Nomadic Ethics
Attending to the Ghosts we Cite

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Résumé de l'article

In response to Maureen Flint's (2020) performance and essay, Fingerprints and Pulp, on the ethics of truncating and flattening research participants in qualitative research, I extend this ethical concern to the voices of scholars flattened in qualitative research and writing processes. Scholars cite for many reasons, but what is there that holds us to account for our treatments of academics that come before; how can we avoid flattening and abusing those we cite? Through endeavouring to recognise and protect ghosts and nomadic identities of those other than the author in the research and writing process, I propose a new way of re-animating and re-embodying the haunting, nomadic voices in cited texts, in order to minimise further, future truncations and limitations of the other in academic writing. Attending to the ghosts allows for more ethical and just behaviour towards those cited. Seeing the multitude of ghosts haunting scholarly work obliges more ethical behaviour toward those voices flattened in writing.

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NOMADIC ETHICS:
ATTENDING TO THE GHOSTS WE CITE

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Abstract: In response to Maureen Flint’s (2020) performance and essay, Fingerprints and Pulp, on the ethics of truncating and flattening research participants in qualitative research, I extend this ethical concern to the voices of scholars flattened in qualitative research and writing processes. Scholars cite for many reasons, but what is there that holds us to account for our treatments of academics that come before; how can we avoid flattening and abusing those we cite? Through endeavouring to recognise and protect ghosts and nomadic identities of those other than the author in the research and writing process, I propose a new way of re-animating and re-embodying the haunting, nomadic voices in cited texts, in order to minimise further, future truncations and limitations of the other in academic writing. Attending to the ghosts allows for more
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**Keywords:** qualitative methods; citational ethics; arts-based research; reading and writing; post-qualitative research
Introduction

Like Maureen Flint (2020), I spent 2020 sitting with questions of representation, responsibility, and ethics in qualitative research. After spending the pandemic year confined to a desk, I began questioning the ethics with which academic writers reference and interact with the pre-existing literature. When we, the writers and readers of scholarship and research, start to think of the scholars we read as research participants, does it make us reconsider the ethics with which we make the cuts and manipulations necessary in qualitative inquiry? Should it? I will strive to consider how to attend to the complexity of scholars I, and presumably others, write on the backs of, and how to hold ourselves accountable for making cuts in the research and writing process. Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic ethics (2008; 2013; 2014), and concepts of ghosts, hauntology, and disjointed time posed by Jacques Derrida (1999), Karen Barad (2010), and Shantel Martinez (2016) will help me as I work through these questions of ethics and representation. As I endeavour to become an embodied, embedded, and accountable nomadic subject, I ought to consider the ethics of my engagement with the more-than-human assemblage of the text ought to be considered (Guyotte et al., 2019; Kuecker, 2020). To me, Derrida’s conception of a *hauntology* adds depth to Braidotti’s *nomadic ethics* with regard to the assemblage of the text and how I might reanimate, re-embodi, and re-embed the ghosts in the text.

After three and a half years of reading and writing at university, I began feeling uncomfortable with manipulating the texts I read, and massaging them so they contributed to my arguments. I borrowed the authority of scholars to validate my thinking. I used literature for my own ends; I congealed and simplified complex ideas and complex writers to pass as my own critical engagement necessary for the course. I was never accused of plagiarising. According to agreed-upon practice, I never did. The in-line reference covered for all sorts of mistreatment and unfaithfulness to those writers. Whatever comes after this point is my attempt to inhabit this anxiety and explore the diffracting implications of seeing the acts of reading and writing as a becoming, the unending re-composition of multiple agencies (Barthes, 2001; Braidotti, 2011; Cannon & Holbrook, 2020). Roland Barthes (2001, p. 143) argued that the “death of the author” is necessary for the rising subjectivity of the reader; however, this act of violence of reader against writer, perpetuating a binary distinction between the self and the other, demands a reconsideration of the ethics of reading. Similarly, there is a burgeoning literature regarding the life of the text as agentic and as an assemblage; framing this discussion in terms of a competing reader and writer ignores the life of the text (Kuecker, 2020). Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre (2014a) asks if it is possible to see writing as something other than a container for thoughts and characters, and, instead, as the space and time

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of assemblage. Does a recognition of the complexity and agency of the text—of the text as an assemblage and a site of intra-actions, haunted by ghosts—facilitate a new, more ethical practice of citation?

In this essay, I draw significantly on Deleuzoguattarian concepts of the nomad and the assemblage to work through the fraught relations between reader, writer, and text (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988). The nomad is perpetually becoming and moving in relation with the world (Guyote et al., 2019). Nomadism’s emphasis on embeddedness and embodiedness facilitates a nomadic ethics, an accountability to those we are enmeshed in assemblage with. By searching for the ghosts I may not have noticed but likely have acted against, manipulated, and stifled, I might become more ethical in my writing. The text is an example of an assemblage, a moving and multi-dimensional space, full of numerous meanings, intentions, and ghostly, haunting voices. Seeing the text as an assemblage—a collective of human and nonhuman agencies, where component parts perpetually constitute, reconstitute, and interrelate (St. Pierre, 2018; Ulmer, 2018)—necessitates, at least, the shrinking importance of the author (Kuecker, 2020). But herein lies the question of ethics and how to attend to those co-existing nomadic ghosts, including the writers referenced and the text itself. How do I acknowledge and behave better to the ghostly spectres present and unpresent in the texts I read, write, and cite; the ghosts which signal the possibilities of the past, always already existing in the present and future; metaphors for memory which connect our world with a world I cannot know, desperate to be free, but trapped in my writing (Derrida, 1999; Martinez, 2016)? In order to work through the dilemma of how to precisely apply nomadic ethics to the question of citation, I will turn to notions of a hauntology, ethical cuts, and performative accounts of nomadism in qualitative research, in order to search for ways of better treating the fragmented ghosts who haunt my writing.

**Section 1. Performing Nomadism in Qualitative Research and Academic Writing.**

I was sent into a spiral of anxiety regarding my treatment of those I cite after reading Flint’s (2020) performance of the flattening she perceived herself to inflict against her research participants. To Flint, the aim of constructing a coherent argument and undertaking rigorous qualitative research demanded erasures, truncations, and manipulations of her participants. In her performance, Flint cut apart, boiled, and massaged a copy of her research paper within which she considered the impact of race on the perception university students have regarding how they belong to their institution.
In the stock pot the segments and scraps of paper float in the water I have added to it, overlapping, congealing, and intersecting with each other. The stories on the paper are fragments of those shared by students over the two years of the study. (Flint, 2018, p. 5).

Through massaging the mulch of her paper, Flint found it became legible again, as letters and words began to become visible, emerging from the pulpy assemblage to produce new meaning. Following this performance of the research process, Flint discussed the choices and cuts necessary in producing research. She verbalised her guilt at truncating some participants and leaving other participants out entirely, and considered how history is made (in)visible in the present.

As I blend the now soggy paper in my food processor, identifiable parts whirling into a seemingly undifferentiated pulp, I wonder about the transformation of the paper and text in relation to qualitative research methodology. (Flint, 2018, p. 5)

To Flint, nomadic ethics requires taking accountability for one’s embeddedness and impact on those with whom I am co-implicated. Despite undertaking her initial project with Braidotti’s nomadic ethics in mind, Flint nevertheless found reducing the complexities of her research participants unavoidable. At the heart of this tension, to Flint, was a discomfort at the self/other binary the research process recapitulates.

Flint was concerned with how her representation of research participants necessitated their reduction and congelation. I extend this concern to the scholars I write with. In qualitative data collection, Flint comments on how the researcher is confronted with so much data that it is impossible to accurately attend to the complex stories that have been gathered. Representing the other is a burden. Yet, as nomadic subjects, we must critically attend to those we affect and who affect us as we undertake research.

Tami Spry (2017) similarly explores the representation of the agency and identity of the other in autoethnography. Spry asks for researchers to represent the other with the same commitment that they represent the self, and argues that the other is conceptualised for the purpose of understanding the self, a dynamic which empowers the self and erases the other. Like Spry, Flint agonises over how to sufficiently approach the complexity of the other. Both arrive at a need to refocus on the embodiment of the we. The nomadic ethics Flint develops emphasise the researcher as enmeshed in relation to the researched. Spry concludes with Donna Haraway’s (1992) proposal that asks who are we?, moving us toward more hope-filled futures. Flint noticed this self/
other distinction in interview research, Spry in autoethnography, and I would extend the need for this commitment to desk-based research with the haunts of scholars and researchers.

Although she did not substantially consider the life of the text itself, Flint’s artistic method provides an intriguing demonstration of an agentic and embodied text. Flint considered the exploitative and manipulative dynamic between researcher and researched, and of reader and writer, as she worked with interview data.

Flattening the pulp with my fingertips, I watch as stories coalesce, brief lines of texts that are still familiar, still index the person and place and time it was said, even as they are fragmented. (Flint, 2018, p. 6)

But the idea of the physical mass of her text, one which pushes back and falls apart against her, helpfully depicts the agency of the text itself. After being boiled, the remnants of the text begin to move and flow independently, and, although Flint applies pressure to it, the text which emerges is arranged by the text.

I smooth the paper pulp across the screen, and as recognizable fragments of feedback and stories come to the surface, I wonder… (Flint, 2018, p. 8).

Ghostly words not present in Flint’s own writing emerge from the assemblage, revealing their existence all along. A consideration of the agency of the text, as well as of the numerous other agencies existing and exerting in the writing process, enables a move through stifling binaries. It is not a matter of the reader killing the author, or the author oppressing the reader. Instead, I believe it is important to reach for new ways of approaching the nomadic subjectivities and the ghostly lives in and of the text, in order to behave more ethically toward those I am enmeshed in research assemblage with. To see the text as assemblage, a site for intra-actions, and a site of negotiations between numerous haunting actors (including the text itself), helps me conceive of a means to reach past unhelpful dualisms and towards more ethical ways of being, doing, and becoming research.

Flint’s performance acknowledges the contradictory positions that writing seems to hold—it is a becoming as it constructs new worlds moving into the future, but simultaneously prompts a stagnation and congelation through how it represents the world as it was. Writing is simultaneously generative and repetitive (Ulmer, 2018). While I would agree that writing does emanate outwards in assemblages and networks of encounters (Braidotti, 2013), I am not convinced this adequately attends to the cuts and
congealments made in writing. Making cuts is an inevitable and unavoidable part of writing. Ethics emerge, therefore, in how to attend to those ghosts cut from the assemblage of writing. I am not yet certain of how I might achieve this as a writer. It is hard, having read Flint’s guilt at truncating and erasing her research participant Elizabeth, to then perform similar cuts on Flint herself. Flint’s performance acknowledged the tension she had noticed in the research process as she erased and truncated her participants. By using the artist-researcher’s own words, I try to retain the presence of her ghost; but in the creative endeavour of writing, splicing, blending, massaging, and tearing apart Flint’s words is unavoidable. As I paraphrase and quote Maureen Flint, I am not Flint, and yet I am not not Flint (Willerslev, 2004). Writing with ghosts is an act of consumption; looking for the ghosts of those that have been cut serves as an ethical injunction to confront the treatment of those ghosts. Even as I write an essay to atone for the erasures, truncations, manipulations, and violence I have enacted on the scholars I have worked with and cut up to this point, I will invariably continue to manipulate due to the collaborative, compositional nature of assembling research.

Section 2. Writing as Becoming: Does the Birth of the Reader Necessitate the Death of the Author?

I have been told that I distrust the referencing relationship because of a discomfort with the idea of reading as dialogue, that I dislike the construction of the dyad between myself and those I cite as though we are engaged in a discussion. Perhaps this discomfort is due to how this dialogue is predicated on the humanist, binary separation of self and other. The presupposition that I and a discrete other engage in a discussion in writing recapitulates humanist philosophies. Bruno Latour (2010) similarly argued that entities emerge perpetually enmeshed in compositions, and Karen Barad (2010) asserted that agencies are not possessed by individuals, but rather emerge in intra-actions and relation with others. I, therefore, have become unsure about maintaining the distinction between the self and the other that this dialogic conception of reading necessitates. After this pre-reading, I have become sceptical as to the validity of attempting to represent (by which I mean manipulate and flatten) the discrete other, which I see as prerequisite in citation. Through nomads and ghosts, I endeavour to make visible the invisible in writing.

Citation frequently allows for a disembodiment. As a writer cites, they partly aspire to derive some external authority based on the ghostly competency of the other (Wolfreys, 2002). Just then, I turned to Julian Wolfreys to support a claim that was substantially self-reflexive and autoethnographic. As the citation implicitly draws on the
expertise of the other, the writer is liable to dissolve away and become invisible. To cite as a means of proving a point is to become disembodied in the writing, to write from nowhere as simply a messenger. Nomadic ethics, with its emphasis on recognising our embodied nature and on becoming situated from a particular location, enables a route out of this disembodiment (Guyotte et al., 2019). Nomadic becoming requires that the nomadic subject speaks from somewhere, a critical relocation, per Braidotti (2011). The 2021 Cremin et al. article on post-abyssal ethnographic ethics suggests a critical embodiment and emplacement to move through this issue of disembodiment. The article asks researchers to recognise the physical space they write in, and thus acknowledge that they are not adrift in “unrestrained subjectivity” (p. 11). A similar approach to desk-based research, a critical relocation, takes crucial steps toward embodying (and embedding) the researcher who works with the ghosts of their citations.

Furthermore, this distinction between self and other, a legacy of the Cartesian cogito, pushes toward destructive hierarchies (St. Pierre, 2014b; 2016). Asserting that subjectivity or agency is uniquely possessed only by the thinking human, constructs and maintains discriminatory and destructive hierarchies and binaries (Nxumalo & Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2017). While the dissemination of rights was an important aspect of Enlightenment Humanism, Braidotti (2013) argued that the subject/object binary—which simultaneously bestows and withholds subjectivity—remains a root cause of oppression and destruction. Moving beyond this dialectic and binary thinking is a central ambition of the nomadic, posthuman, post-structural project (Braidotti, 2019; Hamilton & Neimanis, 2018; Sinclair & Hayes, 2019; St. Pierre, 2019). bell hooks (2013) argued for the vitality of deconstructing binary thinking where we encounter it. As such, the binary of writer/reader in academic citation is a dualism which ought to be complexified, especially as it perpetuates damage to the other who is held in stasis when cited. Through nomadic ethics, there may be more luck in attending to the complexity of the assemblages produced in writing. Consequently, one might move (hauntologically) beyond constructing agency in terms of static binaries.

Flint (2020) thinks with nomadic identities to work through her anxieties at how she treats her research participants. Nomadism, as theorised by Braidotti, seeks to move beyond static binaries by emphasising the movement, multiplicity, entanglement, and instability of identity and subjectivity. To Braidotti, nomadism allows the self to become joyfully discontinuous (2013), and necessitates respect for the complexity of identity and accountability to those we are embedded with (2011). Braidotti follows a line of Deluezian, post-structural thought which decentres traditionally Western, anthropocentric conceptions of the self, and, instead, reaffirms distributed, composite, ontological relationality (Braidotti, 2013). The self emerges in relation to others in
processes of doing and becoming. Nomadism entails a focus on the ways difference prompts and moves, and assumes the necessity of moving into nomadism collectively. To move toward nomadism, the blurring of the self/other dichotomy recognises the need to redefine the relations between the subject and the world, and to build an ethic which addresses becoming in relation to its place in a larger world, outside the constraints of Western, anthropocentric, egocentric identity (Grosz, 2017). Nomadism offers an ethic that is not founded on individual, egocentric subjectivity, but, instead, anchors ethics in a moving landscape without relying on a static self (St. Pierre, 2004). Nomadic ethics prioritises an attention and a responsibility to one’s co-implicitness, to the networks we are assembled and inter-connected with (Braidotti, 2011). In the research process, this ethic of attentiveness (to the ghosts previously ignored) necessitates an awareness of how the cuts impact those so inter-connected with the work (Flint, 2019).

The nomad interprets writing as a dance that infinitely expands, spirals, and flows outwards in webs and assemblages (Guyotte et al., 2020; Ulmer, 2018). Writing is a becoming (Deleuze, 1993). These radical assertions emphasise the immersion of the nomadic subject, and, in perpetual motion and relation, the subject moves through an assemblage of numerous and contradictory locations (Guyotte et al., 2019). For writing to be an expanding and lively dance requires abandoning previously held conceptions of language as representational and merely a means of communicating and containing ideas in stasis. The author, text, and reader all write and create each other (St. Pierre, 1997). For the rhizomatic text, like roots from a sprouting potato, (ghosts of) meanings and agencies emanate from and arrive at the text (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988; Derrida, 1999). This Deleuzian, rhizomatic conception of a text as an emergent assemblage destabilises the representational logic of citation, and demands an accountability to compositions we belong to; it destabilises the notion that thoughts and characters can be contained within writing (Guyotte & Flint, 2020; St. Pierre, 2014a). To Flint, nomadic ethics manifest in qualitative research as a commitment to attend to the complexities of the qualitative research participants she attempts to story. Applying nomadic ethics to desk-based research not only requires attention to the scholars read in their fully fledged complexity, but arguably also to the complex lives of the texts read (and the ghosts within and around them).

The text is, after all, not some passive container of meaning. It is, instead, a moving, vibrating, and agentic assemblage—meaning is not inherent in the text, but is co-constructed in the interactions between reader, writer, text, and potentially infinite other factors (Springgay et al., 2005). The text has a complex life that needs to be accounted for (Hanley, 2019). Anyone who has read and discussed a text will understand that the text reveals and makes itself understood differentially. Writing,
therefore, cannot be a matter of signifying, of flatly representing meaning (St. Pierre, 1997). But, where St. Pierre moves from this assertion to claim writing as a process of mapping new grounds, I would claim the text is an (haunted) assemblage. St. Pierre holds the realm of ideas and the language which maps those ideas in separation, but ideas and text itself are irretrievably entangled in assemblage. The text possesses a dynamism and asserts its own subjectivity; it unfolds itself as it is read. This movement from seeing the text in stasis to seeing the text as agentic, firstly obligates an extension of these nomadic ethics to the text itself, and secondly, moved me to bring the concepts of ghosts and hauntology into this discussion. The text’s agency exists as a relic of the past, and thus demands an acknowledgement that the past continually composes the present (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988; Derrida, 1999). How can we extend our ethical commitment to those ghosts who are of the past irreconcilably in the present?

Section 3. Ghosts and Cuts: Acknowledging the Hauntology

In an effort to attend to the complex lives of those I cite and write with, I was turned to Derrida’s poststructuralist concept of hauntology (Derrida, 1999). Derrida’s hauntology forces a consideration of what is absent, and of what is in the space between presence and absence. It demands an attention to the ghostly figures which emerge from the text, there but not there. Through seeing these voices which echo through time from within the text as ghosts, one might make visible those who have been made invisible, and respect their wholeness. To believe in objective representation is to affect a totalisation or a unification, casting the subject as a homogenous whole or finished product (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988; Roberts, 2007). It represses the dynamic and multiple subjectivities of the text and the writer. Through thinking with ghosts, looking for that which haunts the text, one becomes obliged to attend to complexities that would otherwise be flattened.

A rhizomatic and nomadic understanding of desk-based research acknowledges the interrelated, multiple agencies of the reader, writer, and text itself. Hence, maintaining the tripartite division between the real (the world), the representative (the text), and the subjective (the author) becomes untenable (Deleuze & Guattari, 1990). When these distinctions become indefensible, a hauntology becomes necessary to understand how the text lives both perpetually and creatively. The past and the future are both immanent in the present, and writing is no longer recognition and representation of an unknown world, but is inherently creative (Birth, 2008; Deleuze & Guattari, 1980). A hauntology is the accepting of the past as a continual and irretrievable part of the present; the ghosts of the past which stain the present refute any claim that the present can be defined in isolation (Schofield, 2019). The text is a ghost
from the past which flows through the present; such a recognition necessitates a shift in how those texts are conceived. Texts can no longer be material relics frozen and congealed in the past, but instead must become something which constantly shapes the present and the future (Martinez, 2016). Shantel Martinez imagines the ghosts of her traumatised past self, and argues for embracing and bringing these ghosts, and the array of other ghosts which haunt her present, in from the outside to the centre. Flint (2018) performed an apology to ghosts in her research, to the participants whose nomadic complexity had been pared back, or had been frozen in her final write-up, who had been left on the outside.

Kevin Birth (2008) explored the ways in which the past is ever-present in the present, describing how the past is gnawing into the present as texts, ruins, and monuments, but also existing in memories. Birth argues that the past forms the ground upon which we in the present move and interact. Maintaining this metaphor of ground is twofold—both a foundation on which to stand, and a ground out of which we can recompose ourselves. Derrida (1999) and Barad (2010) explore the past’s impingements and conditionings on the present, and then how this haunting might guide ethical becomings in relation to the world. “Living in relation with the dead (as well as spirits and ghosts), who are always already present, is not a method, but a responsibility to confront the cutting of history” (Bjartveit & Panayotidis, 2014, p25). Ghosts move through the present, demanding that we connect ourselves to our (in)visible pasts, and thus produce ethical dialogue with the present (Martinez, 2016). Writing, in particular, is a spectral, haunted space, a space contaminated by the past. Frequently, qualitative research methods iron out the fluidity, dynamism, and agency of the ghosts in the text. Through thinking with hauntologies and ghosts, by attending to and acknowledging the ghosts and their vitality, the text might be reanimated and ghosts previously obscured might become visible (Blackman, 2015). The past is irrevocably ingrained in the text, impossible to remove—acknowledging this presence enables one to relate to the text more ethically as one dares to represent it (Gordon, 2020).

Treating writing as a becoming, both productive and generative, and a world-making device, acknowledges the potential of writing (Braidotti, 2013; Ulmer, 2018). If the writer is to an ethical existence, then the writer should listen to the ghost (Derrida, 1994). These hauntings ground and presence us and the world, as they become irrevocably part of the ongoing material performativity of the world. Both the future and the past are inherent in writing, but attending to each requires the tracing of distinct lines of flight. A text is not merely a flat container for meaning, it is a location stained by a broken sense of time, and a place for encountering that broken time (Fisher, 2012). As such, Derrida’s conception of a hauntology adds depth to Braidotti’s nomadic ethics with
regard to the assemblage of the text and how the ghosts might be reanimated, re-embodied, and re-embedded in the text. When one reads a text, the physical text is not all there is; an attention to the haunts that are there but not there—such as the presence of the author, voices other than one’s own, in-text citations, histories, contexts, and inter-text references—might elucidate the connections within the assemblage of the text, and thus accountability to those connections. At the very least, it challenges the idea that the text can be statically represented. Haunting is a call to action (Derrida, 1994). To endeavour to enter into conversation with the ghosts we write with, alive, dead, yet-to-come, loud and quiet, is the ethical obligation of the scholar. Making sense of the cacophony of voices, while listening attentively and honestly to those voices (Harris, 2015).

The question of how to re-animate the ghosts of those cited voices of the past becomes paramount. Teacher educators, Bjarveit and Panayotidis (2014), explore the implications of placing students in conversation with the ghost of Jean-Jacques Rousseau through mimicking Rousseau, responding to their students’ questions with quotes from *Emile* and *On Education*. This form of mimicry is one means of re-animating ghosts to ethically address them in the present, but does not alleviate my anxiety at consuming those I read. Rousseau is brought into the present, but when surrounded by an infinity of ghosts, effortful re-animation can only attend to the minority. Suppressed and erased voices remain suppressed in the cacophony of smaller voices circling writing (Harris, 2015). In citing and quoting, one mimics so that one might consume/collaborate. Anthropologist, Rane Willerslev (2004), comments on how Yukaghir hunters in North-East Russia become “like yet also different from the animal impersonated” (p. 630). In citing, as in hunting conceptualised by Willerslev, the other is mimicked so it might be consumed, but the citing writer must remain ontologically separate so that citer does not become cited. By quoting and paraphrasing, Flint’s, Braidotti’s, my granny’s words, my girlfriend’s words, even my own—all citations become my own, unavoidably. As I revise my own work, my work in the past is consumed by myself in the present. Re-animation is likely to attend to only the privileged minority of ghosts, and does not preclude from the consumption of the cited. The subtlety of hauntology, searching for all ghosts regardless of their esteem, enables me to take responsibility for my treatment of those I write with.

A hauntology enables a more intricate vision of temporality to emerge; the future and the past are not still, and they are not there in a distinct, other place. Rather than time unfolding linearly, time is diffracted through itself (Barad, 2010). Barthes notes that the author is a figure only in the past, the text and the author stand “on a single line divided into a before and after” (2001, p. 145). My ethical injunction is, therefore,
continual and ongoing (Peeren, 2014). Through seeing the temporality of the text as Barad would—with the past, present, and future threading through one another—it becomes easier to account for and protect the voice of the author, among the other voices in the text assemblage, as these ghostly voices and presences still exist and surround. Not only does this conception of a past, which is both in flux and immanent in the present, destabilise the representative logic of citation, it forces me to reckon with the ghosts which haunt writing (Dixon-Roman, 2017). Acknowledging these ghosts, and the discontinuous and heterogenous flow of time, can reveal what has been concealed or suppressed (Gordon, 2020). The lessons which stem out of haunted time are that the ghosts I write with are immanent with and in me, and that these ghosts of nomadic subjects therefore have agencies and fluid identities (Peeren, 2014). This recognition ought to prompt a change, an uncomfortable attempt to engage and co-construct more ethically with these ghosts. In a hauntology, I see the identities of those I write with as moving, not fixed; in writing, I am co-constructing the changeable identities I write with. Colin Davis (2005; 2013) argues that the ethical injunction of the writer is to preserve the otherness of the ghost. Through reading Barad and Braidotti, this ethical commitment is not necessarily about preserving distinctions, but rather accounting for connections as I engage in productive dialogue with ghosts of the past. As I write, I cut, truncate, erase, and consume the ghosts in the literature. Through Nomadic ethics, attending to these ghosts obligates an accountability to, and a recognition of those I cut.

Conclusion

This essay has been more of a diffractive cartography of my own attempts to reconcile my ethical concerns with representing scholars in my writing than a manifesto suggesting a new way forward. Through thinking with nomads, assemblages, ghosts, hunting, and hauntologies, I have looked for ways through the dualistic construction of reader and writer in opposition. The issues surrounding citation are a matter of ethically representing the other. As I see it, this is not to mean representing a dialogically opposed and separate other, but rather the other components of the assemblage I am entangled inside, and who I am entangled with. In writing with ghosts, this ethical endeavour requires an attention to the past and to the future, and an interrogation of how I relate to and represent the wholeness and complexity of the other in my writing (Davis, 2005). In academic writing, those I write about get truncated and erased (Blackman, 2015). Herein lies the overwhelming mass of my ethical quandary—the sheer number of those I have hunted and consumed in my writing. Selective re-animation can only enable more ethical behaviour to the minority, to the Rousseaus and the Derridas. Instead, I am obliged to an ethical treatment of the totality—fidelity and honesty as I co-construct haunted assemblages of manuscripts. By working with
concepts of haunting and nomads, these infinitudes of ghosts who had been made invisible might become seen again. At the centre of my own discomfort with citation was the issue of representing the other as though it is in dialogic opposition to the self. Through joining an understanding of nomadic ethics to the idea that the text is an assemblage haunted by the ghosts of others, I might move through this interpretation of writing which places the represented other in stasis, and see the ghosts entangled in my thinking, speaking, and writing.
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