Notice of Books Received

Waleed Mebane

Volume 39, numéro 3, 2019

URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1064946ar
DOI : https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v39i3.6015

Notice of BOOKS RECEIVED Policy

*Informal Logic* no longer invites *descriptive* book reviews. However, at the end of each issue of the journal, *Informal Logic* will print, and reprint, *notices* of monographs, collected papers, proceedings of conferences, anthologies and any similar scholarly books (not textbooks) published during the previous four years on topics related to informal logic, critical thinking, argument (logic, dialectic, rhetoric) theory or practice. The notice, to be supplied by the author(s) or editor(s) or publisher, may simply describe the work or shamelessly promote it, or both, but *must not exceed 150 words*. Each notice will be reprinted in each issue of the journal until four years after the year the edition of the book was first published. (Be sure to include at least the author’s or editor’s name, the title of the book, the year of publication, the publisher and the number of pages.) We hope this department of the journal will serve as a resource for researchers wanting to know of recent work in the field. Send notices to: tblair@uwindsor.ca.

A reader may apply to the editors to publish a *critical review* of a book on the *notices* list, and the editors may from time to time commission such a critical review.

**Books Received** (by date):


In the last fifty years, the study of argumentation has become one of the most exciting intellectual crossroads in the modern academy. Two of the most central concepts of argumentation theory are presumptions and burdens of proof. Their functions have been explicitly recognized in legal theory since the middle ages, but their pervasive presence in all forms of argumentation and in inquiries beyond the law—including politics, science, religion, philosophy, and interpersonal communication—have been the object of study since the nineteenth century.
However, the documents and essays central to any discussion of presumptions and burdens of proof as devices of argumentation are scattered across a variety of remote sources in rhetoric, law, and philosophy. *Presumptions and Burdens of Proof: An Anthology of Argumentation and the Law* brings together for the first time key texts relating to the history of the theory of presumptions along with contemporary studies that identify and give insight into the issues facing students and scholars today.


This book investigates the role of inference in argumentation, considering how arguments support standpoints on the basis of different *loci*. The authors propose and illustrate a model for the analysis of the standpoint-argument connection, called Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT). A prominent feature of the AMT is that it distinguishes, within each and every single argumentation, between an *inferential-procedural* component, on which the reasoning process is based; and a *material-contextual* component, which anchors the argument in the interlocutors’ cultural and factual common ground. The AMT explains how these components differ and how they are intertwined within each single argument. This model is introduced in Part II of the book, following a careful reconstruction of the enormously rich tradition of studies on inference in argumentation, from the antiquity to contemporary authors, without neglecting medieval and post-medieval contributions. The AMT is a contemporary model grounded in a dialogue with such tradition, whose crucial aspects are illuminated in this book.


Since the time of Aristotle, various approaches have been offered to tackle what makes language stronger. Some approaches have
focused on rhetoric, while others have given attention to logic. Still others have concentrated on dialectics. This book takes into account a full-fledged comprehensive model of analysis that brings these three perspectives together. Throughout, it investigates the presence of pragmatic criteria and the utilization of pragmatic strategies that make language stronger in the context of argumentation. Cogent argumentation is a pragmatic communicative interactional process that goes through stages, and is regarded as a communicative exchange of arguments. The cogency of these arguments is attained according to the availability of pragmatic criteria and the utilization of pragmatic strategies, and determined throughout the whole process of argumentation.

The book will be of interest to anyone interested in the fields of pragmatics, communication, and politics, and will widen their understanding of the pragmatic structure and criteria which constitute cogent argumentation.


Critical thinking deserves both imaginative teaching and serious theoretical attention. Studies in Critical Thinking assembles an all-star cast to serve both. Besides five exercises teachers may copy or adapt, by Derek Allen, Tracy Bowell, Justine Kingsbury, Jan Albert van Laar, Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby, there are chapters on: what critical thinking is, the nature of argument, definition, using the web, evaluation, argument schemes, abduction, generalizing, fallaciousness, logic and critical thinking, computer-aided argument mapping, and more—by such illustrious scholars as John Woods, Douglas Walton, Sally Jackson, Dale Hample, Robert Ennis, Beth Innocenti, David Hitchcock, Christopher Tindale, G. C. Goddu, Alec Fisher, Michael Scriven, Martin Davies, Ashley Barnett, Tim van Gelder and Mark Battersby.

This volume reflects the development and theoretical foundation of a new paradigm for critical thinking based on inquiry. The field of critical thinking, as manifested in the Informal Logic movement, developed primarily as a response to the inadequacies of formalism to represent actual argumentative practice and to provide useful argumentative skills to students. Because of this, the primary focus of the field has been on informal arguments rather than formal reasoning. Yet the formalist history of the field is still evident in its emphasis, with respect to both theory and pedagogy, on the structure and evaluation of individual, de-contextualized arguments. It is our view that such a view of critical thinking is excessively narrow and limited, failing to provide an understanding of argumentation as largely a matter of comparative evaluation of a variety of contending positions and arguments with the goal of reaching a reasoned judgment on an issue. As a consequence, traditional critical thinking instruction is problematic in failing to provide the reasoning skills that students need in order to accomplish this goal. Instead, the goal of critical thinking instruction has been seen largely as a defensive one: of learning to not fall prey to invalid, inadequate, or fallacious arguments.


The book offers a compact but comprehensive introductory overview of the crucial components of argumentation theory. In presenting this overview, argumentation is consistently approached from a pragma-dialectical perspective by viewing it pragmatically as a goal-directed communicative activity and dialectically as part of a regulated critical exchange aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. The book also systematically explains how the constitutive parts of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation hang together.

The following topics are discussed: (1) argumentation theory as a discipline; (2) the meta-theoretical principles of pragma-dialectics; (3) the model of a critical discussion aimed at resolving
a difference of opinion; (4) fallacies as violations of a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse; (5) descriptive research of argumentative reality; (6) analysis as theoretically-motivated reconstruction; (7) strategic manoeuvring aimed at combining achieving effectiveness with maintaining reasonableness; (8) the conventionalization of argumentative practices; (9) prototypical argumentative patterns; (10) pragma-dialectics amidst other approaches.


This book brings together in one place David Hitchcock’s most significant published articles on reasoning and argument. In seven new chapters he updates his thinking in the light of subsequent scholarship. Collectively, the papers articulate a distinctive position in the philosophy of argumentation.

Among other things, the author:

- develops an account of “material consequence” that permits evaluation of inferences without problematic postulation of unstated premises.
- updates his recursive definition of argument that accommodates chaining and embedding of arguments and allows any type of illocutionary act to be a conclusion.
- advances a general theory of relevance.
- provides comprehensive frameworks for evaluating inferences in reasoning by analogy, means-end reasoning, and appeals to considerations or criteria.
- argues that none of the forms of arguing *ad hominem* is a fallacy.
- describes proven methods of teaching critical thinking effectively.

This book is an accessible review of scholarship on key elements of face-to-face arguing, which is the interpersonal exchange of reasons. Topics include frames for understanding the nature of arguing, argument situations, serial arguments, argument dialogues, and international differences in how people understand interpersonal arguing. This is a thorough survey of the leading issues involved in understanding how people argue with one another.


When political actors respond to criticism by pointing at an inconsistency in the critic’s position, a tricky political practice emerges. Turning the criticism back to the critic can be a constructive move that restores coherence, but it may also be a disruptive move that silences the critical voice and obstructs accountability. What distinguishes constructive cases from disruptive ones? This is the question this book sets out to answer.

The question is addressed by adopting an argumentative perspective. Argumentation in Prime Minister’s Question Time focuses on the turnabout employed by the British Prime Minister in response to the Leader of the Opposition. The turnabout is characterised as a particular way of strategic manoeuvring. The manoeuvring is analysed and evaluated by combining pragmatic, dialectical and rhetorical insights with considerations from the realm of politics. The outcome is an account of the turnabout’s strategic functions and an assessment guide for evaluating its reasonableness.

The book will be of interest to advanced students and researchers of argumentation, discourse analysis, communication and rhetoric.


This collection of essays has achieved to gather an international group of scholars, mainly, but not exclusively, from the field of
Argumentation Theory, and put together an anthology of eleven original chapters on *Narration as Argument* from different perspectives. It presents reflections on the relationship between narratives and argumentative discourse, focusing on their functional and structural similarities and dissimilarities, and offering diverse conceptual tools for analyzing the narratives’ potential power for justification, explanation and persuasion. The first Part, under the title “Narratives as Sources of Knowledge and Argument”, includes five chapters addressing general, theoretical and philosophical issues, related to the argumentative analysis and understanding of narratives. The second Part, entitled “Argumentative Narratives in Context”, brings us six more chapters that concentrate on either particular functions played by argumentatively-oriented narratives or particular practices that may benefit from the use of special kinds of narratives.


This book studies the relations between rationality and ambivalence (mental conflict). Ambivalence and its forms are central to subjectivity and communication, action and judgement. Defending a Davidsonian view about the constitutive rationality of mental attitudes, it argues that ambivalence is an important form of basic (constitutive) rationality and mental unity. Ambivalence can be irrational in a secondary sense, as in weakness of the will and self-deception. It can also be *highly rational*, including forms of appropriate significant action with both opposed poles. Ambivalence of belief is possible, ordinary, basically rational and central to the logic of belief. The rationality of deliberation is also bound up with ambivalence. Rather than being the agnostic consideration of propositions or practical options, deliberation usually assumes and employs ambivalence, and may aptly end with it.

**Books reviewed since 2014 (in order of appearance):**


