

“A Future in the Past”? Tourism Development, Outport Archaeology, and the Politics of Deindustrialization in Newfoundland and Labrador in the 1990s

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Résumé de l'article

Déjà précaire, l'économie de base de nombreuses villes et petites communautés de la province canadienne de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador s'est détériorée davantage pendant la crise de l'industrie de pêche des années 1990. La situation s'est aggravée lorsque les gouvernements fédéral et provincial ont mis en œuvre des programmes de libéralisation économique ayant comme objectif de limiter le rôle de l'état dans les domaines économiques et sociaux.

Pendant que les effets de la crise se faisaient sentir et que l'aide provenant de l'état diminuait, le tourisme est devenu, pour un nombre augmentant de groupes locaux de développement et d'organismes de conservation du patrimoine, un moyen de restaurer l'économie de base bouleversée de plusieurs communautés. Du financement limité et à court-terme pour quelques projets reliés au domaine du tourisme provenait en grande partie d'un ensemble de programmes gouvernementaux employés principalement comme moyen de diriger politiquement l'ajustement structurel recherché.

L'article qui suit examine le rôle de la politique de l'état face à la désindustrialisation. Après avoir abordé le sujet de la crise économique en Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador et le développement communautaire qui fut favorisé suite à cette crise, un aperçu de quelques problèmes associés au développement du tourisme et à l'archéologie des collectivités isolées sera présenté. Ensuite, le rôle joué par l'industrie du tourisme dans la crise des communautés de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, qui étaient auparavant dépendantes de l'industrie de la pêche, est évalué dans l'axe de la pérennité et de la survie.

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James Overton

Abstract

The fishing industry crisis of the 1990s saw the already precarious economic base of the many towns and small communities further eroded in Newfoundland and Labrador. The situation was made worse by both federal and provincial pursuit of programs of economic liberalization that sought to limit the role of the state in economic and social affairs.

As the effects of the crisis were felt, and established state supports were weakened, tourism was embraced by a growing body of local development and heritage organizations as a way of restoring the shattered economic base of many communities. Limited, short-term funding for some tourism-related projects was provided mostly from government programs, largely as a means of politically managing the structural adjustment that was being pursued.

This paper examines the role of the state policy in deindustrialization. After discussing the crisis in Newfoundland and Labrador and the promotion of community development in response to that crisis, some of the problems associated with tourism development and “outport archaeology” are outlined. Focusing on sustainability and survival, an assessment is made of the role of tourism in dealing with crisis in the once-fishing-dependent communities of Newfoundland and Labrador.

Résumé

Déjà précaire, l'économie de base de nombreuses villes et petites communautés de la province canadienne de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador s'est détériorée davantage pendant la crise de l'industrie de pêche des années 1990. La situation s'est aggravée lorsque les gouvernements fédéral et provincial ont mis en œuvre des programmes de libéralisation économique ayant comme objectif de limiter le rôle de l'état dans les domaines économiques et sociaux.

Pendant que les effets de la crise se faisaient sentir et que l'aide provenant de l'état diminuait, le tourisme est devenu, pour un nombre augmentant de groupes locaux de développement et d'organismes de conservation du patrimoine, un moyen de restaurer l'économie de base bouleversée de plusieurs communautés. Du financement limité et à court-terme pour quelques projets reliés au domaine du tourisme provenait en grande partie d'un ensemble de programmes gouvernementaux employés principalement comme moyen de diriger politiquement l'ajustement structurel recherché.

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de la crise économique en Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador et le développement communautaire qui fut favorisé suite à cette crise, un aperçu de quelques problèmes associés au développement du tourisme et à l'archéologie des collectivités isolées sera présenté. Ensuite, le rôle joué par l'industrie du tourisme dans la crise des communautés de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, qui étaient auparavant dépendantes de l'industrie de la pêche, est évalué dans l'axe de la pérennité et de la survie.

In the 1990s in Newfoundland and Labrador, an already ailing fishing industry was devastated by the closure of ground fisheries, starting with the first moratorium on northern cod announced in 1992, which displaced over thirty thousand people from the industry in the province and made the abandoned fish plant a feature of the landscape.¹

The political climate in which people in Newfoundland faced the failure of the fishing industry was hostile. The policies of both federal and provincial governments, particularly the shift towards neo-liberalism, contributed to the crisis of the 1990s. Narrowing the public domain and downsizing the state was accompanied by a strong populist thrust that aimed to make individuals and communities more responsible for providing for themselves. The call was for self-reliance and self-help as a new localism in social and economic development policy was encouraged. The promotion of a “community” approach to social and economic development policy was part of an attempt to shift responsibility for dealing with the crisis away from the federal and provincial governments.

One response to the crisis was a growing interest in an alternative economic base for many communities, particularly those that had been heavily dependent on fishing, and tourism was presented as a new industry with great potential. There is no doubt that interest in archaeology and heritage on the part of people in rural communities was stimulated by economic concerns.

This paper examines deindustrialization through discussion of sustainability and survival in Newfoundland and Labrador, focusing particularly on the province's rural areas—generally taken to be that part of the province outside the capital city of St. John's. In the context of this paper, then, “rural” applies to smaller urban places—coastal fishing towns and villages that were formerly dependent on fishing. The focus of the paper is thus on the kinds of resource-dependent communities that have long been the focus of attention in this journal. Concentrating on the role of state policy in deindustrialization, the paper discusses the crisis in Newfoundland and Labrador that developed in the 1990s and the promotion of tourism as a response to it. More particularly, questions are posed about

the use of community archaeology and heritage projects as development tools.

Crisis

By the end of the 1990s over half the 221 fish plants active a decade earlier in Newfoundland and Labrador had been closed.² Employment in fish processing, equivalent to 13,500 full-time jobs in the late 1980s, had fallen to less than half by 2000. And the situation has not stabilized. The fishing industry continues in a state of uncertainty resulting in significant job losses and further fish plant closures.³ From the start it was clear that both federal and provincial governments viewed the fishing crisis as an opportunity to pursue policies that would lead to structural adjustment in the industry—lessen state support for fishing (privatization) and remove a majority of the workforce from the industry.⁴ Pursuit of such policies proved politically difficult, however. One of the first major battles fought by those displaced from the fishing industry was to force government to provide income support that offered reasonable levels of assistance.

Industries such as mining and forestry have also faced difficulties. And in spite of claims that Newfoundland and Labrador is "moving towards a service economy," levels of service provision seem to be shrinking in many parts of the province.⁵ The province's population fell by 10 per cent in the 1990s.⁶ This trend continues, albeit at a slower pace.⁷ Population decline has varied by region and community, with its effect being most devastating for communities that have lost up to half of their population.⁸

The spiral of decline is most evident in rural areas where, as industry vanishes, jobs are eliminated, populations shrink, and services disappear. Unemployment, poverty, and loss of population undermine the financial ability of communities to maintain services, the responsibility for the provision of which has been shifted increasingly onto municipalities by provincial cutbacks. The loss of spending power caused by unemployment and out-migration is significant, and even a large number of short-term visits by tourists would not compensate for this loss. It is true that there are fewer people to support as the population declines, but the cost of maintaining many services does not decline proportionally. Roads still have to be cleared, and water and sewer systems and emergency services still have to be maintained. Rural decline has implications for those wishing to develop economic alternatives such as tourism, for loss of services makes some areas less attractive for tourists, many of whom already complain about the scarcity of services in rural Newfoundland.

Deindustrialization is not just about fish plant closures or even the demise, full or partial, of one industry. It is complex and far-reaching. Much of the devastation in Newfoundland has been wrought by provincial and federal government policy. In general, it was the shift towards what is variously called economic liberalization, neo-liberalism, or neo-conservatism that was at the root of many problems.⁹ State policy—cuts and restructuring—is not just a response to deindustrialization, it is also a cause of it.

When Premier Clyde Wells announced in 1994 his intention to "make profit a holy word" in Newfoundland, he was making clear his government's commitment to what Jim Stanford has termed "a business-centred model of development."¹⁰ The economic recovery strategy that was developed in the early 1990s—and, with some minor modifications, is being continued—involved a program of privatization, deregulation, spending cuts, and reform of social policy, especially income support and education. A strong thrust in this strategy has been an attempt to restructure labour relations in order to strengthen the hand of employers. Some people have benefited from liberalization, but many have been harmed, particularly those who are most dependent on state activity and support for their livelihoods.

The neo-liberal assault on Newfoundland and Labrador was justified ideologically by the need to fight deficits, but also to combat dependency, which was seen as the root of what the Fraser Institute's Michael Walker termed "the Newfoundland problem," and create a positive climate for entrepreneurial activity.¹¹ The analysis offered by Clyde Wells's government in its Strategic Economic Plan and by the Economic Recovery Commission—headed by sociologist Doug House and established in 1989—differed little from Walker's.¹² In the 1990s, the idea that the province had developed a "culture of dependency" became *the* favoured explanation for its economic problems.

The strategy that flowed from this analysis was to cut income support and eliminate subsidies, to remove state support from the province and encourage the surplus population to leave. The *Globe and Mail's* Barbara Yaffe wrote about the importance of "not coddling the codless," and Tom Van Dusen argued that "Newfoundlanders located in communities which have no hope of becoming self-sufficient must be relocated," while others claimed that we can no longer afford to be romantic and prop up dependent people and areas.¹³ This position continues to be promoted: witness John Ibbitson's recent suggestion that Newfoundland and Nova Scotia should "stop worrying about propping up rural areas and, instead, concentrate their populations in St. John's and Halifax."¹⁴

In the 1990s, downsizing the state—centralization of services, privatization, layoffs, and cuts in funding—all took their toll.¹⁵ Government policies continue to have negative effects. Rather than abandon or reverse the policies of the 1990s, the Progressive Conservative government of Danny Williams, elected in 2003, is pursuing such policies with renewed vigour, leading John Ibbitson to endorse the Williams government's efforts while calling for their intensification:

Newfoundland needs to aim for a target of 80-per-cent urbanization within a decade. It needs to ruthlessly slash services to rural and remote communities (aboriginals excepted). It needs to downsize, privatize and outsource its public-sector work force; cut business taxes; encourage private-sector investment; funnel every available dollar into education (yes, even at the expense of health care); and market itself to the rest of the world as a low-tax, low-cost, high-skill business destination equidistant from Europe and central North America . . . Mr. Williams has already

taken the first steps towards meeting these goals. He deserves encouragement.¹⁶

Ibbitson thinks that Ottawa "could contribute to necessary change (and save some money) by simply eliminating seasonal employment insurance altogether."¹⁷

Community Development

While provincial and federal governments were pursuing a scorched earth approach to rural Newfoundland in the 1990s, some funding was put into community projects as a way of trying to manage some of the political problems that resulted from the devastation being wrought.¹⁸ Narrowing the public domain, downsizing the state, and removing support from rural areas was accompanied by a strong populist thrust that aimed to make individuals and communities more responsible for providing for themselves.

Miranda Joseph's work on how the "discourse of community" is used politically can be used as a guide to examining the politics of community development in relation to the crisis of rural Newfoundland and Labrador.¹⁹ The key task is to look at how *community* is thought about and what political work is it called upon to perform. As Joseph makes clear, *community* is a persuasive term. It is talked about as an "unequivocal good," a code word for caring, selflessness, belonging, co-operation, equality, and communion.²⁰ It "emerges" or is called on in times of crisis, and "supplements capital" by being "deployed to shore it up."²¹ Because most of its connotations are positive, community has great propaganda value and it is often used to sell policies that might otherwise be opposed. Everingham, too, suggests that community is "a *resource* that can be used by government," it being "pulled out in times of social disruption" and "taken up in political rhetoric to address the many and varied 'market failures' associated with the new economic conditions of globalization."²²

Donald Savoie locates community economic development (CED) in relation to "the neoconservative ideology [which] has now firmly established itself."²³ His outline of the implications of such a political program for devastated regions is informative:

When industries or communities are hard hit, the solution for those who subscribe to a neoconservative agenda is straightforward: unleash the invisible hand of market forces to restore the necessary economic equilibrium, and in time all will be well. If people have to be moved to other jobs or to other communities, so be it. This, they insist, is healthy—if not in the short term, then certainly in the medium and long terms. Governments should not, the argument goes, intervene to attenuate the economic misfortune, however difficult the circumstances may be. Governments can only make the situation worse by temporarily postponing the required economic equilibrium and, in the process, waste taxpayers' money.²⁴

One expression of this trend is a waning interest in regional development, while another is a general retreat from the idea that governments can and should create jobs to deal with unemployment.

The promotion of non-state agencies as a means of dealing with things that the state has withdrawn from has been a significant

recent trend: witness the burgeoning literature on what is called "social capital."²⁵ This is, of course, a program of privatization in a general sense, whether it is the profit-making sector or "the community," volunteers, non-government agencies, charities, or even unions that are promoted as having a role in dealing with social problems.

Savoie outlines the logic of this move clearly:

If recent economic history has taught us anything, it is that the two senior levels of government do not always have the answers when communities are faced with having to make serious economic adjustments. Nor is it reasonable to expect that either government would be able to produce, on short notice, specific solutions for every community confronting an economic crisis or wishing to promote economic growth. One possible option would be to turn the problem over to the affected community and say, "OK, now you drive." Governments can easily make the case that solutions should come from the communities themselves, not from Ottawa, St. John's, Halifax, Charlottetown, or Fredericton. This is a relatively simple and easy message to sell, particularly if a special fund is attached to the proposal.²⁶

But rather than seeing the promotion of CED as a natural and logical expression of government's discovery that it cannot deal with certain economic and social problems, as Savoie tends to do, it should be seen as an important component of a neo-liberal agenda that involves shifting away from state responsibility for dealing with social problems.

For Savoie, the problem with CED is that in many situations it is simply a straw being grasped by desperate people and it has little chance of dealing with the serious problems that they face. The danger is that, like leaving abandoned fish plants standing in communities, CED provides people with false hopes, and by doing so it encourages people to hang on when they should be leaving.²⁷

Savoie's concerns about false hopes notwithstanding, CED was promoted by government agencies as a response to the crisis in Newfoundland in the 1990s.²⁸ The stick that has encouraged people to embrace CED and other self-help responses to problems has been the downsizing of the state and its impact, in particular, on rural communities. But selling the populist approach to dealing with the crisis has involved a major propaganda effort. In the 1980s, a key role was played by the Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment (RCEU), which set out to persuade people that the limits of the state in relation to social policy had been reached if not passed and that, in future, we would all have to become more self-reliant.²⁹ The RCEU was also influential in promoting and popularizing the idea that state programs such as unemployment insurance were the cause of many of the problems of Newfoundland and Labrador.³⁰ The argument was that unemployment insurance and make-work projects had created an "insidious dependency upon government programs which is now firmly entrenched in the social and economic fabric of Newfoundland communities."³¹ This idea was well-established by the start of the 1990s when the Economic Recovery Commission (1989–1996) took up the task of constructing the problem of the province as one of dependence on the state.³²

The attack on dependency influenced every aspect of government policy. It even led the provincial government to cut core funding to development associations, allegedly because these associations had strayed from their early radical community development roots and degenerated into organizations that were supposedly adept at milking governments for make-work money.³³ The war on dependency was presented as a necessary shock tactic which would force Newfoundlanders to abandon their culture of dependency:

Autonomy also brings responsibility, and in an environment sure to be fraught with failures, local control of development strategies in Newfoundland will also erode the ability to blame Ottawa. Such political maturity may be an essential ingredient for Newfoundlanders to throw off the cloak of economic dependency and retake the survival skills which have enabled them—and other peripheral populations—to carve out their niche in the global geo-political landscape.³⁴

Fighting dependency might involve community development, but only of a type that would not involve significant ongoing state support.

At the local level, as Savoie notes, CED has proved a "relatively simple and easy message to sell," an appeal made to local patriotism, pride, and empowerment—development "from the bottom up," not "from the top down."³⁵ Decentralization can appear attractive where there is disillusionment with, and even hostility towards, the state. People frustrated by the failure of governments to take action are driven to seek other ways of dealing with problems. Important also is the fact that there is often a little funding available for some projects, and this is an appealing prospect for cash-strapped communities where it can provide some work or a chance for personal advancement for some members of the community.

That a community approach to dealing with deindustrialization has been relatively easily sold in Newfoundland and Labrador is linked to the presence of populist ideas about development in the province, in academic and other circles.³⁶ As Steve High argues, there is a tendency to see problems of deindustrialization as an opposition between capital and the local community.³⁷ The danger of this populist approach is that it reinforces that idea that it is local communities that should do battle against the forces of globalization. They are the ones to struggle valiantly for survival. Very often this view sets one community or region against others. It also puts the responsibility for dealing with what is a problem for society onto the shoulders of the victims of capital and state policy. Resistance and survival rests on the local community's ability to mobilize its resources and use its social networks, rather than, for example, the actions of the national community. Imbued with the romance of community and resistance, this approach tends to "reify romantic notions of local community" and work with a static conception of community that is "synonymous with place."³⁸

Survival—Grasping the Tourism Straw

The crisis in the fishing industry in the early 1990s forced attention on what was going to happen to rural Newfoundland and

posed the question, Can the outports survive?³⁹ Some people were optimistic; however, many were pessimistic about the future, arguing, for example, that the "decline in the fishery threatens to erode the province's entire economic, social and cultural life—and have a significant psychological impact on the massive number of unemployed workers."⁴⁰ One response was a call to "involve people in a process of discussion and action which would harness the energies and resources of their communities and develop a community-based response to the crisis."⁴¹

While there was much talk about survival, little was said about what was the term meant. For many, survival meant being able to find work and stay in their communities in the face of the fisheries collapse. It meant, initially, fighting for an emergency income-support program and getting access to benefits from it. It meant qualifying for support under the Northern Cod Adjustment Response Program (NACARP) and then the Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS) with its maximum of \$382 per week, providing that claimants were prepared to enrol in programs that were intended to channel half of those involved in fishing out of the industry.⁴² For those with inadequate support, survival largely meant leaving to find work. In the 1990s people drained out of the province and particularly out of rural areas such as the Great Northern Peninsula, even if, by the end of the decade, Craig Palmer could assure us that the "dire predictions of a complete collapse of the fishery and wholesale abandonment of the Great Northern Peninsula did not materialize."⁴³

For others, survival meant the survival of Newfoundland as a distinctive political and cultural entity. Images of rural Newfoundland and Labrador and of the outports have a key place in ideas about the province's identity. In the words of Rosemary Ommer, they are cultural "tabernacles."⁴⁴ They are what make Newfoundland and Labrador distinct. What was happening in rural Newfoundland was seen as a threat to the outports and the province's cultural identity. "Our way of life is quickly being taken away from us," argued Jacob Hunt in 1997.⁴⁵ Cultural survival meant saving the outports. And for some this meant a political fight. Shawn Pumphrey accused the provincial government of implementing a intricate plan to empty the coves and bays of Newfoundland, warning that the "final solution" to the problem was about to be implemented.⁴⁶ Lana Payne also argued that people were being "forced out by economic policy," as governments implemented what she described as "the new resettlement."⁴⁷

The crisis of the early 1990s gave rise to many expressions of concern about the disintegration of rural Newfoundland. Newspaper columnist Ted Warren talked about the "deadly cancer [that] has been eating away at our rural society," focusing particularly on the "damage done to the spirit of the people" by the cod moratorium.⁴⁸ "The loss of hope, the crushing of ambition, the state of constant uncertainty" were "doing the real damage," he argued. As with many others, Warren looked back to what fast became the good old days before the crisis, calling for a revival of "the spirit that allowed the outports to thrive in splendid isolation for centuries." Warren's was a cry of despair and

anguish, but he saw some rays of hope, including the "swelling legions of tourism operators."⁴⁹

In August 1993, a *Maclean's* writer noted that people were already "touting tourism" in response to the emerging crisis in rural Newfoundland.⁵⁰ Many were wary about the prospects for the industry, but tourism represented a straw that, in the absence of anything more promising, might be grasped by many of Newfoundland's drowning communities. Academic Rosemary Ommer also looked towards tourism for salvation, although her statement that "there is nothing left to try, so you might as well give it a whirl" suggest desperation rather than a realistic assessment of the industry's potential.⁵¹

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that it was the perceived danger posed by the loss of hope in rural Newfoundland that led many people to grasp the tourism straw, at least in part as a morale-boosting exercise at a time when fears were being expressed by academics and others about family breakdown, health problems, and increased crime and violence. For some of those with only limited economic opportunities, tourism was seen as one of the few areas that might offer some opportunity.

Tourism was pushed as an alternative economic base for rural Newfoundland by governments, academics, and industry representatives. It was presented as a new industry with great potential, despite the fact that, as I have noted elsewhere, there is a long history of attempts to promote tourism as a development strategy in Newfoundland.⁵² It was pushed in spite of the fact that the early 1990s were "tough times for tourism," in part because of the impact of the recession of the early 1990s on the industry.⁵³

Newfoundland's 1992 Strategic Economic Plan identified tourism as an opportunity for growth.⁵⁴ In 1994, *A Vision for Tourism in Newfoundland and Labrador in the 21st Century* was published, which identified tourism as "a relatively new economic activity" in the province while making a case for significant investment in the industry.⁵⁵

The *Vision* document made it quite clear that the promotion of tourism by using government funds would have significant costs for the people of the province: "In the budgetary realities of the 1990s, allocating additional public resources to further develop the tourism industry means that these resources will not be available to develop other industrial sectors (or, for that matter, social infrastructure such as hospitals and schools)."⁵⁶

However, the report's writers argued for increased government spending on tourism development, justified by "the potential of the tourism industry to generate economic benefits, as compared to the potential of other industrial sectors to do so."⁵⁷ Spending on essential services such as health care and education would be sacrificed in order to encourage tourism. It was also recognized that the development of tourism might involve other "social costs," including congestion, pollution, and the loss of natural and cultural resources. If such development was unregulated, and uncontrolled, then the negative effects of tourism might be significant in areas where "the resource is

especially fragile."⁵⁸ However, "safeguards" put in place at an early date would limit any danger to "the Province's natural and social environments" in this regard. Services would also have to be improved, a key one being transportation. The profile of the province as a tourism destination would also need to be raised by advertising and developing its "tourism product."⁵⁹ Developing the "tourism product" would involve both interpretation and protection. Archaeology was identified as one area of potential strength in this regard, but here product enhancement and development would involve major investment.

Preservation was a major theme in the 1994 tourism development plan: witness the statement that the province's "long-term comparative advantage in adventure tourism depends almost entirely on the preservation of its natural environment, which is rapidly being eroded as a result of resident pressures and industrial expansion."⁶⁰ To combat such erosion, "an enhanced conservation ethic within government, industry and the general public" would have to be developed.⁶¹ The importance of the province's natural heritage and its tourism potential would have to be recognized and "a similar change of attitude [would be] required regarding cultural resources."⁶² This was part of the *Vision* report's promotion of a populist vision of grassroots involvement in tourism development.

Notwithstanding their enthusiasm for tourism, the report also made clear that the industry would "not be a panacea for the Province's economic ills" because "the capability of the tourism industry to absorb large numbers of workers displaced by downturns in the traditional sectors will be relatively limited in the short term."⁶³

Evaluating Outport Archaeology and Tourism Development

The newspaper headlines "Bird Cove Mayor Hopes Bones Will Lead to Tourist Attraction" and "Town Hopes Ovens Will Raise Tourist Dough" capture something of the hope invested in archaeology, and more generally in heritage, as a means of stimulating tourism and providing economic opportunities in rural Newfoundland.⁶⁴ Government advertising seeks to persuade people that Newfoundland is "turning the past into the future. Right here, right now."⁶⁵ Comments like the following suggest that the strategy is working:

There was a happy, festive atmosphere to the event, possibly because Newfoundland—alone among North American jurisdictions—can lay claim to the Vikings, and Vikings mean value. As one Northern Peninsula business operator put it, to cheers and applause from the crowd, by the end of this summer she hopes to have bags "full of money."⁶⁶

Bird Cove has become a model of how to build a feasible and sustainable new industry by building on the resources and history of the region. What makes this project different from other archaeological projects in the province is that it is completely community driven. With assistance from several funding agencies, and the concerted cooperation of many local and regional development groups, it is expected that this project will become the model for community-run archaeological projects in the future.⁶⁷

Interest in the tourist potential of archaeology was expressed long before the crisis of the 1990s. Premier J. R. Smallwood's involvement in this area in the mid-1960s was stimulated by the Norse discoveries at L'Anse aux Meadows and the publication of Farley Mowat's *Westviking* in 1965.⁶⁸ Around the same time, the discovery and excavation of "native graves" at Port au Choix, also on Newfoundland's Great Northern Peninsula, stimulated the Northern Regional Development Association—formed in Port au Choix in 1967—to protest the removal of "findings" from the excavation to St. John's in 1968.⁶⁹ At Red Bay in Labrador a committee of local residents was formed in the late 1970s to protect the newly discovered wreck of the Basque ship *San Juan*.⁷⁰

The 1980s saw growing interest in the development potential of archaeology by government agencies, academics, and local development organizations. In mid-decade the Labrador Straits Historical Development Corporation undertook a study of that region's archaeological potential,⁷¹ no doubt stimulated by the work undertaken at Red Bay, Labrador—around which, incidentally, there was some controversy over whether the *San Juan* should be raised, preserved, and exhibited, and how the site should be developed to maximize benefits to local residents.⁷² One of the most important sites developed has been the Colony of Avalon at Ferryland. Following on earlier investigations, Memorial University's James Tuck undertook major excavations in 1992, funded by the Canada-Newfoundland Tourism and Historic Resources Cooperative Agreement, signed in 1991.⁷³ Subsequent funding for this project, which is ongoing, has come from a variety of largely government sources.⁷⁴

Those involved in organizing archaeology saw their activity as a means to diversify the economy of rural Newfoundland. The short-term benefits would be direct employment in the projects, but short-term and the long-term benefits would derive from the influx of tourists who would be attracted by the active digs and exhibitions once they were developed. Archaeologists were paying increasingly attention to the economic benefits associated with their work. In 1993, Priscilla Renouf argued that Newfoundland and Labrador's "rich and varied" archaeological heritage is "an important Provincial and community resource," drawing attention to both the employment generated by archaeological work and the tourism benefits associated with the development of archaeological resources.⁷⁵ But she also argued that "archaeology is not just about tourism dollars," but about informing Newfoundlanders and Canadians about the province.⁷⁶ She may be right, but it is the lure of tourism dollars that has led governments to provide the financial assistance for outport archaeology and other heritage projects.⁷⁷

Interest in tourism development in many parts of rural Newfoundland increased significantly following the cod moratorium. People were looking for alternative economic opportunities, and one expression of their search was the growing interest in heritage generally, and what was became known as "outport archaeology." In this period, archaeologists, along with other academics and cultural workers, were part of a growing trend to engage in rescue work in rural Newfoundland.⁷⁸ A key role in the

development of the archaeological resource was played by professional archaeologists, who were necessary for such projects and often played a important role in capturing funding from a variety academic and non-academic sources. By the early 1990s archaeological digs were becoming a tourist attraction and Peter Gullage could speak of archaeologists as "folk heroes" in Newfoundland.⁷⁹

Memorial University's archaeological "outreach work" grew in the 1990s, with a variety of forms of assistance being provided to organizations interested in archaeology. The Newfoundland Archaeological Heritage Outreach Program (NAHOP) was officially started in 2000.⁸⁰ Outport archaeology may be seen as a variant of what known as community archaeology.⁸¹ Typically these projects involve the use of some local labour in the archaeological work, and they provide basic training for that work. They involved "academics and contract archaeologists working with projects sponsored by small-town community groups."⁸² It is this key element of "community-level sponsorship" that Pope suggests is a new model for archaeological research and interpretation in Newfoundland, one that has rapidly become the most common way in which projects are promoted.⁸³ Community involvement "increasingly implies an organizational and fund-raising commitment by community groups" and often involves "a degree of control over the interpretative agenda."⁸⁴

Community archaeology, and heritage projects more generally, were a means to an end for many of those seeking to rescue rural communities from the devastation wrought by both the fish crisis and government policy.⁸⁵ "Economic survival" was the quest, and tourism was seen as a kind of cash cow to be milked.⁸⁶ However, for such a strategy to have a chance of success, there would have to be a major growth in tourism. This, in turn, would depend, in part, on a high level of government commitment, financial and otherwise. Creating the attractions that would provide the basis for tourism would require government funding for archaeology, museums, research stations, and interpretation sites, as well as for other infrastructure (accommodation, food, etc.). To justify the spending, a case would have to be made for "monetary returns," and where there was intense competition for a slice of a relatively small pie, some activities, projects, and places would lose out. Local mobilization was required to exert political pressure for funds and this, in turn, required considerable effort from the community to develop organizations, educate people, overcome disagreements, and build a consensus about what activities to promote and what projects to sponsor. For those interested in developing an archaeological resource, an archaeologist was a basic requirement, along with funding for excavation and developmental work.

Even with a significant government commitment to tourism development, whether or not the industry would be able to sustain rural communities was an open question. Tourism, like all market activities, is by its very nature unpredictable. Fluctuations in the price of gasoline, and a multitude of other factors, including changes in fashion and the cost and quality of transportation services, affect the industry's fortunes. Reliance on tourism is

bound to be a risky economic development strategy, especially for places that have a narrow economic base.

The government's 1994 *Vision* document argued that the success of a tourism development strategy would depend on making Newfoundland a more attractive place for people to visit through, for example, developing heritage and archaeological activities. However, if we look at what governments have done in this regard, the story is not a good one. Spending on advertising did increase, and there was an emphasis on creating events such as Cabot 500 and the Viking Millennium.⁸⁷ But clearly the province's attractiveness as a tourist destination is not determined solely by how much advertising there is and how what the province has to offer is packaged. Nor should we think of "attractiveness" as a given. Human actions (including the failure to act) can make a place more or less attractive. Some government actions probably had a negative effect on the province's attractiveness—the privatization and/or closure of most of Newfoundland's provincial parks in the 1990s being a case in point.⁸⁸

Economic liberalization actually undermined any move to develop tourism by making the province more attractive. In Canada, there is little evidence that the protection of the natural and cultural environment was taken seriously, even though, as J. G. Nelson shows, from the late 1980s on there was growing "concern about the loss of heritage" in Canada, including "the traditional structures and lifestyles of the countryside."⁸⁹ In fact, federal and provincial cuts and deregulation seriously weakened protection for natural and cultural heritage in the 1990s.⁹⁰ One result of the cuts was, in Nelson's words, "a shift to greater private volunteerism in many aspects of public affairs," a move that was "encouraged by government as a way to compensate for its reduced role."⁹¹ This shift was "in line with free market thinking and a neoliberal philosophy where the focus is on individuals taking greater responsibility for their own welfare and that of their neighbours, relying less on the support of governments."⁹² At least initially, some government support was made available to non-governmental organizations; however, this support has usually been provided ad hoc.

Newfoundland and Labrador lagged behind many other Canadian provinces in providing resources for the heritage sector in this period. As Canning, Pitt, and Associates noted in 2002, "In relative terms, heritage spending by the Provincial Government has actually declined over the last decade," adding, "Within the provincial museum/historic sites system, this lack of investment has translated into a steady decline in visitor numbers, at a time when visitation to federal sites in the province have increased."⁹³

This, in turn, meant that, "at the community level . . . heritage facilities were often on the 'edge of insolvency,'" and this put "heavy stresses on volunteer boards," which had to spend a great deal of time and money attempting to find sufficient funds to keep their operations going.⁹⁴

When David Lowenthal announced that "the past must now pay for itself" in the late 1980s, he was describing the shift in phi-

losophy that accompanied the rise of economic liberalization.⁹⁵ Old buildings might be saved, archaeology might be pursued, but only if the work was justified in market terms.

Such an approach clearly has implications for areas where the ability to raise funds from tourism (directly) is limited and where, if there are benefits from tourism, they go first to the private investors who own gas stations, airlines, hotels, and restaurants. In such a situation, there may be a trickle-down effect, but it is limited, uncertain, and uneven, especially in the small community that has one store and a handful of people employed seasonally in tourism-related activities. In addition, only limited funds find their way into government coffers via taxation where they may become available for heritage protection or tourism development.

In 1991 Peter Gullage argued that tourism would be a way to pay for "digging up our heritage."⁹⁶ In a sense this did prove true in the 1990s. Government efforts to promote tourism did direct some funds towards archaeology projects. But this was funding made available at least in part to deal with the fallout of the fish crisis. Tourism was not paying for heritage and archaeology directly. Rather, the government was providing funds for this work as part of an effort to develop tourism. Moreover, there was no long-term commitment of money for tourism-related heritage projects or for community archaeology. In fact, as already noted, government policy shifted away from support for rural areas in the period.

The problem is that once preservation, whether of heritage or nature, is justified in economic terms and is linked to the market, problems arise: preserve, but only if what is preserved can pay its way. In addition, access to funding depends on ability to mobilize politically and campaign effectively for a share of a very limited pot of funds, using arguments based on market values. The evidence of the last decade or so is that, while linking archaeology to tourism may have provided an argument that allowed *some* groups and people to gain access to *some* government funds, tourism itself has not in any direct sense provided funding for archaeology in the long term.

Can the Outports Survive?

As the recent Royal Commission on Newfoundland's place in Canada noted, "Rural sustainability emerged as an overpowering issue in all the Commission's deliberations."⁹⁷ If sustainable development is the aim, we need to ask what is understood by this term before examining whether it is realistic to expect tourism development—and "the past" and archaeology as key attractions—to provide the basis for the future in rural Newfoundland.

As Peter Sinclair notes, the concept of "sustainable development . . . encompasses a disturbingly wide range of meanings with respect to what is to be sustained, why it should be sustained, how sustainability should be measured, and what political process is involved."⁹⁸ This is an important point, since the way in which many people think about sustainability is at variance with

the use of the term as a synonym for ending dependence and cutting state spending to rural communities, a use that became common in the 1990s.⁹⁹

In examining this issue of sustainability as it relates to the outports and to the role to be played by tourism and community archaeology in outport survival, we need, first, to ask, What is to be sustained, and by whom is this to be done? Here the question of scale is important. Are we talking about sustaining all of rural Newfoundland or just some communities? Are we aiming to sustain past or existing population levels, a given standard of living, a way of life, or a resource that will be the basis for a particular industry? What time frame for action is involved?

In trying to assess the impact of tourism generally, or an activity such as community archaeology of the sustainability of the outports, it is important to acknowledge that the situation in rural Newfoundland is by no means stable. We are not looking at impact on a fixed target. This is point is significant, because it affects our concept of success. Where rapid rural decline is taking place, success might be measured by slowing the rate at which that decline takes place. Where government policies are daily further marginalizing already marginalized communities, the impact of a community development project may simply be to slow decline slightly. And such a project might simply lessen the negative impact of other government actions, such as cuts in funding to local government.

However, it is also possible that projects that have a short-term benefit—providing enough work to allow some people who are employed part-time to qualify for unemployment insurance, for example—might be problematic in the long-term because they require an ongoing commitment of funds in order to continue, while the ability of communities to come up with those funds continues to be eroded by out-migration and by cuts in funding from higher levels of government.

The problems involved in addressing the question of whether tourism (and archaeology and heritage) can provide the basis for community survival and sustainable development can be illustrated in a number of ways. In an article on the Norse site at L'Anse aux Meadows, Kevin McAleese argues that as a result of public recognition of the importance of the site, "a growing number of local people now work seasonally as Viking-Age 'living history' interpreters," and that this provides a "new and potentially lucrative type of employment."¹⁰⁰ In his words,

Local presentation of the Norse past bodes well for the long-term future of the community and area. Norse heritage tourism related businesses, such as boat tours and hotels/cafes, are slowly expanding. As they expand they strive for a high level of Norse cultural presentation, an interplay of culture history and culture tourism that needs to be well managed. This repackaging and presentation of the past has become part of "sustainable development" for the LAM community's future.¹⁰¹

The good news story is that local people have taken ownership of "the site and its Viking history" and that there is some growth in economic activity.¹⁰² But despite the focus of the article on "sustainable development," the author provides no discus-

sion of what this means or of how in concrete terms it might be achieved. Rather, we are offered the bald claim that it is happening, at the same time as we are told that the population of L'Anse aux Meadows has dropped from seventy-five to thirty-six over the last eighteen years.¹⁰³

Many discussions of survival and sustainability proceed on the assumption that in the past outports were sustainable, again without any discussion of what that means. Writing about Bird Cove on the Great Northern Peninsula, Will Hillard suggests that the community's problems started in 1992, implying that the community was in some sense sustainable before the cod crisis.¹⁰⁴ But was there any time when economic life in the outports was stable and secure? What were standards of living like in the past? Was this true of the 1930s when each year a third of the country's population was on relief and nutritional surveys suggest that even life itself was not easily sustainable? Asking these kinds of questions about the past is important. In fact, outport survival has long been an issue in Newfoundland, and an examination of history raises serious questions about whether there ever was a golden age in which life in small communities was secure and stable.

The 1994 *Vision* document argued for the need to change public attitudes towards protecting the province's natural and cultural resources. Clearly, the survival of "the outport" is of central concern here because "the outport" is *the* Newfoundland attraction for many tourists. And the argument is now made that the survival of "the outport" as perhaps *the* most important part of Newfoundland's heritage—the "soul" of the province—is threatened and that its very survival now depends on tourism. But, again, the importance of the question must be stressed: What is meant by *survival*?

In a recent article on the tourism potential of "the Newfoundland outport," Gregory Ashworth argues that the outport is an "unsaleable tourism product."¹⁰⁵ What he means by this is that

the "authenticity of the experience" has to be preserved by a voluntary suspension of disbelief on the part of the consumer and an extreme skill and sensitivity on the part of the tourism producers and promoters . . . The defining characteristic of an outport is physical isolation while the activation of a resource for tourism depends on physical access for the tourist. The presence of the tourist is not only a threat to the continuing existence of the resource, it is a sign that the resource, *sensu stricto*, no longer exists.¹⁰⁶

Ashworth adds that part of the problem of tourism development is that "even if tourists can be brought to the outports, they have only limited possibilities for remaining over-night." The problem for Newfoundland is stated thus:

The difficulties lie mostly in rendering accessible that which by its nature is inaccessible. This is compounded by the inability to finance the development of a supporting infrastructure of sufficient quality to sustain and expand the possibilities as well as find the exploitable markets in competition with spatially better favoured areas.¹⁰⁷

For Ashworth, tourism threatens the outport. Successful tourism will destroy many of the things that make the outport distinctive

and attractive. However, he also thinks that tourism development is likely to be limited because outports are difficult and costly to visit. Be this as it may, an argument is being made that the very basis for much of Newfoundland's attraction is already being eroded, not by tourism, but by the events discussed earlier in this paper.

In an article in *Maclean's* in 1993, a resident of Twillingate pointed to one of the problems with tourism development: "To loose our fishery is to loose our culture . . . People come here for the traditions. They want to see somebody fishing and jigging and hauling cod. If the fishery is dead, tourism is dead."¹⁰⁸

The case may be overstated, because Newfoundland and Labrador has a range of attractions for tourists, but with a seriously eroded economic base and without adequate government support the future of the outports is nothing if not uncertain. It is the loss of fishing and state support, rather than tourism, that has already set in motion changes that have transformed many rural communities. However, the argument that many outports are on the way out must be understood in a very particular sense. This does not mean that all of them will go. It does not mean that there will not be clusters of houses where fishing communities formerly existed. The pattern of change is and will be uneven. Some outports will become dormitory communities for commuters. A few may develop as recreational centres for summer visitors. Some may become essentially retirement centres. Whether, and how soon, this will happen depends on many factors, including proximity to St. John's, the adequacy of transport links, and the costs of travel.

When in 1998 Sandra Kelly, the minister responsible for tourism, stated that "'built heritage' has a unique and special character which is the cornerstone of the cultural tourism product of the province," she was telling us that there is a public interest in houses, outbuildings, and other structures.¹⁰⁹ They are not just places where people live and work, they "form part of the allure of the tourism experience."¹¹⁰ They have become the inputs for an industry. The same could be said about the outports in general or about the natural landscape. In this context we can understand the growing concern of people such as Victoria Collins of the Heritage Foundation about "the out-migration from rural communities, the expected intense economic activity in communities such as Nain and Placentia, and the local availability of imported building materials."¹¹¹

The function of rural communities is changing. The future of places where people who were engaged in fishing and/or forestry lived and worked is now more likely to be seen as dependent on their attractiveness for tourists. But perhaps some of what made the outports attractive has been, and is being, lost. The architecture is fast vanishing as suburban house styles and vinyl siding are adopted and older-style homes are abandoned, fall into disrepair, and eventually collapse or are torn down. Fishing stages, flakes, sheds, and boats are almost a thing of the past. To be sure, some limited funding is now being directed towards conservation, but this is hardly more than a gesture.¹¹² Some her-

itage villages ("outports") are being constructed, but while this happens the actual heritage of the outports is being lost.¹¹³

It is one thing to declare a public interest in the natural or built environment or in archaeological resources, but it is quite another thing to effectively protect from destruction what is deemed be valuable. The 1994 *Visions* document argued the need for conservation measures to protect both natural and cultural resources, but the evidence of the past ten years suggests that little, if anything, significant has been done in this regard. In fact, government policies have led to a weakening of protection in some key areas at the same time that support for rural communities has been eroded.

Sustaining Community Archaeology?

Outport archaeology is a relatively small component of tourism development. However, discussion of some of the problems associated with it reveals some of the more general problems involved in tourism development as a means of dealing with deindustrialization.

When the Viking Trail Tourism Association approached Memorial University's Public Policy Research Centre in the fall of 2001, it was concerned about the sustainability of non-profit heritage tourism attractions on the Great Northern Peninsula and in southern Labrador.¹¹⁴ These attractions included national and provincial parks and historic sites, community museums, archaeological sites, and living history and heritage theatre productions. The region had received "significant investment in tourism infrastructure" during the 1990s, especially under the 1994 Viking Trail Tourism Accord, but now there was growing concern that

much of this investment may be lost unless heritage tourism attractions can establish long-term business plans based on stable sources of revenue. These sites are operated largely by non-profit, community-based organizations and have been developed through short-term project funding from both levels of government. These organizations are now finding it difficult to finance yearly operations as well as do the marketing, packaging and product development work needed for future viability.¹¹⁵

Governments have pushed the idea that tourism sites should be self-sustaining, at least after an initial period of state assistance, even if there is some recognition that, in practice, this is not likely to happen. The chances that many sites will be able to cover operational costs, let alone generate funds for development, are slim. Even high-quality sites may not attract the anticipated numbers of visitors. What happens when the past cannot pay for itself? What happens when government funds that formerly sustained projects, albeit inadequately, become scarcer than in the past?

Concern about how the existing heritage infrastructure will be maintained (let alone developed) has also been expressed by the province's Department of Tourism, Culture, and Recreation recently:

Culture and heritage industries are at an early stage in the development cycle and the current momentum must be main-

tained so that they will reach a more mature, solid stage of development and the gains of the last decade will not be lost. As historic sources of federal-provincial funding are ending, there is an urgent need to determine how to manage these significant investments.¹¹⁶

Sustaining and improving existing attractions and developing new ones is seen as being one of the keys to developing tourism. However, the attractiveness of Newfoundland for tourists should not be taken for granted in what is a very competitive environment. Attractiveness depends not only on factors such as ease of access, measured in both financial and other costs, but on what services exist. The quality of transportation is a key issue in Newfoundland and Labrador, for many of the province's highways are in disrepair. Sustaining a tourism industry depends on maintaining and improving transport links. It also depends on maintaining and enhancing the attractiveness of places, and this involves investment. We should not assume that people will be attracted to L'Anse aux Meadows irrespective of what it offers them as a "tourist experience." In considering such matters we are again lead back to politics. The two-volume report *"Unimpaired for Future Generations"? Conserving Ecological Integrity with Canada's National Parks* documented the serious situation in Canada's national parks, which is the result of inadequate funding in the 1990s.¹¹⁷ The recent report of Canada's auditor general confirms the extent to which Canada's "cultural resources are at risk" because of cuts to spending on historic parks and heritage resources.¹¹⁸ Funding in 2000–2001 was \$228 million, but this was \$14 million less than a decade earlier. L'Anse aux Meadows is still in relatively good condition, but many sites have been harmed by cuts, and this, in turn, has affected the ability of those sites to attract visitors. The 2004 strike of Parks Canada employees was but one manifestation of the wider crisis produced by the policies of the federal government.

Nor do recent Newfoundland governments have a good record on protecting the province's natural and cultural heritage and sustaining important tourist attractions. It is commonly argued that tourism will provide the justification and the means to preserve natural and cultural heritage. What is clear, however, is that the market—the tourism trade—is unlikely to fulfil this role, let alone provide profitable opportunities for significant increase in the number of private investors or in employment. Fees just won't provide adequate support for most—perhaps any—museums and attractions. And the money spent by tourists in many areas is often quite limited, because there is little to spend it on. In addition, there is no mechanism for channelling money from tourists into the public coffers in local areas. Although tourists benefit individual businesses, and while a little of this benefit may trickle down to the limited number of local residents who are employed in tourism, work is seasonal and usually for minimum wages—which, incidentally, are often subsidized by the provincial government.

The business-centred government model of development sucks money out of social programs and support systems and directs funds into businesses that are thought likely to succeed, but

these are few and far between in many rural areas. The process starves organizations that look after so many of our tourist attractions, inhibiting the development of tourism by threatening the basis for much of Newfoundland's attractiveness.

In order to maintain heritage attractions, significant and stable funding is required. Even if tourism increases, it will not provide the direct means by which the vast majority of attractions will be maintained and developed. State revenue will have to be raised from tourism or elsewhere, and this revenue will have to be directed towards sustaining and developing the province's tourism infrastructure. The problem here is that government policies in recent years have cut business taxes. The result is that although Newfoundland and Labrador has seen substantial growth in recent years, measured in gross domestic product (GDP), there has been in a fivefold increase in before-tax corporate profit rates, according to economist Jim Stanford, who argues that out of every dollar in new GDP, "corporate profits snapped up over 50 cents," and much of this profit found its way out of Newfoundland.¹¹⁹ The trickle-down effect of the growth in GDP, measured in improvements in disposable incomes, was quite limited.¹²⁰

Sustainability is a political issue, and so, as Ucko reminds us, is archaeology.¹²¹ Archaeology may be one drawing card among others for tourists, but tourism has not provided and is not likely to provide the funds for sustained archaeological work. Funds for archaeology have come, if they have come at all, from governments. For continued spending, it has become necessary, but not sufficient, to demonstrate that there are tangible economic benefits from this activity. But this does not guarantee that financial support will be forthcoming when there is intense competition for limited government funds and where politics plays a role in determining how those funds are spent. The history of community archaeology reveals just how uncertain and vulnerable the funding is for it. Such unpredictability underlies the problems of those involved in archaeology and in the maintenance and development of sites. And it should be remembered that, as Fowler notes, "Archaeology is not merely knowledge of the past; it is also the safeguarding of the future study of the past. By what we preserve now we of course affect the nature of future research."¹²²

There may be a case for saving and presenting what Fowler calls "show-pieces," but there needs to be awareness of the importance of preserving natural and cultural landscape—not just the odd feature or building—through a range of measures that would include effective regulation and provision of financial supports and incentives.

In the absence of ongoing (sustaining) government funding, groups involved in archaeology and heritage face the annual lobbying lottery—an uncertain political process that consumes a great deal of time and money. This is a task that usually involves trying to obtain funds for the obvious activities like "digs," which are most likely to be attractive because they have come to be most associated with archaeology in the public mind. The

danger here is that less attention is given to covering the costs involved in the protection of increasingly publicized archaeological resources and developing and maintaining archaeological sites and displays as tourists attractions. It has been argued that tourism will provide the funds that allow the province's archaeological and other forms of heritage to be preserved and interpreted, but clearly this kind of activity must first be paid for out of the public purse.

Significant ongoing costs must be met if archaeological survey and excavation work is to be undertaken, if sites are to be protected before and after excavation, and if the products of archaeological work are to be properly conserved, interpreted, and displayed. When Sprinkle writes about "the curation crisis" in archaeology, he is drawing attention to a growing problem caused by "too many artifacts, records, and the like with too few custodians to care for them."¹²³ This is a real problem where public agencies like national parks services are experiencing major funding problems due to cuts in government support. It is severe funding problems caused by cuts in government funding that has led some of those involved in museums in Britain to argue the need to "strangle a museum a week."¹²⁴

Archaeological activity like that undertaken in Bird Cove is often presented as "completely community driven," but on closer examination it proves to be actually driven by government funding.¹²⁵ To be sure, "the community"—or, more properly, groups of organized people within communities—may be a key factor in forging the necessary political and other connections if there is to be a chance of obtaining government funds, but it is government money that hires the workers and pays the bills. When this source dries up, the projects grind to a halt, as it has in Bird Cove. So the future is uncertain, especially in a climate where political priorities may change and where once accessible sources for funds can vanish. And when money is spent, it is usually on projects that are likely to have significant political impact, such as a high-profile project in a marginal riding. It most certainly will mean that funds for surveys, inventories, and reports will take second place to digs, which are much more attractive and visible. One danger is that when initial funding dries up, communities will be left with significant ongoing costs that have to be met. Responsibility for many museums rests with local government. There may well be some limited support provided for them, but it is uncertain and minimal. Meanwhile the capacity of communities to support infrastructure is undermined as their fiscal capacity to meet these costs is eroded by out-migration, cuts in government support for local government, layoffs, and centralization policies. Even the continued availability of volunteers cannot be assumed.

The immediate concern for those involved with community archaeology is how it can be sustained, given the unpredictable and limited nature of government assistance and the difficulties of generating funds in other ways.

It was concern about funding—its uncertainty and inadequacy—that partly drove the lobbying efforts of cultural and heritage

organizations to press governments for a formal cultural policy. In late 1999 a forum on heritage was held, which led to creation of a steering committee, which in turn led to establishment of the Association of Heritage Industries (AHI) in 2000 to represent institutions and individuals involved in heritage activities, including archaeology, and promote the growth and development of heritage industries in Newfoundland and Labrador. In 2001 it produced a proposal for a new cultural heritage strategy.¹²⁶ The Association of Cultural Industries (ACI) produced a related document, also in 2001.¹²⁷ Meanwhile, working together, AHI and ACI had organized a comprehensive, government-funded study of the economic and social benefits of the arts and heritage sectors of the economy. The results were published in 2002.¹²⁸

In 2006 the government issued its cultural plan.¹²⁹ Noting that "expenditures on culture by the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador declined between 1996 and 2003," the present government has made a commitment to "reverse this trend."¹³⁰ The report is full of lofty statements and the usual clichés about the importance of culture and heritage, but the actual commitment of funding, while reversing the past downward trend, provides but a very small drop in a very large ocean. Some \$17.6 million is provided over three years to implement the cultural plan.¹³¹ In the first year of this cycle, \$8.5 million—\$6.3 million in new investment—is to be spent, at least a quarter of it going to the film and music industries. In the year 2006–2007, \$760,000 is earmarked for "preserving, strengthening and celebrating our heritage," \$300,000 of it in core funding for heritage sites, community museums, and archives. Given these modest commitments, Paul Pope's statement that "culture produces wealth, wealth creates hospital beds and everything else, and this government really understands it" seems unduly laudatory and demonstrates an unwarranted faith in the magic of the multiplier effect.¹³²

The "good news for culture and heritage in Newfoundland" announced by the provincial government should be seen against the backdrop of cuts to programs now being introduced by the Harper government. Not only are there cuts to museum funding, but also to regional development agencies, including the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA)—one of the organizations that has played a key, if limited, role in funding archaeology and other heritage projects in Newfoundland in the period discussed in this essay.¹³³

Conclusion: "Painting the Graveyard Fence"

Archaeology projects were developed as one response to the crisis in rural Newfoundland, which was a result of problems in the fishing industry and withdrawal of state support from rural areas in the 1990s. The fisheries proved to be unsustainable, and governments were no longer willing to provide the funds needed to maintain rural areas. Tourism was turned to as a possible lifeline, and it has received some government support. Although tourism has provided some economic opportunities, they have been limited, and it seems unlikely that it will provide an economic base to sustain rural Newfoundland. Whether or not

tourism will be sustained at present levels or perhaps expanded depends on several factors, some of which cannot be controlled. What is certain is that without basic infrastructure or ongoing government commitment, the industry's future will be fraught with problems. If communities are to be sustained, will it be only their buildings that are preserved, or something more? If tourism is to help support rural Newfoundland, the magnitude of the problem must be faced, given that present government policy continues to marginalize rural areas and undermine rural communities. And if tourism is to be sustained, there must be clarity about what resources are central to the tourist trade and how the attractiveness of these resources can best be maintained or developed. If the attraction is wilderness, what happens if it is "opened up"? If solitude is a scarce and valuable resource, how is it threatened when roads and trails are constructed? If the outport is one of Newfoundland's main tourist attractions, what happens when the features and functions that made outports distinctive are gone? And if the attraction is landscape, what happens when forests are clear cut and the wharves, fish flakes, boats, and sheds are gone?

The political climate in which the future for community archaeology is currently being discussed is uncertain. In a recent article, ministers in the Williams government took a tough stand on providing funding for make-work programs for those involved in the fishery who have failed to qualify for employment insurance. Arguing that "one of things that brought the Tories to power was a platform of making make-work a thing of the past," Innovation Minister Cathy Dunderdale told the *Independent*, "We're certainly not going to be looking at painting the graveyard fence in the fall."¹³⁴

Fisheries Minister Trevor Taylor is clear that the fisheries are unable to sustain the present numbers of people in the industry, but it appears that his government is unwilling to go very far in providing support for people who cannot find enough work in the fisheries to qualify for unemployment insurance. Even in the face of the ongoing rural crisis in Newfoundland, the government's war on "dependency" continues to prohibit spending on "make work" projects, even if a project such as "painting the graveyard fence" might make sense in human terms or as part of an effort to preserve the province's heritage and enhance its attractiveness for tourists.¹³⁵

The government of Newfoundland and Labrador has recently allocated money for heritage as part of the funding for its cultural plan. However, the funds are quite limited and their impact on the province's many rural communities is likely to be negligible. They may not even be able to compensate for the cuts of over \$4 million made to municipal operating grants in 2004 and 2005.¹³⁶ In the province's recently launched cultural blueprint, Premier Danny Williams makes much about there being "something precious about Newfoundland and Labrador" that "you cannot fully appreciate until you have lived here, until you come to care for this place so deeply that the thought of losing it is more than you can bear." He talks of the need to "preserve and protect" our "living heritage," but such fine statements should be

weighed against his government's harsh treatment of many who constitute that living heritage.¹³⁷

The government of Newfoundland and Labrador promotes the province as having "remains to be seen."¹³⁸ But whether tourism development, archaeology, and heritage can provide the basis for dealing with the crisis in Newfoundland also remains to be seen. However, measured against the basic requirements for tourism development, outlined in the 1994 *Vision* document, the actions taken by governments in the last decade fall far short of what is needed to bring about significant development of tourism in Newfoundland. This does not mean that the millions of dollars put into tourism by the government have not had an impact, for clearly they have, but it is doubtful if they will provide an adequate economic basis for most of Newfoundland's struggling communities.

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2. A useful source here is W. E. Schrank, "Government Policy, Fisheries Management and the Newfoundland Economy, 1991 and 2002" (paper presented to the European Association of Fisheries Economists, Rome, 2004). Permission to cite this paper, which has since been published as "The Newfoundland Fishery: Ten Years after the Moratorium," *Marine Policy* 29, no. 5 (2005): 407–20, is gratefully acknowledged.
3. J. Murphy, "Cod Closure Sparks Exodus: Fish Plant Forced to Grapple with Loss of Seasonal Workers," *Telegram*, 19 October 2003; M. Tutton, "FPI Cuts Could Hammer Plants," *Telegram*, 8 November 2005; R. Antle, "Problem 'Provincially Rooted': Ottawa Ponders 'Difficult Challenge' in Harbour Breton," *Telegram*, 17 June 2005.
4. J. Overton, "The Politics of Sustainability and Privatization: The Example of Newfoundland's Cod Crisis," in *Sustainability in Environmental Management in Canada*, ed. K. Atkinson and A. T. McDonald (Leeds: Centre for Canadian Studies, University of Leeds, 2000): 111–150.
5. Ivan Emke quoted in C-M. Gosse, "A People in Decline?" *Independent*, 1 January 2006.
6. For a detailed discussion of population loss, see Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Our Place in Canada: Royal Commission of Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada* (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 2003), 35–45.
7. Gosse, "People in Decline."
8. J. Overton, "Communities in Decline: The Impact of Economic Liberalization on Newfoundland's Urban System" (unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, NL, 1998); J. Overton, "The Savage Cove Solution to the Newfoundland Problem: Politics and Migration in Newfoundland" (paper presented at the Migrations Conference, Centre of Canadian Studies, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, May 1998).
9. For a good general review of the rise and nature of neo-liberalism see D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). For Canada, see G. Teeple, *Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform* (Toronto: Garamond, 1995); and J. Shields and B. M. Evans, *Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration* (Halifax:

- Fernwood, 1998). There has been little analysis of neo-liberalism's impact on Newfoundland, apart from my published and unpublished efforts referenced in this essay. However, J. Stanford, *The Newfoundland and Labrador Economy: Finding a New Direction* (St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Labour, 1998) is valuable.
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 11. M. Walker, "What shall we do about the Newfoundland Problem?" *Fraser Forum*, February 1994: 11–12.
 12. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Change and Challenge: A Strategic Economic Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador* (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 1992).
 13. B. Yaffe, "On Not Coddling the Codless," *Evening Telegram*, 17 April 1994; T. Van Dusen, "Go West, Young Person," *Evening Telegram*, 2 May 1994; J. Overton, "A Newfoundland Culture?" in *A Passion for Identity: An Introduction to Canadian Studies*, ed. D. Taras and B. Rasporich (Toronto: ITP Nelson, 1997), 329–354.
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 17. Ibid.
 18. See, for example, Government of Canada, *A Strategy to Enhance Agency Collaboration in Initiating Community Economic Development through NCARP Training Initiatives* (St John's: Employment and Immigration, Newfoundland Region, 29 March 1993). The Northern Cod Adjustment Response Program (NCARP) was introduced in 1992.
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 20. Ibid, vii.
 21. Ibid, xxxii.
 22. Christine Everingham, *Social Justice and the Politics of Community* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 14–15, 59.
 23. Savoie, *Community Economic Development*, 18.
 24. Ibid.
 25. See Everingham, *Social Justice*, for a comment of this point.
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 27. Ibid., 109. In 1994 Savoie suggested demolishing idle fish plants as a way of encouraging people to leave the fishery and Newfoundland. See D. J. Savoie, "A Shrinking Fishery," *Evening Telegram*, 21 August 1994.
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 29. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Building on Our Strengths: Report of the Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment* (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 1986); J. D. House, "Outports and the Microchip: Peripheral Regions in a Post-Industrial Age," in *Beyond Anger and Longing: Community and Development in Atlantic Canada*, ed. B. Fleming (Fredericton: Centre for Canadian Studies, 1988): 99–118.
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 31. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Building on Our Strengths*, 285.
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76. *Ibid.*, 158.
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81. P. E. Pope and S. F. Mills, "Outport Archaeology: Community Archaeology in Newfoundland," in *The Past Meets the Present: Archaeologists Partnering with Museum Curators, Teachers, and Community Groups*, ed. S. Baugher and J. Jameson (New York: Springer, 2004), forthcoming. This is not the place to examine what is meant by "community archaeology," more generally. For some discussion, see D. Start, "Community Archaeology: Bringing It Back to Local Communities," in *Managing Historic Sites and Buildings*, ed. G. Chitty and D. Baker (London: Routledge, 1999): 50–59; Y. Marshall, "What Is Community Archaeology?" *World Archaeology* 34, no. 2 (2002): 211–219.
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85. This is made clear in the video *Outport Archaeology*, R. Buckley (director), P. Pope (script) and F. Hollingshurst (producer), Memorial University, NAHOP, 2000.
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88. Overton, "Official Acts of Vandalism."
89. J. G. Nelson, "Rural Sustainability in Canada and Elsewhere: A Historic and Civics Perspective," *Environments* 31, no. 2 (2003): 82.
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91. Nelson, "Rural Sustainability," 83.
92. *Ibid.*
93. Canning, Pitt, and Associates, *Economic and Social Benefits of Heritage Industries in Newfoundland and Labrador* (St. John's: Association of Heritage Industries, 2002), 10.
94. *Ibid.*
95. D. Lowenthal, review of *On Living in an Old Country: The National Past in Contemporary Britain*, by Patrick Wright, *Journal of Historical Geography* 13, no. 4 (1987): 438.
96. Gullage, "Digging Deep," 42–45.
97. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Our Place in Canada*, 43.
98. Sinclair, "Sustainable Development," 167.
99. J. D. House, "Sustainability and Integration: Key Principles for Economic Development," in *An Integrated Approach to Sustainable Development in Newfoundland and Labrador* (St. John's: Economic Recovery Commission, 1995): 1–2; Overton, "The Politics of Sustainability and Privatization."
100. K. McAleese, "L'Anse aux Meadows: Rediscovered and Remade," in *Vinland Revisited: The Norse World at the Turn of the First Millennium*, ed. S.

- Lewis-Simpson (St. John's: Historic Sites Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2002), 181.
101. Ibid., 187.
102. Ibid., 186. A similar story is told about the Bird Cove Archaeological Project's contribution to "sustainable development." See Bird Cove Interpretation Centre, *Fact Sheet*.
103. This story of population decline is repeated in community after community. Even in Ferryland, the home of the successful Colony of Avalon archaeological project, the population is now down to 530 people, some 220 fewer than it was a few years ago.
104. W. Hilliard, "Banking on the Past," *Telegram*, 27 August 2004.
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106. Ashworth, "The Newfoundland Outport."
107. Ibid.
108. "Newfoundland," *Maclean's*, 23.
109. "Bernie Bennett, "Province Gives Boost to Heritage Foundation," *Evening Telegram*, 26 March 1998.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. In 2004 the Heritage Foundation of Newfoundland and Labrador provided \$100,000 for twenty projects under its fisheries heritage preservation program: see "Foundation Approves Funds to Preserve Fisheries Structures," *Evening Telegram*, 11 January 2004. In a recent article, David Bradley of the Association of Heritage Industries argued that government expenditures on heritage are now only half of what they were two decades ago. See D. Bradley, "Heritage Receives Little Support," *Telegram*, 25 October 2003.
113. The most recent suggestion is to construct Pigeon Inlet, the fictional outport in Ted Russell's *The Chronicles of Uncle Mose*. See L. Simmons, "Bay Roberts Looking to Re-create Pigeon Inlet," *Express*, 9–15 November 2005.
114. S. White and Susan Williams, *Sustainability of Non-Profit Heritage Tourism Sites* (St. John's: Public Policy Research Centre, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2001). See also Canning, Pitt, and Associates, *Economic and Social Benefits*, 10.
115. Ibid., 1.
116. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Department of Tourism, Culture and Recreation: Annual Report, 2003–03* (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 2004), 19.
117. Parks Canada Agency, "Unimpaired for Future Generations"? *Conserving Ecological Integrity with Canada's National Parks*, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Services, 2000).
118. Government of Canada, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons*, chap. 6, *Protection of Cultural Heritage in the Federal Government* (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 2003).
119. J. Stanford, "GDP and the Real World," *Telegram*, 19 October 2003.
120. Ibid. A recent study by Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) of the largest archaeology project in Newfoundland, the Colony of Avalon, shows that approximately fifty people receive some employment related to the development. Of the approximately \$1.2 million generated annually, the claim is made in a recent NAHOP document that this means that "Newfoundlanders take home almost \$900,000 more pay than they would without the project." See NAHOP, *Findings: The Economic Impact of Archaeology* (St. John's: NAHOP, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2005), 1–2. There is not space here to comment on the problematic nature of the kinds of cost-benefit analysis that are the basis for this claim.
121. P. J. Ucko, foreword, in *The Politics of the Past*, ed. P. Gathercole and D. Lowenthal (London: Unwin, 1990), xv.
122. P. J. Fowler, "Archaeology, the Public and the Sense of the Past," in *Our Past Before Us: Why Do We Save It?* ed. D. Lowenthal and M. Binney (London: Temple Smith, 1981), 60.
123. J. H. Sprinkle, "Uncertain Destiny: The Changing Role of Archaeology in Historic Preservation," in *A Richer Heritage: Historic Preservation in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. R. E. Stripe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2003): 273–5.
124. B. Appleyard, "Pleasures or Treasures?" *Sunday Times Culture*, 8 August 1999. In late September 2006 the Canadian government announced cuts of \$4.6 million to the Museums Assistance Program, according to V. Ross and J. Adams, "Heritage Cuts Rock Regional Museums," *Globe and Mail*, 27 September 2006.
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126. Association of Heritage Industries, *Recommendations for a New Cultural Heritage Strategy for Newfoundland and Labrador* (St. John's: AHI, 2001).
127. Association of Cultural Industries, *Proposal for a Cultural Policy for Newfoundland and Labrador* (St. John's: ACI, 2001).
128. Canning, Pitt, and Associates, *Economic and Social Benefits*.
129. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Creative Newfoundland and Labrador: The Blueprint for Development and Investment in Culture* (St. John's: Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Recreation, 2006), <http://www.tcr.gov.nl.ca/tcr/publications/2006/culturalplan2006.pdf> (accessed 18 January 2007).
130. Ibid., 11.
131. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Government Invests in Promotion and Preservation of Province's Culture," news release, 28 March 2006, Tourism, Culture and Recreation, <http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2006/eccec/0328n03.htm> (accessed 3 January 2007).
132. "Arts Blueprint Gets Pre-Budget Boost," CBC News, 26 March 2006, quoted in *Creative City News* 68 (2006), <http://www.creativecity.ca/news/2006/n68-2006-04-05e.html> (accessed 3 January 2007).
133. "Tory Cuts Trashed," *Telegram*, 27 September 2006.
134. J. Ducharme, "'Painting the Graveyard Fence,'" *Sunday Independent*, 22–28 August 2004.
135. C.-M. Gosse, "A Grave Matter," *Independent*, 3 October 2004, has discussed the "600 crumbling cemeteries which are gradually disappearing into the earth, destined to either vanish forever or be dug up by developers building resorts." It might make sense to invest resources in maintaining these cemeteries, given the growing interest in genealogy and the numbers of people from other parts of Canada and from the United States who come to Newfoundland and Labrador looking for their roots.
136. "Municipal Operating Grants to Be Cut—Again," *Independent*, 27 March 2005.
137. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Creative Newfoundland and Labrador*, 2, 5.
138. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and Parks Canada, "Newfoundland and Labrador: Remains to Be Seen," *Archaeology* 53, no. 1 (January/February 2000): inside cover.