious problem. City engineers thought that the site was suitable in terms of access. They also discounted claims that water contamination was a possibility. Yet for all its promotion, the Stampede must take its share of the blame. Perhaps its greatest mistake was in expecting recompense from the City. Estimating that a successful bid would mean abandoning \$6 million worth of land and facilities in Victoria Park, the Stampede Board unwisely suggested that the City provide the money. Some aldermen,

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not understanding the Lindsay Park situation, thought that the Stampede's bid was too sudden. Others saw it as self-serving and arrogant. Lakeview residents resented "rich men flexing their muscles." Knowing the importance of the issue, the Stampede Board should have removed all taint by excusing the aldermen from discussions. It also did little to counter suggestions for alternative sites. No clear case was laid before the public giving the reasons why other possibilities had already been considered and rejected.

But even considering these points, politics and the lure of potential revenue worked against the Stampede. It made little political sense to anger a well-organized, articulate, middle-class neighbourhood. More likely, however, financial considerations doomed the Stampede's proposal. Set against the Stampede's bid of \$750,000 for tax-free land, the prospect of receiving \$3 million in land sales and substantial annual taxes was simply too much to resist.

For the first time, the Stampede had failed to advance its interests with the City on a major issue. It was a severe blow, as evidenced by President Don Matthews's equation of the Planning Department's report with the end of the Stampede. The Board of Directors met on 20 June to consider a response. Amid practical comments like "We should bow out gracefully," and "It would be futile to continue," the Stampede Board decided to abandon its interest in Lincoln Park.⁸⁴ It was seen in the press as a generous gesture since, in effect, it reinstated the voting powers of the four aldermen and enabled a truly representative Council to adopt the Planning Department's recommendation.⁸⁵ The failure to secure Lincoln Park meant a change in strategy. Given its consultant's report that Lincoln Park was the only suitable outside site, the Stampede redirected its focus to its existing premises.⁸⁶ In the fall of 1965, the Stampede reopened negotiations on a Lindsay Park site, but was thwarted by City traffic plans that effectively isolated it from the existing grounds. In December 1965 the Stampede sites committee reported to the Executive Committee that the only viable solution lay in rapid transit from outlying parking reserves.⁸⁷ But when it also mentioned that expansion north was "a partial solution," the focus began to shift to an entirely new debate.

Victoria Park

Between 1968 and 1976, the Stampede acquired eight blocks in residential Victoria Park directly north of the grounds. It marked the beginning of the end for this older working-class neighbourhood. This intrusion into a deteriorating yet well-established community aroused spirited opposition from residents who did not want to leave. The Victoria Park expansion issue provides the best single example of the complex relationship between the Stampede and the City. Co-operation, antagonism, and distance were all observable in this emotional and protracted public issue.

Following the Lincoln Park setback, the Stampede began pressuring the City for a solution to its space problems. By 1967, expansion on the existing site was an accepted fact. In

an astounding move in March 1968, the City commissioners asked the four aldermen on the Stampede Board to settle the future of the area "for once and for all."⁸⁸ Their subsequent recommendation to allow the Stampede to expand into residential Victoria Park was accepted by the commissioners and endorsed by Council. Under an agreement reached in July 1968, the City provided \$4 million at \$400,000 a year to the Stampede to enable the purchase of eight blocks east of Macleod Trail between Seventeenth and Fourteenth avenues in Victoria Park.⁸⁹ The agreement also contained alternative accommodation provisions for displaced tenants, who were allowed to remain in the purchased houses until they were ready for demolition, which was to occur by block and not until most of it was in the hands of the Stampede. The City was to approve all purchases and retain the title to all acquired lands. Later when a few stalwart residents refused to sell, the 1968 agreement was amended to allow the City to use expropriation where necessary.⁹⁰

The land-acquisition program was a protracted and painful process. It took over seven years for the 229 properties to be acquired. In 1976, the former home to 1200 people was a jumble of ruined empty spaces, interspersed with dilapidated houses awaiting demolition. Across Fourteenth Avenue to the north, the deterioration extended to the rest of Victoria Park.⁹¹ Most residents were convinced that it was only a matter of time before the same fate awaited them.⁹² Caught in the limbo of uncertainty, many sold out to speculators who offered low rent and little maintenance. All in all, it was grim evidence of a partnership dedicated solely to property acquisition.

The issue, however, provoked conflict and difference between the Stampede and the City. The election in 1969 of an antagonistic mayor inflamed the issue, causing delays and inter-civic strife. Rodney Sykes blamed the Stampede Board for its cavalier attitude towards powerless residents, and City Council for its endorsement. Noting that he got little support from Council, Sykes aligned himself with the Victoria Park citizens group in an attempt to halt the land purchases. However, his failure to influence any change was due in large part to a confrontational style and abrasive personality that alienated many aldermen and civic administrators.⁹³ The City Planning Department also opposed the expansion. A study released in 1971 recommended abandonment of the entire expansion project in favour of other options.⁹⁴ The study was ignored by Council, as was a subsequent Planning report in 1974, which recommended extensive rehabilitation outside the expansion zone as a way of preserving it from further encroachment by the Stampede.⁹⁵


Unarguably, the Stampede was partly responsible for the destruction of Victoria Park. It could have gone elsewhere. Lincoln Park was not the only outside solution. In 1967, for example, the Board of Directors gave scant consideration to a proposal to relocate in the recreational area of Happy Valley on the western fringe of the city.⁹⁶ The lack of a master plan meant that the Stampede had moved to destroy a community

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without forethought. The fact that expansion was linked primarily to parking was a major irritant.⁹⁷ As it was, the present grounds were largely empty except during Stampede, and the Board had to defend the validity of turning a residential neighbourhood into a parking lot while already possessing abundant underutilized parking space. According to the Citizens' Committee formed to fight the expansion, the Stampede had acted pre-emptively, and was unconcerned about offering market prices for the houses instead of replacement value. The Stampede Board was also described as confrontational, and of using "blockbusting" and intimidation tactics to force residents from their houses.⁹⁸ It was also alleged that acquired houses were poorly maintained and allowed to deteriorate so that people would be encouraged to move.⁹⁹

However, the City was more responsible for the fate of Victoria Park. It had wanted a northerly expansion as early as 1960. In a meeting with the Stampede, Commissioner John Steel referred to Victoria Park as "a depressed residential area" and suggested a northerly expansion all the way to Twelfth Avenue.¹⁰⁰ By 1965, the City was clearly bent on amalgamating the Stampede expansion plans with large-scale redevelopment of Victoria Park under urban renewal.¹⁰¹ A 1965 land use map of the city slated all of Victoria Park for redevelopment. On the other hand, the Stampede did not mention Victoria Park as a possible expansion area until late 1965, and even then referred specifically to its being a City decision. It was only when the federal and provincial governments proved less than enthusiastic about urban renewal for Victoria Park that the City forced its hurried solution.¹⁰² Furthermore, the City's lack of a consistent long-range vision for Victoria Park made it virtually impossible to protect the rest of the community in the post-expansion phase. The City Plans for 1970, 1973, and 1977 showed conflicting visions. The city's first General Plan (1963) made no provision for the central area. In the 1970 Plan, the Stampede Board's encroachment was implicitly recognized.¹⁰³ An updated Plan released in 1973 specifically stated that expansion would not be allowed north of Fourteenth Avenue.¹⁰⁴ Yet in a map accompanying a further update in 1977, the whole of Victoria Park had been given over to the Stampede.¹⁰⁵ The area's integrity was threatened by other civic policies, which included a commitment to redevelopment rather than rehabilitation, in spite of contrary recommendations.¹⁰⁶ The proposed light rail transit system through the community was another potential dividing influence.

The Victoria Park issue entailed the reversion of private land to the City and a civic decision to deploy it in the Stampede's interests. In short, it was an initiative conceived and sanctioned by the City but executed by the Stampede. Yet the bulk of the public criticism fell on the latter. The Stampede was perceived as the architect of residential ruin far more than the City was. That the City had plans for a northerly expansion since 1960 did not figure in the public debate. Neither did the City's original proposal to absorb the entire community. The public was not aware of the haphazard decision-making or of the dereliction of



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duty by the City commissioners. As with Lincoln Park, the City was quite prepared to treat the Stampede like a private body instead of a junior partner. Interestingly, the Stampede made no effort to shift the burden of blame to the City. Given its elitist nature, it probably preferred "to take the heat" rather than admit chattel status.

Conclusion

Several broad conclusions follow from this discussion. First, it is undeniable that the Stampede's huge success in "selling" the city was due in large part to the co-operation it received from City Hall. However, the fact that the Stampede was able to operate at arm's length from the City when it came to policy making allowed the freedom and flexibility not enjoyed by similar institutions. For example, the structure of the Edmonton Exhibition made it far more susceptible to political interference.

The City never used its position to influence the Stampede. It could have done so easily through lease provisions. Yet no attempt has been made to effect change in Stampede priorities or practices, especially with respect to minority groups. It could be argued that the Stampede consciously freezes First Nations in time, in the interests of tourists.¹⁰⁷ For instance, Natives were asked not to wear glasses during the 1968 parade.¹⁰⁸ Do ethnic groups and women have restricted access to the portals of power within the Stampede? The year 1979 marked the first time a woman was elected to the board of directors or invited to the annual Stampede president's luncheon.¹⁰⁹ As late as 1995, only one woman sat on the Board of Directors. The interests of property and the Stampede would appear to count more than

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those of the poor and disadvantaged in Victoria Park. Though, arguably perhaps, the Stampede is now responding to these criticisms, the City's silence speaks volumes.

The city's "Cowtown" image, for good or bad, is closely linked to the Stampede. Through its support, the City has consciously endorsed this image. During the years of rapid growth between 1950 and 1970, Mayor Don Mackay was the Stampede's best publicity agent. His folksy correspondence to mayors and politicians in Canada and the United States were full of Stampede—and western—allusions. Other mayors in this period—such as Harry Hays, cattleman and founder of the popular Hays Stampede Breakfast, Grant MacEwan, agriculturalist and widely read western author, and home-grown Jack Leslie—grew up with horses and publicly advertised their strong identification with the western spirit. The civic support behind business participation in Stampede activities, the half-day civic holiday, and the willingness to adopt western civic symbols were all linked not only to a desire to support the Stampede but also to the image that it was trying to promote.

The Stampede's Board of Directors and the list of associate directors comprise an impressive aggregation of local business and social elites. Their ongoing interaction has produced a powerful coalition of interests, influence, and ideology that has advertised and even branded the city. The ideological dimension has particular relevance to the ranching and oil and gas industries. Each has always been interested in the other. Ranchers have been inveterate investors in the oil and gas industry, while the oilmen have always nurtured an ongoing fascination with ranching and the outdoor western ethos it embodies. The Stampede provides an urban forum where these two ideologically compatible groups can work together, and with the City to serve the common interest. In this sense, the civic emblem of the white stetson may have more validity than popularly imagined. Except, of course, it is not the cowboy who is wearing it. It is the rancher—and by extension the oilman who wants to be like him.

Notes

1. In the interests of brevity, the word Stampede will be used throughout this discussion to refer to the Exhibition and Stampede. It also the most common term used to identify the Exhibition and Stampede.
2. See Colin S. Campbell, "The Stampede: Cowtown's Sacred Cow," in *Stampede City: Power and Politics in the West*, ed. Chuck Reasons (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984), 103–120.
3. Rebecca Aizenman, the vociferous opponent of Stampede expansion in Victoria Park, wrote a long letter to the City asking for clarification on the relationship between the two.
4. Notes of Citizens' Meeting, Victoria Park, 4 December 1966, file 7200, box 262, Board of Commissioners Papers series V, City of Calgary Archives (CCA).
5. See Faye Reineberg Holt, *Awed, Amused and Alarmed: Fairs, Rodeos and Regattas in Western Canada* (Calgary: Detselig, 2003).
6. Alan F. J. Artibise, "Boosterism and the Development of Prairie Cities, 1871–1913," in *Town and City: Aspects of Western Canadian Urban Development*, ed. Alan F. J. Artibise (Regina: Canadian Great Plains Centre, 1981), 209–235.
7. Paul Voisey, "Boosting the Small Prairie Town, 1904–1933: An Example from Southern Alberta," in *Town and City*, 154–155.
8. Gerry Kearns and Chris Philo, eds., *Selling Places: The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1993); Philip Kotler, Donald H. Haider, and Irving Rein, *Marketing Places: Attracting Investment, Industry and Tourism to Cities, States and Nations* (Don Mills: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1993).
9. John R. Logan and Harvey Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
10. See Stampede, *2003 Report to the Community*. Tourist spending in Calgary in 2003 was estimated at \$900 million. In 2003, the Stampede's 1,500 permanent/part-time employees and 2,000 volunteers managed 450 events in Stampede Park and participated in numerous other community programs.
11. For good treatment of the early years, see Linda Christine English, "The Calgary Exhibition and Stampedes: Culture, Context and Controversy, 1884–1920" (master's thesis, University of Calgary, 1999).
12. File 27, box 3, and file 36, box 4, City Clerk's Correspondence, CCA.
13. Ernie Richardson to city commissioners, 12 November 1910, file 272, box 35, City Clerk's Correspondence.
14. The number of shareholders and directors has changed over the years. Currently, there are over 1,000 shareholders and a 25-member board of directors. The City now has three representatives—including the mayor—on the Stampede board, and the province, one.
15. Correspondence dated 8 October 1946, file E-1, box 48, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV.
16. Correspondence dated April 30, 1965, Board Submissions, Lincoln Park Expansion, file 4100.1, box 84, Board of Commissioners Papers series V, CCA.
17. Minutes of a Meeting Held at City Hall, 14 March 1960, file 175, box 22, Board of Commissioners Papers series V.
18. Mayor J. W. Mitchell to E. A. Cruickshank, commander Military District #13, 26 June 1912, file 403, box 50, City Clerk's Correspondence.
19. "Stampede Board Postings Spark First Bitterness on New Council," *Calgary Herald*, 20 October 1964.
20. Private poll taken by author in the summer of 2004. Well over one third of those polled believed that the Stampede was a private operation.
21. T. A. Hornibrook to Mayor Andrew Davison, 20 August 1943, file 44, box 8, City of Calgary Papers, CCA.
22. File 19, box 15, City of Calgary Papers, CCA.
23. Guy Weadick to Mayor J. Mitchell, 13 June 1912, file 403, box 50, City Clerk Correspondence.
24. Ernie Richardson to Mayor R. C. Marshall, 18 August 1919, file M–S, April–December 1919, box 89, Board of Commissioners Papers series I.
25. C. M. Baker, president, to E. A. Hookway, city comptroller, 26 February 1935, file 277, box 29, City of Calgary Papers.
26. File Calgary Exhibition Board 1972, file 1 of 2 in "Stampede: A Proposal for Long Range Development," box 71, Board of Commissioners Papers series VI.
27. File E-1, Stampede 1945–49, box 13, Board of Commissioners Papers series III.
28. Robert Konrad, "Barren Bulls and Charging Cows: Cowboy Celebrations in Copal and Calgary," in *The Celebration of Society: Perspectives on Contemporary Performance*, ed. Frank E. Manning (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Press, 1983), 161.

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29. Correspondence to mayor dated 17 July 1928, file 5, box 2, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Papers, Glenbow Archives, Calgary.
30. Minutes of the Calgary Industrial Exhibition Co. Ltd., 26 September 1923, box 1, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Papers. To be fair to Richardson, it should be added that he always equated the value of the Stampede with its success in advertising and coalescing the agriculture and livestock industries.
31. File 1 of 2, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede 1953–59, box 21, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV.
32. City Solicitor's Office to Commissioner Dudley E. Batchelor, 23 May 1958, file 1 of 2, Calgary Exhibition Board 1953–59, box 21, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV.
33. File Calgary Exhibition Board 1975, box 72, Board of Commissioners Papers series VI. The 1968 expansion agreement with the City was amended to allow the City to assume direct responsibility for securing the remaining land in the area, effective 5 October 1975.
34. File General Correspondence, Jan.–June, A–D, 1911, box 18, Board of Commissioners Papers series I.
35. Discussion on the Exhibition Bylaw 1632, 28 August 1913, Minutes of the Calgary Industrial Exhibition Co. Ltd., Glenbow Museum. As a result of wartime conditions, the first bonds on the bylaw could not be sold until after the war.
36. Henderson, Teare, and Waines, chartered accountants, "Stampede Limited: Examination of Accounts to Mayor and Council of the Corporation of the City of Calgary," 26 August 1943, file 2207, box 339, City Clerk Files, CCA.
37. Minutes of the Calgary Industrial Exhibition Co. Ltd., 22 January 1915, box 1, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Papers.
38. *Ibid.*, 20 October 1919.
39. Charles Yule, managing director, to Mayor Don Mackay, 2 June 1951, file E-1, box 48, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV.
40. Annual Report 1939, box 2, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Papers.
41. File Stampede Board 1980, box 73, Board of Commissioners Papers series VI.
42. File Stampede Board 1976, box 72, Board of Commissioners Papers series VI.
43. File Stampede Board 1978, box 72, Board of Commissioners Papers series VI.
44. File Calgary Exhibition Board 1978, box 73, Board of Commissioners Papers series VI.
45. City Council Motion, 17 December 1975, file Victoria Park 1976, box 17413, City Planning and Building Department series VIII, CCA.
46. Correspondence dated 26 May 1961, file 175, box 22, Board of Commissioners Papers series V; City Council Minutes, 5 April 1979, file Stampede Board 1979, box 73, Board of Commissioners Papers series VI.
47. Correspondence dated 2 May 1955, file E-1 1954–55, box 48, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV.
48. Correspondence dated 9 March 1955, file E-1 1954–55, box 48, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV.
49. The "non-conformities" concerned extensions to the grandstand in 1967. See correspondence of L. S. Walker, chief building inspector, to Commissioner Ivor Strong, 9 November 1967, file 125, box 22, Board of Commissioners Papers series V.
50. Maurice Brown to J. B. Cross, president Calgary Exhibition and Stampede, 11 January 1951, and Mayor Don Mackay to Maurice L. Brown, 18 January 1951, file E-1, box 48, Board of Commissioners Papers Series IV.
51. "Exhibition-Stampede Racket Flourishes at Expense of Taxpayers," *Spokesman*, 13 July 1932.
52. Correspondence dated 21 March 1947, file E-1, box 13, Board of Commissioners Papers series III.
53. Civic and Stampede Dinner Meeting, Fort Calgary House, 10 November 1964, file 4100.1, box 84, Board of Commissioners Papers series V.
54. Correspondence by Andrew Marshall, 20 August 1974, file 406, Rod Sykes Fonds, CCA.
55. Minutes of the Calgary Industrial Exhibition Co. Ltd., 26, 27 November 1911; also *Morning Albertan*, 27 November 1911.
56. Charles Yule to Mayor Andrew Davison, 12 August 1943. file folder 45, Box 8, City of Calgary Papers,
57. City Council Minutes, 16 August 1943.
58. "Suggest \$20,000 Fair Board Lease," *Calgary Herald*, 31 August 1943.
59. City Solicitor T. W. Collings to Mayor and Council, 20 August 1943, file 45, box 8, City of Calgary Papers.
60. Henderson Teare, and Waines, "Stampede Limited."
61. "Aldermen Probing Fair Board Rink," *Calgary Herald*, 17 August 1943; "Suggests \$20,000 Fair Board Lease," *Calgary Herald*, 31 August 1943.
62. "Fair Directors Ready To Quit," *Calgary Herald*, 8 September 1943.
63. Finance Director's Report, Annual Report 1943, box 2, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Papers.
64. R. B. Bennett to Ernie Richardson, 25 September 1912, Minutes of the Calgary Industrial Exhibition Co. Ltd.
65. Annual Report 1948, box 2, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Papers.
66. Calgary Exhibition Board 1953–59, file 1 of 2, box 21, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV.
67. For negotiations see file 4100.1, box 84, Board of Commissioners Papers series V. There have been accounts that Agriculture Minister Harry Hays had initiated the whole Lincoln Park sale in Ottawa on behalf of the Stampede. Evidence does not support this claim. In the summer of 1964, Hays was pushing for the municipal airport.
68. Crown Assets Disposal Corporation, the federal government's agency for disposing of unneeded assets, initially wanted \$1 million for the site. Deciding on the actual boundaries of the area and the need for provincial approval delayed the sale until November 1964.
69. Maurice Hartnett to city commissioners, 23 October 1964, file 4100.1, box 84, Board of Commissioners Papers series V. Hartnett urged haste and indicated that the board wanted to have the new site available by centennial year, 1967.
70. File E-1, file 1 of 3, box 48, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV. In 1951, General Manager Charles Yule told the City that the Stampede had reached its saturation point with respect to the numbers that the grounds could hold.
71. Meeting between City and Stampede Officials, 14 March 1960, file 175, box 22, Board of Commissioners Papers series V. Steel suggested that the expansion should extend as far north as Twelfth Avenue.
72. Board of Directors Meeting, 26 February 1963, Minutes of the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Board, 1961–76 (hereafter cited as Stampede Minute Book), box 2, CS.99.106, Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Archives.
73. Executive Committee Meeting, 16 October 1964, Stampede Minute Book. The CNR wanted \$690,000 for 20.63 acres. By this time the Stampede had expended around \$145,000 in purchase of ten properties.
74. File 4100.1, box 84, Board of Commissioners Papers.
75. City Council Minutes, 26 October 1964.
76. Board of Directors Meeting, 23 December 1964, Stampede Minute Book.
77. "City Holds Back on Stampede Bid," *Calgary Herald*, 27 October 1964.

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78. File 4001.1, box 84, Board of Commissioners Papers.
79. As the result of the influence of one of the directors, the radio and television broadcasts were free. See Executive Committee Meeting, 7 May 1965; James H. Gray, *A Brand of Its Own: The 100 Year History of the Stampede* (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1985), 152.
80. Gray, *Brand of Its Own*, 152.
81. Reports of meetings with Mount Royal officials, Executive Committee Meetings, 23 April, 5 May 1965 Stampede Minute Book.
82. "Report Picks ATCO for Lincoln Park"; "Stampede Bid for Lincoln Park Led Only in Intangible Benefits," *Calgary Herald*, 18 June 1965.
83. Commissioners' Report to Council, 16 June 1965, file 4001.1, box 84, City Commissioners Papers.
84. Special Board of Directors Meeting, 20 June 1965, Stampede Minute Book.
85. "Stampede Drops Lincoln Park Bid," *Calgary Herald*, 22 June 1965.
86. In March 1965 the Stampede Board issued a press release to the effect that its consultant, Gaylord Perry of Findlay, Ohio, had visited all the sites and had determined that Lincoln Park was the most suitable. Although details of these other sites were not given, mention had been made of the northeast near Sixteenth Avenue North and Highway 2, another near the Burns feedlot, in south Calgary, and another in the vicinity of Ogden.
87. Sites Planning Committee Meeting, 10 December 1965, Stampede Minute Book.
88. City Council Minutes, 25 March 1968; Commissioners' Report, 17 April 1968, file 7200, box 262, Board of Commissioners Papers series V.
89. File 175, box 23, Board of Commissioners Papers series V.
90. File Stampede Board 1976, box 72, Board of Commissioners Papers series VI. The 1968 agreement was amended effective 5 October 1975 to give the City the direct responsibility of acquiring land in the expansion area.
91. "Cockroaches Found in City's Suites," *Calgary Herald*, 6 March 1972.
92. Their fears were well founded. The construction of the Saddledome on Stampede property combined with further expansion plans effectively sealed the fate of Victoria Park.
93. Secretary's correspondence dated 4 December 1973, file 406, Rod Sykes Fonds. One wonders what a more persuasive approach might have achieved.
94. File V2, "The Future of Victoria Park," City of Calgary Planning Department, August 1971, box 17413, Planning and Building Department series VIII.
95. George Steber, director of planning, to Commissioner George Cornish, 21 March 1974, file 406, Rod Sykes Fonds.
96. File 175, box 22, Board of Commissioners Papers. See proposal by S. Flock and Company, 29 June 1967.
97. C. Kennedy to Mayor Jack Leslie, 30 May 1968, file Calgary Exhibition and Stampede No. 3, 1968, box 227, Board of Commissioners Papers series V; C. Kennedy to mayor and commissioners, 1 January 1968, file 7200, box 262, Board of Commissioners Papers series V.
98. Text of presentation to workshop on citizen participation, Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Quebec City, 24 May 1972, file Stampede 1972, file 2 of 2, Board of Commissioners Papers series IV. In her presentation, Aizenman castigated both the Stampede Board and the City as middle-class business elitists, and the Stampede as "a middle-class drunk or an anything-goes celebration"; Andrew Marshall, executive assistant to Rod Sykes, to R. J. Benoche, chairman, Victoria Park Family Centre Board, 4 December 1973, file folder 406, Sykes Fonds.
99. Confidential memo, 7 December 1973, Stampede Minute Book.
100. Meeting between City and Stampede officials, 14 March 1960, file Calgary Exhibition Board 1960, box 22, Board of Commissioners Papers series V.
101. Originally the City wanted the Stampede to expand from its present boundary on Seventeenth Avenue all the way to Twelfth Avenue.
102. The CMHC was already cutting back on urban renewal funding while the province wanted a lengthy and costly city-wide study to see if Victoria Park was the best choice for urban renewal.
103. *The Calgary Plan*, City of Calgary Planning Department, March 1970, 10.7.
104. *The Calgary Plan*, City of Calgary Planning Department, May 1973, 10.7.
105. *The Calgary Plan*, City of Calgary Planning Department, June 1977.
106. File 7200, box 262, Board of Commissioners Papers series V. See comments by both the Medical Board of Health and the chief building inspector on 21, 31 May 1965.
107. This point is argued in Marilyn Burgess, "Canadian 'Range Wars': Struggles over Indian Cowboys," *Canadian Journal of Communication* 18 (1993): 351-364.
108. File 125, box 23, Board of Commissioners Papers series V.
109. Cheryl Cornacchia, "A Lady among the Men," *Calgary Sun*, 12 July 1982. The pressure to change the rules for the president's luncheon was brought to bear by Alderman Naomi Whelan. See CAA, Ross Alger Fonds RG 2, #1061, correspondence between Naomi Whelan and Mayor Ross Alger, 30, 31 May, 7 June, and 23 July 1979. It was a breakthrough year for women. The year 1979 also saw the first female outrider in the chuckwagon races.