

## **Ward Heelers and Honest Men: Urban Québécois Political Culture and the Montreal Reform of 1909**

Alan Gordon

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Résumé de l'article

Alors que les érudits insistent souvent pour dire que le traditionnalisme, la vie rurale et l'anti-étatisme ont été les « éléments dominants » de la culture politique au Québec avant la Révolution tranquille, certains Québécois ont adhéré au progressisme au début du vingtième siècle. La réforme de l'administration municipale, l'un des fleurons du mouvement progressiste, a vu le jour dans la plus grande ville du Canada, Montréal loin d'être uniquement le fait des anglophones et de ce que restait du parti rouge du Québec, l'appui à la réforme est venu d'une bonne tranche de la population francophone de Montréal. Par l'analyse de la rhétorique qui avait cours dans les journaux montréalais à grand tirage durant la campagne référendaire de 1909, le présent article démontre la popularité de la réforme à Montréal et met à jour les principales doctrines du progressisme canadien-français. La culture politique du Québec urbain adapta, alors, la position de la ville à la culture québécoise et envisagea un rôle plus grand et plus actif de l'état dans la vie de la ville. Le fait dépasser outre à ces convictions a présidé à l'élaboration des hypothèses de base du libéralisme du début du dix-huitième siècle et, ce qui est surprenant pour une campagne référendaire, a été une façon de discréditer la composante « souveraineté populaire » contenue dans le réformisme nord-américain en général.

# ***Ward Heelers and Honest Men: Urban Québécois Political Culture and the Montreal Reform of 1909***

***Alan Gordon***

**Abstract:**

***While scholars often emphasize traditionalism, ruralism and anti-statism as the “dominants” of Quebec’s political culture prior to the Quiet Revolution, some Québécois embraced progressivism early in the twentieth century. Municipal government reform, one of the hallmarks of the progressive movement, cropped up in Canada’s largest city, Montreal. Far from being confined to anglophones and remnants of Quebec’s rouge party, support for reform came from a wide section of Montreal’s French-speaking population. This article analyzes the rhetoric employed by Montreal’s mass circulation newspapers during the referendum campaign of 1909 in order to demonstrate the popularity of reform in Montreal and to uncover the main doctrines of French-Canadian progressivism. Urban Quebec’s political culture, then, accommodated the position of the city in Québécois culture and envisioned an expanding and active state role in city life. Overriding these beliefs were the basic assumptions of early-twentieth-century liberalism and, curiously for a referendum campaign, a distrust of popular sovereignty characteristic of North American reformism in general.***

Only a few histories of Montreal during Canada’s first urban boom have been written. It is a paradox that an era in which urban questions were so profound has produced such meagre debate on the development of Canada’s largest city.<sup>1</sup> This is especially surprising considering that French Canadian boosterism had proponents as prominent as those of Ontario and the Prairies.<sup>2</sup> While much ink has been spilled over the political culture of French Canada, little has covered the political culture of urban French Canada, leaving a dangerous simplification of *québécois* culture that this article will attempt to correct. In essence, and contrary to historical stereotypes, at least some French Canadians in the early twentieth century, following the progressive, North American urban reform movement, actively supported both reformism and an active state role.

### ***Political Culture in Quebec***

Following the polemics of Michel Brunet, the character of *québécois* political culture prior to 1960 has been called *anti-étatiste*. Brunet attributed the fear of the state to a retarded classical liberalism among Quebec’s nineteenth-century francophone élite that emphasized Quebec’s traditional rural culture as its “vocation.” In an effort to counter the upheaval of urbanization and industrialization, these being phenomena of foreign inspiration, this traditional-minded élite turned the rural lifestyles into a defence against foreign domination.<sup>3</sup> In Denis Monière’s terms, the city “par son étrangeté, [était] l’espace des étrangers.”<sup>4</sup> Bernard Vigod attributes this view to attempts to explain and justify the Quiet Revolution through comparison with Quebec’s earlier backwardness.<sup>5</sup> Despite Vigod’s caution, Canada’s anglophone historians continue to implicitly accept Brunet’s characterization. For instance, although Ralph Heintzman searched for a corrective to

Brunet’s simplification, he supported French-Canadian ambivalence towards the state. In Heintzman’s scheme, various factors forced francophones away from modern economic development and into the liberal professions, resulting in a nineteenth-century employment crisis that, in turn, necessitated government patronage to maintain a reasonable standard of living. Thus the state became associated with partisan connections, producing a cynicism about politics that called for protection from political control of important social objectives.<sup>6</sup> Municipal affairs was one such area. For Heintzman, the Montreal reform movement of 1909 “both symbolized and reflected the continuing desire of a portion of Quebec’s élite to protect public administration from the ravages of electoral politics, a concern repeatedly frustrated by the realities of economic need experienced by the population as a whole.”<sup>7</sup> However, Heintzman ignores any sense that the reform of 1909 followed the tradition of municipal reforms carried out by more “progressive” provinces like Ontario, and the rest of anglophone North America. “Nonpolitical” municipal systems cropped up across the continent.

Studies of Quebec’s municipal *anti-étatisme* also borrow from the American model of urban corruption. In the age of American machine politics the immigrant vote was largely exploited for machine purposes.<sup>8</sup> As America’s urban immigrants tended to be Catholics, the notion of corrupt Catholicism developed. Apologists stress that a bias of the dominant society against the unsophisticated and unprotected made collective action into a form of protection. As the urban poor tended to be Catholic, it is all too easy to associate corruption with Catholicism.<sup>9</sup> This association crops up in some of the best works on Canadian municipal reform. One student of urban reform char-

**Résumé**

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acterized the Montreal combatants of 1909 in Manichaean terms. State restructuring was supported by "a reform coalition supported by many English voters, certain businessmen, and French Canadian progressives like Bourassa and Asselin." The opposition included "a mixed bag of opportunists who had the backing of most French Canadians, especially the clerical and artisan classes."<sup>10</sup>

Fernande Roy has recently criticized such single-minded approaches. In particular, she berates the recurrent notion of "monotheism" in the study of ideology. Work on political culture, she argues, has not given adequate thought to the fluidity and variety within *québécois* ideologies. Roy then proceeds to build a convincing case for the ascendancy of liberalism among Montreal's francophone business community at the turn of the century, without insisting on its universality.<sup>11</sup> Harold Kaplan's study of reformism in Montreal presents a similar subtlety. While describing the 1909 movement as English-dominated, he acknowledges its broad base of support. Moreover, he attributes the slow progress of reform to serious divisions in the ideological premises of over forty reform groups active in the city.<sup>12</sup> Jacques Mathieu and Jacques Lacoursière have also insisted on the variety of opinion in *québécois* society. Not only do societies develop over time, they argue, but they do so in a way that ignores disciplinary barriers. Thus, while in flux, many entwined streams of development can co-exist.<sup>13</sup> This seems to be a more fruitful premise from which to study the place of the municipal state in political culture, and provides a stronger theoretical background to the variety of responses to the municipal reform movement of 1909.

**The Montreal Tradition**

Like its Western and Ontarian counterparts, Montreal embraced the impulses of the progressive era. Rapid city growth, and an increased importance of urban issues, built awareness of corruption at City Hall. New social classes developed and expanded alongside the process of urbanization. Between the extremes of wealth and poverty emerged the new "white collar" middle class of clerical workers. Canadian industrial and financial sector amalgamations after 1900 produced a revolution in administration, a far-reaching change in the complexity and size of business practices. Canada's first big wave of mergers crested in 1909–1912, with Montreal at the centre of the movement. As companies merged and expanded, they required an ever-increasing army of clerks to handle the flows of information and paper that such operations demanded. Clerical employment grew steadily during the first decade of the century, especially in Montreal.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile urban and industrial growth built increased clout for the working classes. The largest city wards were all working class wards.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, Montreal's early annexations tended to bring more working class communities, like Hochelaga and Saint-Jean-Baptiste, into the city.<sup>16</sup> While the struggle between the affluent western wards and the poorer eastern wards characterized city politics, this division also reflected the ethnic division of Montreal.<sup>17</sup> Working-class annexations tended to involve predominantly-francophone communities. In Montreal, city politics and the "racial question" were intricately entwined.

Montreal municipal politics experienced a shake-up in the first decade of this century. Unrest over corruption at City Hall became open agitation. A group popularly known as the "Gang of 23," funded

by Rodolphe Brunet of the *Compagnie de Construction et de Pavages Modernes*, and led by Alderman Giroux, monopolized city contracts and subsidies. The judicial system worked along similar lines. Between 1905 and 1907, over 100 *hôteliers*, charged with liquor law infractions, paid their fines directly to the appropriate aldermen.<sup>18</sup> The policing of gambling and prostitution establishments followed the same guidelines.<sup>19</sup> The *Compagnie de Construction et de Pavages Modernes* was not, despite its name, a paving company. Rather, it was a firm set up to subcontract municipal paving and construction contracts at a profit of over fifty cents per yard.<sup>20</sup>

Reaction to such abuses had been brooding for some time, but various factors prevented the formation of a coalition of reformers until 1909-10.<sup>21</sup> By that time, however, abuses of patronage had become so great that the reform movement had recruited a number of prominent city figures. Former Mayor, Hormisdas Laporte and certain leading citizens organized a *Comité des Citoyens*, adding their voice to those of the Good Government Association, The Board of Trade, and the *Chambre de Commerce*, all of which had been lobbying against the rising costs of city administration.<sup>22</sup> Coordination of the effort benefitted from a great deal of cross representation on these bodies. Members of the *Comité* also sat on the other three organizations, as well as on the Montreal Businessmen's League and the Real Estate Owners' Association.<sup>23</sup> The *Comité des Citoyens* included men like Farquhar Robertson, a coal merchant and president of the Board of Trade for 1909.<sup>24</sup> Robertson, along with Victor Morin of the Real Estate Association and Charles Chaput of the Businessmen's League, petitioned the provincial government for an inquiry into the state of municipal affairs. Moreover, they asked for a change

in the city's administrative structure.<sup>25</sup> Quebec Premier Sir Lomer Gouin, a Montrealer sympathetic to the calls for honest and efficient government, could hardly ignore such demands while pledging the same for the provincial administration.<sup>26</sup>

Quebec's Legislative Assembly received the petition on 5 March, 1909. It became Bill 112, separate from the usual amending and maintenance of city charters in Bill 135. Thus, unlike previous amendments, this one dealt with the municipal state apart from the rest of urban affairs, suggesting that historians, following this division, ought to isolate municipal reform from the broader urban reform. Essentially, Bill 112 called for a referendum on reforming the Montreal state structure. Although little debated in the legislature, the proposal did not pass until 19 May, receiving assent ten days later.<sup>27</sup>

While the legislature studied the reform bills, Superior Court judge Lawrence John Cannon led a commission of inquiry that, beginning in April, was to report its findings in September, coinciding with the referendum. The inquest revealed a series of scandals at City Hall, each of which was prominently covered by the local press. The publicity fuelled the reform momentum. Although Cannon delayed his report to the middle of November, the public spectacle of the inquiry helped assure the outcome of the 20 September referendum. On 21 September, *La Presse* celebrated the triumph of "La Conscience Publique" on four pages.<sup>28</sup> Triumphant the victory seemed: close to 90% of the vote favoured the *Comité des Citoyens*. Never mind that only 34% of the electorate bothered to vote.<sup>29</sup>

What did that minority of the electorate support so overwhelmingly? The referendum put forward three motions: the reduction of the number of aldermen from

two to one per ward; the election of a Board of Control by the population at large; and the nomination of a municipal works commission by the City Council.<sup>30</sup> The latter two offered competing models for the new government structure: the Board of Control model suggested by the Board of Trade and the Technical Commission suggested by Alderman Louis-Audet Lapointe. The public sided with the first two and against the last. In effect this brought into being a system of government that had been popularized across North America. Ward heeling would subside by cutting in half the number of aldermen per ward. The Mayor and twenty-two aldermen sat on a council as before, but with greatly reduced powers. The Board of Control, consisting of four Commissioners elected by the city as a whole rather than by ward or district, prepared the city budget which could be ratified, but not altered, by the Council. Similarly, the Board took over control of appointments to the administrative service and the tendering of public works contracts.<sup>31</sup>

Did "le régime des honnêtes gens" sweep out corruption at City Hall? Montreal's famous satirist, Stephen Leacock, characterized the hypocrisy of the whole movement, and its outcome in particular, in his "The Great Fight for Clean Government." The following statement is typical:

And as they talked, the good news spread from group to group that it was already known that the new franchise of Citizen's Light was to be made for two centuries so as to give the company a fair chance to see what it could do. At the word of it, the grave faces of many bondholders flushed with pride, and the soft eyes of listening shareholders laughed back in joy. For they had no doubt, or fear, now that clean government had come. They knew what the company could do.<sup>32</sup>

Mr. Leacock's black humour reveals more than his cynicism. A look at the composition of the first Board of Control supports his depiction. The *Comité des Citoyens* ran a slate of candidates in the subsequent election. They captured all four Board positions, most Council seats, and the mayoralty. If Commissioner Dupuis is an example, Olivar Asselin was right to call for a close scrutiny of the contributors to the "Citizen's Fund."<sup>33</sup> Dupuis was a financier with interests in utilities and land speculation, as well as a major department store.<sup>34</sup>

While the Board of Control did improve the city's water supply and eliminate the worst abuses of patronage, administrative costs and taxes did not benefit from the new structure. Moreover, the city's paving contracts simply shifted to the affluent western wards, suggesting that a western "faction" had taken control.<sup>35</sup> Nor were the exactions of the great franchise holders corrected. The street railway and utility corporations, thanks in part to connections with the new Board of Control, continued to function as they had before the reform. Perhaps the costs of bribery had merely become too high, and the bribers had seized the opportunity to take control themselves.<sup>36</sup> Eventually disillusionment set in and enthusiasm for the reform ebbed.<sup>37</sup> It is interesting to note that Guy Bourassa, "the foremost student of Montreal politics," saw the election of Méric Martin as Mayor, in 1914, as the real restructuring of the personnel of municipal politics.<sup>38</sup> However, the Montreal press knew nothing of this, fully expecting the reform to usher in historic change in civic politics.

### **Theory and Method**

The popular press, or mass-circulation newspapers, was instrumental in the reform debate. Newspaper coverage of the Cannon Commission sensationalized the

corruption at city hall, and editorials debated the merits of the reform proposals. Before the arrival of the electronic media, information travelled chiefly through the daily newspaper, making newspapers an essential component of Canadian political debates. *La Presse*, with nearly 100,000 readers per day, demonstrates the influence potential of the popular press. While *La Presse* was Canada's largest, and possibly most influential, newspaper, it was not alone in the field. *La Patrie* and *Le Canada* were two of Montreal's larger papers. For this article, the coverage of these three largest representatives of the popular press, along with *Le Nationaliste*, the influential weekly voice of the *Ligue nationaliste*, was examined exhaustively from April to September 1909. Smaller newspapers, such as *La Croix* or *Le Bulletin* provide support and evidence of counter-currents of the debate.

Although political activists directed most newspapers, it would be incorrect to tie a newspaper's ideology too closely to its political alliance. As newspapers deal in language, their choice of words gives the clearest picture of their ideological position. The rhetoric of newspapers thus represents the surest and quickest avenue into the exchange of ideas within the culture of turn of the century Montreal. Moreover, the wide readership of the popular press allows for a broad dispersal of specific language patterns propagating a wide exposure of a given ideological slant.<sup>39</sup>

However, newspapers also pose some problems for the historian who would use them as an indicator of popular exchange. As Gilles Bourque and Jules Duchastel note, discourse is strategic.<sup>40</sup> Any analysis of the language surrounding a particular question must be aware of the strategic value of including or omitting particular ideas.<sup>41</sup> Rhetoric, rather

than the more rigid structures of discourse analysis, reveals the shared assumptions of combatants in a given field. Through attention to the shared characteristics of the debate, the underlying ideological assumptions of the politically active segment of the public become clear. Each of these assumptions, notably popular sovereignty and liberalism, will be examined in turn.

### **Popular Sovereignty**

The concept of popular sovereignty is bound to come out in a referendum campaign; it figured prominently in the reform rhetoric. Even reform opponents could not escape the appeal to the people. Alderman Giroux originally cautioned that the masses could not make a proper decision on the issues, but later backtracked and, in a circular argument, suggested that no referendum should be held because the people had not asked for one.<sup>42</sup> Some aldermen had good reason to fear the referendum. *La Presse* cited majority opinion as the chief reason for reducing the number of aldermen.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, it defended its early opposition to the Board of Control proposal on that body's likelihood of usurping popular sovereignty:

Avec le projet du "Board of Trade" on enlève, pratiquement, toute autorité administrative aux représentants des quartiers, aux échevins. Le peuple compte plus. Avec le projet Lapointe, ou la Commission Technique, on améliore de 1000 pour cent la situation actuelle à l'hôtel de ville, sans rien diminuer l'influence populaire.<sup>44</sup>

Similarly, *La Patrie* claimed that the Technical Commission ought to be responsible to the Council, "c'est-à-dire aux représentants du peuple."<sup>45</sup> And *Le Nationaliste*, in choosing between the Board

of Control and Technical Commission, asked a question of popular sovereignty:

Le peuple croit-il que ses échevins doivent être contrôlés, et, dans l'affirmation, quelle sorte de contrôle croit-il le plus opportun de leur imposer?<sup>46</sup>

After all:

D'après nos principes de gouvernements, il est entendu que c'est la majorité qui gouverne, et cela est parfaitement juste.<sup>47</sup>

*Le Canada*, whose owner had proposed the referendum, most forcefully defended popular sovereignty, using it as the rallying cry for the entire campaign.<sup>48</sup> Differing with its main competitors, *Le Canada* distinguished between the Board of Control and the Technical Commission on the grounds of popular control throughout the campaign. The Board of Control "... étant élu par le peuple, sera responsable directement au peuple. La commission des Travaux Publics nommée par le conseil, ne serait responsable qu'au conseil."<sup>49</sup>

However, the press did not champion popular sovereignty as universally as these examples suggest. An element of authoritarianism lurked in the reform discourse. *La Patrie*, for example, saw the sovereignty of the people as subject to a higher control:

*La loi donne au peuple de Montréal le droit, le pouvoir de le détruire, de doter la ville d'une administration nouvelle offrant toutes les garanties possibles de bon gouvernement...*<sup>50</sup>

*La Presse* saw legitimate restrictions on popular sovereignty. Aside from restrictions on the use of referenda, the government administration should be insulated

from popular control. The following statement gives *La Presse's* early position:

Un des grands avantages de la Commission technique réside dans le fait que ses membres ne seront pas désignés au hasard d'une élection coûteuse, mais seront choisis avec soin parmi les hommes les plus compétents dans les travaux publics de toutes sortes.<sup>51</sup>

In essence, *La Presse* favoured a technocracy. The Commission, responsible to the Council, which was in turn responsible to the people, preserved popular control, albeit a step removed. The suggestion that election results are random belies a lack of faith in popular sovereignty. Harold Kaplan outlines how Canadian reformers tended to view experts as a counter to the excesses of democracy (ward-healing and pork barrelling). The better qualified, disinterested professional administrator, in theory, had a clearer view of the general interest of the city and, in such matters, the public ought to defer to his judgement.<sup>52</sup>

Despite these calls for elite accommodation through respect for technocratic skills, the francophone notion of the expert was somewhat fuzzy. Unlike their American counterparts, francophone reformers eschewed expert opinion. Neither technocrat opinion, nor technocrats were discussed in the press.<sup>53</sup> Men with no special claim to urban mastery represented expertise. Olivar Asselin, Henri Bourassa, Senator Dandurand, Louis-Audet Lapointe, and the editors of the popular press were the key experts. These same individuals offered opinions on every other public matter. In short, they were public figures, not experts. The Cannon Commission's discrediting of the obvious municipal experts, aldermen and city employees, partly explains this phenomenon. Yet, while the rhetoric

shunned expert opinion, at the same time it called for more expert participation. The Technical Commission, comprised of the best civic employees, would be an expert body advising the Council. Business experts, the organizational leaders of the reform movement, fully expected to elect their own to the reconstituted state. Thus the triumphs of the expert and of enterprise coincided. However, as the Montreal reform movement tried to paint such experts as non-political—indeed this was their claim to legitimacy—it avoided involving them in the campaign. The expert in scientific management, having been called to work by the referendum, preserved democracy by preventing its abuses and serving the public interest.

The form of popular sovereignty envisioned also says something about the ideology of the Montreal newspapers. Moreover, it says a great deal about the municipal state in *québécois* political culture. Popular sovereignty, the reformers stressed, is not expressed solely through direct popular appeals like referenda, the structure of a state also influences the extent of its democracy. The municipal state was presented in two main stages: pre-reform and post-reform. The post-reform state, then, appeared in two democratic models: one Parliamentary, the other Congressional.<sup>54</sup> *Le Nationaliste* strongly favoured a Congressional style system of checks and balances.<sup>55</sup> Such a system, instituted through the separate selection of Aldermen and Controllers, would make a majority in each "body" more difficult to ensure, thereby reducing corruption.<sup>56</sup> This surveillance of each body by the other, a practice of mutual supervision, would, according to *Le Canada*, ensure successful, clean government.<sup>57</sup>

On the other hand, parliamentary models most often appeared in a negative fash-

ion. Admittedly, reformers often imagined the Council and Board of Control to be legislative and executive branches of government.<sup>58</sup> But, they frequently confused this split for the American checks and balances system. *La Presse* even argued against the institution of parliamentary control:

Toutes décisions, rapports, recommandations du Bureau de Contrôle, concernant une dépense d'argent, l'octroi de contrats, l'acceptation des soumissions, l'achat du matériel, etc. ... tout cela doit être soumis au Conseil, aux échevins qui peuvent les accepter, les rejeter ou les amender à volonté ... avec la majorité simple ou la majorité absolue.<sup>59</sup>

No scheme of reform entrusted the control of money, the prerogative of elected assemblies in a parliamentary system, to the Council. But this, according to *La Presse*, was a product of the distinctions between the levels of the state. The Board of Control was like a Parliament, but without popular control:

Il faut dire que le Bureau de Contrôle agirait auprès du Conseil comme le ministère auprès de la Législature. Lorsqu'il y a un conflit entre le Cabinet et la Législature, il y a appel au peuple, et c'est le peuple qui tranche la question. Si le Bureau de Contrôle ne s'entendait pas avec le Conseil de ville, c'est celui-ci qui aurait raison, sans qu'il y eût besoin d'en appeler au peuple.<sup>60</sup>

*La Presse* was speaking here of a motion of confidence in the assembly. However, parliamentary government of the sort understood by *La Presse* functioned on the basis of parties. Yet, *La Presse* had an interesting view of the party system:

Nous disons "sur le principe" des partis politiques sans nécessairement y faire entrer les éléments "rouge" ou "bleu." Toutes autres choses pourrait servir à des organisations bien définies.<sup>61</sup>

Clearly, *La Presse* saw differences between the requirements of the provincial state and those of the municipal state. They did not need to be structured by the same principles.

On the other hand, reformers universally denounced the "régime actuel," or pre-reform state. No one compared it to democratic models, emphasizing its undemocratic characteristics. This was part of the strategic nature of rhetoric. Discussion of the structure in place before the referendum focused instead on the need for change. The alleviation of the rampant patronage exposed by the Cannon Commission was the most obvious reason for reform.<sup>62</sup> However, Cannon's work was not necessary to reveal the extent of patronage, and *Le Nationaliste* expressed concern that the *Comité des Citoyens* had appropriated it for its own gain.<sup>63</sup>

Another reason for reforming the state followed from the first: expense and inefficiency. Reformers connected these two ideas more closely than maladministration and patronage. The business experts of the reform campaign understandably demanded fiscal responsibility, but the popular press was no less demanding. Differing with its competitors, *Le Canada's* support for fiscal restraint turned it to the business-style reforms of the Board of Control long before *La Presse* or *La Patrie* came on side.<sup>64</sup> Efficiency closely mirrored business. However proponents of the Technical Commission also stressed economy and efficiency: *La Presse*, favouring the Commission in the early phases of the

debate, subordinated popular sovereignty to savings, claiming that elections would be costly.<sup>65</sup> In economic matters, the popular press fell into line with economic liberals from the *Ligue nationaliste* to radical *rouges*.

### **Liberalism**

Fernande Roy characterized the study of liberal ideology as a search for a system of symbolization revealing the understood definition of man and society. Her study of the ideology of francophone businessmen described its main tenets as individualism, private property and a strict separation of private affairs from the public interest.<sup>66</sup> Such a characterization of liberalism agrees with the broadly defined ideology of liberalism outlined most notably in the works of John Stuart Mill. Mill's summary of liberalism includes three key doctrines: a faith in individualism as the source of human well-being; an airtight division between public and private interests; and the sanctity of private property. To these three, Mill added the principle of utility, the test of the greatest good for the greatest number, as the measure of all ethical questions.<sup>67</sup> The analysis of the reform rhetoric reveals similar sentiments among the francophone popular press.

Reformers premised their rhetoric on the concept of the liberal individual. Although the popular press rarely discussed the notion of the individual, it never questioned individualism. *La Patrie* condemned "the vestiges of the seigneurial system" as an infringement on individual rights.<sup>68</sup> *La Presse*, in a clear endorsement of the liberal principle, denounced the idea of property tax paying corporations voting in local elections because the right to vote belonged only to individual citizens.<sup>69</sup> *Le Canada* even individualized the entire mass of municipal corruption, frequently blaming

it all on Alderman Giroux.<sup>70</sup> Individualism also appeared in the major tourist extravaganza of September 1909, Back-to-Montreal Week. This week-long festival, designed to promote Montreal commerce by encouraging former residents of the city to return for a visit, was only loosely connected to the reform campaign. Only one reform proponent linked the two events, but the rush of civic pride could only aid the reform forces.<sup>71</sup> On the surface, Back-to-Montreal Week was a simple tourist event: newspaper coverage centred on the enormity of the crowds at festivities such as fireworks displays, tours of the city and a parade in which “les diverses grandes maisons de commerce de Montréal avaient leurs représentants dans la procession.”<sup>72</sup> However, the newspaper coverage managed to separate individual tourists from the masses that tramped through the city. Articles highlighted specific visitors, like Madame Mainwaring of Yokohama, Japan.<sup>73</sup> A broader effort at individualizing the masses was the practice of printing the names and hotels of many of the tourists.

Similarly, reform editorials and articles generally did not discuss individualism openly, but left traces of it in other subjects. One such subject, also central to the reform rhetoric, was the concept of community. Liberal communities, much like John Locke envisioned, are collections of autonomous individuals; the reform rhetoric defined community less clearly. If the community obviously included Montreal, the precise definition of Montreal was less obvious. Some saw Montreal as the entire urbanized area of the Island of Montreal, a forerunner of a metropolitan community, making annexations the “liberation” of the suburbs.<sup>74</sup> However, political boundaries necessarily left such ideas on the periphery of the discussion. After all, municipal government reform concerned only the city of

Montreal proper, allowing the popular press to define community more abruptly than in the dialogue on wider reforms.

This clarity also permeated discussions of relations between Montreal and other communities. Montreal required autonomy, much as the province required autonomy within Canada. Reformers did not use municipal autonomy in the same manner as traditionalists would later use autonomy to keep Quebec out of national welfare schemes, however they also subordinated the desirability of reform to local autonomy. Where the city could reform without provincial intervention, autonomy ought to be guarded.<sup>75</sup> Any concept of community likely involves some version of community autonomy. Like the nation and its claim to self-determination, a community can only constitute itself in opposition to that which it holds to be external; a sense of the “other” is essential to the construction of any community. Moreover, such conceptions often formulate the “other” as more than alien—almost as hostile—in order to maintain the integrity of the community. Autonomy allows the community to distinguish itself by revealing its ability to act in pursuit of common goals. In the case of Montreal, the remainder of the province was external, therefore any action by the provincial assembly, which had only six Montreal members, had to be curtailed. What Heintzman saw as the removal of municipal affairs from political influence was only the logical extension of the concept of municipal autonomy, a commitment that lasted at least until the 1920s.<sup>76</sup>

Representations of a community often reinforce the legitimacy of political power. In the case of Montreal, the existing local political authority had been discredited and therefore was excluded from the notion of community. Aldermanic abuses that had victimized “les citoyens” cre-

ated a barrier between community and alderman.<sup>77</sup> If aldermen were external to the community, the hypothetical members of the Board of Control, in contrast, would be drawn from the community. Like the aldermen, Labour leaders were also outsiders, even if the working class was part of the larger community. Class, thus subsumed to community, was only legitimate when in concert with the general interest of the city. In this way, the reform rhetoric pushed potential oppositional leaders to the margins of the notion of community, and presented reformers as the only legitimate authority in the city.

The most fruitful representation of communities within the city was the concept of race. Race, as understood by Canadians at the turn of the century, was the primary divider of humanity into its largest groupings. *Fin-de-siècle* conceptions of race were substantially different from today's notions. Montrealers of 1909 used race to distinguish between Canadians of British stock and Canadians of French stock. By this definition, Montreal was a city of two main races, and race, consequently, figured in local politics. Despite many attempts to minimize its importance, the reform debate was no exception. Nevertheless, proponents of reform, understanding that racial division could seriously hurt the movement, generally sought to minimize the racial question.<sup>78</sup> Consequently, the majority of the popular press was unwilling to launch racial accusations. Many papers praised Senator Dandurand for denouncing the anti-reformist use of the race question. Similarly, the anglophone reform rhetoric claimed that English Canadian voters would happily vote for any honest and competent *individual*, regardless of race.<sup>79</sup> Individualism soothed potential racial squabbles. Moreover, reform opponents unwittingly supported such an idea: Rodolphe Brunet justified his excesses of patronage



on his excess of patriotism. His purpose had been to ensure that the city's contracts went to French Canadians, the city's majority.<sup>80</sup> About the same time, one weekly claimed that the Board of Control reform was an anglophone plot to control the city.<sup>81</sup> While reformers generally denied this possibility, *Le Nationaliste* was less certain, asking "Est-il vrai que l'institution du bureau de contrôle est une manoeuvre de la minorité anglaise pour reprendre dans l'administration civique la suprématie qu'elle a perdue et qu'en votant le projet nous ne ferons que tirer pour elle les marrons du feu?"<sup>82</sup> Moreover, a Board of Control split between anglophones and franco-phones, would only hurt the latter. Olivier Asselin agreed with Brunet that franco-phones had borne the brunt of Cannon Commission's criticism of municipal corruption.<sup>83</sup>

The racial issue was more volatile than the reform rhetoric admitted. The Technical Commission, involving a commission of the senior municipal employees appointed by the Council to advise on public works (and executing those works independently of the Council) was the brainchild of the francophone Alderman Lapointe. *La Presse* supported it because, not being subject to elections, racial quarrels would be less likely to erupt than in more directly democratic bodies.<sup>84</sup> Although *La Presse* and *La Patrie* rushed to support Lapointe's proposal over the anglophone Board of Trade's proposal for a Board of Control, they had to change when, at the last minute, Lapointe denounced his own idea and backed the Board of Control. Orphaned, the Technical Commission also lost its two strongest friends.<sup>85</sup> Yet, despite its claims to seek racial harmony, *La Presse* distinguished between Lapointe's "Commission technique" and "le proposal du 'Board of Trade'" until it opted for the latter. Only two newspapers openly

claimed the obvious: the Board of Control proposal was an English Canadian proposal, both in its inspiration in Toronto and in its main proponents, the Board of Trade. In countering this drawback, reformers relied on liberal individualism to override the collectivity of race.

Social class is another attempt to represent community. As with race, proponents of reform subordinated class to community, while opposing groups tried to reveal a divide between class interests and those of the reform campaign. Labour activists used such arguments most frequently. In fact, Labour saw the reform program as a ploy by Montreal's capitalists to reduce the costs of bribery. Arguing that the Board of Control would be no more than a smaller city council, and thus easier to corrupt, Labour leaders urged a rejection of the proposals. Furthermore, the reduction of the number of aldermen would weaken the voice of working-class wards in government, as well as reducing any likelihood of electing a worker to the Council.<sup>86</sup> However, the authors of the "Workers' Manifesto" chose to phrase their concerns in liberal terms. Aside from the persistent use of the expression "working class," the Labour Manifesto did not divert appreciably from the rhetoric of the major papers. It focused on such concepts as the corruptibility of individuals, municipalisation of utilities, and the costs of the change. Three points must be made here. By publishing in *La Presse*, the Labour Manifesto had to follow the guidelines of the paper. Secondly, the *Parti ouvrier* in Montreal was not a socialist organization, thus its acceptance of liberal principles need not be contradictory.<sup>87</sup> Lastly, acceptance of some liberal concepts does not necessarily imply acceptance of all. One cannot assume that the dominated ideology is just the inverse of the dominant ideology.<sup>88</sup>

Labour was not the only agent to make use of the concept of class. The popular press, in a typically liberal understanding of class, also presented itself as the friend of the working man. The working classes, as part of the larger community, were manipulated into a false consciousness. The true consciousness being city-, not class-based, reform opponents attempted to "use" Labour to swallow their adversaries.<sup>89</sup> *La Presse* outlined its dispute with Labour opposition to reform in dubious terms:

Quelle différence entre l'Eglise qui élève les travailleurs pour eux-mêmes et l'agitateur cupide qui les souleva pour s'élever, lui, tout seul!<sup>90</sup>

The removal of the property qualification, coupled with a community spirit, would permit the election of any citizen, even a worker. Nonetheless, organized labour consistently counselled against voting for the reforms, something that any proclamation of unanimous support for reform ignored.<sup>91</sup>

While *La Patrie* sought to avoid any class struggle, it was willing to accommodate class in the make-up of society.<sup>92</sup> After all, if the referendum failed, "ce sera par la faute des ouvriers qui représentent certainement la majorité de l'électorat."<sup>93</sup> However, *La Patrie* never implied that class was a stronger identity than the larger community of the city. In the same article it maintained that worker interests were in conjunction with the general interests of the city, thus making itself the voice of the working class, and implying a unity of the workers with the larger community.<sup>94</sup> Even the radical *Le Canada* included class in its understanding of society, but as a category rather than as a formulation. Unlike a formulation, a category is artificial and cannot develop a consciousness.<sup>95</sup> Thus while it was possible to speak of a "classe

dirigeante," *Le Canada* meant this only as a useful simplifier.<sup>96</sup>

If the sense of community of the reform discourse was fluid, it was dominated by the spirit of individualism. And yet, collective identities can be seen creeping into the francophone notion of the self. Community, as a concept, reconciled collective identities with liberal individualism. Communities exist at various levels; individuals were to act as members of the most general community affected by a given issue. As municipal maladministration affected all residents, particular interests ought to give way to the general good. On the other hand, issues affecting a single ward ought to be left to that ward.<sup>97</sup> John Cooper argued that inertia alone kept the ward system in place, but ward representation reconciled the local interests within the city with the general interest.<sup>98</sup> Similarly, the legitimacy of the Labour movement went unquestioned, even if its leadership remained illegitimate.<sup>99</sup> The collectivity of race was the premise of the *Ligue nationaliste*, setting the *Ligue* apart from other North American progressives by its desire to reconcile the collectivity of race with the individualism of economic liberalism.<sup>100</sup> The reform rhetoric reveals that the place of the individual in society, while still dominant, slowly adapted to the mass culture of the twentieth century.

Similar adaptations can be seen in the attitudes of reformers towards two other aspects of liberalism: the airtight division of public and private spheres, and the sanctity of private property. In adapting these liberal doctrines from their "retarded" classical formulations, reformers relied heavily on the language of utility. The rhetoric's vision of the structure of the municipal state, and more importantly its role, demonstrates how the premise of separate public and private spheres of activity evolved. The role of the state

points to the dividing line between public and private. Classical liberalism, of the type Brunet and Heintzman expected, favours a limited state. The example of Back-to-Montreal Week supports such an assumption. Nearly the entire programme of events was planned, advertised, and paid for by private initiative. Nonetheless, much like the *Ligue nationaliste*, many advocates of reform blended such *laissez-faire* attitudes with a corporatist and progressive view of society. Olivar Asselin's argument in favour of public utility ownership was not the only endorsement of such an active state.<sup>101</sup> As the reform debate raged, the City of Montreal discussed buying a private utility, the Montreal Water and Power Company, which fed water and power into four city wards. The francophone press generally supported the idea. *La Presse* called for "l'achat immédiate par la ville de la 'Montreal W. and P. Coy.'"<sup>102</sup> *La Patrie*, while calling for a referendum, also supported the proposal.<sup>103</sup> However, this was not the only municipal role envisioned. *La Patrie* wanted the city to take a more active part in the leisure of its citizens, putting parks in every ward and funding public concerts.<sup>104</sup> Meanwhile, *Le Canada* favoured a permanent public commission to supervise utilities, and was well disposed towards the municipalization of the Montreal Water and Power Co.<sup>105</sup> Despite a reputation for radical liberalism, *Le Canada's* owner Godfroy Langlois, and his allies in the Provincial Cabinet, were not strangers to state expansionism.<sup>106</sup> Thus the example of minimal state activity in Back-to-Montreal Week did not hold up throughout the rhetoric.

The francophone press gave every indication that it favoured a more active municipal state.<sup>107</sup> As Heintzman suggested, francophones tried to protect city administration from patronage and political interference, but not in the man-

ner he anticipated. Rather than insulate the municipal state from provincial manipulation, though such an effort can be seen in demands for local autonomy, francophone Montrealers attempted to reform the state to prevent factionalism from dominating political activity. In so doing, they expressed a rather instrumentalist view of the state. The municipal state, a tool in the hands of a dominating faction, needed reforms to protect the people from trusts and interests. A checks and balances system, favoured in the reform rhetoric, would keep civic politics in the public eye, as "corrupteurs et corrompus n'ont pas de pire ennemi que la discussion publique."<sup>108</sup> Public discussion of the role of the municipal state emphasized two competing goals of government activity: to protect the citizens and to improve the general welfare. Reformers often portrayed the Board of Control as "ce bureau protecteur."<sup>109</sup> *La Croix* saw the protection of rights as the purpose of the state.<sup>110</sup> After the success of the referendum, *L'Événement's* only comment was that "le peuple de Montréal s'est uni pour se protéger."<sup>111</sup>

The airtight compartments separating public from private began to wear through in the first decade of the twentieth century. Power production and distribution increasingly slipped from the private realm of property to the public realm of social need. In this slide, utilitarian principles guided the rhetoric through the difficult task of maintaining the principles of liberalism. State interference with private property had to follow the general interest of the community. *La Croix* phrased its qualification of property rights in terms that would have brought a smile to the lips of John Stuart Mill:

Autrefois le droit d'expropriation n'était accordé que pour les fins d'utilité publique.<sup>112</sup>

Nationalists supported public utility ownership for the greater good it would accomplish in redressing past abuses of power.<sup>113</sup> This utilitarian thread ran through the reform debate: Board of Control elections would promote the general interest and the greatest good; four-year tenures of office, coupled with a requirement of full-time dedication, promoted a long run view of administration.<sup>114</sup> While the rhetoric did not involve anything so exact as Bentham's Calculus, it did employ the general principles of utility.

The public-private dichotomy also appears in the idea of public service, a concept that presumes a separation of public and private spheres. Thus, when *Le Nationaliste* argued that municipal employees, as public servants, owed their allegiance to the public, it assumed that corruption subverted this public duty.<sup>115</sup> Similarly, reformers presented the elected members of the Board of Control as public servants, preferable to "les échevins professionnels" who had corrupted the notion.<sup>116</sup> The idea that only the Board of Control could redress corruption united reform with the ideal of public service. Thus, the liberal ideal of government as public service encouraged acceptance of reform.

The rhetoric on municipal reform demonstrates that, while the popular press shared many assumptions, within these assumptions there was room for divergence. Often the same paper or individual held divergent views. The wide audience of newspaper readership opened the reform rhetoric to a variety of elements in Montreal's political culture. Within its range were such concepts as direct democracy, representative government and technocracy. All, however, clustered around a liberal discourse. While the primacy of the individual was generally assumed, collective identities were able to co-exist with individualism

at different points in the rhetoric. Popular sovereignty was both upheld and feared. Human interaction was divided between public and private spheres, guided by utilitarian principles. But, like the nature of utilitarianism, these categories were not always easy to separate. Quebec was not stuck in Brunet's retarded classical liberalism, but ideology in Montreal was in a state of flux. The focus on the metropolis has obviously slanted the evidence towards a confirmation of the recent emphasis on progressivism.<sup>117</sup> However, even in Montreal, lingering antecedents and developing precedents can be found alongside the dominant ideology.

### *Amérique française ?*

By the early twentieth century, English Canadian liberalism and some collective activities had become compatible.<sup>118</sup> For instance, business worked collectively through organizations like the Canadian Manufacturers Association, and bureaucratization implied a qualified acceptance of collective action. The reform rhetoric's similar accommodation of certain forms of collective action demonstrates that English- and French-Canadian liberalism experienced similar developments. Despite this, Canadian intellectual history continues to depict *québécois* intellectual traditions as more European than North American. Francophone leaders such as Olivar Asselin and Henri Bourassa, so the depiction asserts, toiled oblivious to the work of Stephen Leacock and Andrew McPhail, though all four were Montrealers.<sup>119</sup> Meanwhile, G.-A. Nantel modelled his beautification plans on the reforms of Paris and the Parisian model inspired the architecture of Montreal's City Hall buildings.<sup>120</sup> However, English Canada, not France, supplied the models for the reform rhetoric of 1909. On the surface, this seems understandable. The

Board of Control proposal came from the anglophone-dominated Board of Trade, using the Toronto Board of Control as its archetype.<sup>121</sup> However, *La Patrie* held up another Ontario city as an example to be followed:

Nous [y] verrons bientôt si les contribuables attachent quelque prix aux merveilleux résultats obtenus à Guelph et s'ils sont prêts à suivre son exemple.<sup>122</sup>

Reformers found more immediate examples in English Canada, or at least Ontario, than in Europe. The United States was similarly prominent. Olivar Asselin published a pamphlet on the Galveston model's application to Montreal.<sup>123</sup> Other precedents were probed in New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Iowa, Ontario and Nova Scotia.<sup>124</sup> Comparisons were sought across the continent, but were "impossible entre Montréal et aucune autre ville du continent américain."<sup>125</sup> Despite this, no one turned to Europe for solutions to North American problems.

The Americanness of the reform rhetoric suggests that urban francophones, being North American in both outlook and inspiration, relied on European traditions less than is often claimed. Given the magnitude of French-Canadian emigration to the textile mills of New England, and accepting that culture crosses territorial frontiers more easily than do people, the Anglo-French language barrier appears less firm.<sup>126</sup> Although *québécois* reform reveals unique characteristics, such as the reluctance to embrace expert aid, or the Technical Commission, itself a unique formulation, it must be placed in a North American context. Assuming a North American outlook and inspiration, one might also assume that the political ideas of this continent had penetrated *québécois* society. Without over-

stating this commonness, the rhetoric surrounding Montreal municipal reform in 1909 does suggest a degree of cross-cultural contact that is not often assumed.

### **Conclusion**

This article suggests that a large number of academic assessments of French-Canadian attitudes toward the city and its state are inadequate. The city was not foreign to *québécois* culture as Denis Monière suggested. Indeed, far from siding with the opponents of reform, the francophone popular press embraced the North American reform tradition. If *La Croix* can be taken to represent the clerical community, then it did oppose reform, but *La Croix* was a marginal weekly paper whose voice was far outweighed by others. In the main, the francophone popular press was divided by a number of issues, but overriding that division were the basic assumptions of early-twentieth-century liberalism. Essentially liberal, *québécois* political culture was neither uncompromising nor unchanging. This snapshot of *québécois* ideology reveals a changing rhetoric that, with hindsight, can be seen adapting to the social imperatives of the modern, industrial age. Similarly, francophones looked to the municipal state to make parallel adaptations. While such assumptions suggest a faith in liberal democracy, the reform rhetoric revealed a curious ambivalence towards the idea of popular sovereignty. Although the referendum campaign demanded calls on popular sovereignty, francophone reformers shared the distrust of the electorate demonstrated by anglophone reformers in Ontario and the Prairies. In conclusion, the complexity of the rhetoric of urban political culture suggests that similar intricacies might be found elsewhere in the political culture.

### **Notes**

1. Annick Germain, "L'émergence d'une scène politique: mouvement ouvrier et mouvement de réforme urbaine à Montréal au tournant du siècle," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* (septembre 1983), p. 186.
2. Ronald Rudin, "Boosting the French Canadian Town: Municipal Government and Urban Growth in Quebec, 1850-1900," *Urban History Review* (June 1982), p. 9. The most notable exception is: P.-A. Linteau, *Maison neuve* (Montreal, 1981).
3. Michel Brunet, "Trois dominantes de la pensée canadienne-française: l'agriculture, l'anti-étatisme et le messianisme," *La présence anglaise et les Canadiens* (Montreal, 1964), pp. 113-166. Fernand Dumont, "Du début du siècle à la crise de 1929: Un espace idéologique," in Dumont et al (eds), *Idéologies au Canada français, 1900-1929* (Quebec, 1974), p. 12. Fernand Dumont, "La représentation idéologique des classes au Canada français," *Recherches sociographiques* (janvier-avril 1965), p. 15.
4. Denis Monière, *Le développement des idéologies au Québec des origines à nos jours* (Montreal, 1977), p. 230
5. Bernard Vigod, "History According to the Boucher Report: Some Reflections on the State and Social Welfare in Quebec Before the Quiet Revolution," in Allan Moscovitch and Jim Albert (eds), *The Benevolent State: The Growth of Social Welfare in Canada* (Toronto, 1987), p. 178.
6. Ralph Heintzman, "The Political Culture of Quebec, 1840-1960," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (March 1983) pp. 3-59.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
8. Harvey Boulay and Alan DiGaetano, "Why did Political Machines Disappear?" *Journal of Urban History* (November 1985), p. 36.
9. J.P. Fitzpatrick, "Catholics and Corruption," *Thought* (1962), pp. 379-390.
10. Paul Rutherford, "Tomorrow's Metropolis: The Urban Reform Movement in Canada, 1880-1920," Canadian Historical Association, *Historical Papers*, 1972, p. 212.
11. Fernande Roy, *Progrès, harmonie, liberté* (Montreal, 1988); see also Linteau, *Maison neuve*, op cit., and his *Histoire du Québec contemporain* v.1. (Montreal, 1979), esp. pp. 308-312.
12. Harold Kaplan, *Reform, Planning, and City Politics: Montreal, Winnipeg, Toronto* (Toronto, 1982), p. 326.

13. Jacques Mathieu and Jacques Lacoursière, *Les mémoires québécoises* (Sainte-Foy, 1991).
14. Graham Lowe, *Women in the Administrative Revolution* (Toronto, 1987), pp. 30-31; p. 49.
15. John Irwin Cooper, *Montreal: A Brief History* (Montreal, 1969), pp. 124-125.
16. Germain, op cit., pp. 187-189; Michel Gauvin, "The Reformer and the Machine: Montreal Civic Politics from Raymond Préfontaine to Mérédic Martin," *Journal of Canadian Studies* (Summer 1978), p. 17.
17. Gauvin, op cit., p. 17.
18. *La Patrie*, 28 avril 1909.
19. Andrée Lévesque, "Eteindre le Red Light: Les réformateurs et la prostitution à Montréal entre 1865 et 1925," *Urban History Review* (February 1989), p. 193; Robert Rumilly, *Histoire de Montréal* (Montreal 1972), p. 404.
20. Rumilly, op cit., p. 400; Olivar Asselin, *The Montreal Graft Inquiry, Its Funny Side and Its Serious Side* (Montreal, 1909), p. 6.
21. Kaplan, op cit., p. 326 lists the two key factors as a traditional culture that blurred distinctions between politics and religion, and partisan divisions among the reformers themselves.
22. Cooper, op cit., p. 133.
23. Gauvin, op cit., pp. 20-21.
24. Rumilly, op cit., p. 402.
25. *Canadian Who's Who* v. 1, p. 167; pp. 42-43. Quebec, Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, p. 40.
26. Cooper, op cit., p. 133.
27. Quebec, Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, p. 40; p. 120; p. 138; p. 358; p. 372; p. 525; p. 534; p. 635; Legislative Council, *Journals*, pp. 142-143; p. 147; p. 183; pp. 194-195.
28. *La Presse*, 21 septembre 1909.
29. Rumilly, op cit., p. 405.
30. *La Presse*, 11 septembre 1909.
31. Edward VII c.82. s 2 (21).
32. Stephen Leacock, *Arcadian Adventures of the Idle Rich* (Toronto, 1914), p. 309; See also Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, *Monopoly's Moment* (Philadelphia, 1986), pp. 101-107.
33. Asselin, *Montreal Graft Inquiry*, op cit., pp. 14-15.
34. *Biographes Canadiennes-françaises* v. 3, p. 135.
35. Gauvin, op cit., p. 21.

## *Ward Heelers and Honest Men*

36. John Weaver, "Elitism and the Corporate Ideal: Businessmen and Boosterism in Canadian Civic Reform, 1890-1920," in A.R. McCormack and I. Macpherson (eds) *Cities in the West* (Ottawa, 1975), p. 53.
37. Cooper, op cit., p. 135.
38. Guy Bourassa, "Les élites de Montréal: De l'aristocratie à la démocratie," in R. Desrosiers (ed) *Le personnel politique québécois* (Montreal, 1972), pp. 117-142. The quotation is from Andrew Sancton, *Governing the Island of Montreal* (Berkeley, 1985), p. 24.
39. Ralph Fasold et al, "The Language-Planning Effect of Newspaper Editorial Policy: Gender Differences in *The Washington Post*," *Language in Society* (December 1990), p. 522. See also Murray Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago, 1987), p. 104.
40. Gilles Bourque and Jules Duchastel, *Restons traditionnels et progressifs* (Montreal, 1988), p. 34
41. Jean-Jacques Courtine, "Quelques problèmes théoriques et méthodologiques en analyse du discours, à propos du discours communiste adressé aux chrétiens," *Langages* (juin 1981), p. 9.
42. Alderman Giroux cited in *Le Canada*, 22 avril 1909; 23 avril 1909.
43. *La Presse*, 3 avril 1909.
44. Ibid., 25 juin 1909.
45. *La Patrie*, 23 août 1909.
46. *Le Nationaliste*, 22 août 1909.
47. Ibid., 22 août 1909.
48. *Le Canada*, 14 août 1909.
49. Ibid., 17 août 1909.
50. *La Patrie*, 8 septembre 1909, emphasis added; see also 11 septembre where reform came "Grace au gouvernement."
51. *La Presse*, 23 août 1909.
52. Kaplan, op cit., p. 167; pp. 190-194.
53. Despite coming during the campaign, G.-A. Nantel's death received only a minor note in *La Croix*, 5 juin 1909.
54. While the system of checks and balances could stem from Montesquieu and not America, the high visibility of American examples in the reform rhetoric suggests that the United States did provide the immediate inspiration.
55. *Le Nationaliste*, 12 septembre 1909.
56. Ibid., 19 septembre 1909.
57. *Le Canada*, 18 août 1909.
58. Ibid., 20 août 1909; *La Presse*, 19 août 1909.
59. *La Presse*, 19 août 1909.
60. Ibid., 21 août 1909.
61. Ibid., 31 juillet 1909.
62. For examples see *La Patrie*, 16 juin; 11 septembre 1909; *La Presse*, 2 septembre; 14 septembre; 15 septembre 1909; *Le Canada*, 17 septembre 1909; *Le Nationaliste*, 12 septembre 1909.
63. *Le Nationaliste*, 13 juin; 12 septembre 1909.
64. See especially *Le Canada*, 17 septembre 1909.
65. *La Presse*, 23 août 1909.
66. Roy, op cit.
67. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (New York, 1956).
68. *La Patrie*, 10 mai 1909.
69. *La Presse*, 27 avril 1909.
70. See for example, *Le Canada*, 10 août 1909.
71. *La Presse*, 13 septembre 1909.
72. *La Patrie*, 15 septembre 1909.
73. *Le Canada*, 15 septembre 1909.
74. *La Presse*, 7 avril 1909; *La Patrie*, 1 juin 1909.
75. *La Patrie*, 14 avril 1909.
76. Compare Heintzman's "Political Culture of Quebec," op cit., p. 19 with Bernard Vigod, *Quebec Before Duplessis: The Political Career of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau* (Kingston and Montreal, 1986), p. 101.
77. *La Patrie*, 14 septembre 1909.
78. Ronald Rudin has noted a similar "sugar-coating" of ethnic relations in recent Quebec historiography. See his "Revisionism and the Search for a Normal Society: A Critique of Recent Quebec Historical Writing," *Canadian Historical Review* (March 1992), p. 38.
79. *Le Canada*, 1 septembre 1909.
80. *La Patrie*, 27 août 1909; Rumilly, op cit., p. 404.
81. *Le Bulletin*, 29 août 1909.
82. *Le Nationaliste*, 22 août 1909.
83. Asselin, *Montreal Graft Inquiry*, op cit., p. 15.
84. *La Presse*, 28 août 1909.
85. *La Patrie*, 3 septembre 1909; *La Presse*, 10 septembre 1909.
86. "Un manifeste des ouvriers," *La Presse*, 1 septembre 1909.
87. Jacques Rouillard, "L'action politique ouvrière, 1899-1915," in *Idéologies au Canada français, 1900-1929*, op cit., p. 310.
88. Michel Pêcheux, "L'étrange miroir de l'analyse de discours," *Langages* (juin 1981), p. 7.
89. *La Presse*, 9 août 1909.
90. Ibid., 7 septembre 1909. This is the only point in the campaign at which a major paper distinguished between different labour leaders.
91. Ibid., 18 août 1909.
92. *La Patrie*, 24 mars 1909.
93. Ibid., 4 septembre 1909.
94. Mackenzie King's Industrial Disputes Investigation Act makes a similar presentation, Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, *Monopoly's Moment* (Philadelphia, 1986), pp. 240-241.
95. Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (London, 1976), p. 59.
96. *Le Canada*, 31 juillet 1909.
97. *La Presse*, 15 juin 1909.
98. Cooper, op cit., p. 134; *Le Nationaliste*, 12 septembre 1909.
99. *La Presse*, 9 août 1909.
100. Joseph Levitt, *Henri Bourassa and the Golden Calf* (Ottawa, 1972), pp. 143-144.
101. Armstrong and Nelles, op cit., p. 147; see also Levitt, op cit., p. 111.
102. *La Presse*, 28 avril 1909.
103. *La Patrie*, 8 mai 1909.
104. Ibid., 12 août 1909. See also 22 avril; 7 juin; 14 juillet; 10 août 1909.
105. *Le Canada*, 24 avril; 7 mai 1909.
106. P.A. Dutil, "The Politics of Progressivism in Quebec: The Gouin 'Coup' Revisited," *Canadian Historical Review* (December, 1988), pp. 444-445.
107. Heintzman had suspected this in his stress on "modernism" in his "The Struggle for Life: The French Daily Press of Montreal and the Prob-

## ***Ward Heelers and Honest Men***

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108. *Le Nationaliste*, 19 septembre 1909.
109. *Le Canada*, 18 août 1909.
110. *La Croix*, 3 juillet 1909.
111. *L'Événement*, 22 septembre 1909.
112. *La Croix*, 3 juillet 1909. Italics in original.
113. Armstrong and Nelles, op cit., p. 148.
114. *Le Canada*, 15 septembre 1909.
115. *Le Nationaliste*, 23 mai 1909.
116. Curiously, the virtues of professionalism encouraged in private affairs were seen as a vice in public affairs.
117. See Rudin, "Revisionism and the Search for a Normal Society," op cit., p. 55.
118. Allen Smith, "The Myth of the Self-Made Man in English Canada, 1850-1914," *Canadian Historical Review* (June 1978), pp. 207-208.
119. R.C. Brown and Ramsay Cook, *Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed* (Toronto, 1974), p. 164.
120. Paul Rutherford, *Saving the Canadian City: The First Phase, 1880-1920* (Toronto, 1974), p. xiv.
- Montreal. Public Relations Department. *Montreal and its Government – A Brief Note on the History and Administration of the City of Montreal* (1972), p. 6.
121. *La Patrie*, 9 juillet 1909.
122. Ibid., 1 juillet 1909.
123. Olivar Asselin, *Le problème municipal: Le leçon que Montréal doit tirer de l'expérience des Etats-Unis* (Montreal, 1909).
124. *Le Canada*, 15 avril 1909.
125. *La Presse*, 21 août 1909.
126. Mathieu and Lacoursière, op cit., p. 125.