Résumés
Abstract
This paper discusses a challenge to the claims made by biocentrists and some ecocentrists that some nonsentient biological entities (e.g., organisms, species, ecosystems) qualify as candidates for moral considerability. This challenge derives from Wayne Sumner’s (1996) critique of “objective theories of welfare” and, in particular, from his critique of biocentrists’ and ecocentrists’ biofunction-based accounts of the “good of their own” of nonsentient biological entities. Sumner’s critique lends support to animal ethicists’ typical skepticism regarding those accounts, by contending that they are more plausibly interpreted as accounts of the perfectionist value than of the welfare of nonsentient biological entities. In response to this critique and its implication that those function-based accounts would fail to qualify nonsentient biological entities as candidates for moral considerability, it is argued that those accounts should be interpreted as ones of the health of biological entities rather than ones of their perfectionist value. It is suggested that their being bearers of health may be sufficient for nonsentient biological entities to qualify as candidates for moral considerability, such that biocentrists and ecocentrists could grant Sumner and animal ethicists’ contention that the function-based accounts of the good of their own of nonsentient biological entities are not accounts of their welfare, while not giving up on the project of defending those entities’ moral considerability.
Résumé
Cet article discute d’une objection à la thèse défendue par plusieurs biocentristes et écocentristes selon laquelle les entités biologiques non sentientes (ex. : organismes, espèces, écosystèmes) se qualifieraient comme candidates à la considérabilité morale. Cette objection découle de la critique des « théories objectives du bien-être » formulée par Wayne Sumner (1996) et, plus particulièrement, de sa critique des théories du « bien propre » défendues par les biocentristes et les écocentristes, lesquelles définissent ce bien en relation avec les concepts biologiques de fonction et de téléologie. La critique de Sumner offre un certain appui au scepticisme généralement suscité par ces théories chez les auteur-e-s oeuvrant dans le domaine de l’éthique animale, en ce qu’elle fait valoir que celles-ci sont plus plausiblement interprétées comme concernant une forme de valeur perfectionniste s’appliquant aux entités biologiques non sentientes que comme concernant leur bien-être. Cet article soutient que la manière la plus prometteuse de répondre à cette critique pour les biocentristes et les écocentristes consiste à faire valoir d’une part, que les théories du bien propre qu’elles et ils défendent doivent être interprétées comme des théories de la santé des entités biologiques plutôt que comme des théories (de leur bien-être ou) de leur valeur perfectionniste, et d’autre part, que la possibilité pour les entités biologiques non sentientes d’être en plus ou moins bonne santé suffit à les rendre candidates à la considérabilité morale.
Parties annexes
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