Nationalism and Racism

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Résumé de l'article

Cet article propose une typologie des idéologies présentes dans les projets nationalistes et cherche à voir comment les divisions ethniques, fondées sur la « race » et sur la nation ne constituent pas des catégories mutuellement exclusives. Il résume d'abord les diverses conceptions de la nation (primordialistes, marxistes, modernistes) et les conceptions qui examinent les origines ethniques des nations et les processus d'homogénéisation des États-nations autour de « communautés imaginées » (Smith, Zubaida, Anderson, etc.). Sont ensuite distingués divers types de nationalismes : un nationalisme s'alimentant à même l'idée d'origines biologiques communes, comme mythe fondateur, et qui sera à la source du racisme différentialiste; un nationalisme à base culturelle, selon lequel le monde est divisé entre « eux » et « nous » au moyen de frontières imaginaires ou de mythes-moteurs qui permettent d'identifier les gens comme membres ou non-membres d'une collectivité spécifique; et, un nationalisme religieux (sous la forme de la théologie de la libération ou du fondamentalisme) dont elle affirme l'expansion dans le monde au nom de la lutte anti-impérialiste et anti-raciste. On discute par la suite du type de nationalisme qui tente de se fonder sur les idéologies et les politiques établies d'un multiculturalisme ou de pluralisme culturel. Et, l'auteure soulève les difficultés liées à l'application de ces politiques : tension, sinon contradiction, avec la culture hégémonique; définition des frontières de la différence entre les diverses cultures; vision essentieliste de la culture et réductionnisme des minorités aux aspects culturels; détermination des besoins culturels à respecter dans la sphère privée et la sphère publique, détermination des représentants « authentiques » des communautés, homogénéisation des minorités, qu'elles soient anciennes, nouvelles, immigrantes ou autochtones en un tout uniifié, etc. Finalement, elle aborde le sujet du multiculturalisme et de la citoyenneté en soulignant que les États-nations de l'Ouest sont construits autour du postulat qu'il y a correspondance entre les frontières de la société civile et politique, les citoyens de l'État et les membres de la collectivité nationale. Ceci dit, l'auteure crée l'idéologie et l'illusion d'une vision universaliste de la citoyenneté. S'il est vrai que cette idéologie fournit les bases des mobilisations anti-exclusionnistes et anti-racistes, elle masque en même temps l'existence du racisme institutionnel en dépit du discours universaliste.
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Nira YUVAL-DAVIS

The collapse of the 'Cold War' and the intensification of many nationalist struggles in the Balkan and East Europe, has given new momentum to debates on the 'National Question'. To many communities, such as the Quebecois, the Palestinians and the Northern Irish, the question, of course, has been at the forefront of their political agenda for many decades. What our attitude towards nationalism should be, however, is very controversial. Opinions range from those who interchange social revolutionary and national liberation struggles to those who interchange nationalism and fascism. Eli Kedourie\(^1\) sees nationalism as always inherently illiberal and in constant tension with universalism. Anderson\(^2\), on the other hand, makes an absolute distinction between nationalism and racism. For him, nationalism and racism are opposite sentiments. He views nationalism as a positive sentiment, "which thinks in terms of historical destinies," while racist discourse is negative:

Racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time... On the whole, racism and anti-semitism manifest themselves, not across national boundaries but within them\(^3\).

While it is clear that not all nationalist ideologies are equally racist, I do not accept Anderson's dichotomy. Wherever a delineation of boundaries takes place — as is the case with every ethnic and national collectivity — processes of exclusion and inclusion are in operation. These can take place with varying degrees of intensity and with a variety of cultural, religious and state mechanisms. But exclusions of 'the Other' can become a positive and inherent part of national ethnicities. Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa are two examples in which such exclusions became a major and an obsessive preoccupation of the national culture. But many, if not most, other ethnicities of hegemonic national collectivities include elements of racist exclusion within their symbolic orders. Several studies have pointed to this in the context of contemporary Britain, for

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\(^3\) Ibid., p. 183.
instance⁴ Tom Nairn in his study of *The Break-up of Britain*⁵ (1977) described nationalism as a Janus with two opposite, positive and negative, facets.

In this paper I would like to examine the concepts of nation and nationalism and the ways in which they can become racialized. I believe that by unpacking different dimensions of the nationalist phenomenon, and the racisms that can be associated with them, we can begin to move beyond the 'Dialogue of the Deaf' that so often typifies debates between those who support and those who oppose specific nationalist projects. It can also contribute to a more systematic study of different kinds of 'racisms'⁶.

1 The Notion of the 'Nation'

What constitutes a nation and the extent to which it is a particularly modern or even western phenomenon are controversial questions. At one extreme there are 'the primordialists'⁷, who claim that nations are natural and universal, an 'automatic' extension of kinship relationships. Their historical importance might rise or fall but they are always there, waiting to be discovered rather than to be historically constructed.

At the other extreme are 'the modernists' who see nationalism and nations as a phenomenon which is particular to capitalism⁸.

While Marxists have developed very different theories of nationalism — Otto Bauer⁹, Samir Amin¹⁰, and Tom Nairn¹¹, for example, — all Marxists share the 'modernist' viewpoint in that they see in nationalism and in nations, social rather

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⁶ For a full elaboration of the theoretical framework within which this paper has been written please see the book I have written with Floya Anthias, in association with Harriet Cain, *op. cit.* 1992. This paper is closely related to part of ch. 2 in the book.
⁹ O. Bauer, *The National Question*, (Hebrew), Rehavia, Hakibutz Ha'artrzi, 1940.
than 'natural' facts. However, not all of them consider the construction of nations as specific to capitalism. Samir Amin, for instance, links the emergence of nations to the existence of a strong state bureaucracy and claims that 'a nation' already existed in societies with centralized states such as ancient Egypt.

Recent popular 'modernist' approaches include those of Anderson\textsuperscript{12} and Gellner\textsuperscript{13} who claim that nations are a direct result of particular historical developments and that their beginnings can be located no earlier than 18th century Europe. Anderson anchors the development of nationalism to the development of print, which popularized culture. Printing allowed for the establishment of 'imagined communities' which, under capitalism, came to occupy the place religion used to play. Gellner traces the development of nationalism to the need of modern societies for cultural homogeneity in order to function. This need, when satisfied, is sponsored by the modern nation state; but when it is unfulfilled, it stimulates the growth of ideological movements among the excluded groupings (those who have not been absorbed into the hegemonic culture). These groups, in turn, call for the establishment of alternative nation states.

All these 'modernist' approaches see the development of nationalism, like capitalism, as originating in Europe. Gellner and Hobsbawm\textsuperscript{14} trace nationalism in Europe, and following Europe, — corresponding with the uneven development of capitalism — in the rest of the world. They observe the nationalist phenomenon as undergoing certain evolutionary stages of development and, according to Hobsbawm at least\textsuperscript{15}, even the beginning of its decline.

2 Nationalism, Ethnicity and the State

Another influential approach to the study of nations is that of Anthony Smith\textsuperscript{16} who looks at the 'ethnic origins of nations'. While agreeing with the 'modernists' that nationalism, both as an ideology and as a movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon, Smith argues that: "the 'modern nation' in practice incorporates several features of pre-modern ethnie and owes much to a general model of ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the dawn of the 'modern era'\textsuperscript{17}.

\textsuperscript{12} B. Anderson, \textit{op. cit.}, 1983.
\textsuperscript{14} E. Hobsbawm, \textit{op. cit.} 1990.
\textsuperscript{15} In a more recent article Hobsbawm has softened this position which seems more and more unsustainable in the present global political climate. E. Hobsbawm, "Dangerous exit from a stormy world", \textit{New Statesman and Society}, 8 Nov. 1991, p.16-17.
\textsuperscript{17} See A.D. Smith, \textit{op. cit.} 1986, p. 18.
Smith claims that the specificity of the ethnie has to be found in its 'myth-symbol complex'. This is very durable over time (although the specific meaning of the myths and symbols can change over time) rather than in any other social, economic or political features of the collectivity.

Sami Zubaida\(^\text{18}\), in criticizing this approach, has anchored the durability of ethnicities in certain socio-economic and political processes. He claims (by using historical examples from both Europe and the Middle East) that historically ethnic homogeneity is not a cause, but a result of a long history of centralized governments that created a 'national unity' in the pre-modern era. It 'was not given — but was achieved precisely by the political processes which facilitated centralization'\(^\text{19}\).

Whether it is the state or other socio-economic and political processes that homogenizes ethnicity, it is important to recognize, as both Smith and Zubaida have done, that there is an inherent connection between ethnic and national projects. While it is important to look at the historical specificity of the construction of collectivities, there is no inherent difference between them, whether they are constructed as ethnic, national racial or religious (although sometimes there is a difference in scale): they are both Andersonian 'imagined communities'.

What is specific to the nationalist project and discourse is the claim for a separate political representation for the collectivity. This often — but not always — takes the form of a claim for a separate state. However, there is virtually no contemporary state in which the boundaries of civil society and the boundaries of the national collectivity, which is hegemonic in that state, are identical, 'ethnic cleansing' notwithstanding.

### 3 Definitions of 'the Nation'

If 'nations' are not to be identified with 'nation-states' — in reality or in potential — one questions if there are any 'objective' characteristics according to which nations can be recognized. This question is not purely theoretical given the wide consensus regarding 'the right of nations to self determination'. While Marx and Engels developed a tautological differentiation between 'historical nations', entitled to their own states, and 'history-less' nations which are not, Lenin differentiated between nations who fight against their oppression by others, and therefore have the right to be supported by socialists, and oppressing nations who


do not\textsuperscript{20}. Stalin, when he came to power, differentiated between 'positive' 'proletarian nations' and 'negative' 'bourgeois nations'\textsuperscript{21}, is best known in this respect for the 'formula definition' he developed at an earlier period as 'the expert on the national question' among the Bolsheviks. According to Stalin: "A nation is an historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture"\textsuperscript{22}.

In contrast, Otto Bauer's definition\textsuperscript{23} dispensed with the economy, language and territory (although in objecting to the Bund's adoption of his model for the Jewish collectivity, Bauer claimed that a certain territorial concentration is vital for the development of a nation). He concentrated on a common culture and on what he called 'common destiny'.

This element of 'common destiny' is of crucial importance and is what is lacking from Smith's focus on the ethnic origins of nations. It has future, rather than just past, orientation and can explain more than individual and communal assimilations within particular nations. It can explain the subjective sense of commitment of people to collectivities and nations, such as in settler societies or in post-colonial states in which there is no shared myth of common origin\textsuperscript{24}. At the same time it can also explain the dynamic nature of any national collectivity and the perpetual processes of reconstruction of boundaries occurring within them via immigration, naturalization, conversion, and other similar social and political processes.

A crucial element in the interaction between the elements of 'common origin' and 'common destiny' relates to what Amrita Chhachhi calls 'forced identities'\textsuperscript{25}. In situations of national, ethnic and racial conflicts, markers of origin signify particular constructions of exclusion, subordination or even extermination. When this happens a third characteristic of the definition of 'the nation', the one so emphasized by French historian Ernest Renan of 'common solidarity'\textsuperscript{26}, gains its most forceful manifestations. Such solidarity is based on a construction of self in


\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, 1972 [1913], p. 13.


\textsuperscript{24} See the introduction in D. Stasiulis and N. Yuval-Davis (eds.), \textit{Beyond Dichotomies: Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class in Settler Societies},London, Sage, forthcoming.


\textsuperscript{26} E. Renan, \textit{Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?}, Paris, 1882, p. 27.
which membership in the collectivity becomes the most dominant organizing principle, even if, before this conflict arose, members of the collectivity had only relatively weak bonds with it (as has been the case, for instance, with many Jews in Nazi Germany and many Muslims in contemporary Bosnia).

4 Different Kinds of Nationalist Projects

Not all nationalist ideologies are the same. As Sami Zubaida pointed out back in 1978, "The general designation of 'nationalism' as a unitary object or phenomenon and the general 'theories' of it. would not help very much in the task of adequate analysis of particular social formations"\(^{27}\).

As mentioned above, there have been many attempts to classify the different kinds of nationalist movements and nationalist ideologies which have arisen in the world during the last two hundred years. Good summaries of these classifications can be found both in Snyder\(^ {28} \) and Smith\(^ {29} \). Two 'classical' typologies relate to the 'moral' nature of various nationalist projects. The typology of Kohn\(^ {30} \) differentiates between 'Western' and 'Eastern' Nationalisms — between the benevolent Western European nationalism and the oppressive nationalism of the rest of the world. Hayes\(^ {31} \) developed a more universalist model based on a basic differentiation between what he calls 'original' (liberationist) and 'derived' (post-independence oppressive) nationalism. More recent classifications have tried to maintain scientific 'neutralism'. Either they take the form of historical taxonomies (which focus almost exclusively on Europe), or of sociological taxonomies (which focus on the various social locations and specific goals of the national movements, both of the majority or the minority, aimed either at secession or pan-national liberation etc.).

Anthony Smith\(^ {32} \) has developed a typology based on the specific character of the nationalist project, including both the 'ethnic-genealogical' movement and the 'civic-territorial' movement. A somewhat similar dichotomy has been developed in Germany between Kulturnations and Staatnations\(^ {33} \). These dichotomous divisions, however, conflate origin and culture. If we differentiate between them we come up with three categories, Volknation, Kulturnation and Staatnation: In


\(^{29}\) A. D. Smith, A. D., *op. cit.*, 1971, ch.8.


\(^{32}\) A D Smith, *op. cit.*, 1971 and 1986.

other words, nationalist ideologies constructed around the specific origin of the people (or their race) — like classical German nationalism, or white South Africanism; those which focus on specific cultures (or religions) — like classical French nationalism, or Pakistani nationalism; and those which focus on citizenship of specific states (in specific territories), like, for example, American nationalism in its 'purest form'.

However, rather than attempting to classify all different states and societies according to these different types — an a-historical, impossible, and misleading mission as most classifications of social phenomena are, they should be seen as three dimensions of nationalist ideologies and projects which are present, to a greater or lesser extent, in the different concrete nationalist projects. I shall now look at the different ways in which these three dimensions can be connected to racist exclusions.

5 Nationalism and 'Biological Stock'

The relationship between racism and the nationalist dimension of Volknation is the most obvious one. If membership in the national collectivity depends on being born into it, then those who do not share the myth of common origin are completely excluded. The only way 'outsiders' can conceivably join the national collectivity is by intermarriage. Not incidentally, those who are preoccupied with the 'purity' of the race are also preoccupied with the sexual relationships between members of the different collectivity. Typically, the first (and only) law that Rabbi Kahana, leader of Kach, the Israeli fascist party, raised in the Israeli Parliament was to forbid sexual relationships between Jews and Arabs. However, as the Nuremberg laws in Nazi Germany demonstrate, even if children of such cross collectivities exist, the notion of 'racial contamination' can be carried through several generations.

Skin colour and other visible inherited characteristics have been of particular importance as signifiers of origin. Although any marker of ethnic boundaries can become racialized, physical characteristics are not generational specific attributes — unlike accents or modes of dress, for instance, which can be specific only to first generation migrants. Also, assimilation is impossible as a coping strategy for the victims of such racism and their children as long as the inherited characteristics continue to be used culturally as a signifiers for racist discourse and practice.

Nevertheless, the inclusion in the collectivity is far from being only a biological issue. There are always rules and regulations about cases in which

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children of 'mixed parenthood' should be part of the collectivity and the cases when they should not; about when they would be considered a separate social category, like in South Africa; part of the 'inferior' collectivity, as during slavery; or — although this is rarer — part of the 'superior' collectivity, as was the case with marriages between Spanish settlers and aristocratic Indians in Mexico\textsuperscript{35}. When a man from Ghana tried to claim his British origin for the sake of the Patriality clause in the British Immigration Act, arguing that his African grandmother was legally married to his British grandfather, the judge rejected his claim, stating that at this period no British man would genuinely marry an African woman\textsuperscript{36}.

The worry about the quality of the 'stock' has been a major worry in the British empire and its settler societies. The Royal Commission on Population declared in its 1949 report that: "British traditions, manners, and ideas in the world have to be borne in mind. Immigration is thus not a desirable means of keeping the population at a replacement level as it would in effect reduce the proportion of home-bred stock in the population\textsuperscript{37}." And it was concern for the 'British Race' that Beveridge describes in his famous report as the motivation to establish the British welfare state system\textsuperscript{38}. In countries like Australia and Canada there has been a constant debate between those who want to keep the 'Anglomorphic' character of the society and those who urge 'populate or perish' — with whatever 'least undesirable' immigrants there are who are available to settle. To let 'outsiders' share in the 'common destiny' is preferable to having no future at all.

The exclusionary nature of 'common origin' has undergone a transformation under what is known as 'new racism'\textsuperscript{39}. Martin Barker claimed that with the discrediting of nazism after WW2\textsuperscript{40}, some of the more vulgar forms of racisms became unacceptable. These forms of racism have openly identified the non-European 'races' as biologically inferior. The 'new racism' on the other hand, merely identifies them as 'different', and, as such, as inappropriately located among the others. As Enoch Powell put it. "The West Indian does not by being born in

\textsuperscript{35} N. Gutierrez, N., "Mixing races for nation building: native and settler women in Mexico", in D. Stasiulis and N. Yuval-Davis., N. op. cit., forthcoming.
\textsuperscript{36} For a discussion of this and other related issues see WING (Women and Immigration and Nationality Group), Worlds Apart, Women Under Immigration and Nationality Law, London, Pluto Press, 1985.
\textsuperscript{38} W. Beveridge, Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services, London, HMSO, 1942.
\textsuperscript{40} Or is it more apt to say these days that it was only a 'temporary discreditation of nazism after WW2?
England, becomes an Englishman". Balibar, has called this phenomenon *racisme differentialiste*, in which 'cultural groups' need to be kept in their country of origin, in order not to harm or be harmed by the unmixable foreign elements. To understand this phenomenon of 'cultural racism' we need to analyse the relationships between: nation and culture; nationalism and religion, multiculturalism, citizenship.

6 Nation and Culture

Political divisions that are so easily and intuitively understood in relation to state politics become much more obscure when related to the nation. Patriotism is supposed to affect everyone similarly regardless of class or gender. 'Our troops' have to be cheered, whether the 'national project' in hand is a war or an international cricket game.

This mythical unity, this 'imagined community' that divides the world between 'us' and 'them', is maintained and ideologically reproduced by a whole system of what Armstrong calls symbolic 'border guards'. These 'border guards' can identify people as members or non-members of a specific collectivity. They are closely linked to specific cultural codes of style of dress and behaviour as well as to more elaborate bodies of customs, literary and artistic modes of production, and, of course, language. These 'border guards' are used as shared cultural resources and, together with shared collective positioning vis-a-vis other collectivities, they can provide the collectivity members not only with the Andersonian 'Imagined Communities', but also with what Deutch and Schlesinger call "Communicative Communities": "Membership in a people consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders".

It is important, however, not to reify these 'border guards' as 'the' national culture. They are cultural resources used in the struggles for hegemony that take place at specific moments not only between collectivities, but also within them.

Different, sometimes conflicting, cultural 'border guards' can be used simultaneously by different members of the collectivity. One example is the use of different Suras in the Koran to argue for and against abortions in Egypt; another is the promotion of Hebrew vs. Yiddish by Zionists and Bundists respectively. In contemporary Quebec, the French language, rather than origin or colour of skin has become the most important signifier of racialized boundaries. Although at certain historical moments there might be a hegemonic construction of the collectivity's culture and history, its dynamic, evolving, historical nature, continuously re-invents, reconstructs, reproduces and develops the cultural inventory of various collectivities. In extreme cases, these processes involve not only the redefinition of boundaries, but also the complete dissolution and/or transformation of the collectivity and its positioning of difference vis-a-vis other collectivities. Two such examples are the 'absorption' of East Germany into the 'New' (and old) Germany, and the evolving categories of the 'African American' and 'Black British'.

The ability to communicate more easily, prevalent among members of the same collectivity, derives not only from a common sharing of cultural forms, but also, on a deeper level, from the fact that national cultures can supply answers to some basic human questions regarding one's position in the world, the meaning of history, and what 'proper' behaviour is. This is done through the absorption, on conscious and unconscious levels, of what Smith calls 'the mythomoteur': that is the constitutive myth of the ethnic polity which describes how and why the collectivity was created, why it is unique and what its mission is. Although this constitutive myth would have different versions among different classes and segments within the collectivity, it would be continuously narrated.

7 Nationalism and Religion

The questions treated by the 'mythomoteur' parallel very closely the general questions about the meaning of life and beyond resolved by religious systems. It is not surprising, therefore, that 'modernist' theorists of nationalism saw it as replacing religion which was expected to eventually 'whither away' in a secularized world.

The reality, of course, is very different. Religion, in the form of liberation theology, and even more so in the form of religious fundamentalism, is rising (although not without resistance) all over the world. Even in Eastern Europe, where religion was exorcised from the public domain for more than fifty years, it has undergone an important revival, probably more powerful than ever. And some of the most enduring and problematic international and interethnic conflicts in the

world today — whether in Northern Ireland, the Middle East or the Indian subcontinent — are waged in the name of religion.

There are two major reasons for this. The negative one concerns the failure of the secularist-enlightenment project within which Eurocentric nationalisms have established themselves. The positive one relates to the centrality of religious codes in existing national cultural codes.

The crushing failure of the civil religion attempted in France after the revolution should have alerted social scientists to the limits of rationality and human-centred cosmology. While some of the nationalist 'mythomoteurs' in Europe linked their constitutive moments to pre-Christian times, only very rarely was Christianity fully rejected on that ground. Despite the development of secularist ideologies that completely rejected religion as an anachronism in the age of enlightenment, the prevalence of liberal ideologies in Western Europe meant that, on the political level, religion was at most pushed into the voluntary sector rather than banned from the public domain. Moreover, the long struggles for the recognition of religious pluralism did not necessarily secularize national culture. Even in societies like the USA, which established total separation of church and state, the national slogan is "In God We Trust". By God, is meant the Christian God or, at most, the Judeo-Christian God. Thus biblical myths and narrations, Christian holidays as national holidays, musical and other cultural heritage, as well as an ethical code broadly based on the Christian code, have continued to survive and be reproduced (although probably minus the literal ideas of post-mortem heaven and hell — people became much more occupied with heaven and hell on earth).

However, this was not unproblematic. With the withdrawal of active state support for religious institutions, and the hegemony of rational discourse in the scientific and political spheres, churches gradually started to lose their hold over people, and membership in religious institutions dropped. As Don Cupitt said:

There is a world of difference between a society in which your religious beliefs are supported by reason and confirmed by daily experience, and a society like ours in which the truth of religious beliefs is no longer a matter of common knowledge and, what is worse, the religious consciousness itself has come to be regarded by many people as deviant. 49

Given that religious ethics have continued to be the basis for the moral code in the nationalist social order and the failures of the modernist enlightenment project 50, fears of anomie, nihilism and a general sense of disorientation

prompted, among other factors, the rise of religious fundamentalism in the West\textsuperscript{51}.

At the same time, religious specificity has proved to be more durable and resistant to assimilation than many other aspects of nationalist cultures. Moreover, in many countries, especially in the Third World, traditional religions were incorporated into, rather than replaced by, the new national states. (This was usually done, however, in a selective and controlled manner, often by concentrating on personal law and through use of women as cultural symbols of the national collectivity\textsuperscript{52}. With repeated failures by nationalist and socialist movements to bring about successful liberation from oppression, exploitation and poverty, both in the Third World and among Third World minorities in the West, religion has become both a comfort and a base for new militant mass mobilizations. As the boundaries of the 'new nations' have often been imposed by the ex-colonial powers, religion (unlike secular nationalism, which has been identified as a western project) has been utilized by militants for their nationalist projects as an 'indigenous' ideology with which to confront imperialism and racism. This, of course, has not been confined to the 'Third World'. Catholicism, for instance, in Ireland, Poland and Quebec, has played a similar role.

The continuation of the co-opted, non-problematic reproduction of religious codes within nationalist cultures has also been affected by the growing heterogeneity of western societies through the gradual settlement of new Third World minorities in them. This has been the result of post-WW2 processes of labour migration\textsuperscript{53}, as well as the immigration of refugees and others from their countries of origin. These minorities did not share part or all of the dominant nationalist cultural code and therefore have forced the question of the relationship between the nationalist project to multi-culturalism.

8 Nationalism and Multi-Culturalism

Different national collectivities are constructed with varying degrees of tolerance to cultural difference. 'New nations' or states, which from their inception have included more than one collectivity (like Switzerland), have some built-in mechanisms to deal with questions of cultural difference, at least of certain kinds, although their effectiveness depends on the specific historical context (as the


examples of Lebanon and Yugoslavia can unfortunately show). There might be more than one formal language (like in Belgium), or interpreters might be offered as an institutional right for those who cannot speak the formal language (as in Australia).

Other countries (or the same countries in relation to cultures of minorities outside the constituent ones) might be much less tolerant of cultural difference. The recent debate in France around the school-girls who wore headscarves is but a symptom of the persistence of the French perspective, so prevalent during French imperialism, that living under French rule must involve becoming culturally French as well. Even in countries where there is a formal policy of multiculturalism, such as Britain, the USA and Australia, there are problems.

First of all, it is problematic to define the boundaries of difference between the actual different 'cultures.' How is it to be decided which 'cultures', or elements of 'cultures', would be 'legitimately' included in the multi-culturalist vision and which would not? Outlawing cultural systems like polygamy or the ritual use of drugs immediately come to mind, as well as, for instance, such issues as Aboriginal demands to apply their customary laws among themselves rather than the laws of the state. How tolerant the hegemonic culture is about various social practices will clearly determine what can or cannot be allowed.

However, hegemonic legitimacy is not the only factor. There is also what the Australian 'National Agenda for a Multi-culturalist Australia' calls "the boundaries of multi-culturalism". An important issue in allocating resources under multi-culturalist policies to different cultural 'needs' is the determination of what are considered to be 'private needs' and what are 'public collective needs'. The boundaries between public and private are socially determined within specific cultural, class and gender contexts. Whether or not facilities for specific religious needs, childcare facilities for working mothers or certain leisure activities are provided, depends on, among other factors, who has the decision-making power at a specific point of time.

An even more basic problem in the construction of multi-culturalism is the assumption that all members of a specific cultural collectivity are equally committed to that culture. It tends to construct the members of minority collectivities as basically homogenous, speaking with a unified cultural voice. These cultural voices have to be as distinguished as possible from the majority culture in order to be able to be seen as 'different'; thus, the more traditional and

distanced from the majority culture the voice of the 'community representatives' is, the more 'authentic' it would be perceived to be within such a construction\textsuperscript{55}.

Therefore, such a construction would have no space for internal power conflicts and interest difference within the minority collectivity, as is the case with conflicts along the lines of class and gender as well as of politics and culture, for instance.

The whole notion of multi-culturalism assumes definite, static, a-historical and essentialist units of 'culture' with fixed boundaries and with no space for growth and change. Moreover, such a notion would tend to homogenize all minority collectivities, whether 'old' 'new' 'immigrant', or 'indigenous' as long as they are not the hegemonic naturalized hegemonic culture\textsuperscript{56}.

An alternative dynamic model of cultural pluralism has been developed by Homi Bahba\textsuperscript{57}. Emphasizing the constantly changing boundaries of the national 'imagined communities' and of the narratives that constitute their collective cultural discourses, Bhaba notes the emerging counter-narratives from the nation's margins — by those cultural 'hybrids' who have lived, because of migration or exile, in more than one culture. Those 'hybrids' both evoke and erase the 'totalizing boundaries' of the nation. Such counter-narratives do not have to come, of course, from immigrant minorities. The growing voice of Native peoples in Canada, for example, is an instance of a counter-narrative which is heard from within. On a much larger scale, such counter-narratives have disintegrated the 'Soviet nation'. It is important to note in this context, however, that 'Counter-narratives', even if radical in their form, do not necessarily have to be progressive in their message...

9 Nationalism and Citizenship

It is not only in 'new nations' that formal citizenship is used, at least in some ways, to indicate membership in a national collectivity. Theodor Shanin once remarked\textsuperscript{58} that in English (and French) — as opposed to East European and other languages — there is what he called 'a missing term' which defines nationality in its ethnic rather than its civic meaning. For one product of the historical circumstances of the rise of the nation-state in western Europe is an inherent assumption that in the nation-state there is an overlap between the

\textsuperscript{56} See M. de Lepervanche Discussion on the Ethnocization of the Australian Aborigines under Multi-Culturalism — "From Race to Ethnicity", Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol. 16, no 1.
boundaries of civil and political society (to use Hegel's and Marx's terminology), citizens of the state and members of the national collectivity. This creates both an ideology and an illusion of universality of citizenship. While the first can provide a basis for anti-exclusionist and anti-racist mobilizations, both political and legislative, the second can block and obscure them, and construct institutional racism while using universal language. In Israel, for example, Palestinians are excluded from a variety of social rights given only to 'Israeli citizens who have relatives who have served in the Israeli army' (Muslim Palestinians are prevented from joining the national service). In Britain, the patriality clause in the Immigration Act also used a supposedly universalistic language for very racist purposes.

The most popular definition of citizenship which is used, at least in British social science, is that of T.S. Marshall\textsuperscript{59}. He defines citizenship in terms of "membership in a community". This definition, as I have elaborated elsewhere\textsuperscript{60}, assumes a given collectivity with pre-defined boundaries.

This is not to say, of course, that Marshall and his followers assume that all those who are included in 'the community' also enjoy citizenship rights. On the contrary, Marshall's work constructs an evolutionary model in which more and more people who are members of the civil society gradually acquire citizenship rights. But the boundaries of the 'society' and of 'the community' are virtually static in this model. The differentiation between civil and political societies is a functional differentiation relating to the same national collectivity or 'community' and the people within it, rather than marking, as is usually the case, two kinds of groupings whose boundaries partially overlap. Members of the national collectivity can also live in 'the diaspora' and be citizens of other states, while some citizens and permanent residents can be members of other national collectivities. In addition there can be cases in which a national collectivity is divided between several neighbouring countries (such as the Kurds). Moreover, there can be cases of disagreement about the boundaries of membership in the national collectivity based on conflicting ideologies (e.g. Arab Jews; Black British).

As Stuart Hall and David Held\textsuperscript{61} point out, in real politics, the main, if not the only, arena in the West in which questions of citizenship have remained alive until recently, at least in the West, has been the discourse revolving around questions of race and immigration, questions that challenge any notion of fixed boundaries of 'the community'.


\textsuperscript{60} N. Yuval-Davis, \textit{op. cit.}, 1991

Debates concerning the citizenship of ethnic and racial minorities have
developed in relation to all levels of citizenship — civil, political and social (to
use Marshall's categories). However, the primary concern of many relevant
struggles and debates has centred on an even more basic right: the right to enter, or
once having entered, the right to remain in a specific country. Boundaries are
constructed according to various inclusionary and exclusionary criteria relating not
only to ethnic and racial divisions but also to those of class and gender. This
central arena of struggle concerning citizenship remains completely outside the
agenda of Marshallian theories of citizenship. The 'freedom of movement within
the European community', the Israeli Law of Return and the German nationality
law are all instances of ideological, often racist, constructions of boundaries
allowing unrestricted immigration to some and block it completely to others.

Racist boundaries of citizenship and freedom of movement do not always
relate to outside immigrants. In settler societies such inhibitions apply also to
indigenous people. For example, the Australian Aboriginals received the right of
citizenship only in 1967, and Black South Africans are only now in the process of
achieving it. The same can apply to stateless minorities, as has been the case for
Jews and Gypsies in large parts of Europe. The linkage of racialized boundaries of
a collectivity with nationalist claims for separate state within specific territorial
boundaries can lead to shutting people up in Reserves, deportations and 'ethnic
cleansing' and actual genocide.62

Even after questions of entry and residence have been resolved, the concerns of
people of ethnic minorities might be different from those of other members of the
society. For example, their right to formal citizenship might depend upon the
rules and regulations of their country of origin, those of the country where they
live, as well as the relationship between the two. The USA, for example, has
allowed dual citizenship with certain countries but not with others. Concern for
relatives and fear of not being allowed to visit their country of origin prevent
others (such as Turkish migrant workers in Germany) from giving up their
original citizenship. Thus, although they might spend the rest of their lives in
another country, they would have, at best, limited political rights in it. Also,
given specific combinations of nationality laws, children can be born stateless in
countries like Israel and Britain. Such countries confer citizenship on those whose
parents are citizens rather than on those born in the country.

Immigrants can also be deprived of social rights enjoyed by other members of
the society. Often the right of entry into a country is conditioned on a
commitment by the immigrant that neither s/he or any other member of his or her

62 On the relationships of nationality and territoriality see discussions in N. Yuval-
Davis, "Marxism and Jewish Nationalism", History Workshop Journal, no 24, Autumn,
1987, and "Should we go?/Could we stay? — The Emigration of Jews from the Soviet
Union", Theory, Culture and Society, autumn, 1990; see also E. Nimni, Marxism and
family will claim any welfare benefits from the state. Proof of a sizeable fortune in the bank can be used to override national/racial quotas for the right to settle in a country. Class difference, therefore, can sometimes override ethnic and racial difference.

Gender differences are also important in this context. Women of majority and minority groups are affected differently by sexist limitations to their citizenship rights. This can concern their right to enter the country or bring in their husbands, their right to receive child benefits or their right to confer citizenship on their children, to mention just a few examples. Similarly, men and women of ethnic and racial minorities suffer from gender specific racisms: they can have different legal rights (for instance for getting permits to bring their families into the country); they would often have different rates of participation in political organizations, and similar differences would exist between them on a whole host of civil and social rights.

Differential access to the state and its resources can also exist among different ethnic and racial minorities within the same state just as their location within the labour market can be very different. Some minorities have high access to welfare benefits and low access to employment, while others, in the same state, are employed as cheap labour and have almost no access to welfare benefits.

Of course, it is not only ethnic and racial minorities that have differential access to the state. Various regions within the boundaries of the same 'national collectivity' can sometimes have such different levels of access to the state that Hechter and others developed the model of 'internal colonialism' to analyse the relationship between them. These, together with class, gender, age and other cross-cutting differences within the civil society affecting their access to the state, highlight the fact that the state should not be seen as a neutral universalistic institution. Nor can the 'national projects' of the state (both in times of peace and in times of war) be seen as equally representing the interests of all members of 'the nation'.

'Ethnic Cleansing' notwithstanding, today there is virtually nowhere in the world in which 'pure' nation-states exist, if they ever did, and, therefore, there are always settled residents (and usually citizens as well) who are not members of the dominant national collectivity in the society. The fact that there still exists an often automatic assumption about the overlap between the boundaries of the state citizens and 'the nation' is one expression of the naturalising effect of the hegemony of one collectivity and its access to ideological apparatuses of both state and civil society. This constructs minorities as deviants from the 'normal' and

64 See Southall Black Sisters, Against the Grain, SBS, 1990.
excludes them from important power resources. The most extreme form of such an exclusion is physical annihilation by deportation or genocide. Deconstructing this is crucial to tackling racism, as well as to tackling the growing national conflicts in the post-communist bloc and other places.

Some anti-racist struggles have gained enough power to break, to a certain extent, the 'naturalness' of the hegemony of the dominant national collectivity in various western societies. This relative success (which should be recognized in spite of the general oppressive economic and political climate) has exposed, however, the need for new and adequate tools for constructing an anti-racist strategy which would transcend the conventional solutions of anti-racist strategies (of assimilation/separation) which have failed in the past, and would tackle head-on the racist criteria for membership in the national collectivity itself, or, in Schlesinger's terminology, tackle the problem of 'the internal processes of ideological boundary management' .

Conclusion

In this paper the national phenomenon and the ways it relates to racist exclusions were explored. I looked at the construction of nations as specific ideological and political forms and linked them with specific socio-economic conditions and the emergence of strong centralized states. Nationalist ideologies were defined as those with a claim for a separate political representation of ethnic collectivities, and I looked at myths of 'common origins' and perceptions of 'common destiny' as the main building blocs of ideologies of national solidarity and 'common culture'. Rather than attempting to classify different types of national ideologies, this paper explored notions of origin, culture and citizenship as assuming different types of national exclusions which might be racialized.

This is not to imply that there are no other collectivist ideologies linked to national projects which are inclusivist and at least non —, if not anti-racist innature. Two such ideologies are the 'leftist' social democratic one, which promotes the welfare state, and a 'rightist' libertarian one, which promotes a laissez-faire market. However, just as worries about the 'quality of the British race' have been inherently connected with the rise of the British welfare state, so have the 'freemarketeers' been part of the Thatcherite 'New Right'.

The analysis of the interrelationships between the various forms of racial exclusions, as well as of the economic and political contexts in which they are

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embedded, is vital for the understanding of any concrete form of nationalism. Ethnic, racial and national divisions are not mutually exclusive categories, although the linkages between them can be complex and are indeed historically specific and undergoing continuous, though not arbitrary, change. The struggle against racism should take all these into account. Positions or specific national struggles must derive from such considerations.

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Résumé

Cet article propose une typologie des idéologies présentes dans les projets nationalistes et cherche à voir comment les divisions ethniques, fondées sur la "race" et sur la nation ne constituent pas des catégories mutuellement exclusives. Il résume d'abord les diverses conceptions de la nation (primordialistes, marxistes, modernistes) et les conceptions qui examinent les origines ethniques des nations et les processus d'homogénéisation des États-nations autour de "communautés imaginées" (Smith, Zubaida, Anderson, etc.). Sont ensuite distingués divers types de nationalismes: un nationalisme s'alimentant à même l'idée d'origines biologiques communes, comme mythe fondateur, et qui sera à la source du racisme différentialiste; un nationalisme à base culturelle, selon lequel le monde est divisé entre "eux" et "nous" au moyen de frontières imaginaires ou de mytho-moteurs qui permettent d'identifier les gens comme membres ou non-membres d'une collectivité spécifique; et, un nationalisme religieux (sous la forme de la théologie de la libération ou du fondamentalisme) dont elle affirme l'expansion dans le monde au nom de la lutte anti-imperialiste et anti-raciste. On discute par la suite du type de nationalisme qui tente de se fonder sur les idéologies et les politiques étatiques du multiculturalisme ou du pluralisme culturel. Et, l'auteure soulève les difficultés liées à l'application de ces politiques: tension, sinon contradiction, avec la culture hégémonique; définition des frontières de la différence entre les diverses cultures; vision essentieliste de la culture et réductionnisme des minorités aux aspects culturels; détermination des besoins culturels à respecter dans la sphère privée et la sphère publique, détermination des représentants "authentiques" des communautés, homogénéisation des minorités, qu'elles soient anciennes, nouvelles, immigrantes ou autochtones en un tout uniifié, etc. Finalement, elle aborde les thèmes du nationalisme et de la citoyenneté en soulignant que les États-nations de l'Ouest sont construits autour du postulat qu'il y a correspondance entre les frontières de la société civile et politique, les citoyens de l'État et les membres de la collectivité nationale. Ceci dit, l'auteure crée l'idéologie et l'illusion d'une vision universaliste de la citoyenneté. S'il est vrai que cette idéologie fournit les bases des mobilisations anti-exclusionnistes et anti-racistes, elle masque en même temps l'existence du racisme institutionnel en dépit du discours universaliste.
This article propose a typology of the ideologies underwriting nationalist projects and seeks to show that ethnic divisions, based on "race" and nation, do not constitute mutually exclusive categories. It distinguishes between nationalisms predicated on biological origin, culture, and religion. It follows with a discussion of nationalism based on the ideologies of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism. Finally, it treats the themes of nationalism and citizenship, arguing that in western nation-states constructed around a universalist notion of citizenship, issues pertaining to immigration and racism serve to delineate the borders of citizenship.

Key words: typology, ideologies, nationalism, ethnic division, race, nation, culture, citizenship, immigration, multiculturalism.