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Gene Homel

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studies. Rudy Ray Seward presents an overview of certain studies, contributes his own findings from an 1850-1880 national sample of the census, and speculates about what it all means. His approach and conclusions are open to criticism, but the book will certainly find a place in history and sociology courses and will challenge other scholars to make their own large statements.

Seward focused *The American Family* on two questions: "Has the American family made... a transition from the prevalence of extended families to a prevalence of nuclear families?"; and "What effect, if any, has the processes of industrialization and urbanization had upon family units?" After examining the work of Demos, Greven, Lockridge, Smith, and others for the colonial period, and his own evidence for the 1850-1880 period, Seward answers "no" and "very little," respectively. These responses are consistent with the thrust of recent thinking about the history of the family. Everyone now emphasizes the timeless dominance of the conjugal family unit. Earlier assumptions about families in traditional society had been based on an image of large extended units. This image has not stood the test of systematic research. It is now clear that the characteristic family structure has changed much less than traditionally thought, and the association of nuclear families with "modern" society is no longer tenable.

The catch-all concepts of industrialization and urbanization are dying a slower death. In recent years, they have been partially revived within the even more nebulous theory of modernization. Seward approaches this issue by examining census data drawn from the 1850-1880 enumerations. Using regression analysis, he rank-orders those aspects of family and household structure which are at least somewhat affected by measurable proxies for industrialization and urbanization. Specifically, Seward suggests that household size, number of children per family and family size were related to family characteristics such as parental occupation and real estate values, and community factors such as population density and percentage of the labour force in manufacturing. Since these variables only represent aspects of either the industrialization or urbanization processes, this analysis is far from complete, but Seward does apply sophistication and sensitivity to the nuances of family change within the general reality of continuity.

Unfortunately, Seward's examination of his own data composes only about forty per cent of the book (90 pages) and consequently leaves many possibilities unexplored and certain topics barely broached. For example, Seward does not enter the debate surrounding declining family size, and he bypasses the tremendous array of fertility studies on the nineteenth century. This lack of thoroughness may be considered the price of general statements about a topic, but a more rapid survey of the colonial literature and the deletion of a wandering final chapter on "quantitative social historians" would have lowered this price considerably. Nonetheless, it should be re-emphasized that this book will contribute significantly to the teaching of historical demography and in some measure should spark discussion in the field.

Chad Gaffield  
Department of History  
University of Victoria

Schiesl, Martin J. *The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America, 1880-1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Pp.ix, 259.

James Bryce, the keen British observer who condemned American urban government in 1888 as corrupt and inefficient, had modified his views by 1911. Speaking to a group of New Yorkers, Bryce maintained that "Your forms of government are far better over the country at large than they used to be.... In nearly all the cities the sky is brighter, the light is stronger." Martin Schiesl's *The Politics of Efficiency* shares this bright assessment. By the end of World War I most American cities were immeasurably more honest, efficient, and beneficial for all of their residents. The central force behind this improvement was a broad-based progressive reform movement, composed of businessmen, lawyers, and other professionals. Despite the movement's weaknesses and contradictions, Schiesl concludes that by "securing the basic reorganization of municipal administration along the lines of middle-class definitions of democracy and efficiency," it "bequeathed to later officials better methods of meeting problems of social control and community welfare."

*The Politics of Efficiency* is concerned with the nature of civic government. The chief merit of the book lies in its narrative of the forty-year campaign by progressive reformers and officials to subdue the boss-ridden corruption, inefficiency, and narrowness of late nineteenth-century cities by reforming the structures and functions of municipal government. Throughout this period there was an unmistakable evolution of reform ideas and goals. The maturation of the movement mirrored the growing attraction of business and professional elites to centralization, bureaucracy, and technical expertise as means to entrench their power.

At first, in the 1880s and 1890s, this attraction was tenuous at best. In examining this period of urban reform, Schiesl focuses on the Mugwumps' campaign against the partisanship and patronage characterizing machine politics. Electing a man to civic office because of his party affiliation, wrote a history professor in 1890, was "about as sensible as to elect him because he believes in homeopathy or has a taste for chrysanthemums." The older Mugwump ranks were joined by new professional men motivated by occupational loyalties and imperatives. Together, these reformers fought for a non-partisan concept of urban politics, and for the replacement of the patronage basis of hiring and firing by strict civil-service procedures. Reform mayors Hewitt and Strong of New York, Low of Brooklyn, and Pingree of Detroit sought to institute these measures and to strengthen the executive's functions within city administration. But reformers were politically weak and often unsuccessful; moreover, their means and goals appeared increasingly inadequate.

By the turn of the century, then, reformers shifted their attention from "the problem of getting more upright men to take part in city administration to the problem of how these men would best be able to govern effectively." Structural reformers determined to alter the basis of civic government along the lines of a centralized and technical bureaucracy. This could be seen in the career of the National Municipal League and numerous reform-minded mayors, such as Tom Johnson of Cleveland. Fiscal procedures were centralized and rationalized to prevent waste, equalize tax burdens, and advance more socially useful spending. Research and investigative bodies were established, mo-

delled on New York City's Bureau of Municipal Research. The commission form of administration was introduced and popularized between 1900 and 1910, and when reformers became disillusioned with it, they turned to the city-manager system, which "combined the supposed virtues of the strong executive and commission government and hence would facilitate the entrance of more professional administrators into municipal government." Finally, reformers enlisted specialized professionals to head departments, and greatly expanded and rationalized the city's social services. Many reformers by World War One interpreted the efficiency of civic order in terms of humanitarian facilities as well as fiscal soundness.

This account of urban reform's modernization drive is a familiar one, but Schiesl examines a number of significant contradictions within the reform movement. First, reform politicians were faced with the problem of being elected to office and remaining in power, which necessitated the marshalling of broad electoral coalitions. Mayors such as Pingree and Johnson, placed into office by elite-backed structural reformists, shifted to social-reform measures for mass support in order to compensate for a loss of elite support. Some reform politicians became backsliders insofar as the abolition of patronage was concerned. The most perceptive in their ranks realized that, both in the interests of efficiency and voter popularity, reform administrations had to assume social services provided by the bosses to ensure the support of the working class and immigrants. Moreover, there was the contradiction between centralized bureaucracy and the democratic protestations of reformers. Schiesl generally accepts at face value reformers' arguments that "efficiency meant a modernization of urban democracy rather than the destruction of popular government." Reformers were concerned with political results; these could only derive from a centralized and professionalized political process.

The book's primary concern is not the effects of this modernization upon the urban masses, but it does indicate a number of cases in which the efficiency drive harmed the immediate interests of working-class and immigrant residents. Patronage was an important avenue of advance for many of them. Hiring clerks, firemen, and labourers in over-abundance could be regarded as an early form of counter-cyclical public finance, but it was this sort of patronage that reformers sought to eliminate. In one case a Boston labour leader argued that slashing city payrolls hampered workers because such costs resulted from "direct employment of labor by the city, or giving municipal work only to fair contractors," and therefore were "sound economically and beneficial to the whole community." To take another example, commission government and the city-manager system, particularly when coupled with at-large elections, were both designed to reduce the election of working-class and lower middle-class candidates. These innovations thus aroused the ire of labour forces. Proposals for commission or manager administrations, as well as for civic research bureaus, were often initiated and bankrolled by businessmen. Reform clearly reduced representativeness in favour of "the business view of what was good for the community."

Schiesl acknowledges that the efficiency drive can be regarded as "a program to develop and insulate the power of emerging metropolitan elites from sustained pressures from the masses as expressed in machine politics." But he assumes that urban politics contain trade-offs. Despite bureaucratic pitfalls,

reform made it easier for organizations "representing all occupational classes to gain greater access to government without the intervention of the machine and with the assurance that their goals would be more readily achieved." By rationalizing democracy, reformers adapted it to the urban environment. Furthermore, they often instituted efficient and rationalized civic governments that paved the way for what Schiesl regards as today's competent, responsive, and humanitarian cities. Most of all, reformers promulgated "the concept of public responsibility for the welfare of all urban dwellers." By launching various social welfare measures, they demonstrated that "efficient government did not simply mean the retooling of administrative machinery to fit the needs of modern business. Governmental efficiency... also involved the creation of a modern system of social security for the urban masses" which encompassed child welfare, housing regulations, public health, and the like.

The assumption that the urban historian must analyze the trade-offs and net benefits in civic politics makes this book significant. Similarly, the author demonstrates that urban reform was not a monolithic movement, but contained contradictory methods and goals. Both features suggest useful modifications for the sharply critical literature on progressive reform of the last fifteen years. Schiesl's account, however, would be more valuable had he displayed more scepticism regarding reform's beneficial impact. He does not come to terms with the problem of why business reformers *did* desire hegemony over civic administration. The book might have sketched the broader goals and accomplishments of business within the class politics of urbanizing America. Those corporate capitalists referred to by Schiesl desired optimal economic inputs such as healthy public and private credit, expanded transportation links, and regularization of business-government relations. Advancements in civic social services likely owed as much or more to business needs for a contented and productive labour force than to efficient humanitarianism.

Gene Homel  
Department of History  
Simon Fraser University

Guterbock, Thomas M. *Machine Politics in Transition: Party and Community in Chicago*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp.xxii, 324. Tables, notes, bibliography, index. \$20.00.

The political machine of the late Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago is one of the best known and most studied political organizations in American history. At least four biographies of Daley have appeared in recent years, and numerous political scientists have analyzed the machine's nuts and bolts, from Harold Gosnell's *Machine Politics Chicago Style* (1937) to Milton Rakove's *Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers* (1975). Still, an element of mystery has always surrounded the Chicago machine's continued existence in an era when machine politics were supposed to be extinct. If the classic machine boss simply bought votes with jobs and favours, as is widely supposed, how does a boss survive today when the welfare state has made such material favours largely irrelevant? If a boss gained some of his power from primordial ethnic ties with transplanted peasants living in "urban villages," as another theory surmised, how does a boss continue to exist when the descendants of the immigrants