
Alan Dodson

If the twenty-four essays in this collection can be said to have one thing in common, it is their profound engagement with current philosophical and social issues that challenge our operating assumptions, and perhaps our intuitions, about how music exists, what it represents, and how it interacts with words and the world. But lest "rethinking music" be confused with "New Musicology"—a term (and a scholarly genre) that many of the contributors to this collection find troublesome¹—I should point out that the former seems in general to be somewhat less reactionary than the latter, though the two orientations seem equally to be driven by the pressing need for criticism and contextualization not only of music, but also of musicology, including its history, its often implicit or covert ideologies, and its methodological links to other disciplines. The table of contents gives a sense of the scope of the current phase of this ongoing project:


¹See especially the editors' Preface, viii–x, and Treitler, 364–70. Further page references will be indicated parenthetically in the text.
When We Teach Music? One Apology, Two Short Trips, Three Ethical Dilemmas, and Eighty-Two Questions.”

Perhaps *Rethinking Music* will one day be seen as a milestone in the development of a “Renewed Musicology” in which time-honoured approaches are neither rejected out of hand to make room for the New nor adhered to with unflinching confidence as they reputedly were in the pre-Kerman era. In my thumbnail sketches of these essays, I will emphasize perspectives on four timely issues that seem to be central to this process of renewal: the nature of music’s putative autonomy, the elaboration of meaning through the contact of music and words, the institutionalization of musical tastes and values, and the philosophical bases of interpretive pluralism.

Cooperation among disciplines, another timely feature of the Renewed Musicology, seems to be highlighted by the ordering of the contents, particularly the placement of broadly-conceived essays by ethnomusicologists at the head of each Part. Philip Bohlman (Ch. 1) establishes a pluralistic and (perhaps consequently) self-conscious tone that foreshadows the provisional quality of many of the ensuing arguments in his insightful overview of the multiple meanings that we attach to music. His essay throws into relief the struggle for control that underlies most attempts at definition, classification, and contemplation.

An engagement with the implications of poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophies of literature for the writing of music theory and analysis underlies the next four essays. Jim Samson (Ch. 2) surveys the ideological and institutional contexts of Western music analysis during the past two centuries and reminds us that, contrary to prevailing stereotypes, music analysis necessarily involves both metaphor and subjectivity. He explores postmodernism’s challenges to categorical knowledge, institutional dogma, and covert motivations, and he concludes with the intriguing suggestion that we begin to emulate Roland Barthes’ playfully eccentric (though arguably hedonistic) reading strategy. Still more daring is the critique offered by Kevin Korsyn (Ch. 3) of univocal argumentation (monologism) and the hypotheses that musical works can be considered autonomous and that historical and stylistic developments can be modeled as continuous trends. He invokes the theories of Mikhail Bakhtin and Harold Bloom to show how these “privileged contexts” might be subsumed to their more complex, challenging, and democratic opposites: multivocality, cultural contingency, and discontinuous change and development. In a rather more pragmatic vein, Arnold Whittall (Ch. 4) surveys some recent analytic literature that seems to negotiate successfully between modernist (especially Schenkerian) and postmodernist approaches (pp. 82–90), and his own interpretation of Elliott Carter’s *Scrivo in vento* is a particularly compelling example of this type of alliance. Robert Fink’s essay (Ch. 5), like Whittall’s, proposes an analytic approach that seems especially well-suited to eclectic twentieth-century styles, but Fink replaces Whittall’s epistemological diplomacy with irreverence: his deconstruction of the pervasive surface/depth

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2For the context of the latter designation, see the editors’ Preface, viii.
analogy involves a concerted attempt to turn Schenkerian theory (and its metaphysical scaffolding) on its head. After developing a theory of linear ascents between salient events at the level of the musical surface, Fink provocatively suggests that Schenker's obsession with totalizing explanations and deep structures can be read as an irrational strategy for escaping the humiliation and self-doubt that plagued Germany and Austria after the First World War. Although Fink's rhetoric is, in my opinion, "over the top," the essay nevertheless provides an erudite and (still) timely postmodern critique of the deepest foundations of contemporary formalist music theory.

The next two essays offer excellent introductions to perhaps the largest and longest-established interdisciplinary fields in contemporary music theory. Kofi Agawu (Ch. 6) discusses the foundations of musical semiotics in the linguistic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure and C. S. Peirce, peruses some influential music-analytic applications, offers potential interrelationships between semiotics and mainstream music theory, and identifies three of the most promising research areas for musical semiotics: music and emotion, referentialist conventions (topoi) and their syntax, and text-music relationships in song. Robert Gjerdingen's rather polemical essay on empiricism and music analysis (Ch. 7) characterizes music theory as a quasi-Aristotelian science that is self-stabilizing and founded on speculative "truths" rather than objective measurement. He suggests that theorists should engage in collaborative research with psychologists in order to ensure the use of proper experimental methodologies and thus raise the credibility of their perceptual claims and assumptions. Gjerdingen seems to be placing this intersection on the psychologist's turf; Agawu offers a more balanced exchange wherein the taxonomic "discovery procedures" that have been found useful by some semioticians need to be more deeply informed by aesthetic judgements associated with mainstream approaches to music theory.

Relationships between musical meaning and the acts of analysis, writing, and performance are explored next. Fred Maus (Ch. 8) claims that any attempt to theorize musical unity exhaustively (such as Cohn and Dempster's network model) is destined to fail if it neglects to clarify the relationships between analysis and the listening experience. His essay is a critique of the equation of unity-discourse and analysis; he contends that analysis might be used to show disunity and, conversely, that non-analytic discourse can address unity. Along similar lines, Scott Burnham (Ch. 9) claims that poetic accounts of music can sometimes offer more profound insights into the revelatory nature of the musical experience than technical analyses, and he demonstrates this through a comparison between E. M. Forster's colourful reading of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony and other, more formal interpretations. John Rink's essay on the transmission of meaning through performance (Ch. 10) gives a new twist to the dwindling "authenticity" debate, for he argues that performances can

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capture the spirit or expressive idiom of bygone eras in ways that words (presumably even poetic ones) cannot. In the case of much nineteenth-century music, the performer should "[act] out the music's drama, communicating a kind of meaning which can only be heard, which exists in sound alone, and taking the listener on an expressive journey up and down the emotional peaks charted by the musical materials themselves" (p. 237). Like Maus and Burnham, and unlike many performance-practice scholars, Rink is primarily concerned with theorizing an enriched *subjective* relationship with a musical work.

Nicholas Cook's essay (Ch. 11) addresses the problems of prescriptiveness and premature closure in analytical studies, including those designed to inform performance, through his application of J. L. Austin's theory of speech-acts\(^4\) (p. 243). Cook suggests that music analyses be read not only as truth-claims (which Austin terms *constative* utterances) but also, more importantly, as acts of persuasion (*performative* utterances) designed to shape listening and performance. Perhaps the greatest advantage of this reorientation is its openness: it allows us to conceive of different perspectives' coordinated influence and mitigates the need to cling dogmatically to any single interpretation or critical lens.\(^5\) Joseph Dubiel (Ch. 12) further explores the construction of musical meaning in his reflections on the experiences of composerly and analytical listening. His lengthy discussion of a single note in Beethoven's *Violin Concerto* demonstrates the complexities of "knowing a sound," and he considers the greatest value of analysis to be its potential for raising the listener's consciousness of the frames of mind that the composer sought to evoke. Like all the authors in Part I, and perhaps more than most, Dubiel shows that music theory seems to be "dropping its guard" and describing the introspective and subjective experiences that have always been its most effective and rewarding motivations.

Bruno Nettl's history of musicology as an academic discipline (Ch. 13) leads the reader from the intersection of music and words that is thematized throughout Part I to the wider issues surrounding the values and social contingencies of musicology that are contemplated and rethought in Part II. (I will return to these recurring themes shortly.) Nettl draws particular attention to the definitions that have been attached to the term "musicology," to the ideological implications of some foundational writings by Guido Adler, Friedrich Chrysander, Charles Seeger, and others, and to the dynamics of increasing disciplinary specialization during the twentieth century. According to Nettl, Adler understood that all cultures have their own musicologies but seemed to consider Austro-German scholars to have an innately superior perspective on all musics (p. 289). Regula Qureshi (Ch. 14) demonstrates the advantages of studying


\(^{5}\)For this reason, performativity is also central to Cook's encyclopedic overview, "Epistemologies of Music Theory," in *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, ed. Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
other cultures' musicologies in order to escape problems related to this founda­tional ethnocentricity. Her argument focuses on an intriguing nineteenth-century Indian treatise, the *Ma’dan-ul-Mausiqi*, which she reads as “a multiply ‘other’ musicology that establishes a linear time-sequence, but not a develop­mental [i.e., evolutionary or teleological] one; a centre, but not an exclusive one; an appreciation of theoretical norm and system, but not an unbending one” (p. 332). This remarkable treatise seems also to be a model of multivocality and the frank admission of inevitable self-contradictions and diverse personal and social contingencies.

The next three chapters shed much-needed light on methodological issues of particular interest to historical musicologists: canonicity, historiography, and reception. William Weber (Ch. 15) offers a short history of the musical canon from the sixteenth century onward and argues that canon-related assumptions are so thoroughly embedded in the philosophy of music history that they are normally unquestioned. His concluding section on the ideology associated with the canon (pp. 351–55) is of special interest, for it is here that he comments on its function as “a moral, a spiritual, or a civic force.” (In this light, it is curious that he ignores the philosophy surrounding established *liturgical* canons, such as the plainsong repertory.) Leo Treitler (Ch. 16) offers a cautionary discussion of the autonomy principle in contemporary music historiography. He is particularly critical of the ambivalence of many New Musicologists (including Susan McClary and Lawrence Kramer) on this issue, and he suggests that this ambivalence mitigates their ability to answer the often profound questions about music’s social contexts that they feel compelled to pose. He is also skeptical of the efficacy of using methodologies from the social sciences to discuss musical works, and he calls for the re-aestheticization and re-historicization of music on the grounds that the interpretive depth that these orientations enable should outweigh postmodernists’ ethical problems with aestheticism and the “grand narratives” of high culture. Mark Everist’s study (Ch. 17), like Treitler’s, draws widely on interdisciplinary readings in a call for improvements in theoretical sophistication. Everist uses Hans Robert Jauss’ concept of the “horizon of expectations” (p. 382) to show interconnections between value-systems, reception history, and historiography and to propose a strategy for dealing with competing interpretations and judgements through a sort of historical-aesthetic hermeneutics.⁶

The emphasis shifts to primary sources in the next two chapters. Stanley Boorman (Ch. 18) sheds light on the problems of textual consistency and authenticity in his discussion of notational sources. This essay challenges not only the authority of *Urtext* editions, but also the main ontological assumption

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⁶Jauss' approach is strongly influenced by Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose writings clarify what I have termed “historical-aesthetic hermeneutics.” According to Gadamer, understanding is never purely objective or subjective, but rather emerges through a historically-effected dialectical “conversation” between a text and its interpreter. This argument might be considered postmodern, for it offers an alternative to the Enlightenment conception of science, wherein subject and object are considered independent entities. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (1960), trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming, 2nd revised edition, ed. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2000).
underlying many forms of music analysis: the idea that the written text defines the essential elements of the work. Similarly, José Bowen (Ch. 19) argues that the variability found in comparing historical recordings of a given work challenges the Platonist assumption that works of art are somehow fixed, stable, and timeless. Bowen suggests that the separation of works' essential and interpretive elements creates a false dichotomy, and he reconceives works as "blurred concepts" (p. 428, n. 8) whose realizations are related by Wittgensteinian family resemblances and shaped by the forces of period- and genre-specific styles, work-specific traditions, and performer-specific innovations (p. 437). Of these, Bowen seems most fascinated with tradition, which he considers "the history of remembered innovation," (p. 427) and the key to "the history of the changing definitions of the work itself" (p. 430).

Two very different views on the status of this notion of "the work (or the music) itself" are offered in the subsequent essays by John Covach and Suzanne Cusick. In contrast to the poststructuralist critiques of musical autonomy in Part I, Covach (Ch. 20) complains of the paucity of sophisticated intrinsic analyses of works in popular idioms, a consequence of the hegemony of sociological approaches to popular music. His apologia for formalism extols its ability to capture the musical experience in a more powerful way than sociological study and (in an unexpected turn that calls to mind Allen Forte's classic introductory article on Schenkerian theory) explains that analysis can enrich our understanding of historical developments, musical influences, and compositional processes. Cusick (Ch. 21), in contrast, argues that the "ultimate threat of feminist musicology" is its challenge to the autonomy ideology, which she (like Kevin Korsyn) sees as a projection of the male Romanticist's self-image. After describing the marginalization of the feminine from musicology through the parable of Ruth Crawford's exclusion from the inaugural meeting of the New York Musicological Society, Cusick outlines some of the objectives of feminist musicology, including: elevating the status of "women's work in music" (especially pedagogy) and of "the art of music" (composition, creative interpretation), enriching our understanding of our musical heritage through compensatory histories of women composers, and ultimately replacing the chauvinist self-image represented by "the music itself" with the postmodern...

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8 For a preliminary attempt to develop a model of "family resemblances" among performances, a case-study involving differences in ornamentation, see Nicholas Cook, "At the Boundaries of Musical Identity: Schenker, Corelli, and the Graces," Music Analysis 18 (1999): 179–233. Cook suggests that his methodology could be applied to other parameters of performance as well: "[I]n this article I am treating the notated variance of the graces as a kind of surrogate for the unnotated variance of performance" (p. 181).


The discussion of social issues continues in the remaining chapters of the volume. Ralph Locke (Ch. 22) addresses the issue of relevance through an examination of the hidden values and agendas that permeate musicology and especially the teaching of Western music history. The section “Social Values in the Musicologist’s Work” (pp. 510–17) is of particular interest, for here Locke identifies some widespread paradigms whose underlying values need to be faced, including: narratives of historical progress, especially the notion of ever-increasing organic unity in Austro-German music and the marginalization of other Western repertories under the rubric of “nationalism”; conversely, narratives of decline from an idealized and glorious past; the “Great Man” doctrine, which is often transmitted casually in biographies; and “nationism,” or the proposal of essential style characteristics for various countries as frames of reference for evaluation and canon-formation. Another side of scholarship’s relevance is explored in Kay Kaufman Shelemay’s account of an ethnomusicological study that could have been used against its subjects (Ch. 23): at the height of the controversial mass emigration of the Falasha people from Ethiopia to Israel in the 1970s, Shelemay’s doctoral research cast some doubt on this group’s claim of preserving a Jewish tradition without absorbing Christian influences, a finding that might have undermined support for their repatriation. This is surely an extreme case of the potential impact of scholarship on the outside world, yet it dramatizes key ethical concerns surrounding access to materials, interpretation and its contingencies, and the dissemination of findings. Three further ethical issues in ethnomusicology are discussed in Ellen Koskoff’s essay (Ch. 24), and these pertain to the transmission of values in the age of postmodernism: the selection and omission of cultures in World Music surveys, the commodification of non-Western musics, and the claiming of the Western art-music canon as “our music.” Koskoff’s engaging vignettes on the musical cultures of North India and of the Lubavitcher Hasidim in Brooklyn reveal that the problems of canon-formation and insider/outsider prejudices are widespread, perhaps universal. Ultimately, she suggests that encouraging open-mindedness and appreciation for diversity should be more important than deciding what music(s) we should teach.

As I mentioned above in passing, a distinct recurring theme unites each half of *Rethinking Music*. To summarize: Part I concentrates on the boundary between music and words or extramusical meanings, including the relationship between naming and being (Ch. 1), the implications of poststructuralism and postmodernism for the writing of theory (Ch. 2–5), perspectives from scientific disciplines (Ch. 6–7), the expression of subjective interpretations of meaning (Ch. 8–10), and the dynamics by which analysis can shape the listening experience (Ch. 11–12); while the second half focuses on issues pertaining to the transmission of cultural and institutional values, through discussions of ethnocentricity and the avoidance thereof (Ch. 13–14), historiography and canon-formation (Ch. 15–17), variability in source studies and its philosophical implications (Ch. 18–19), some pros and cons of “the music itself” (Ch.
20–21), and ethical problems at the boundary between (ethno)musicology and the outside world (Ch. 22–24). However, these are only general trends; I don’t mean to suggest that the contributors to Part I are uninterested in cultural values (see Bohlman, Fink, Burnham) or that Part II avoids the music/meaning boundary (see Treitler, Bowen, Covach), or that the institutional subdisciplines corresponding to each Part necessarily share these emphases.\textsuperscript{11}

Virtually all the essays in Rethinking Music address one long-standing concern on some level: musical autonomy, the seductive illusion of music’s independence from “outside” contingencies.\textsuperscript{12} Some propose social contexts for the development of this ideology during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Whittall, Korsyn, Fink, Cusick). Those that dwell on issues of ontology (Bohlman, Boorman, Bowen) illuminate the philosophical environment in which the autonomy ideology thrived (i.e. Platonism) and its problems.\textsuperscript{13} And some articles touch on another problematic type of autonomy, that of musicology from the wider contexts of music pedagogy and the world outside the academy (Locke, Koskoff, Shelemay). At this point, the consensus seems to be that provisional autonomy is in many cases an essential working hypothesis for music analysis and criticism, but that it must be understood as a fiction and a form of abstraction rather than a first principle, a doctrinal truth, or a metaphysical law.

Clearly, such a position demands a high (indeed, perhaps unprecedented) degree of conceptual flexibility on the part of the reader and an openness to aesthetic relativism. Fortunately, several authors attempt to build frameworks for dealing with the plenitude (or the cacophony) of interpretive voices that relativism sets loose. The most fruitful of these pluralisms, perhaps coincidentally, seem also to be the most “musical”: Bakhtinian polyphony or heteroglossia (Ch. 3), Barthesian jouissance (Ch. 2), the performativity of utterances (Ch. 11), and the unapologetic multivocality of the Ma’dan-ul-Mausiqi (Ch. 14). Most of these frameworks are richly informed by the authors’ forays into contemporary literary theory, a symptom of the wide interdisciplinary reading that methodological critique and renewal seem to encourage. In light of this eclecticism, Ralph Locke’s cautionary remarks are worth quoting:

"An ideology that can make room for a phenomenon but also its opposite may find it too easy to explain anything at all (and thus explain nothing). This is the case, for example, with post-structuralist approaches that set about demonstrating that texts (musical works, scholarly arguments) can subvert the"


\textsuperscript{13}For a contrasting and somewhat more conservative rationalization of variability, see Peter Kivy, The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 35–74.
very value system that they outwardly support or (the reverse) reinforce a system that they overtly critique. The danger is equally well exemplified by traditional criticism, which can praise a piece at one moment for powerfully fulfilling the requirements of its genre . . . and at another for its novelty in breaking with convention. . . . When a game has rules like this, no great composer can ever misstep. And a minor composer may be blamed, rather than praised, for the very same features: following a rule becomes proof of textbook thinking; breaking one, ineptness (pp. 515–16).

The contributors avoid this sort of double-talk through a general avoidance of premature interpretive closure, although if they were taken out of context, the strong dialectical arguments of some authors (including Korsyn, Fink, Burnham, Cook, Everist, and Bowen) might easily be misinterpreted as apologetics for new orthodoxies and privileged contexts.

*Rethinking Music* is a timely volume that serves a variety of needs. Those who are interested in the disciplinary history of musicology should read the Preface and the essay by Bruno Nettl (Ch. 13) for concise and thought-provoking overviews. Some selections seem ideally suited to graduate seminars, such as introductions to methodologies in music history (Ch. 15–17), theory and analysis (Ch. 2, 5–7, 11), and performance studies (Ch. 10, 11, 19); and others might be useful for courses on gender studies in music (Ch. 21, 22), music criticism (Ch. 4, 8, 9), Schenkerian theory (Ch. 3–5), and the philosophy of music education (Ch. 21, 22, 24). The volume is sure to have a place in the library of any busy scholar who is seeking an accessible introduction to complex arguments in booming fields like musical semiotics, performance-related studies, poststructuralist applications, and feminist musicology or simply a refresher course on the philosophy of music. As a whole, the volume can also be read as a microcosm of a far-reaching scholarly dialogue that holds great promise in leading us to a renewed, realigned, reinvigorated musicology.

Alan Dodson


Although every life-and-works treatment of Arnold Schoenberg grapples with the subject of Bryan R. Simms' new book, his is the first book-length study devoted exclusively to it. Because of Schoenberg's huge influence as a composer, teacher and thinker, this subject is central not only to his career, but to the history of twentieth-century music generally. The author's credentials for the job are beyond reproach. He has published extensively on Schoenberg, and because he is a former archivist at the Schoenberg Archive in its Los Angeles days, his command of both published and unpublished sources is extensive and shines through on every page.

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