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## **Ethnic Structure, Conflict Processes and the Potential for Violence and Accommodation in Canada**

by *David E. Schmitt*

### **INTRODUCTION**

The structure of ethnic group relations in Canada and Quebec increases significantly the likelihood of violent conflict should Quebec vote to secede at any future referendum. This structural imperative is compounded by the probable demands for partition in the event separation becomes likely, as well as the inherent limitations of conflict management processes once violent ethnic conflict has broken out. Even if a future referendum produces another "no" vote, the potential for a recurrence of constitutional breakdown and renewed pressure for Quebec separation will remain. This article will first analyze the facets of the ethnic makeup of Quebec and Canada that weaken the potential for compromise and encourage violent conflict. Next, an analysis of the impact of separation processes will be undertaken showing how these forces might encourage violence and make violent conflict less manageable. Yet there are a number of forces, including, ironically, other aspects of ethnic group structure in Canada, that may help prevent violence from getting out of control and for reaching accommodation. These issues will be addressed in the final section of the article.

### **STRUCTURES OF CONFLICT**

#### **Patterns and Consequences of Structural Bicomunalism in Canada**

The overarching bicomunal structure of ethnic group relations in Canada intensifies the conflict between francophone Quebec and the rest of Canada and makes accommodation more difficult. The term "bicomunal" refers to societies where two principle ethnic groups predominate.<sup>1</sup> The key point about bicomunal societies is that compromise and accommodation are especially difficult to achieve. Even where the two predominant groups constitute a kind of overlay as in Canada, where numerous subgroups also exist, the problems of bicomunalism may still occur.<sup>2</sup> With just two groups coalition shifts become difficult; conversely, where numerous groups exist policy tradeoffs and coalition shifts become less problematic. If several groups share power, it may be possible to make less glaring compromises or even to hide losses to each group behind more complex plans. Central political authorities can more easily resist the demands of any one group, in part by playing off one group against the other and allowing each group to be a part of winning coalitions on particular issues. The classic example is India where, despite huge problems of ethnic diversity, lack of economic resources, and system-threatening conflicts, the political leadership has managed to hold the country together.<sup>3</sup>

However, when just two groups predominate, the psychology of conflict may become more pronounced and more difficult to mediate.<sup>4</sup> Policy issues are more likely to be

perceived as a zero-sum game where one side wins and the other loses. The starkness of policy differences is especially acute when there are disagreements about constitutional issues. Constitutional compromises may be particularly difficult to achieve, because leaders will be less likely to bargain and implement changes behind closed doors. When contentious issues become public, success may be more difficult to achieve. In the difficult arena of ethnic relationships a public fight may benefit the more radical politicians and undermine a more moderate spirit of compromise. The public debate and open choice of Canada's electorate on the question of "distinct society" status for Quebec was a major complicating facet in the failure of the Meech Lake constitutional accord and the contemporary alienation of voters.<sup>5</sup> Naturally, a case can be made that these issues should be open and decided by the electorate, and there were other key issues in the failure of the Meech Lake accord such as the involvement of Native groups. But the overriding question was the constitutional relationship between Quebec as a majority francophone province and the rest of Canada. The predominant issue and the predominant overarching groups in Canada reflect fundamental problems of bicomunalism.<sup>6</sup> Thus far conflict has been largely nonviolent. In political systems where violent conflict between the two groups has broken out, feelings of hostility between the two communities may be particularly intense because of the existence of just one protagonist group.

Where bicomunal social structure is reflected in a country's constitutional arrangements, the minority community may feel protected, and efforts to make constitutional changes may threaten the minority's sense of security and their sense that the political system is legitimate. The fear and anger produced by the patriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982 is a fundamental source of separatist sentiment in Quebec. Quebec's francophones see themselves as equal, founding partners of the Canadian federation, and many of Quebec's francophones felt that the 1982 constitutional changes significantly eroded their status and powers and threatened their survival as a people.<sup>7</sup> The Canadian Supreme Court, for example, acquired increased powers, and other groups, such as women and Native populations, were explicitly recognized.<sup>8</sup> Quebec's francophones, especially the intelligentsia and many members of the political elite, were also offended by the process of patriating the Constitution, which was approved despite Quebec's objections. The merits of the arguments on both sides will not be dealt with here. The point is merely to indicate that, especially from the viewpoint of Quebec's sovereigntist leaders and intellectuals, the constitutional changes of 1982 were a direct and illegitimate challenge not just to their dignity but to their survival.

To be sure, there is no question that Canada as a whole has become much more pluralistic in recent decades.<sup>9</sup> Immigration has led, for example, to a dramatic decline in the percentage of citizens with British ancestry. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically acknowledges the multicultural character of Canada.<sup>10</sup> This increased pluralism, especially in the provinces west of Quebec, has produced significant resentment toward the idea that Canada is bicomunal and that the francophones of Quebec are entitled to special consideration. The demands of Native groups have also become a major component of the politics of Canada and Quebec. In brief, although the predominant political issue and the overarching political division can be viewed as

bicommunal, demographic and political changes have eroded the willingness of Canada's anglophones, allophones (native language other than English or French) and Natives to continue viewing the process from this perspective. The tension between the bicommunal and emerging multicultural aspects of Canadian society and politics are at the root of the current threat to Canada's survival as a country. Many of Quebec's francophone nationalists see the emphasis on multiculturalism as a direct and intentional challenge to the dualistic view of the Canadian state and thus to their ability to preserve and control their own destiny.

Further complicating the ability of the system to manage bicommunal tensions is the system of federalism. Whatever the merits and necessity of a federal structure from the standpoint of beginning and building a nation, representing diverse interests over great distances and other positive attributes, the federal structure of Canada's political system greatly impedes the ability of national leaders to reach bargains concerning the overlying bicommunal division. Indeed, federalism can encourage provincial leaders to exploit the underlying tension between multiculturalism and bicommunalism, a process that accelerates and intensifies separatist sentiment in Quebec. Especially in the West, regional elites are responsive to electorates greatly removed from both the historical and contemporary issues of anglophone/francophone relations. As Reform Party strategy in the 1997 federal election campaign suggests, it can be to the short-run political advantage of regional elites to play the ethnic card, disparaging the notion of Canada as a bicommunal political system. In sum, the changing nature of overall ethnic group structure as well as the system of federalism have exacerbated the normal tensions of bicommunal politics.

### **Dual Majority/Dual Minority Status within Quebec**

Both the francophone and anglophone communities in Quebec are simultaneously majority and minority groups.<sup>11</sup> This has profound implications for group psychology, causing each group to feel the entitlements of the majority while possessing the insecurities of a minority. Where a majority has been conquered by military force or is dominated by a minority through technological or economic superiority, the likelihood of eventual rebellion is nearly certain except in cases of overwhelming power. The case of South Africa is particularly instructive in this regard. Although anglophone dominance in Quebec was never complete nor wholly exploitive, there was certainly some economic and even cultural control. Arguments that Quebec could be viewed as an exploited colony prior to the Quiet Revolution have been exaggerated.<sup>12</sup> There existed a symbiotic relationship between francophone political and social elites on the one hand and anglophone economic elites on the other.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the anglophone community of Quebec contributed in many ways to the economic, cultural and medical development of Quebec to the benefit of all its citizens. Nevertheless, perceived dominance by a minority produces a particularly intense assertiveness for power by the majority. The size of the francophone majority of Quebec, today standing at about 83 percent of the population, partly explains the determination and intensity of the drive for political, economic and social control since the Quiet Revolution began in 1960.

But the francophones of Quebec are a distinct minority in Canada as a whole and fear that the massive anglophone environment surrounding them could swamp their language and culture. The francophones of Quebec exist not only as a minority within Canada but as a much smaller minority within the anglophone community of the United States and Canada combined. Of particular importance is the declining percentage of the population of Quebec within Canada as well as the declining percentage of Canadian francophones within Canada as a whole. These figures are now each below the symbolically important level of 25 percent and add to the sense of urgency in securing the future of the French language and culture of Quebec. The low birthrate of Quebec's francophones and immigration to Quebec create a heightened sense of demographic insecurities.<sup>14</sup> To be sure, the requirement that most immigrants send their children to francophone schools as well as other language legislation has undoubtedly slowed the erosion of the use of French in the home and expanded its use in the workplace, but many francophones nevertheless feel threatened by demographic trends and the growing use of English internationally. The degree to which the French language is really threatened is, of course, subject to considerable debate, but the point is that the perception of threat is a powerful stimulant to Quebec nationalism.<sup>15</sup>

English language media and business are a major force in Quebec's cultural life. Although Quebec law requires that Quebec's radio stations maintain a high level of French language content, American and other anglophone musicians are quite popular and are heard frequently on French language radio stations. The programming on English language television is also popular among many francophones. The technological and informational networks developing internationally also challenge the long-term survival of the French language. Computer programs, for example, are often available only in English.<sup>16</sup>

The insecurities of Quebec's francophones are also heightened by the treatment that francophone minorities have received in Canada's other provinces. Approximately one million francophones live outside Quebec, the most politically significant of whom are the francophones of New Brunswick. Particularly resented was the treatment of francophone minorities in such places as Manitoba and the continuing difficulty of francophone minorities to obtain education and other services in their language. Although some of the political and economic circumstances of these communities have improved significantly in recent years owing to various federal programs and, in New Brunswick, constitutional protections, instances of discrimination have created a perception of ill-will by Canada's English-speaking majority toward francophones.<sup>17</sup> Ironically, the Quebec government has provided little support to francophones living outside Quebec, partly because it does not want its policies toward Quebec's minorities subject to additional federal constraints.

Motivated both by fears concerning the survival of the French language and culture as well as a belief that the majority has a right to control the internal politics of Quebec, both the Liberal Party of Quebec and sovereigntist Parti Québécois have passed and implemented stringent language and education policies designed to protect and support the development of the French language and culture. At present virtually all foreign

immigrants to Quebec must send their children to French schools. Quebec Bill 101 (Charter of the French Language) required even anglophone immigrants from the rest of Canada to send their children to French schools, although this provision was overturned by the Canadian Supreme Court in 1984. Bill 178, revoked by the Quebec government in 1993 (Bill 86), prevented anglophone establishments from displaying signs in English. These measures, as well as various language enforcement policies, have created great resentment in the English-speaking community and led to an exodus of anglophone residents as well as some business.<sup>18</sup>

The francophones of Quebec emphasize that they are not like other ethnic groups in Canadian society and regard themselves as a people with an historical homeland having its own institutions.<sup>19</sup> It is not unusual where democracies contain regionally based ethnic groups for the members of these groups to have dual loyalties as, for example, in the case of Scotland and Wales, where inhabitants typically have feelings of loyalty to their homeland as well as their country, the United Kingdom.<sup>20</sup> Such feelings of dual loyalty have in the past been typical among francophones who viewed their motherland or nation as Quebec and their country as Canada.<sup>21</sup> After the constitutional crises of recent years within Canada and contention over issues such as language policy within Quebec, these dual loyalties have eroded. Indeed, some scholars argue that relationships are now largely devoid of affective content and that it is pragmatic economic considerations that will determine future relationships.<sup>22</sup> Francophone ethnic identity has developed into full-fledged nationalism based upon the preservation of francophone culture within the Quebec homeland.

Of course, the emphasis upon the preservation of the French language and culture has made problematic the effort to obtain the support of Quebec's anglophone and allophone minorities.<sup>23</sup> The claim that the separatist movement is based on a liberal democratic notion of individual and group rights rings hollow to most of Quebec's ethnic minorities. Many of these groups have a positive affinity for Canada and see nothing but risk in sovereignty for Quebec. Because Quebec nationalism is based primarily on the French dimension of the province, it has little to offer from the point of view of most of Quebec's minorities.<sup>24</sup> An analysis of pre-referendum opinion poll data by Maurice Pinard shows a similarity of poll results among these groups; an average of only 8.7 percent of Quebec's anglophones and allophones preferred the sovereignty option. It is probable that the preference against sovereignty was particularly pronounced among anglophones but that even among allophones there was probably no more than 10 percent in favor of the "yes" position.<sup>25</sup> Members of Quebec's Native communities voted 90 percent against sovereignty in the referendum, with even French-speaking Native communities voting no more than 25 percent "yes."<sup>26</sup> So pronounced is the lack of support for sovereignty among Quebec's minorities that they can be together considered as a relatively cohesive counter group to Quebec's francophones.

In other words, from the perspective of Quebec's overwhelmingly predominant political issue, Quebec can be considered as a bicommunal society with francophones on one side and virtually all other ethnic groups on the other. This is not to say that there exist no significant divisions within the two political groupings. Like Native groups, allophone



communities often have a strong sense of community identity and group interests. Also, the francophone community includes recent immigrants as well as citizens with British Isles ancestry, and there are significant historical and contemporary ties to Native groups and others.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, a significant number of francophones prefer to remain within Canada, and many of Quebec's francophones hold key jobs in the federal government including the positions of prime minister, cabinet minister and many others. Furthermore, some of the support among francophones for the "yes" position in the referendum was probably based on a misperception of the ballot question. Many "yes" voters believed that they were not voting for separation but rather for continued close ties under a sovereignty association relationship.<sup>28</sup>

Yet being citizens of Quebec is a core part of the identity of most francophones and evokes powerful sentiments of pride and loyalty. Quebec's minorities understand the strength of francophone national identity within Quebec and are greatly concerned about their rights and cultural survival if Quebec separates from Canada. In power, large majorities are likely to be intolerant toward minorities, and there is little question that both francophones of Quebec and anglophones in the rest of Canada have sometimes treated the other group badly. However, the greater cultural cohesiveness and larger numerical predominance of the francophone culture of Quebec compared with the anglophones of Canada suggests a potential serious problem for minorities if Quebec separates. Of course, as noted above there is some social division within the francophone community, and many francophone politicians of both major Quebec parties as well as many francophone leaders of business, educational and cultural institutions are committed to the protection of Quebec's minorities.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, the size and relative cohesiveness of francophone culture heighten the fears of Quebec's minorities that they would be subject to discrimination in a sovereign Quebec. In brief, Quebec is less pluralistic than the rest of Canada; francophones have an overwhelming numerical advantage and have pursued aggressively defensive language and educational policies.

Moreover, the anglophones and most allophones of Quebec perceive themselves as part of the national majority. A key element of their strong resistance to the idea of Quebec sovereignty is a positive sense of being Canadian. There is often disagreement concerning the degree to which the anglophones of Quebec in the past have perceived themselves to be a distinct minority group anglophone Quebecers rather than merely a part of the broader anglophone community in Canada. After the Quiet Revolution and the imposition of stringent language and educational regulations, a sense of being an oppressed minority within the new Quebec emerged.<sup>30</sup> It should be added that the anger of anglophones, especially those with British Isles ancestry, toward Quebec nationalism has undoubtedly been heightened as a result of the psychological shift from dominant elite status to being a threatened minority.

In sum, Quebec's two principle groups are strongly motivated both by their minority and majority status. These conditions contribute to intense insecurities as well as a sense of entitlement and complicates the search for accommodation. For anglophones and most allophones there are clear and powerful incentives to remain with the rest of Canada, where they would be a part of pluralistic majority. Part of this desire is motivated by

strong feelings of political attachment and part by the fear of the economic consequences of Quebec independence. There is also a pronounced fear that the historic rights and privileges of the English-speaking community would be seriously undermined in a state with a huge francophone majority that has as the center of its *raison d'être* its French language and culture. Quebec's Native groups, although not part of the national majority and only about one percent of Quebec's population, control key territories, especially in the north, and see themselves as similarly threatened in an independent Quebec.

## **CIRCUMSTANCES ENCOURAGING VIOLENCE AND COMPLICATING ITS RESOLUTION**

To many observers the idea of widespread communal and terrorist violence surrounding the secession of Quebec seems intuitively far-fetched. It is sometimes noted, for example, that after a close defeat in October 1995, pro-sovereignists did not resort to violence. But this argument is of limited import as the status quo did not change, and there would always be hope of a future success. Indeed, many sovereignists became convinced that eventual success was inevitable. Some writers have suggested that the idea of major violence in Canada is unrealistic.<sup>31</sup> These individuals are often thoughtful scholars or practitioners who specialize in Canadian affairs rather than on issues of ethnic conflict and the processes of political violence. They are certainly correct that Quebec, for a variety of reasons, will never become another Bosnia, but they underrate the potential for other forms of very serious violence, including conflict between security forces as well as long-term, low-intensity guerilla and communal warfare.

A referendum "yes" vote would mean the probable destruction of Canada and an immediate perceived threat to the security of Quebec's minorities. Pressures resulting from moves to partition Quebec as well as stresses concerning the economic and administrative terms of separation, including whether secession was to be permitted without political, legal or other challenge, would threaten and anger francophones. Extreme emotional forces could be unleashed after a "yes" vote, and their peaceful containment should not be assumed.

There is far greater potential for both planned and unplanned violence over the separation of Quebec than most observers may realize, and it is inevitable that large-scale police or military intervention would have to take place except in all but minor disturbances.<sup>32</sup> Leaders of government and of the security forces would have no choice but to intervene in an effort to prevent more widespread violence. Yet, as will be discussed, such intervention is likely to produce escalation.

It should also be emphasized that in spite of its strong democratic political culture, Canada, like most democracies, also has experienced violence in its historical development, although much less than in societies such as the United States. Subject to various interpretations, the Rebellion of 1837-38 in Lower Canada constitutes an important event in the psychology of francophone nationalists. There is an understandable pride in the challenge to authority believed to be illegitimate, whether this authority is viewed as anti-colonial, upper class or in other terms.<sup>33</sup> Violence surrounding



the revolts of the Métis as well as the disturbances surrounding conscription might also be noted. The violence perpetrated by the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) is the most important recent illustration of this phenomenon, including bombings, and to a much lesser extent kidnapping and assassination among its techniques.<sup>34</sup> It is instructive that the FLQ was popular among some francophone college students and intellectuals during the bombing campaigns of the 1960s. It is, of course, true that FLQ violence was comparatively tame by international standards and that the group did not have widespread public support. There was widespread condemnation of the assassination of the Quebec Labour Minister, Pierre Laporte. Yet the point is precisely that this relatively narrow and mild conspiracy had enormously destabilizing consequences that suggest a potential for such events to get out of hand given a higher level of violence by communal/terrorist organizations and the security forces of whatever side. Support for violent organizations by a minority of people on both sides could be anticipated in the event of significant official or communal violence.

It is sometimes argued that democracies do not go to war with one another, and Canada and Quebec are certainly democracies. Often referred to as the "democratic peace theory," this idea can be carried to the extreme viewpoint that the chance of war between democratic political systems is so remote as to be negligible, no matter what the circumstances. There are, however, significant statistical and methodological problems with this viewpoint.<sup>35</sup> Positive examples of peaceful separation such as Czechoslovakia and Norway are sometimes cited as indicating the probability of peaceful secession. A problem with these comparisons is that there are inevitably key differences from the Canadian case.<sup>36</sup> Additionally, there are obviously too few cases to develop meaningful conclusions concerning any general peacefulness of secession in democracies.

Ethnic sensitivities, entitlements and grievances provide intense fuel for emerging conflicts. In other forms of political conflict, such as levels of funding for medical care and unemployment benefits, issues may be more easily compromised. Where the issue is fundamental identity, such as what country one belongs to, compromise can be difficult if not impossible. Where there is a breakup of a country, nationalistic passions can be inflamed beyond the point of self-restraint among many partisans.

Ethnic and national feelings represent fundamental identities and that can be viewed as an extension of the family.<sup>37</sup> The most intense form of human anger may be elicited when members of one's family are physically attacked, especially when they are perceived as being attacked by a rival or enemy family. Such feelings form quickly in situations of ethnic conflict. Family feelings also add to the intensity of emerging conflict from another perspective. To a limited extent the breakup of Canada can be conceived as a divorce. Although feelings of attachment by Quebec's francophones have no doubt waned, there is a history of loyalty as well as grievance toward Canada. Similarly, although most anglophones and allophones have probably felt a sense of pride in the French dimension of Canada, many have had mixed feelings of pride, superiority and resentment, with resentment becoming pronounced in recent years. Just as former marriage partners or estranged brothers may achieve the height of hatreds, so former compatriots can become the bitterest of foes, whether members of the political elite or

rank and file. The tone of some of the debate in the 1997 federal election began to hint at a darker long-term potential.<sup>38</sup> It is a central thesis of this article that it takes far less than many suppose for these forces to be unleashed beyond the point of government, military and police control, particularly where these institutions are themselves confronting major changes, divisions and conflicts. As deteriorating events further polarize feelings and identities, the focus on one hated enemy camp creates a psychological intensity that may become almost impossible to unwind.

## **The Security Forces**

There are several fundamental concerns about the role of police and military forces during the separation of Quebec from Canada and any dismemberment of Quebec. First, given the high emotions unleashed in the aftermath of a "yes" vote as well as during ensuing deliberations, inevitably there will be demonstrations that get out of control. It should be anticipated also that communal violence between crowds of opposing communities could ensue that requires the intervention of security forces. Also, there may be instances of civil disobedience, such as refusal to pay taxes or occupation of public buildings, that require a government response.

No function of government is more sensitive than physical enforcement. A tax or regulation perceived as unjust may alienate, but a plastic bullet that blinds and deforms one's sister, cousin or ethnic compatriot will enrage, even if fired by mistake. Even restrained arrest and physical removal of defiant lawbreakers from their homes or businesses will infuriate. If the soldiers or police officers are from the other community, anger will be directed at the other side and their political and security forces. Once violence reaches a certain point, efforts to contain it actually contribute to escalation.

Nothing can turn good citizens against government more quickly than military or police forces that overreact. Even competent performance of duty can produce casualties. Under the stresses of crowd and riot control, there will also be human overreaction produced by stress or the need to make instantaneous decisions. It can also be anticipated that there may be some incompetent and malicious behavior, especially after the security forces themselves begin taking casualties. If violence begins to escalate, it can be expected that individuals and small groups on both sides will attempt to elicit an overreaction by security forces in an effort to radicalize public opinion. Taunting and injuring members of the security forces requires no great finesse.

Even mild techniques of enforcement in these circumstances are likely to infuriate emotionally charged demonstrators, rioters and ordinary citizens. Curfews penalize large populations of non-participants eager to perceive a lack of even-handedness. Plastic and rubber bullets sometimes kill and maim, even with newer, safer methods. Non-lethal gas drifts uncontrollably and can harm infants, asthmatics and the elderly. Prolonged confrontation virtually assures serious excess. Thirteen Northern Irish civil rights marchers were killed on "Bloody Sunday," 1972, by British soldiers, an event that led to the demise of the Northern Irish government. Furthermore, the initial violence that brought the British Army into the conflict in Northern Ireland resulted from teenage

Catholics in August, 1969 throwing bottles and rocks at a scheduled Protestant parade in Londonderry.<sup>39</sup>

It is probable as well that there would be at least a few acts of terrorism. It does not take great intellect or organization to commit outrages that incite retaliation by other outrageous individuals in situations of ethnic conflict. Had the Oklahoma City bombing been conducted by a Middle East terrorist group with clear evidence of an Iranian connection, the pressure on the US government to respond would have been enormous. If the bombing had been connected to an issue of ethnic conflict in the United States, the potential disruptive effect of this one act would have been enormous.

It takes only small, isolated urban pockets or relatively few rural based paramilitaries to do enormous damage. It is comparatively easy to create ungovernable no-go areas in remote rural or dense urban areas where security forces are denied routine access. It would not require significant numbers of individuals in the anglophone, allophone, francophone or Native communities to shatter hopes of a viable Quebec and perhaps new Canadian state. The difficulty in containing the 1996 and 1997 narcoterrorist bombings by motorcycle bikers in Quebec suggests the complexity of the problem from the standpoints of intelligence and the coordination of police forces, which in this case were on peaceful terms with one another.<sup>40</sup> In both the anglophone and francophone communities there are individuals with the military training and access to materials needed to carry out terrorist attacks.

It should give pause that the size of the IRA in Northern Ireland at the time of the August, 1994 ceasefire was perhaps three to four hundred members. With the support of only a small minority of Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the IRA has fought the British military (numbering at its highest level about 30,000), top-notch intelligence services, and Northern Irish police forces to a stalemate that has lasted more than a quarter of a century. Northern Ireland is only about two and a half times larger in area than Prince Edward Island, and less than one percent of the size of Quebec. It has a population of only about one million six hundred thousand people.<sup>41</sup>

Of course, in the Northern Ireland conflict the security forces of both Britain and the Republic of Ireland were working in concert. It is probable that the separation of Quebec from Canada would produce a split in the military, with most francophone officers opting to be a part of Quebec. An independent Quebec would require armed forces for basic security such as the handling of civil unrest.<sup>42</sup> Prior to the 1995 referendum, there were efforts by nationalist politicians to entice francophone military officers to opt for service with Quebec. Younger francophone officers would see great opportunity for promotion in the Quebec military, while many officers and enlisted personnel would feel great pressure to join their homeland's forces, both from the standpoint of personal identity as well as the positive pressures of family ties and the negative pressures of an unfriendly anglophone community.<sup>43</sup>

Eventual conflict between reconstituted armies is not unimaginable. The contentious issues of Native claims and partition will be discussed below. It can be anticipated that

both the governments of Quebec and Canada will have carefully thought out contingency plans for controlling key military, security and other assets. Although these endeavors would not rationally include physical confrontations, the potential for miscalculation exists. Overexuberance and misjudgment can also occur in highly tense situations where one side may feel compelled to intervene to protect its own citizens or property. The Canadian government and its personnel control many facilities within Quebec, and they could be removed non-violently only through mutual agreement. Clashes can quickly erode remaining trust and produce great public pressure for retaliation. Any ongoing military conflict or widespread civil violence that could not be contained would eventually bring international intervention, a likelihood that will be discussed below.

### **The Partition Issue**

The partition issue is one of the most explosive aspects of the sovereignty project. Most Natives and Native groups want to remain within Canada, with some expecting the Canadian government to protect them from incorporation within Quebec and others willing undoubtedly to employ violence in their effort to remain independent of the new country.<sup>44</sup> Of course, some other Canadians also insist that areas ceded to Quebec after confederation remain a part of Canadian territory. Although only a small fraction of the population of Quebec, Native groups inhabit key areas, in particular massive land areas in the North that are rich in resources. Furthermore, Natives have a strong moral claim as original inhabitants as well as legal and political resources both domestically and internationally.<sup>45</sup> Recent Canadian history illustrates the potential for difficulty in the event Quebec moves to become independent. The rebellion by Mohawks at Oka in 1990 constituted a major challenge to the government of Quebec as well as the federal government. It marked the first use of the Canadian military in a domestic rebellion since the troubles surrounding the FLQ crisis in 1970. So furious were some civilians at the Natives that rocks were thrown at Native children and the elderly, with suggestions of vigilante action against the Mohawks.<sup>46</sup> Given the inability of the Quebec government to handle the problem at Oka, some Native groups might physically challenge a sovereign Quebec because of perceived weakness. Also, the difficulty government officials had in controlling cigarette smuggling by some Native individuals and possible links between Native individuals near the American border and criminal organizations in the US suggest the potential for traffic in arms in the event of separation.

It is sometimes argued that francophone Quebecers would not fight and die for northern territories, as many see legitimacy to Native claims and are in any event isolated from these areas. Even the leader of the Bloc Québécois acknowledged during the 1997 electoral campaign the possibility of negotiations over northern territories. It is also true, however, that there are significant economic resources in these areas and that many sovereigntist leaders and intellectuals have a strong commitment to preserving Quebec's physical boundaries.<sup>47</sup>

A serious partition movement has arisen in southern Quebec as a consequence of the 1995 referendum. The goal is that pro-federalist areas, including parts of Montreal and its suburbs, the south shore of the St. Lawrence River, federalist areas west of Montreal and

the southern Gaspé Peninsula should remain in Canada if Quebec becomes independent. A core argument of this movement is that if Quebec can be partitioned away from Canada then Quebec itself is subject to partitioning.<sup>48</sup> Groups such as the Equality Party have organized efforts toward partition both as a strategy to dissuade francophone voters from voting "yes" next time and also as a genuine quest to remain in Canada.<sup>49</sup> Numerous local governments in anglophone areas have passed unity resolutions advocating their desire to remain within Canada. A May 1997 opinion poll suggests the possibility of some public support for partitioning even if force is necessary in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec.<sup>50</sup> Support for the idea was strongest in the west of Canada and weak within Quebec, even in federalist areas.<sup>51</sup> Of course, respondents were answering abstract questions that would not necessarily reflect their sentiments at the moment of impending separation, but the poll does suggest the strength of feeling among those committed to Canada and the potential for radicalization in the event of a Quebec unilateral declaration of independence.

There are various models for the achievement of partitioning, including plebiscites in ridings for the Quebec legislature as well as corridors and other techniques for connecting isolated areas. Analysis of the details of these proposals is beyond the scope of this article. The main point is that any effort to partition Quebec would be risky and difficult from both theoretical and practical standpoints.<sup>52</sup> One of the difficulties with the dismemberment of political entities is that there are almost always minorities left behind.<sup>53</sup> Many anglophones and others not part of districts voting to remain with Canada would be embittered, as would some francophones residing in districts choosing to remain with Canada. No conceivable new border could satisfy everyone unless there were massive population movements that would be prohibitively expensive and dangerous.

In the event of the separation of Quebec from Canada, the significance of francophone national identity with Quebec can hardly be overstated. The controversy surrounding the comments of Canadian government officials raising the issue of the partition in 1996 and similar contention during the 1997 federal election suggest the sensitivity of this issue.<sup>54</sup> There would almost certainly be some violent attacks by individuals or emergent terrorist organizations. The same problem applies to non-francophone areas denied the right to remain within Canada. It is likely that individuals and latent small groups would not peacefully accept this outcome. In other words, after a "yes" vote the partition issue probably will produce violence whether Quebec is partitioned or not. The greatest level of violence would probably occur from partitioning, in part because it might involve direct confrontation between Canadian and Quebec security forces and in part because the large francophone majority provides a much greater population base for terrorist activities. On the other hand, terrorists in the other camp might find a somewhat safe haven across the Ontario (or even US) border, much as the IRA has had safe houses in the Republic of Ireland. Terrorists from either side could inflict terrible damage in Montreal and other urban areas.

Prior to another referendum the encouragement of partition by the Canadian government might help dissuade francophone voters from voting for separation, although it could

have the opposite effect, especially among those who do not realize that partition is a real possibility. In the event of a future "yes" vote, it is not necessarily wise for the Canadian government to support partition. To do so might unwittingly encourage Native groups to separate from Canada, and, perhaps, some francophones in New Brunswick, to separate from that province and integrate with Quebec.<sup>55</sup> This seems highly unlikely at present, although it might become more attractive if the rest of Canada unravels. The greatest concern is the potential for violence. Yet a case for partitioning Quebec can be made from the standpoint of the human rights of those wanting to remain in Canada as well as a bargaining strategy in negotiating with Quebec after an affirmative referendum vote.<sup>56</sup>

The position of the Quebec government is that Quebec is not divisible. While Lucien Bouchard has been moderate in tone, a Quebec government minister has suggested that the use of force to protect Quebec's territorial integrity may be necessary.<sup>57</sup> The claim that borders are non-negotiable is perhaps the only prudent initial strategy for the Quebec government. From a political perspective any weakening on this matter would alienate supporters and give up a powerful bargaining chip. It may not be politically or ideologically feasible to agree to plebiscites even during negotiations after a "yes" vote.

Of course, the government of Quebec may not have a choice. The demand for plebiscites within Quebec, and perhaps eventually in New Brunswick and other areas of Canada, could easily become irresistible if the governments become weakened or divided. If violence, economic chaos or other problems create a hostile public opinion among the francophone community and reduced support from the bureaucracy or security forces, a weakened Quebec government might have to allow plebiscites, particularly if international actors encourage them. Some federalist areas might unilaterally secede. Enforcement could become a serious problem for the government if there is widespread civil disobedience. Unless a government is able and willing to mount a major military operation and maintain an occupation force, these areas become open challenges to the viability of the state. Only the most cohesive, undemocratic or powerful government can sustain such actions. One additional difficulty to be noted is that a deteriorating civil order in the face of ethnic conflict typically benefits more militant political leaders. Moderate democrats tend to be outbid for popular support by radicals who question the national loyalties of pragmatists. This problem could effect either the Canadian or Quebec government or both, with obvious implications for escalating conflict.

That the ethical issues for and against partition have been given little attention in this analysis does not suggest that they are unimportant, merely that they are beyond the scope of this article. Ethical and human rights arguments can be made on both sides. Quebec as a geographically defined entity constitutes a true homeland for the French-speaking peoples of Quebec, and Quebec has functioned effectively as a democratic political system. On the other hand, it can be argued that it is people who have rights, not geographic pieces of land (an argument that also could be applied to Canada and other countries) and that, in any event, it is Quebec that has opened up the question of separation. There are more sophisticated arguments that might be made from political, legal and philosophical perspectives.<sup>58</sup> The point is merely to acknowledge that the issue of partition is extraordinarily complex and problematic. It is tied to profound feelings of



self-interest, fairness and fundamental group identity and challenges the core concepts of political philosophy and political science.

Unfortunately, the settlement of this question would almost certainly include forces and events that may well get beyond the control of the respective governments. Already the polarization into two distrustful and hostile communities is well underway. The surest route to new borders would be massive violence and population movements, an extreme and rather unlikely outcome no rational individual wants. But the development of a lower level campaign of terrorism and communal violence that acquires an ongoing life is much more likely.

## **THE POTENTIAL FOR ACCOMMODATION AND THE AVOIDANCE OF VIOLENCE**

There are several key forces that would serve as an initial restraint to violence in Quebec. Most basic is the powerful democratic tradition throughout Canada. One need only recall the public revulsion in both communities at the FLQ kidnapping and murder of Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte in 1970. The criticism by sovereigntist leaders of threatening statements toward members of Quebec's minority groups by former FLQ member Raymond Villeneuve suggests the inherent moderation of democratic leaders among the francophone community.<sup>59</sup> The unity resolutions adopted by local governments wanting to remain in Canada have become increasingly moderate in tone, and the socio-economic characteristics and age of many favoring partition suggest little probability of massive numbers joining in communal violence against a separating state or their neighbors. The deep-rooted sense of decency and fair play among the vast majority of all Canadians makes widespread ethnic cleansing unlikely. The dominant political values have been nonviolent since the Conquest, and grievances have usually been tolerated or challenged through peaceful means.<sup>60</sup>

The leadership and participation of many Quebec francophones in the federal government as well as the existence of Canada's one million other francophones would serve as a counter to francophone militancy and excesses by the Quebec government. Similarly, anglophones outside of Quebec as well as Canadian government leaders would serve as a brake on excessive militancy by sectors of Quebec's anglophone community, as would many sectors of that community itself. In brief, external linkages would on balance serve to moderate overly heated confrontations. A degree of plurality within each of the major groups would also constitute a force for moderation in an increasingly violent confrontation. Francophone immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa and individuals within the allophone communities, for example, would be moderating influences. In the difficult arena of bicomunal social structure, such complexities offer important opportunities for moderation, provided the leaders hold democratic values.

Although there is a real risk of confrontations between the security forces of Canada and Quebec, it should be emphasized that the military and police forces have generally functioned in democratic fashion. To be sure, there have been serious instances of abuse by military and police personnel, but it is unrealistic to see these forces as uncontrolled

by constitutional principals. The leaders and officers are generally committed to democratic values. In 1991, General John de Chastelain, Commander of the Canadian Armed Forces stated that ". . . in any constitutional debate, and in any action that results, the role of the Armed Forces will be a silent one, and that our only involvement will be to assist the police and associated agencies in the maintenance of law and order, should that be necessary."<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, the police forces of Canada are capable of effective, coordinated and restrained action as indicated in the May 1997 large-scale raid by Quebec police on narcoterrorists.<sup>62</sup>

It was earlier noted that the system of federalism made the search for compromise more difficult and that the very existence of the province of Quebec gave sovereigntists a powerful mechanism with which to threaten the survival of Canada. Yet the government and structure of Quebec as a political system are fundamentally democratic. An irony of provincial recognition of ethnic minorities such as the francophones of Quebec is that these minorities can have the constitutional means to survive and flourish as well as the capacity to destroy the political union. Deny federal structures and one risks more extreme, violent demands for separation. Grant provincial status and one provides a mechanism for destroying the union. But provinces within democracies are democratic entities, and the processes of democracy make more difficult the employment of government violence and repression, whether by federal or provincial leaders.

### **The Centrality of Legitimacy and Effective Planning**

It can be argued that Canada should not negotiate terms of separation prior to a future referendum in order not to lend unwitting support to an affirmative vote or to give Quebec a bargaining advantage.<sup>63</sup> There is a broader, more important issue, however, that suggests the importance of coordination and temperance, without either side giving up an understandable desire to be in a strong bargaining position. That principal is the need to maintain the maximum level of legitimacy to the procedures employed in both the referendum and any separation processes. Given the inevitable strong pressures for civil disorder and terrorism in a highly charged environment of impending separation, both sides have a clear, powerful self-interest as well as responsibility to minimize the inevitable alienation that could be felt in either community.

It is unreasonable to expect political leaders to be silent while their most cherished values are being threatened, whether it be Canada or a sovereign Quebec. But it is important that each side recognizes and be responsive to potential sources of alienation by the other. Often this is primarily a matter of the tone or way in which demands or comments are expressed. From the standpoint of the federal government, the less Quebec's francophones are alienated, the more likely they are to reject sovereignty. From the perspective of Quebec's sovereigntist leaders, the less Quebec's minorities and the population of the rest of Canada are alienated, the less likely separation processes will produce a radical reconfiguration of Quebec's borders. There are, of course, numerous other political, economic and social costs to radicalization and any violence that gets out of hand.

To the extent possible, Canada's and Quebec's leaders could agree on the specifics of any referendum, including the wording as well as the percentage necessary for separation to proceed. Although it might be more difficult to achieve a positive result with an unambiguous question, the sovereignty side will gain in many ways from the standpoint of achieving its long-term goals. Similarly, the federal government might consider the possibility of specifying a simple fifty percent plus one formula. The anger produced over statements demanding a higher figure illustrates the intensity of this issue.<sup>64</sup> These agreements need not be produced by formal meetings but instead might be the result of tacit or informal processes.

With respect to partition, the key to confining violence to manageable levels and preventing this outcome is the perception by both major communities that the process of deciding to partition or not to partition Quebec is legitimate. This could be achieved by both governments agreeing on a formula for plebiscites that would be supervised jointly or by the Canadian government stating that it does not intend to pursue the goal of partition, either prior to a referendum or in subsequent negotiations with the Quebec government. The subjects of the wording of the referendum question, the required percentage of the vote, partition and related matters are hotly contested issues and the above ideas are noted merely as alternatives for consideration. Other resolutions of these issues are possible. Nothing will entirely legitimize the process of voting or separation for either side, but the more the process is perceived as minimally fair the less likely is chaos that could threaten the existence of both states. The avoidance of a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec would be an especially positive contribution to the prevention of violence, an outcome to which both sides can contribute.

Contingency planning on both sides might include mechanisms for coordinating the activities of the police and other security forces. This could include the sharing of information on potential terrorist activity. It is likely in any case that in a situation of divided sentiments and loyalties the protection of secret information will be difficult. Each side has an interest in preventing terrorism or self-serving criminal activity as well as communal violence that will lead to eventual casualties on both sides, including members of the security forces themselves. With respect to operations, there are numerous obvious techniques that will help defuse violence such as the decision to allow or request, where feasible, the other side to employ its personnel in contentious situations with its own ethnic group. Detailed cooperative operating procedures might be developed independently in advance by both sides, perhaps with informal discussions among key personnel of the two sides to reach understandings on major points. To be sure, none of this will guarantee success, and the security forces themselves may well clash given uncertainty, rising tempers, more militant leadership and other possible negative eventualities. The central point is that each side has a profound common interest in maintaining order and social stability and that specific actions and mechanisms can help maximize the potential for this result.

### **International Participation and Intervention**

International representatives might be requested by the Canadian and Quebec governments for assistance as mediators, facilitators and coordinators, for example, in any partition process. In the event of excessive violence they might also be requested for peacekeeping duties. A highly sensitive issue concerns American involvement in these endeavors.<sup>65</sup> With good reason Canadians tend to be distrustful of the motives and heavy handedness of American foreign policy. To be sure, there are many thoughtful, moderate as well as sophisticated specialists on Canada in the American foreign policy establishment. But the making of American foreign policy is often a highly fragmented undertaking with decisions made for domestic political reasons or even ignorance of the actual situation.<sup>66</sup> Canadians and others are well aware of possible inappropriate intrusiveness by the United States government.

Although it might be resented and resisted through diplomacy, there is little doubt that the United States would intervene if it felt, correctly or not, that instability on its northern border threatened its own security. Such intervention would also occur if political pressures from within the American government or from interest groups or a national press newly interested in Canada were to compel involvement. Whatever the ethical questions surrounding the issue of intervention, the reality is that the United States will maintain a cold and hard eye on the evolving situation. This reality makes it all the more imperative that leaders of Canada and Quebec follow policies that will be perceived as legitimate by both federalists and sovereigntists, and that there be as much coordination, cooperation and planning as is politically feasible. On the other hand, if violence becomes uncontrollable, leaders in both Canada and Quebec might reluctantly support or even request such American intervention.

It is probable that any international peacekeepers or mediators in the face of violence would be concerned foremost with the need to establish stability. Although probably disposed initially to the maintenance of Quebec's borders, the over-riding goal would be near-term stability. The question of what would happen to Quebec's borders is unpredictable and would depend in large measure on the circumstances as well as the entities and personalities involved at that point, whether on the Canadian and Quebec or the international side.

### **Constitutional Reform and Integrated Political Structures**

The chances of constitutional change at present appear to be negligible. English-speaking Canada is fed up and exhausted, and there is little enthusiasm for concessions to Quebec. Polls show little enthusiasm for yet another drawn-out constitutional process to appease francophone Quebecers, who are often perceived as unreasonable.<sup>67</sup> For many francophone leaders and citizens of Quebec constitutional reform is no longer enough. Sovereigntists opposed to reconciliation see little hope that the rest of Canada would be reasonable and fair. Failure to achieve separation would be seen as a major lost opportunity for sovereignty.

Yet a variety of circumstances, such as a common domestic crisis, might emerge that could provide a small opening. A borderline "yes" vote in any forthcoming referendum

might serve a similar function. Constitutional changes might not have to be too radical. There would have to be some concession to the desire that Quebec be recognized as a distinct society. This is, of course, a highly sensitive and complex issue, but there are undoubtedly ways of accommodating the matter to make it politically acceptable to all sides.<sup>68</sup> Although the constitution would have to acknowledge Native peoples, perhaps as original inhabitants, it could also acknowledge Quebec's francophones as one of the two founding peoples. This would certainly be no panacea, but it could help enable Quebec's francophone political leaders to claim a greater measure of acceptance from the rest of Canada and partially relieve the sense of injustice that was greatly magnified by the failure of the Meech Lake agreement. It seems clear that the rest of Canada would not accept significant, unique powers being awarded to Quebec alone. But granting greater control of some policy areas, while retaining necessary constitutional guarantees for minorities could be given to all provinces. Undoubtedly some concessions to Quebec could be made, while respecting the principal that Quebec not be singled out for special power and privilege on major issues. Already, there has been growing sentiment in favor of decentralization among key sectors of Canadian politics, such as the Reform Party, and budgetary and fiscal restraints have compelled the federal government to undertake substantial retrenchment.

Of course, attempts at constitutional accommodation could fail again. Public opinion in the rest of Canada is not sympathetic to concessions, and provincial leaders would have to display significant leadership. The willingness of both leaders and the electorate to accept change is especially problematic in the West and in Quebec. Although a true sovereigntist, Lucien Bouchard's past flexibility suggests that he might be willing to compromise.<sup>69</sup> His leadership abilities and stature among francophones might enable him to contribute to the development of a more modest compromise than many sovereigntist elites might like, although his maneuvering room would not be great given the strong views of the more separatist wing of the Parti Québécois. Statesmanship on all sides would be the key to a successful outcome. Another possible positive force could be Reform Party leader Preston Manning. However much Quebec's francophones and moderates throughout Canada may disparage him, certain aspects of his positions, such as the need for further decentralization, might open a small window of opportunity at some future point. Having the more extreme parties to the dispute agree on key elements of a settlement could have a significant legitimizing effect, much as the Republican President Richard Nixon's recognition of the People's Republic of China helped calm more militant American political and public opinion. In brief, from an international perspective the caliber of Canada's and Quebec's political leadership class, whether in or out of power, is very high and suggests a greater possibility for successfully managing change than might otherwise be the case.

An accord modifying the Constitution could do a better job of providing acceptable political and economic links to the rest of Canada than the superstructure model advanced by the leaders of the sovereigntist parties.<sup>70</sup> For several reasons, the political superstructure model is probably not workable. The problems of bicomunal structure have already been discussed, especially the absence of any possible coalition shifts. The superstructure model, even if it could be achieved, probably would fail to satisfy the

long-term wishes of Quebec's francophones who want significant ties to the rest of Canada. The key stumbling block to the superstructure plan is that the Canadian government and people probably would reject the idea, despite the shock of a "yes" vote and the grave uncertainties over Canada's future. Given its much larger population the rest of Canada would be unwilling to accept a system of equal voting or probably even weighted voting on key issues.<sup>71</sup> With the clear inevitability of Quebec sovereignty, the country as it exists today will have been destroyed, and the profound incentives to save it that could compel a constitutional compromise would not exist. Some forms of economic and administrative cooperation would be accepted, but they would probably be far below the level of the significant ties proposed by Quebec's nationalist leaders. In the event constitutional revision cannot be achieved, interim structures and mechanisms of coordination would have to be established until more permanent institutions could be agreed upon and implemented. At this point there would be an extraordinary incentive for Quebec to be conciliatory, given, among other things, the fragility of its borders.

If a future referendum vote were negative, the federal government side would have a similarly strong incentive to be conciliatory. Many sovereigntists would have a sense of despair, as hope of independence might seem to some as lost forever. Even though the non-sovereigntist Canadian public would be exhausted and angry, it is important that the more militant nationalists believe that there is some hope of future sovereignty through democratic processes. Calls for a permanent end to the goal of secession seem unwittingly counter-productive as radicals might consider the only alternative to be a violent attack upon the state. It is probable that any future FLQ type of movement would have greater firepower and destructive capacity owing in part to readily available improvements in terrorist technology. Such violence would threaten the democratic governments of both Quebec and Canada.

## **CONCLUSION**

The overlying bicomunal social structures of both Canada and Quebec intensify political conflict and make its resolution more difficult. The psychological impact of one perceived hostile group facilitates polarization, complicates the search for a settlement and increases the risk of violence that becomes uncontrollable. If there is an affirmative vote in any future referendum on the sovereignty of Quebec, the risk of significant levels of violence is far greater than most political leaders and policy analysts may realize. Many observers correctly note the multicultural dimensions to Canadian and Quebec society as well as the overall democratic political culture and history of Canada. What tends to be underrated, however, are the particular dynamics of ethnic and nationalist conflict and the potential for much more intense polarization that make these issues particularly volatile and subject to uncontrollable escalation. Several specific problems, such as the question of Native areas, the break up of the military and the development of a serious partitionist movement within Quebec, greatly increase the risk of violence in the event of an eventual vote for sovereignty. The volatile political emotions and forces unleashed make any outcome highly unpredictable, and there is risk of significant violence as well as the dismemberment of Quebec and break up of the rest of Canada.



It may be of little comfort that domestic commitment to human values and international realities ensure that Quebec will never become another Bosnia. During separation processes the probabilities are that the governments of Canada and Quebec will have to deal with violence that has the potential to fragment each state and guarantee that neither for decades achieves the level of stability and prosperity that its citizens deserve. At the point of any affirmative referendum vote an optimal mechanism that also poses the least risk is surely reform within the present constitutional structure, even though this option may have only a small possibility of success. In any event, the leaders of the two sides have powerful incentives to keep the processes as legitimate as possible in the eyes of both communities and to work jointly to contain violence of whatever type in a manner most likely to prevent a backlash that gets out of control. However angry political elites might have become and however militant minority parties and organizations might sound, all democratic political leaders of Canada and Quebec have powerful incentives to be as low-key and accommodationist as possible. However strong and understandable feelings of rejection and injustice in the respective camps might be, the structural logic of their positions argues strongly for moderation, flexibility and perhaps even reconsideration on all sides.

## **Endnotes**

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1. For further theoretical discussion of bicommunalism, see Ivo D. Duchacek, "Dyadic Federations and Confederations," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-31; and David E. Schmitt, *Bicommunalism: An Interim Conceptual Assessment*, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 30 August 1985. As employed in this article the term "ethnicity" refers to social divisions that can be delineated by language, religion and other cultural differences as well as race.

2. R. S. Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), provides an insightful and relevant analysis, especially in its treatment of Malaysia.

3. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. and Stanley A. Dochanek, *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Country*, 4th ed. (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch, 1986), p. 158.

4. David E. Schmitt, "Problems of Accommodation in Bicommunal Societies," *Conflict Quarterly*, 11 (Fall 1991), pp. 7-18.

5. For background consult Kenneth McRoberts, *English Canada and Quebec: Avoiding the Issue* (North York, ON: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University, 1991); Peter H. Russell, *Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, *State, Society, and the Development of Canadian Federalism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); and Charles Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," in Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, *Options for a New Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 53-56. See also Louis Balthazar, Guy Laforest, and Vincent Lemieux, eds., *Le Québec et la Restructuration du Canada: 1980-1992* (Sillery, PQ: Les Éditions du Septentrion, 1992); and Alain-G. Gagnon and François Rocher, eds., *Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Québec* (Montreal: VLB Éditeur, 1992).
6. For key analyses of bicomunalism in Canada, see Daniel Latouche, "Problems of Constitutional Design in Canada: Quebec and the Issue of Bicomunalism," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18 (Spring 1988), pp. 131-46; Peter M. Leslie, "Bicomunalism and Canadian Constitutional Reform," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18 (Spring 1988), pp. 115-29; and Robert A. Young, *The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada* (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), pp. 52-56.
7. Guy Laforest, *Trudeau et al fin d'un rêve canadien* (Sillery, PQ: Septentrion, 1992), p. 16 and *passim*.
8. On the increased power of these newly recognized groups, see Alan C. Cairns, "The Charter, Interest Groups, Executive Federalism, and Constitutional Reform," in David E. Smith, Peter MacKinnon and John C. Courtney, *After Meech Lake: Lessons for the Future* (Saskatoon, SK: Fifth House Publishers, 1991), pp. 13-31.
9. An important document contributing to the official view of Canada as a multicultural society was Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *Report, The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*, vol. 4 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).
10. Section 27 states that "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."
11. One of the first uses of the concept of dual majorities/minorities was employed by Harold Jackson, *The Two Irelands: A Dual Study of Inter-Groups Tensions* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1971).
12. André D'Allemagne, *Le Colonialism au Québec* (Montreal: Les Éditions R-B, 1966).
13. For a useful analysis, see Marc V. Levine, *The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990). An excellent discussion from a broader historical perspective will also be found in