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# Policy Strategies of Accommodation or Domination in Jerusalem: An Historical Perspective

*by*  
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With an age of some 4,000 years, Jerusalem is one of the world's oldest cities. Although there have been numerous changes in regime, prominent issues confronting the present city resemble those of times past, and certain continuities can be found in the policy strategies pursued by those who have governed Jerusalem. This article compares the strategy of the present regime with those apparent in previous periods from the sixth century BC.

Continuities in political geography have contributed something to the similarities in policy strategies over the years. Jerusalem's current population of about 540,000 dwarfs the city that peaked at about 30,000 in late biblical times and again under the Crusaders, and topped that figure only during the last half-century of the Ottoman period.<sup>1</sup> As always, however, the city sits on a strategic site, on the border of competing cultures, and is prized for its symbolic importance by powerful outsiders. It is astride a mountain ridge that controls north-south traffic, and alongside passes that control east-west travel. The country called Judea, Palestine, or Israel has been an important area on the borders of empires, prized for its routes used in commerce or attack, or defense against attacks from other empires. It was to the north of Egypt, south of Assyria, east of Greece and Rome, and west of Babylon and Persia. More recently, Britain and then the United States have viewed Palestine or Israel as an asset in their international strategies. Jerusalem and its hinterland have never had a population large enough or wealthy enough to assure their own security. By one account Jerusalem has been besieged and conquered 37 times.<sup>2</sup> It has been controlled by Canaanites, Jebusites, Israelites, Assyrians, Egyptians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantians, Arabs, Seljuks, Crusaders, Mamluks, Ottomans, British, Jordanians, and Israelis.<sup>3</sup>

Movements through the city have created populations heterogeneous on traits of religion and ethnicity. Jerusalem has long been defined as a "Holy City." One consequence is that religion has been the primary means of identifying residents. During most of the city's history, its governors have been viewed as foreign conquerors by some residents who see themselves as indigenous and entitled by their religion to live in Jerusalem. During some periods, those opposed to the regime have had powerful overseas patrons. At times, more than one group has asserted the priority of its claims against rivals. Today the city's Jewish majority

(72 percent) is identified with the regime that controls the city, while important minorities look for support to the Arab Middle East, Christian Churches, and Western governments.

## **POLICY STRATEGIES OF ACCOMMODATION AND DOMINATION**

Two contrasting policy strategies have been apparent in the governing of Jerusalem. One is a strategy of accommodation, marked by efforts to keep the peace by providing political access, policy benefits and personal opportunities to all groups in the population, or at least by providing concessions on sensitive issues to groups that are not favored by the formal structure. It was pursued at least part of the time during the periods ruled by Persians, Greeks, Romans, pre- and post-Crusader Moslems, British and Israelis. The second strategy is one of domination. It was most prominent in the Crusader and Jordanian periods, and also appeared in Greek and Roman periods. It was marked by a tendency to repress severely or even exclude segments from the city population.

The concepts of policy strategy, accommodation, and domination require some comment, especially in a survey of numerous regimes over a period of 2,500 years. The writing about strategy deals mainly with issues of potential or actual military conflict,"<sup>4</sup> but can be adapted to urban policy making. The term policy strategy implies apian of action explicitly chosen to achieve certain goals, that lends itself to being implemented in a systematic fashion. It is widely recognized that even modern, sophisticated governments have trouble defining their problems clearly, selecting goals and policies, and carrying out what they proclaim as their policies.<sup>5</sup> Developing countries have more serious problems.<sup>6</sup> Loosely articulated feudal or imperial governments, of the types that sought to govern Jerusalem until the modern period, fell far from the standard of centrally defined policies that were strictly observed in remote provinces.<sup>7</sup> What a resident acquired from the local authority depended on the concern of a local official to perceive and to carry out policy, or changes in policy that emanated from the imperial capital, on the status of the resident or on the payment that was made to an official. In reality, no period was entirely free of repression, and no period was entirely one of domination.

The comparison of policy strategies from one period to another over such a long history is also complicated by great changes in the expectations and performance of government. A major divide separates the current regime from all that preceded it. Earlier regimes were non-democratic and concerned largely with collecting revenue and keeping order. Social programming was minimal, if it existed at all. What residents obtained by way of education, health services, housing, and income they acquired by their own efforts, from family, or their religious community. The religious communities regulated their members, judged disputes, and punished wayward behavior. At various times the regime set the boundaries for each community's self-government, intervened in the cases that interested it, and dealt with disputes between members of different communities. There are still prominent traces of service provision, courts, and discipline in

Jerusalem's Moslem, Christian, and Jewish communities. Under the current regime, however, programs of the national or local authorities provide a range of services comparable to those of Western Europe and North America.

The labels of accommodation and domination suggest sharp contrasts in policy, whereas there are finer graduations between two extremes.<sup>8</sup> Figure 1 offers a spectrum of key points from extremes of accommodation to domination. It takes account of access to politics and governing; shares of policy benefits and personal opportunity (i.e., *who gets what?*); an ideology that favors egalitarianism or the attribution of privileges according to ascriptive traits; and the degree of legitimacy that population components attribute to the regime. At the extreme of accommodation is a pluralist democracy with an ideology of egalitarianism that is widely viewed as legitimate. Point #1 in Figure 1 is an ideal of accommodation, that may not be achieved by any regime marked by social divisions of ethnicity, religion, income, or education. At the extreme of domination is a regime with an ideology that benefits some groups and excludes others, and may even expel whole population groups from its area. The minimum degree of accommodation indicated on Figure 1 is #4, i.e., a non-democratic polity that provides out-of-favor groups concessions on sensitive issues in order to co-opt their tolerance of the regime.

The judgments offered in this article seek to be well-balanced and justified by a variety of evidence. However, an evaluation of policy styles like accommodation or domination is likely to depend on one's perspective. What a committed supporter of a regime will term accommodating may be viewed as domination by someone who is on the receiving end of policy that is less than egalitarian.<sup>4</sup> Problems of administration also complicate the record. There are reports of Roman soldiers who insulted Jewish sensitivities by baring their bottoms in the vicinity of the temple, even while their commanding officers were pursuing a policy of accommodation.<sup>10</sup> The riots and repression that followed such incidents made the regimes seem anything but accommodating.

Subsequent sections will acknowledge problems that are profound for the judgment of earlier periods, and only somewhat less difficult for modern periods. There are indications that different and even contradictory activities occurred in each period with respect to accommodation or domination. Research that looks more closely at individual periods might specify more fully the differences between points on the accommodation-domination spectrum. This article will deal most thoroughly with the recent period of Israeli control. Its comparisons across a long time span will sacrifice depth for the sake of breadth.

The advantage of such a broad view is the opportunity to see in one geopolitical setting the continuities that have persisted along with the changes in detail. They suggest the impact of religious history and the doctrines of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in providing the incentive to rule others in the Holy City as an alternative to being dominated by others. Even the present regime, which may be the most explicitly accommodating in the city's history, offers its benefits to non-Jews within the context of Israeli policy that Jerusalem have a substantial Jewish

majority and be the capital of a Jewish state. Perhaps if Jerusalem was a more typical city in being a commercial or industrial center, as opposed to a focus of spiritual aspirations, its inhabitants could more easily decide to make a deal and share power.

Strategies of accommodation or domination may have wider relevance for analyzing policy making in other polities with sharply divided populations. There is superficial evidence for the proposition that a policy of accommodation has been more successful in helping a regime maintain control of Jerusalem. The Crusader and Jordanian regimes most clearly followed a strategy of domination, and they were among the most short-lived in the city's history. To be sure, Jerusalem has been only one issue on the agenda of each regime that has controlled the city. Perhaps more telling for the survival of each regime have been problems of larger regional significance, economic resources, or military power. Yet the spiritual importance attached to Jerusalem has political weight. Policies pursued within the municipal boundaries affect international support or threat, even if they do not always produce the movement of armies toward the city.

There are inherent appeals to a strategy of accommodation over one of domination that stand apart from any claim that one has been more successful than another in maintaining control of the city. In Jerusalem's case regime continuity is a problematic standard of success. If history offers any lesson about this city, it is that no regime has had a certainty of control to compare with those over cities in the heartland of countries that are larger or stronger economically.

## **GOVERNING JERUSALEM: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY**

### **Persian and Greek Periods**

Local government in the earliest periods is not well documented. Judgments rely heavily on biblical materials written from the point of view of one community or even one faction within that community. These also seem to have been altered over the ages as succeeding generations saw in history what was appropriate to their needs." According to these materials, Persian rule of Jerusalem was accommodating with respect to the Judeans who had been exiled to Babylon, and to some extent with respect to their rivals. In 537 BC Emperor Cyrus decreed that exiles might return to Jerusalem and rebuild their temple. Some years later the imperial court sent the Jews Ezra and Nehemiah to promote the rebuilding of Jerusalem and to govern Judea. As reported in the Hebrew Bible, Judeans who had not been exiled, plus others described as "people of the land," complained in the imperial capital about the policies pursued for the sake of the returnees. The regime was accommodating to those who complained, at least to the extent that their claims interrupted the city's reconstruction.<sup>12</sup> Nehemiah mentioned an Arab among those who challenged the Jews, in terms that marks Nehemiah as an early proponent of domination.

The God of heaven will give us success. We, his servants, are making a start with the rebuilding. You have no stake, or claim, or traditional right in Jerusalem.<sup>13</sup>

The accommodating character of the Greek period (330-63 BC) is apparent in the access to Greek culture, together with the opportunity for Jews to follow their own laws. But it is difficult to judge the ancient record without taking account of disputes of ancient and modern times: between those Jews who argue that any interference in Jewish autonomy is intolerable, and those Jews who value cosmopolitan culture and welcome outside help against their own zealots. The Chanukah story of a revolt against tyranny suggests that the Greek regime became anything but accommodating. According to Jewish tradition, Antiochus IV Epiphanes forbade circumcision and Sabbath observances, and ordered the sacrifice of swine in the Holy Temple. A revisionist historian writes that Antiochus' decrees may have come in response to a revolt already underway, by Jews who felt that the Greeks were not sufficiently accommodating.<sup>14</sup> According to *Maccabees I*, the revolt was as much against Hellenized Jews as against the Greek regime, *per se*.<sup>15</sup>

### **The Roman Period**

The rule of the Romans, like that of the Greeks, brought prosperity, cosmopolitan culture, and an appreciation by some Jews of the internal autonomy that they enjoyed in Jerusalem. Also as in the Greek period, other Jews felt that foreign rule was intolerable, and fomented rebellions. Josephus is the primary source for the early Roman period in Jerusalem, through the revolt of 66-73 AD. He wrote in the Preface to *The Jewish War*:

I shall contrast the brutality of the (Jewish) party chiefs towards their countrymen with the clemency of the Romans towards aliens, and the persistence with which Titus showed his anxiety to save the City (Jerusalem) and the Sanctuary by inviting the insurgents to come to terms.<sup>16</sup>

Such a view of Roman accommodation must be seen alongside Josephus' personal interests to appear both as a proud Jew and as a loyal Roman, against the background of having changed sides in the rebellion. The Romans circulated Josephus' work among Jewish communities in Palestine and elsewhere in their empire, presumably to facilitate the acceptance of Roman rule by the Jews. The Romans provided Josephus with a pension of revenues earned from land taken from Judeans.<sup>17</sup> Modern scholars debate the issue of whether Josephus was a traitor who distorted the record of Roman activities, or a pragmatist who sought to protect his people from a poorly conceived revolt.<sup>18</sup>

Simon Bar Kokhba led a second major rebellion against the Romans in 132-35 AD. A modern scholar viewed it as Josephus viewed the earlier revolt. Yehoshafat Harkabi argued that the Jewish rebels were fanatics who did not appreciate either the accommodations offered by the Romans or the Romans' military strength and their concern not to let a rebellion go unpunished. After Bar Kokhba's rebellion, the Emperor Hadrian pursued a policy of explicit domination in Jerusalem. He renamed the city Aelia Capitolina, and forbade the entry of circumcised persons under penalty of death.<sup>19</sup>

## **Moslem and Crusader Periods**

Jerusalem became Arab and Moslem as a result of Omar's invasion in 638 AD. It became Christian with the arrival of Crusaders in 1099, and returned to Moslem rule in 1187 after the victory of Saladin (Salah al-Din). The Moslems tolerated Jews and Christians in Jerusalem, while the Crusaders formally tolerated neither Moslems nor Jews. The Crusaders justified their conquest as a response to Moslem attacks on Christian pilgrims and the violation of Christian holy places, especially the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. A number of modern historians question this view, and conclude that a surplus of European gentry may have led the Crusaders to seek their fortunes elsewhere, in land they could take from others.<sup>20</sup>

The Crusaders marked their approach to the Holy Land by killing Jews and Moslems along their route. Their entry to Jerusalem brought wholesale slaughter. A report from one Crusader expresses Christian righteousness with respect to their Holy City:

It was a just and splendid judgment of God that this place should be filled with the blood of unbelievers, since it had suffered so long from their blasphemies.<sup>21</sup>

The Christians transformed the Moslems' Dome of the Rock into a Christian Church, and the Templar Knights used the al-Aqsa Mosque as a residence, storehouse, and latrine. They are said to have banished all non-Christians from the city, but there are travellers' reports of both Moslems and Jews living there.<sup>22</sup>

When the Moslems recaptured Jerusalem, they cleaned the Haram Al-Sharif of Christian symbols and human filth, and took over some Christian churches for mosques or religious schools. They left the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Christian hands, perhaps out of concern not to provoke another crusade. They sought to minimize the Christian population, but did not forbid it entirely,<sup>23</sup> and they tolerated a Jewish population. An estimate from the early Ottoman period (mid-sixteenth century) places the Jewish population at 1,000-1,500, and the Christian population at 1,800. The city's total population in the sixteenth century ranged between 4,700 and 15,800.<sup>24</sup>

Amnon Cohen, an Israeli historian of the early Ottoman period, concluded that the Jews were subject to discrimination, but not excessively.<sup>25</sup> Jews had to identify themselves with a yellow turban. Bathhouses were integrated, but a Jew had to wear a small bell around his neck and use a specially marked towel. Jewish butchers were allowed to sell meat only on certain days in order to protect the market shares of Moslem butchers. Jews were employed by the Ottoman government, but mostly in "Jewish" positions as tax collectors or financial advisors. Jews could get justice in Moslem courts. Their testimony was accepted against Moslems, provided there was corroborating evidence. Bribery may have eased a Jewish plea before authorities, but was not always necessary. Some local decisions against the Jews were overturned by appeals to officials in Constantinople.<sup>26</sup> One chapter in Cohen's book is labelled, "The Importance of Being Tolerated." It suggests the perspective of a Jewish intellectual after the Holocaust; Moslem rule could have been worse.

Ottoman control of Jerusalem was markedly restricted by the middle of the nineteenth century. Western powers had wakened to religious, commercial, and military interests in the Near East. Consulates were established in Jerusalem from the 1830s through the 1850s by a number of European governments and the United States. Foreign governments and voluntary organizations established churches, schools, hospitals, and orphanages, as well as hospices for their country's pilgrims. Western consulates pressed the Ottoman authorities to expand the rights of non-Moslems, and provide foreign citizenship for a number of the city's Jews.

### **The British Period**

Great Britain was the first democracy to rule Jerusalem. Its regime (1917-48) sought to accommodate the numerous groups with a stake in the city, but local rule was colonial rather than democratic. British officials decided whose interests would be accommodated, and how much. The rulers' task was not enviable. British cabinets and administrative ranks in Palestine were divided between those who favored the Zionist goal of creating a Jewish homeland, those who sided with Arab nationalists, and those who sought to placate both Jews and Arabs. One historian concludes that many British administrators in Palestine were either anti-Semitic or anti-Arab, with anti-Semitism the more prominent trait. He quotes one ranking official who wrote about leading Jews as the "long-nosed friends." Another described the Arab as "an admirable looter and jackal," "decadent, stupid, dishonest and producing little beyond eccentrics influenced by the romance and silence of the desert."<sup>27</sup> The British problem in Jerusalem was even more sharply focused than in Palestine as a whole. Sir Ronald Storrs, the Governor of Jerusalem 1917-1926, wrote that he relished the opportunity to bring peace to the Holy City, but found himself criticized as being Zionist by the Arabs and pro-Arab by the Jews.<sup>28</sup>

The British provided some measure of local government to Jerusalem's residents, but not to the extent of being egalitarian or recognizing majority rule. They seemed especially concerned not to offend Moslems and Christians by giving the Holy City over to the Jews. The Jews comprised some 55 percent of the population early in the Mandate Period,<sup>29</sup> but the government appointed a municipal council with two members each of Moslems, Christians, and Jews, with a Moslem mayor and Jewish deputy mayor. Early British rulers valued Jerusalem's spiritual quality and its beauty over its residents' concerns for their livelihood. They prohibited the construction of any industrial buildings, but later amended this to permit them beyond the point where they could be seen from the Old City.<sup>30</sup> The local council was popularly elected by 1934. Then Jews comprised 75 percent of local taxpayers (a criteria for voting) and 55-80 percent of the population, but the council was structured to have six Moslems and six Jews.<sup>31</sup>

### **The Jordanian Period**

The period of Jordanian rule over a section of Jerusalem (1948-67) featured a policy strategy of domination. Jews were forbidden to enter the area controlled



by Jordan, including the Old City. The Amman government also pursued a policy of domination with respect to Jerusalem's Palestinian residents. It proclaimed the city its second capital and promised to strengthen it economically, but actually worked against its development. The government put its resources into the growth of the East Bank of the Jordan. Christian churches that offered to finance hospitals and other social services in Jerusalem were given permission to provide them only in Amman.<sup>32</sup> The Christian population of Jerusalem declined during the Jordanian period. It was 31,000 in 1946 and 12,900 in 1967." The intellectual and political center of Palestinian nationalism that had developed in Jerusalem against the Zionists and the British turned against Jordan when it absorbed that part of the West Bank that was not taken by Israel, and when it favored Amman and the East Bank in its development policies.<sup>34</sup>

Along with a Jordanian strategy of domination with respect to its section of Jerusalem and enmity between Jordan and Israel, there seems to have been a policy of accommodation between the two governments to divide what had been the British Mandate. Some researchers conclude that both Jordan and Israel wanted to frustrate the development of a Palestinian entity; and that neither Israel nor Jordan wanted to control all of Jerusalem in order not to provoke outside powers to implement the United Nations decision that the city be internationalized.<sup>35</sup>

### **Israeli Period**

From 1948 to 1967, Israeli Jerusalem was almost entirely Jewish. There was heterogeneity of ethnic origin, language, and religiosity, within the Jewish communities that totalled about 100,000. Only 3,500 Palestinians remained in the Jewish part of the city, most of them in the village of Beit Safafa that was itself divided into Israeli and Jordanian sections.<sup>36</sup> It was only after the 1967 war that Jerusalem's population again showed the historic elements of religious and ethnic tension, with latent or explicit conflict between rulers and a sizeable minority that considered itself indigenous and conquered. Those who were out of power locally also had their foreign patrons. The successors of foreign consulates who protected Jews during the Ottoman period played a parallel role of representing Palestinians who acquired citizenship in Western Europe or North America. Even governments that supported Israel and dealt with Jerusalem as its capital de facto formally accepted United Nations decisions that the city be internationalized pending an agreement to the contrary.<sup>37</sup>

For the first time in history, Jerusalem has been governed according to democratic procedures, and the Israeli regime has been the closest in the city's history to the accommodation end of the spectrum shown in Figure 1. A full analysis of accommodation and domination in the Israeli period would include tensions between secular and religious Jews, but this review will focus on the issues between Jews and non-Jews. It concludes that the Israeli regime would rank at #3 on the scale shown in Figure 1. Palestinians receive fewer benefits and opportunities than the Jews, and Palestinians perceive the regime as illegitimate.

Some statements of Israeli policy promise equality to all inhabitants regardless of religion or ethnicity, while others indicate that Jerusalem should be developed with a large Jewish majority, as the capital of a Jewish state. Authorities have not been forthcoming in issuing building permits in Palestinian areas of Jerusalem, and they have not provided social services that are the equivalent of those available to Jews. Some benefits are provided only to Jews by the quasi-governmental Jewish Agency. Other benefits are linked to service in the Israeli armed forces, which effectively excludes Jerusalem's Palestinians.

Palestinian deprivations with respect to the allocation of benefits and opportunities are at least partly a result of their rejection of the Israeli regime and the political opportunities offered to them. Their participation in local elections since 1967 (available to local residents regardless of their citizenship) has never been higher than 22 percent of those eligible, and has been as low as 4 percent. Few Palestinians included in the city as of 1967 have taken the Israeli citizenship required for voting in national elections. Voting in the 1988 or 1992 Knesset elections by residents of Jerusalem's post-1967 Palestinian neighborhoods (a measure of having acquired Israeli citizenship) ranged between 0.5 and 4 percent of the incidence of voting throughout the city.<sup>38</sup> By boycotting the Israeli regime, Palestinians may have preserved their community in readiness for the day when they create their own polity. Until now, however, they have lost the opportunity to translate 25-30 percent of the city's population into a significant voting bloc. With the power they could achieve in the city council and the Knesset they might enhance the economic and social conditions of their sizeable community. By choosing to fight the battle of *whose city is Jerusalem ?*, Palestinians have conceded their loss of political competition about *who gets what in Jerusalem ?* Those Palestinians who have gone beyond boycotting and engaged in anti-Jewish acts of violence reduce the legitimacy of Palestinian claims in the eyes of many Jews, and may have weakened the argument of those Jews who would provide more benefits to the city's Palestinians.<sup>39</sup>

There is an ample supply of Jewish and Palestinian, Moslem, or Christian hyperbole to justify or condemn Jewish rule in Israel and Jerusalem, as well as detailed criticism of the Israeli regime by Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>40</sup> Survey results show the opposition to the regime by Palestinian Jerusalemites. Eighty-six percent of one survey conducted after the onset of *intifada* in 1987 answered "No," or "Not at all" when asked if they were satisfied with the services rendered by the municipality. Almost 90 percent chose "Palestinian state" when asked, "If confronted with a choice, which would you choose: Palestinian state, economic well-being, family and community, or religion?" Less than 40 percent reported that they have some relationship with an Israeli institution, and 55 percent said that the city should be divided east (Palestinian) and west (Jewish).<sup>41</sup>

Israel's first actions in the Old City and East Jerusalem in June, 1967 showed elements of the conquerors' taking sensitive sites for their own. However, it was done within a policy to minimize the impact of conquest, and to accommodate

competing interests. Some of the first soldiers to reach the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) raised the Israeli flag above the Dome of the Rock. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered the flag taken down, and began what became Israel's policy of leaving the administration of the site in Moslem hands.<sup>42</sup> The Jews focused their possessive feelings on the Western Wall and what had been the Jewish Quarter of the Old City prior to the 1948 war. Within three days of taking the Old City, they began to clear Palestinian homes from an area in front of the Wall, and to create the plaza that since has been a site of daily prayer and mass gatherings for Jewish Holy Days and Israeli national holidays.

Also prominent in Israeli policy was the enlargement of Jerusalem's boundaries and the extension of Israeli law to areas formerly under Jordanian control.<sup>43</sup> Included within the new boundaries were the Old City, Palestinian neighborhoods to the north of the city walls and a number of Palestinian settlements immediately east of the Old City, as well as extensive open areas to the north and south. The new boundaries went substantially beyond the pre-1967 Jewish and Jordanian cities of Jerusalem. They stopped short of the Palestinian cities of Bethlehem and Beit Jalla to the south, and Ramallah to the north, and they excluded a number of Palestinian settlements on the city's eastern and northern boundaries. The point was to acquire vacant land that would become Jewish neighborhoods and assure a substantial Jewish majority. Major countries have declined to recognize Israel's changes in the city's boundaries, and Palestinians have protested against the spread of Jewish neighborhoods into areas they consider their own. By 1990, 132,000 Jews (24 percent of the entire city population) lived in neighborhoods constructed on land that had been occupied by Jordan prior to the 1967 war.<sup>44</sup>

The Israeli cabinet that served in the immediate post-war period was divided over the status to be granted the Palestinians of the newly created city. Ministers who would have given Israeli citizenship by fiat were opposed by those who opted for a minimum of Israeli intervention. What emerged was something of a muddle. Israeli citizenship was offered, but not imposed on the Palestinian residents of the enlarged Israeli city. Whether or not they accepted citizenship, the city's Palestinian residents would be entitled to vote in municipal elections, and they were provided certain social services available to Israelis. In contrast, residents of the occupied West Bank outside of Jerusalem were not to receive those social services. Palestinian practitioners of professions and owners of businesses have been allowed to remain within existing Arab associations and the East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, and have not been required to obtain Israeli licenses or to join Israeli associations that govern their members' practices. Jordanian dinars circulate in East Jerusalem, despite Bank of Israel regulations that prohibit Israeli residents from dealing freely in foreign currency. Israeli authorities initially sought to extend the Israeli Arab educational network to East Jerusalem, but backed down in the face of Palestinian boycotts, and came to accept existing Jordanian curricula and private schools with a minimum of Israeli supervision. Israel's tax authorities imposed their rates gradually on East Jerusalem, which had been accustomed to lower rates and an uneven quality of Jordanian administration.<sup>45</sup>

Teddy Kollek, Jerusalem's mayor from 1966 until 1993, acquired a reputation for promoting Israel's policy of accommodation. He created the Jerusalem Foundation to collect contributions overseas for the sake of cultural and social activities in Jerusalem beyond those made available with municipal or national government resources. The Foundation has financed projects for Jewish and Palestinian communities, including some on the borders between neighborhoods designed to promote inter-community contacts.<sup>46</sup> Kollek stood by the principle of respecting each community's preference for voluntary segregation with respect to neighborhoods and schools. He admitted that every resident has a right to live anywhere in the city. He noted that just as secular Jews avoid living in ultra-orthodox Jewish neighborhoods, he would like Jews to avoid choosing a residence in Palestinian neighborhoods.<sup>47</sup> He saw separate schooling, with Arab or Hebrew curricula and languages of instruction, as a vital component of communal peace. These postures caused him problems with some potential overseas donors to the Jerusalem Foundation, who were convinced that integration is the key to Jerusalem's future.<sup>48</sup>

Kollek opposed the efforts of Ariel Sharon (Minister of Housing in the Likud Cabinet that served from 1988 to 1992) to establish Jewish housing and public institutions in Moslem and Christian quarters of the Old City and Palestinian neighborhoods elsewhere in East Jerusalem. By one account, the mayor sought to persuade Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to moderate government purchases of Palestinian land in the Jerusalem area. What he is said to have received for his efforts were the prime minister's congratulations on his 80th birthday, and a book of poems written by Abraham Stern. Stern was a nationalist Jewish fighter of the 1940s who led Shamir and others in attacks on British and Palestinian targets.<sup>49</sup> Kollek said that Israel's sovereignty with respect to Jerusalem can co-exist with a pragmatic concession that leaves the Temple Mount in Moslem hands. He would have taken the additional step of enacting a law to that effect, and having the decision endorsed in a United Nations resolution.<sup>50</sup>

Kollek is a centrist within Zionism. He condemned Jewish officials who took too much land, in too flagrant a fashion, but stood for the right of Israel to continue building Jewish neighborhoods in sections of Jerusalem that other governments continue to define as "occupied land." He broke with a left-of-center member of his coalition on the city council who proposed creating two municipalities in the area of Jerusalem: one Jewish and one Palestinian. Kollek chastised Christian clerics who oppose Jewish efforts to acquire housing in areas the Christians call their own. One researcher found that Kollek was perceived in the Palestinian community as more subtle than Ariel Sharon and other right-wingers, but more likely to assure continued Israeli control of all Jerusalem.<sup>51</sup>

From the 1967 war through the early 1980s, it was common for friendly foreign writers to express cautious optimism about Jerusalem's future. They praised the mayor for his sensitivities toward Palestinian feelings and the projects financed by the Jerusalem Foundation in Palestinian neighborhoods and noted his support by the Palestinian electorate.<sup>52</sup> More recently, an observer who is skeptical

about the prospects for peace labelled Kollek as the city's last optimist.<sup>53</sup> Kollek failed in his efforts to persuade Palestinians to stand as candidates for the city council, His *One Jerusalem* local party did well among those Jerusalem Palestinians who voted in municipal elections, but not against Palestinian efforts to boycott the elections.

This article was originally conceived and drafted prior to the dramatic developments of 1993-94. Israel and the PLO formally recognized one another's legitimacy, and began a process of negotiating and implementing agreements to divide responsibilities and territories in Gaza and the West Bank. At this writing, the parties have agreed to postpone the resolution of the Jerusalem issue. Each is posturing with respect to its claims for the city. Teddy Kollek lost the 1993 election to Ehud Olmert of the Likud Bloc. The Likud Bloc has staked out a posture of Jewish nationalism to the right of center in the Israeli political spectrum. However, any effort to read in the 1993 local election a sign of the people's choice of domination over accommodation is complicated by the prominence of Kollek's advanced age in the election campaign. During the campaign and after the election, Olmert expressed postures both of Jewish nationalism and accommodation with respect to the city's minorities. Jerusalem's mayor is not without influence in the city, but Israel's structure of a strong central government will leave large issues of policy, as well as many details of local administration, in the hands of national government ministries.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RESERVATIONS

Jerusalem provokes strong feelings. Together with the emotions, the complexity of ancient and modern history<sup>7</sup> renders controversial the statement that some of the city's regimes have pursued a strategy of accommodation. No Jerusalem regime has been so accommodating as to satisfy all the city's communities. Despite the imperfections in the classifications, it appears that Persian, Greek, Roman, pre- and post-Crusader Moslem, British and Israeli regimes exhibited strategies of accommodation. None of the pre-Israeli regimes were democratic, and the most accommodating of them would appear to be ranked at #4.1 according to the spectrum of Figure 1. The strategy of the Crusader regime was most clearly one of domination insofar as it proclaimed the exclusion of both Jews and Moslems from the Christians' Holy City. The Greeks and the Romans began their rule of the city with policy strategies of accommodation, at least as perceived by Jews who appreciated their cosmopolitan cultures. However, both Greeks and Romans came to adopt strategies of domination. The Jordanian regime pursued a strategy of domination locally. It excluded Jews from the Jordanian city, and restricted those Palestinians and non-Palestinian Christians who wished to develop the economy or social institutions of East Jerusalem. However, the same Jordanian regime pursued a strategy of accommodation with Israeli authorities on issues of regional control.

The Israeli regime is the first to govern Jerusalem according to the forms of democracy, and disputes among its policymakers and residents are exposed for all

to see. Depending on the traits considered or one's posture with respect to the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Israeli regime in Jerusalem might be ranked at #3 or #4.1 on the spectrum of Figure 1. The ranking is complicated by the Palestinian Jerusalemites' refusal to participate in Israeli politics, which contributes in some measure to the failure of the Israeli polity to provide them with equal benefits. Israeli offers of greater political access to Palestinians, together with the Israeli formulation that Jerusalem remain a predominantly Jewish city and the capital of a Jewish state justify a score of #3 on the spectrum of Figure 1.

The accommodation versus domination themes in urban policy may bear inquiry in other polities affected by elevated tensions between communities of different religion or ethnicity. In Jerusalem's case, a strategy of accommodation seems to be limited by the concern of numerous residents and their foreign supporters to consider the city holy, and by divine law their own. The numerous changes of regime in the city's long history and the dynamics of current politics cautions against detailed conclusions, except that policy may not become more fully accommodating until the contending peoples can agree about the paradise they are pursuing.

**FIGURE 1**  
**KEY POINTS ON THE SPECTRUM BETWEEN**  
**ACCOMMODATION AND DOMINATION**

**Accommodation**

1. Pluralist democracy with an ideology and a practice of providing equality of political access, policy benefits and personal opportunities, and a widely shared perception that the regime is legitimate.
2. Legal forms of democracy but with inequalities of political access, policy benefits or personal opportunities; and population segments who feel themselves deprived by a regime that, in their eyes, is not fully legitimate.
3. Legal forms of democracy, but with provisions that favor certain groups of the population with respect to political access, policy benefits or personal opportunities; and population segments who perceive that the regime is illegitimate.
4. Non-democratic structure that is explicit in ranking population groups with respect to their political access and/or policy benefits and personal opportunities without reference to the traits or behaviors of individuals, to the extent that members of some groups are assured access, benefits and opportunities, while members of other groups are limited or denied them.
  - 4.1. Preferential structure as described above, with out-of-favor groups provided concessions on sensitive issues in order to co-opt their tolerance of the regime.
  - 4.2. Preferential structure as described above, with out-of-favor groups severely limited in their policy benefits and personal opportunities, or denied them altogether.
5. A legal structure that expels entire groups, together with an ideology that provides one group a monopoly of political control.

**Domination**

Note: The line between 4.1 and 4.2 marks the minimum point at which a regime would seem to qualify for the label of accommodating.

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